SUPR3HardenedMain.cpp@ 92270

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1	/* $Id: SUPR3HardenedMain.cpp 87593 2021-02-03 20:21:54Z vboxsync $ */
2	/** @file
3	* VirtualBox Support Library - Hardened main().
4	*/
5
6	/*
7	* Copyright (C) 2006-2020 Oracle Corporation
8	*
9	* This file is part of VirtualBox Open Source Edition (OSE), as
10	* available from http://www.virtualbox.org. This file is free software;
11	* you can redistribute it and/or modify it under the terms of the GNU
12	* General Public License (GPL) as published by the Free Software
13	* Foundation, in version 2 as it comes in the "COPYING" file of the
14	* VirtualBox OSE distribution. VirtualBox OSE is distributed in the
15	* hope that it will be useful, but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY of any kind.
16	*
17	* The contents of this file may alternatively be used under the terms
18	* of the Common Development and Distribution License Version 1.0
19	* (CDDL) only, as it comes in the "COPYING.CDDL" file of the
20	* VirtualBox OSE distribution, in which case the provisions of the
21	* CDDL are applicable instead of those of the GPL.
22	*
23	* You may elect to license modified versions of this file under the
24	* terms and conditions of either the GPL or the CDDL or both.
25	*/
26
27	/** @page pg_hardening %VirtualBox %VM Process Hardening
28	*
29	* The %VM process hardening is to prevent malicious software from using
30	* %VirtualBox as a vehicle to obtain kernel level access.
31	*
32	* The %VirtualBox %VMM requires supervisor (kernel) level access to the CPU.
33	* For both practical and historical reasons, part of the %VMM is realized in
34	* ring-3, with a rich interface to the kernel part. While the device
35	* emulations can be executed exclusively in ring-3, we have performance
36	* optimizations that loads device emulation code into ring-0 and our special
37	* raw-mode execution context (none VT-x/AMD-V mode) for handling frequent
38	* operations a lot more efficiently. These share data between all three
39	* context (ring-3, ring-0 and raw-mode). All this poses a rather broad attack
40	* surface, which the hardening protects.
41	*
42	* The hardening focuses primarily on restricting access to the support driver,
43	* VBoxDrv or vboxdrv depending on the OS, as it is ultimately the link and
44	* instigator of the communication between ring-3 and the ring-0 and raw-mode
45	* contexts. A secondary focus is to make sure malicious code cannot be loaded
46	* and executed in the %VM process. Exactly how we go about this depends a lot
47	* on the host OS.
48	*
49	* @section sec_hardening_supdrv The Support Driver Interfaces
50	*
51	* The support driver has several interfaces thru which it can be accessed:
52	* - /dev/vboxdrv (win: \\Device\\VBoxDrv) for full unrestricted access.
53	* Offers a rich I/O control interface, which needs protecting.
54	* - /dev/vboxdrvu (win: \\Device\\VBoxDrvU) for restricted access, which
55	* VBoxSVC uses to query VT-x and AMD-V capabilities. This does not
56	* require protecting, though we limit it to the vboxgroup on some
57	* systems.
58	* - \\Device\\VBoxDrvStub on Windows for protecting the second stub
59	* process and its child, the %VM process. This is an open+close
60	* interface, only available to partially verified stub processes.
61	* - \\Device\\VBoxDrvErrorInfo on Windows for obtaining detailed error
62	* information on a previous attempt to open \\Device\\VBoxDrv or
63	* \\Device\\VBoxDrvStub. Open, read and close only interface.
64	*
65	* The rest of VBox accesses the device interface thru the support library,
66	* @ref grp_sup "SUPR3" / sup.h.
67	*
68	* The support driver also exposes a set of functions and data that other VBox
69	* ring-0 modules can import from. This includes much of the IPRT we need in
70	* the ring-0 part of the %VMM and device emulations.
71	*
72	* The ring-0 part of the %VMM and device emulations are loaded via the
73	* #SUPR3LoadModule and #SUPR3LoadServiceModule support library function, which
74	* both translates to a sequence of I/O controls against /dev/vboxdrv. On
75	* Windows we use the native kernel loader to load the module, while on the
76	* other systems ring-3 prepares the bits with help from the IPRT loader code.
77	*
78	*
79	* @section sec_hardening_unix Hardening on UNIX-like OSes
80	*
81	* On UNIX-like systems (Solaris, Linux, darwin, freebsd, ...) we put our trust
82	* in root and that root knows what he/she/it is doing.
83	*
84	* We only allow root to get full unrestricted access to the support driver.
85	* The device node corresponding to unrestricted access (/dev/vboxdrv) is own by
86	* root and has a 0600 access mode (i.e. only accessible to the owner, root). In
87	* addition to this file system level restriction, the support driver also
88	* checks that the effective user ID (EUID) is root when it is being opened.
89	*
90	* The %VM processes temporarily assume root privileges using the set-uid-bit on
91	* the executable with root as owner. In fact, all the files and directories we
92	* install are owned by root and the wheel (or equivalent gid = 0) group,
93	* including extension pack files.
94	*
95	* The executable with the set-uid-to-root-bit set is a stub binary that has no
96	* unnecessary library dependencies (only libc, pthreads, dynamic linker) and
97	* simply calls #SUPR3HardenedMain. It does the following:
98	* 1. Validate the VirtualBox installation (#supR3HardenedVerifyAll):
99	* - Check that the executable file of the process is one of the known
100	* VirtualBox executables.
101	* - Check that all mandatory files are present.
102	* - Check that all installed files and directories (both optional and
103	* mandatory ones) are owned by root:wheel and are not writable by
104	* anyone except root.
105	* - Check that all the parent directories, all the way up to the root
106	* if possible, only permits root (or system admin) to change them.
107	* This is that to rule out unintentional rename races.
108	* - On some systems we may also validate the cryptographic signtures
109	* of executable images.
110	*
111	* 2. Open a file descriptor for the support device driver
112	* (#supR3HardenedMainOpenDevice).
113	*
114	* 3. Grab ICMP capabilities for NAT ping support, if required by the OS
115	* (#supR3HardenedMainGrabCapabilites).
116	*
117	* 4. Correctly drop the root privileges
118	* (#supR3HardenedMainDropPrivileges).
119	*
120	* 5. Load the VBoxRT dynamic link library and hand over the file
121	* descriptor to the support library code in it
122	* (#supR3HardenedMainInitRuntime).
123	*
124	* 6. Load the dynamic library containing the actual %VM front end code and
125	* run it (tail of #SUPR3HardenedMain).
126	*
127	* The set-uid-to-root stub executable is paired with a dynamic link library
128	* which export one TrustedMain entry point (see #FNSUPTRUSTEDMAIN) that we
129	* call. In case of error reporting, the library may also export a TrustedError
130	* function (#FNSUPTRUSTEDERROR).
131	*
132	* That the set-uid-to-root-bit modifies the dynamic linker behavior on all
133	* systems, even after we've dropped back to the real user ID, is something we
134	* take advantage of. The dynamic linkers takes special care to prevent users
135	* from using clever tricks to inject their own code into set-uid processes and
136	* causing privilege escalation issues. This is the exact help we need.
137	*
138	* The VirtualBox installation location is hardcoded, which means the any
139	* dynamic linker paths embedded or inferred from the executable and dynamic
140	* libraries are also hardcoded. This helps eliminating search path attack
141	* vectors at the cost of being inflexible regarding installation location.
142	*
143	* In addition to what the dynamic linker does for us, the VirtualBox code will
144	* not directly be calling either RTLdrLoad or dlopen to load dynamic link
145	* libraries into the process. Instead it will call #SUPR3HardenedLdrLoad,
146	* #SUPR3HardenedLdrLoadAppPriv and #SUPR3HardenedLdrLoadPlugIn to do the
147	* loading. These functions will perform the same validations on the file being
148	* loaded as #SUPR3HardenedMain did in its validation step. So, anything we
149	* load must be installed with root/wheel as owner/group, the directory we load
150	* it from must also be owned by root:wheel and now allow for renaming the file.
151	* Similar ownership restrictions applies to all the parent directories (except
152	* on darwin).
153	*
154	* So, we place the responsibility of not installing malicious software on the
155	* root user on UNIX-like systems. Which is fair enough, in our opinion.
156	*
157	*
158	* @section sec_hardening_win Hardening on Windows
159	*
160	* On Windows we cannot put the same level or trust in the Administrator user(s)
161	* (equivalent of root/wheel on unix) as on the UNIX-like systems, which
162	* complicates things greatly.
163	*
164	* Some of the blame for this can be given to Windows being a descendant /
165	* replacement for a set of single user systems: DOS, Windows 1.0-3.11 Windows
166	* 95-ME, and OS/2. Users of NT 3.1 and later was inclined to want to always
167	* run it with full root/administrator privileges like they had done on the
168	* predecessors, while Microsoft didn't provide much incentive for more secure
169	* alternatives. Bad idea, security wise, but execellent for the security
170	* software industry. For this reason using a set-uid-to-root approach is
171	* pointless, even if Windows had one.
172	*
173	* So, in order to protect access to the support driver and protect the %VM
174	* process while it's running we have to do a lot more work. A keystone in the
175	* defences is cryptographic code signing. Here's the short version of what we
176	* do:
177	* - Minimal stub executable, signed with the same certificate as the
178	* kernel driver.
179	*
180	* - The stub executable respawns itself twice, hooking the NTDLL init
181	* routine to perform protection tasks as early as possible. The parent
182	* stub helps keep in the child clean for verification as does the
183	* support driver.
184	*
185	* - In order to protect against loading unwanted code into the process,
186	* the stub processes installs DLL load hooks with NTDLL as well as
187	* directly intercepting the LdrLoadDll and NtCreateSection APIs.
188	*
189	* - The support driver will verify all but the initial process very
190	* thoroughly before allowing them protection and in the final case full
191	* unrestricted access.
192	*
193	*
194	* @subsection sec_hardening_win_protsoft 3rd Party "Protection" Software
195	*
196	* What makes our life REALLY difficult on Windows is this 3rd party "security"
197	* software which is more or less required to keep a Windows system safe for
198	* normal users and all corporate IT departments rightly insists on installing.
199	* After the kernel patching clampdown in Vista, anti-* software has to do a
200	* lot more mucking about in user mode to get their job (kind of) done. So, it
201	* is common practice to patch a lot of NTDLL, KERNEL32, the executable import
202	* table, load extra DLLs into the process, allocate executable memory in the
203	* process (classic code injection) and more.
204	*
205	* The BIG problem with all this is that it is indistinguishable from what
206	* malicious software would be doing in order to intercept process activity
207	* (network sniffing, maybe password snooping) or gain a level of kernel access
208	* via the support driver. So, the "protection" software is what is currently
209	* forcing us to do the pre-NTDLL initialization.
210	*
211	*
212	* @subsection sec_hardening_win_1st_stub The Initial Stub Process
213	*
214	* We share the stub executable approach with the UNIX-like systems, so there's
215	* the #SUPR3HardenedMain calling stub executable with its partner DLL exporting
216	* TrustedMain and TrustedError. However, the stub executable does a lot more,
217	* while doing it in a more bare metal fashion:
218	* - It does not use the Microsoft CRT, what we need of CRT functions comes
219	* from IPRT.
220	* - It does not statically import anything. This is to avoid having an
221	* import table that can be patched to intercept our calls or extended to
222	* load additional DLLs.
223	* - Direct NT system calls. System calls normally going thru NTDLL, but
224	* since there is so much software out there which wants to patch known
225	* NTDLL entry points to control our software (either for good or
226	* malicious reasons), we do it ourselves.
227	*
228	* The initial stub process is not really to be trusted, though we try our best
229	* to limit potential harm (user mode debugger checks, disable thread creation).
230	* So, when it enters #SUPR3HardenedMain we only call #supR3HardenedVerifyAll to
231	* verify the installation (known executables and DLLs, checking their code
232	* signing signatures, keeping them all open to deny deletion and replacing) and
233	* does a respawn via #supR3HardenedWinReSpawn.
234	*
235	*
236	* @subsection sec_hardening_win_2nd_stub The Second Stub Process
237	*
238	* The second stub process will be created in suspended state, i.e. the main
239	* thread is suspended before it executes a single instruction. It is also
240	* created with a less generous ACLs, though this doesn't protect us from admin
241	* users. In order for #SUPR3HardenedMain to figure that it is the second stub
242	* process, the zeroth command line argument has been replaced by a known magic
243	* string (UUID).
244	*
245	* Now, before the process starts executing, the parent (initial stub) will
246	* patch the LdrInitializeThunk entry point in NTDLL to call
247	* #supR3HardenedEarlyProcessInit via #supR3HardenedEarlyProcessInitThunk. The
248	* parent will also plant some synchronization stuff via #g_ProcParams (NTDLL
249	* location, inherited event handles and associated ping-pong equipment).
250	*
251	* The LdrInitializeThunk entry point of NTDLL is where the kernel sets up
252	* process execution to start executing (via a user alert, so it is not subject
253	* to SetThreadContext). LdrInitializeThunk performs process, NTDLL and
254	* sub-system client (kernel32) initialization. A lot of "protection" software
255	* uses triggers in this initialization sequence (like the KERNEL32.DLL load
256	* event), so we avoid quite a bit of problems by getting our stuff done early
257	* on.
258	*
259	* However, there are also those that uses events that triggers immediately when
260	* the process is created or/and starts executing the first instruction. But we
261	* can easily counter these as we have a known process state we can restore. So,
262	* the first thing that #supR3HardenedEarlyProcessInit does is to signal the
263	* parent to perform a child purification, so the potentially evil influences
264	* can be exorcised.
265	*
266	* What the parent does during the purification is very similar to what the
267	* kernel driver will do later on when verifying the second stub and the %VM
268	* processes, except that instead of failing when encountering an shortcoming it
269	* will take corrective actions:
270	* - Executable memory regions not belonging to a DLL mapping will be
271	* attempted freed, and we'll only fail if we can't evict them.
272	* - All pages in the executable images in the process (should be just the
273	* stub executable and NTDLL) will be compared to the pristine fixed-up
274	* copy prepared by the IPRT PE loader code, restoring any bytes which
275	* appears differently in the child. (#g_ProcParams is exempted,
276	* LdrInitializeThunk is set to call NtTerminateThread.)
277	* - Unwanted DLLs will be unloaded (we have a set of DLLs we like).
278	*
279	* Before signalling the second stub process that it has been purified and should
280	* get on with it, the parent will close all handles with unrestricted access to
281	* the process and thread so that the initial stub process no longer can
282	* influence the child in any really harmful way. (The caller of CreateProcess
283	* usually receives handles with unrestricted access to the child process and
284	* its main thread. These could in theory be used with DuplicateHandle or
285	* WriteProcessMemory to get at the %VM process if we're not careful.)
286	*
287	* #supR3HardenedEarlyProcessInit will continue with opening the log file
288	* (requires command line parsing). It will continue to initialize a bunch of
289	* global variables, system calls and trustworthy/harmless NTDLL imports.
290	* #supR3HardenedWinInit is then called to setup image verification, that is:
291	* - Hook the NtCreateSection entry point in NTDLL so we can check all
292	* executable mappings before they're created and can be mapped. The
293	* NtCreateSection code jumps to #supR3HardenedMonitor_NtCreateSection.
294	* - Hook (ditto) the LdrLoadDll entry point in NTDLL so we can
295	* pre-validate all images that gets loaded the normal way (partly
296	* because the NtCreateSection context is restrictive because the NTDLL
297	* loader lock is usually held, which prevents us from safely calling
298	* WinVerityTrust). The LdrLoadDll code jumps to
299	* #supR3HardenedMonitor_LdrLoadDll.
300	*
301	* The image/DLL verification hooks are at this point able to verify DLLs
302	* containing embedded code signing signatures, and will restrict the locations
303	* from which DLLs will be loaded. When #SUPR3HardenedMain gets going later on,
304	* they will start insisting on everything having valid signatures, either
305	* embedded or in a signed installer catalog file.
306	*
307	* The function also irrevocably disables debug notifications related to the
308	* current thread, just to make attaching a debugging that much more difficult
309	* and less useful.
310	*
311	* Now, the second stub process will open the so called stub device
312	* (\\Device\\VBoxDrvStub), that is a special support driver device node that
313	* tells the support driver to:
314	* - Protect the process against the OpenProcess and OpenThread attack
315	* vectors by stripping risky access rights.
316	* - Check that the process isn't being debugged.
317	* - Check that the process contains exactly one thread.
318	* - Check that the process doesn't have any unknown DLLs loaded into it.
319	* - Check that the process doesn't have any executable memory (other than
320	* DLL sections) in it.
321	* - Check that the process executable is a known VBox executable which may
322	* access the support driver.
323	* - Check that the process executable is signed with the same code signing
324	* certificate as the driver and that the on disk image is valid
325	* according to its embedded signature.
326	* - Check all the signature of all DLLs in the process (NTDLL) if they are
327	* signed, and only accept unsigned ones in versions where they are known
328	* not to be signed.
329	* - Check that the code and readonly parts of the executable and DLLs
330	* mapped into the process matches the on disk content (no patches other
331	* than our own two in NTDLL are allowed).
332	*
333	* Once granted access to the stub device, #supR3HardenedEarlyProcessInit will
334	* restore the LdrInitializeThunk code and let the process perform normal
335	* initialization. Leading us to #SUPR3HardenedMain where we detect that this
336	* is the 2nd stub process and does another respawn.
337	*
338	*
339	* @subsection sec_hardening_win_3rd_stub The Final Stub / VM Process
340	*
341	* The third stub process is what becomes the %VM process. Because the parent
342	* has opened \\Device\\VBoxDrvSub, it is protected from malicious OpenProcess &
343	* OpenThread calls from the moment of inception, practically speaking.
344	*
345	* It goes thru the same suspended creation, patching, purification and such as
346	* its parent (the second stub process). However, instead of opening
347	* \\Device\\VBoxDrvStub from #supR3HardenedEarlyProcessInit, it opens the
348	* support driver for full unrestricted access, i.e. \\Device\\VBoxDrv.
349	*
350	* The support driver will perform the same checks as it did when
351	* \\Device\\VBoxDrvStub was opened, but in addition it will:
352	* - Check that the process is the first child of a process that opened
353	* \\Device\\VBoxDrvStub.
354	* - Check that the parent process is still alive.
355	* - Scan all open handles in the system for potentially harmful ones to
356	* the process or the primary thread.
357	*
358	* Knowing that the process is genuinly signed with the same certificate as the
359	* kernel driver, and the exectuable code in the process is either shipped by us
360	* or Microsoft, the support driver will trust it with full access and to keep
361	* the handle secure.
362	*
363	* We also trust the protection the support driver gives the process to keep out
364	* malicious ring-3 code, and therefore any code, patching or other mysterious
365	* stuff that enteres the process must be from kernel mode and that we can trust
366	* it (the alternative interpretation is that the kernel has been breanched
367	* already, which isn't our responsibility). This means that, the anti-software
368	* products can do whatever they like from this point on. However, should they
369	* do unrevertable changes to the process before this point, VirtualBox won't
370	* work.
371	*
372	* As in the second stub process, we'll now do normal process initialization and
373	* #SUPR3HardenedMain will take control. It will detect that it is being called
374	* by the 3rd stub process because of a different magic string starting the
375	* command line, and not respawn itself any more. #SUPR3HardenedMain will
376	* recheck the VirtualBox installation, keeping all known files open just like
377	* in two previous stub processes.
378	*
379	* It will then load the Windows cryptographic API and load the trusted root
380	* certificates from the Windows store. The API enables using installation
381	* catalog files for signature checking as well as providing a second
382	* verification in addition to our own implementation (IPRT). The certificates
383	* allows our signature validation implementation to validate all embedded
384	* signatures, not just the microsoft ones and the one signed by our own
385	* certificate.
386	*
387	*/
388
389
390	/*********************************************************************************************************************************
391	* Header Files *
392	*********************************************************************************************************************************/
393	#if defined(RT_OS_OS2)
394	# define INCL_BASE
395	# define INCL_ERRORS
396	# include <os2.h>
397	# include <stdio.h>
398	# include <stdlib.h>
399	# include <dlfcn.h>
400	# include <unistd.h>
401
402	#elif RT_OS_WINDOWS
403	# include <iprt/nt/nt-and-windows.h>
404
405	#else /* UNIXes */
406	# ifdef RT_OS_DARWIN
407	# define _POSIX_C_SOURCE 1 /* pick the correct prototype for unsetenv. */
408	# endif
409	# include <iprt/types.h> /* stdint fun on darwin. */
410
411	# include <stdio.h>
412	# include <stdlib.h>
413	# include <dlfcn.h>
414	# include <limits.h>
415	# include <errno.h>
416	# include <unistd.h>
417	# include <sys/stat.h>
418	# include <sys/time.h>
419	# include <sys/types.h>
420	# if defined(RT_OS_LINUX)
421	# undef USE_LIB_PCAP /* don't depend on libcap as we had to depend on either
422	libcap1 or libcap2 */
423
424	# undef _POSIX_SOURCE
425	# include <linux/types.h> /* sys/capabilities from uek-headers require this */
426	# include <sys/capability.h>
427	# include <sys/prctl.h>
428	# ifndef CAP_TO_MASK
429	# define CAP_TO_MASK(cap) RT_BIT(cap)
430	# endif
431	# elif defined(RT_OS_FREEBSD)
432	# include <sys/param.h>
433	# include <sys/sysctl.h>
434	# elif defined(RT_OS_SOLARIS)
435	# include <priv.h>
436	# endif
437	# include <pwd.h>
438	# ifdef RT_OS_DARWIN
439	# include <mach-o/dyld.h>
440	# endif
441
442	#endif
443
444	#include <VBox/sup.h>
445	#include <VBox/err.h>
446	#ifdef RT_OS_WINDOWS
447	# include <VBox/version.h>
448	# include <iprt/utf16.h>
449	#endif
450	#include <iprt/ctype.h>
451	#include <iprt/string.h>
452	#include <iprt/initterm.h>
453	#include <iprt/param.h>
454	#include <iprt/path.h>
455
456	#include "SUPLibInternal.h"
457
458
459	/*********************************************************************************************************************************
460	* Defined Constants And Macros *
461	*********************************************************************************************************************************/
462	/* This mess is temporary after eliminating a define duplicated in SUPLibInternal.h. */
463	#if !defined(RT_OS_OS2) && !defined(RT_OS_WINDOWS) && !defined(RT_OS_L4)
464	# ifndef SUP_HARDENED_SUID
465	# error "SUP_HARDENED_SUID is NOT defined?!?"
466	# endif
467	#else
468	# ifdef SUP_HARDENED_SUID
469	# error "SUP_HARDENED_SUID is defined?!?"
470	# endif
471	#endif
472
473	/** @def SUP_HARDENED_SYM
474	* Decorate a symbol that's resolved dynamically.
475	*/
476	#ifdef RT_OS_OS2
477	# define SUP_HARDENED_SYM(sym) "_" sym
478	#else
479	# define SUP_HARDENED_SYM(sym) sym
480	#endif
481
482
483	/*********************************************************************************************************************************
484	* Structures and Typedefs *
485	*********************************************************************************************************************************/
486	/** @see RTR3InitEx */
487	typedef DECLCALLBACKTYPE(int, FNRTR3INITEX,(uint32_t iVersion, uint32_t fFlags, int cArgs,
488	char *papszArgs, const char pszProgramPath));
489	typedef FNRTR3INITEX *PFNRTR3INITEX;
490
491	/** @see RTLogRelPrintf */
492	typedef DECLCALLBACKTYPE(void, FNRTLOGRELPRINTF,(const char *pszFormat, ...));
493	typedef FNRTLOGRELPRINTF *PFNRTLOGRELPRINTF;
494
495
496	/**
497	* Descriptor of an environment variable to purge.
498	*/
499	typedef struct SUPENVPURGEDESC
500	{
501	/** Name of the environment variable to purge. */
502	const char *pszEnv;
503	/** The length of the variable name. */
504	uint8_t cchEnv;
505	/** Flag whether a failure in purging the variable leads to
506	* a fatal error resulting in an process exit. */
507	bool fPurgeErrFatal;
508	} SUPENVPURGEDESC;
509	/** Pointer to a environment variable purge descriptor. */
510	typedef SUPENVPURGEDESC *PSUPENVPURGEDESC;
511	/** Pointer to a const environment variable purge descriptor. */
512	typedef const SUPENVPURGEDESC *PCSUPENVPURGEDESC;
513
514	/**
515	* Descriptor of an command line argument to purge.
516	*/
517	typedef struct SUPARGPURGEDESC
518	{
519	/** Name of the argument to purge. */
520	const char *pszArg;
521	/** The length of the argument name. */
522	uint8_t cchArg;
523	/** Flag whether the argument is followed by an extra argument
524	* which must be purged too */
525	bool fTakesValue;
526	} SUPARGPURGEDESC;
527	/** Pointer to a environment variable purge descriptor. */
528	typedef SUPARGPURGEDESC *PSUPARGPURGEDESC;
529	/** Pointer to a const environment variable purge descriptor. */
530	typedef const SUPARGPURGEDESC *PCSUPARGPURGEDESC;
531
532
533	/*********************************************************************************************************************************
534	* Global Variables *
535	*********************************************************************************************************************************/
536	/** The pre-init data we pass on to SUPR3 (residing in VBoxRT). */
537	static SUPPREINITDATA g_SupPreInitData;
538	/** The program executable path. */
539	#ifndef RT_OS_WINDOWS
540	static
541	#endif
542	char g_szSupLibHardenedExePath[RTPATH_MAX];
543	/** The application bin directory path. */
544	static char g_szSupLibHardenedAppBinPath[RTPATH_MAX];
545	/** The offset into g_szSupLibHardenedExePath of the executable name. */
546	static size_t g_offSupLibHardenedExecName;
547	/** The length of the executable name in g_szSupLibHardenedExePath. */
548	static size_t g_cchSupLibHardenedExecName;
549
550	/** The program name. */
551	static const char *g_pszSupLibHardenedProgName;
552	/** The flags passed to SUPR3HardenedMain. */
553	static uint32_t g_fSupHardenedMain;
554
555	#ifdef SUP_HARDENED_SUID
556	/** The real UID at startup. */
557	static uid_t g_uid;
558	/** The real GID at startup. */
559	static gid_t g_gid;
560	# ifdef RT_OS_LINUX
561	static uint32_t g_uCaps;
562	static uint32_t g_uCapsVersion;
563	# endif
564	#endif
565
566	/** The startup log file. */
567	#ifdef RT_OS_WINDOWS
568	static HANDLE g_hStartupLog = NULL;
569	#else
570	static int g_hStartupLog = -1;
571	#endif
572	/** The number of bytes we've written to the startup log. */
573	static uint32_t volatile g_cbStartupLog = 0;
574
575	/** The current SUPR3HardenedMain state / location. */
576	SUPR3HARDENEDMAINSTATE g_enmSupR3HardenedMainState = SUPR3HARDENEDMAINSTATE_NOT_YET_CALLED;
577	AssertCompileSize(g_enmSupR3HardenedMainState, sizeof(uint32_t));
578
579	#ifdef RT_OS_WINDOWS
580	/** Pointer to VBoxRT's RTLogRelPrintf function so we can write errors to the
581	* release log at runtime. */
582	static PFNRTLOGRELPRINTF g_pfnRTLogRelPrintf = NULL;
583	/** Log volume name (for attempting volume flush). */
584	static RTUTF16 g_wszStartupLogVol[16];
585	#endif
586
587	/** Environment variables to purge from the process because
588	* they are known to be harmful. */
589	static const SUPENVPURGEDESC g_aSupEnvPurgeDescs[] =
590	{
591	/* pszEnv fPurgeErrFatal */
592	/* Qt related environment variables: */
593	{ RT_STR_TUPLE("QT_QPA_PLATFORM_PLUGIN_PATH"), true },
594	{ RT_STR_TUPLE("QT_PLUGIN_PATH"), true },
595	/* ALSA related environment variables: */
596	{ RT_STR_TUPLE("ALSA_MIXER_SIMPLE_MODULES"), true },
597	{ RT_STR_TUPLE("LADSPA_PATH"), true },
598	};
599
600	/** Arguments to purge from the argument vector because
601	* they are known to be harmful. */
602	static const SUPARGPURGEDESC g_aSupArgPurgeDescs[] =
603	{
604	/* pszArg fTakesValue */
605	/* Qt related environment variables: */
606	{ RT_STR_TUPLE("-platformpluginpath"), true },
607	};
608
609
610	/*********************************************************************************************************************************
611	* Internal Functions *
612	*********************************************************************************************************************************/
613	#ifdef SUP_HARDENED_SUID
614	static void supR3HardenedMainDropPrivileges(void);
615	#endif
616	static PFNSUPTRUSTEDERROR supR3HardenedMainGetTrustedError(const char *pszProgName);
617
618
619	/**
620	* Safely copy one or more strings into the given buffer.
621	*
622	* @returns VINF_SUCCESS or VERR_BUFFER_OVERFLOW.
623	* @param pszDst The destionation buffer.
624	* @param cbDst The size of the destination buffer.
625	* @param ... One or more zero terminated strings, ending with
626	* a NULL.
627	*/
628	static int suplibHardenedStrCopyEx(char *pszDst, size_t cbDst, ...)
629	{
630	int rc = VINF_SUCCESS;
631
632	if (cbDst == 0)
633	return VERR_BUFFER_OVERFLOW;
634
635	va_list va;
636	va_start(va, cbDst);
637	for (;;)
638	{
639	const char pszSrc = va_arg(va, const char );
640	if (!pszSrc)
641	break;
642
643	size_t cchSrc = suplibHardenedStrLen(pszSrc);
644	if (cchSrc < cbDst)
645	{
646	suplibHardenedMemCopy(pszDst, pszSrc, cchSrc);
647	pszDst += cchSrc;
648	cbDst -= cchSrc;
649	}
650	else
651	{
652	rc = VERR_BUFFER_OVERFLOW;
653	if (cbDst > 1)
654	{
655	suplibHardenedMemCopy(pszDst, pszSrc, cbDst - 1);
656	pszDst += cbDst - 1;
657	cbDst = 1;
658	}
659	}
660	*pszDst = '\0';
661	}
662	va_end(va);
663
664	return rc;
665	}
666
667
668	/**
669	* Exit current process in the quickest possible fashion.
670	*
671	* @param rcExit The exit code.
672	*/
673	DECLHIDDEN(DECL_NO_RETURN(void)) suplibHardenedExit(RTEXITCODE rcExit)
674	{
675	for (;;)
676	{
677	#ifdef RT_OS_WINDOWS
678	if (g_enmSupR3HardenedMainState >= SUPR3HARDENEDMAINSTATE_WIN_IMPORTS_RESOLVED)
679	ExitProcess(rcExit);
680	if (RtlExitUserProcess != NULL)
681	RtlExitUserProcess(rcExit);
682	NtTerminateProcess(NtCurrentProcess(), rcExit);
683	#else
684	_Exit(rcExit);
685	#endif
686	}
687	}
688
689
690	/**
691	* Writes a substring to standard error.
692	*
693	* @param pch The start of the substring.
694	* @param cch The length of the substring.
695	*/
696	static void suplibHardenedPrintStrN(const char *pch, size_t cch)
697	{
698	#ifdef RT_OS_WINDOWS
699	HANDLE hStdOut = NtCurrentPeb()->ProcessParameters->StandardOutput;
700	if (hStdOut != NULL)
701	{
702	if (g_enmSupR3HardenedMainState >= SUPR3HARDENEDMAINSTATE_WIN_IMPORTS_RESOLVED)
703	{
704	DWORD cbWritten;
705	WriteFile(hStdOut, pch, (DWORD)cch, &cbWritten, NULL);
706	}
707	/* Windows 7 and earlier uses fake handles, with the last two bits set ((hStdOut & 3) == 3). */
708	else if (NtWriteFile != NULL && ((uintptr_t)hStdOut & 3) == 0)
709	{
710	IO_STATUS_BLOCK Ios = RTNT_IO_STATUS_BLOCK_INITIALIZER;
711	NtWriteFile(hStdOut, NULL /Event/, NULL /ApcRoutine/, NULL /ApcContext/,
712	&Ios, (PVOID)pch, (ULONG)cch, NULL /ByteOffset/, NULL /Key/);
713	}
714	}
715	#else
716	int res = write(2, pch, cch);
717	NOREF(res);
718	#endif
719	}
720
721
722	/**
723	* Writes a string to standard error.
724	*
725	* @param psz The string.
726	*/
727	static void suplibHardenedPrintStr(const char *psz)
728	{
729	suplibHardenedPrintStrN(psz, suplibHardenedStrLen(psz));
730	}
731
732
733	/**
734	* Writes a char to standard error.
735	*
736	* @param ch The character value to write.
737	*/
738	static void suplibHardenedPrintChr(char ch)
739	{
740	suplibHardenedPrintStrN(&ch, 1);
741	}
742
743	#ifndef IPRT_NO_CRT
744
745	/**
746	* Writes a decimal number to stdard error.
747	*
748	* @param uValue The value.
749	*/
750	static void suplibHardenedPrintDecimal(uint64_t uValue)
751	{
752	char szBuf[64];
753	char *pszEnd = &szBuf[sizeof(szBuf) - 1];
754	char *psz = pszEnd;
755
756	*psz-- = '\0';
757
758	do
759	{
760	*psz-- = '0' + (uValue % 10);
761	uValue /= 10;
762	} while (uValue > 0);
763
764	psz++;
765	suplibHardenedPrintStrN(psz, pszEnd - psz);
766	}
767
768
769	/**
770	* Writes a hexadecimal or octal number to standard error.
771	*
772	* @param uValue The value.
773	* @param uBase The base (16 or 8).
774	* @param fFlags Format flags.
775	*/
776	static void suplibHardenedPrintHexOctal(uint64_t uValue, unsigned uBase, uint32_t fFlags)
777	{
778	static char const s_achDigitsLower[17] = "0123456789abcdef";
779	static char const s_achDigitsUpper[17] = "0123456789ABCDEF";
780	const char *pchDigits = !(fFlags & RTSTR_F_CAPITAL) ? s_achDigitsLower : s_achDigitsUpper;
781	unsigned cShift = uBase == 16 ? 4 : 3;
782	unsigned fDigitMask = uBase == 16 ? 0xf : 7;
783	char szBuf[64];
784	char *pszEnd = &szBuf[sizeof(szBuf) - 1];
785	char *psz = pszEnd;
786
787	*psz-- = '\0';
788
789	do
790	{
791	*psz-- = pchDigits[uValue & fDigitMask];
792	uValue >>= cShift;
793	} while (uValue > 0);
794
795	if ((fFlags & RTSTR_F_SPECIAL) && uBase == 16)
796	{
797	*psz-- = !(fFlags & RTSTR_F_CAPITAL) ? 'x' : 'X';
798	*psz-- = '0';
799	}
800
801	psz++;
802	suplibHardenedPrintStrN(psz, pszEnd - psz);
803	}
804
805
806	/**
807	* Writes a wide character string to standard error.
808	*
809	* @param pwsz The string.
810	*/
811	static void suplibHardenedPrintWideStr(PCRTUTF16 pwsz)
812	{
813	for (;;)
814	{
815	RTUTF16 wc = *pwsz++;
816	if (!wc)
817	return;
818	if ( (wc < 0x7f && wc >= 0x20)
819	\|\| wc == '\n'
820	\|\| wc == '\r')
821	suplibHardenedPrintChr((char)wc);
822	else
823	{
824	suplibHardenedPrintStrN(RT_STR_TUPLE("\\x"));
825	suplibHardenedPrintHexOctal(wc, 16, 0);
826	}
827	}
828	}
829
830	#else /* IPRT_NO_CRT */
831
832	/** Buffer structure used by suplibHardenedOutput. */
833	struct SUPLIBHARDENEDOUTPUTBUF
834	{
835	size_t off;
836	char szBuf[2048];
837	};
838
839	/** Callback for RTStrFormatV, see FNRTSTROUTPUT. */
840	static DECLCALLBACK(size_t) suplibHardenedOutput(void pvArg, const char pachChars, size_t cbChars)
841	{
842	SUPLIBHARDENEDOUTPUTBUF pBuf = (SUPLIBHARDENEDOUTPUTBUF )pvArg;
843	size_t cbTodo = cbChars;
844	for (;;)
845	{
846	size_t cbSpace = sizeof(pBuf->szBuf) - pBuf->off - 1;
847
848	/* Flush the buffer? */
849	if ( cbSpace == 0
850	\|\| (cbTodo == 0 && pBuf->off))
851	{
852	suplibHardenedPrintStrN(pBuf->szBuf, pBuf->off);
853	# ifdef RT_OS_WINDOWS
854	if (g_enmSupR3HardenedMainState >= SUPR3HARDENEDMAINSTATE_WIN_IMPORTS_RESOLVED)
855	OutputDebugString(pBuf->szBuf);
856	# endif
857	pBuf->off = 0;
858	cbSpace = sizeof(pBuf->szBuf) - 1;
859	}
860
861	/* Copy the string into the buffer. */
862	if (cbTodo == 1)
863	{
864	pBuf->szBuf[pBuf->off++] = *pachChars;
865	break;
866	}
867	if (cbSpace >= cbTodo)
868	{
869	memcpy(&pBuf->szBuf[pBuf->off], pachChars, cbTodo);
870	pBuf->off += cbTodo;
871	break;
872	}
873	memcpy(&pBuf->szBuf[pBuf->off], pachChars, cbSpace);
874	pBuf->off += cbSpace;
875	cbTodo -= cbSpace;
876	}
877	pBuf->szBuf[pBuf->off] = '\0';
878
879	return cbChars;
880	}
881
882	#endif /* IPRT_NO_CRT */
883
884	/**
885	* Simple printf to standard error.
886	*
887	* @param pszFormat The format string.
888	* @param va Arguments to format.
889	*/
890	DECLHIDDEN(void) suplibHardenedPrintFV(const char *pszFormat, va_list va)
891	{
892	#ifdef IPRT_NO_CRT
893	/*
894	* Use buffered output here to avoid character mixing on the windows
895	* console and to enable us to use OutputDebugString.
896	*/
897	SUPLIBHARDENEDOUTPUTBUF Buf;
898	Buf.off = 0;
899	Buf.szBuf[0] = '\0';
900	RTStrFormatV(suplibHardenedOutput, &Buf, NULL, NULL, pszFormat, va);
901
902	#else /* !IPRT_NO_CRT */
903	/*
904	* Format loop.
905	*/
906	char ch;
907	const char *pszLast = pszFormat;
908	for (;;)
909	{
910	ch = *pszFormat;
911	if (!ch)
912	break;
913	pszFormat++;
914
915	if (ch == '%')
916	{
917	/*
918	* Format argument.
919	*/
920
921	/* Flush unwritten bits. */
922	if (pszLast != pszFormat - 1)
923	suplibHardenedPrintStrN(pszLast, pszFormat - pszLast - 1);
924	pszLast = pszFormat;
925	ch = *pszFormat++;
926
927	/* flags. */
928	uint32_t fFlags = 0;
929	for (;;)
930	{
931	if (ch == '#') fFlags \|= RTSTR_F_SPECIAL;
932	else if (ch == '-') fFlags \|= RTSTR_F_LEFT;
933	else if (ch == '+') fFlags \|= RTSTR_F_PLUS;
934	else if (ch == ' ') fFlags \|= RTSTR_F_BLANK;
935	else if (ch == '0') fFlags \|= RTSTR_F_ZEROPAD;
936	else if (ch == '\'') fFlags \|= RTSTR_F_THOUSAND_SEP;
937	else break;
938	ch = *pszFormat++;
939	}
940
941	/* Width and precision - ignored. */
942	while (RT_C_IS_DIGIT(ch))
943	ch = *pszFormat++;
944	if (ch == '*')
945	va_arg(va, int);
946	if (ch == '.')
947	{
948	do ch = *pszFormat++;
949	while (RT_C_IS_DIGIT(ch));
950	if (ch == '*')
951	va_arg(va, int);
952	}
953
954	/* Size. */
955	char chArgSize = 0;
956	switch (ch)
957	{
958	case 'z':
959	case 'L':
960	case 'j':
961	case 't':
962	chArgSize = ch;
963	ch = *pszFormat++;
964	break;
965
966	case 'l':
967	chArgSize = ch;
968	ch = *pszFormat++;
969	if (ch == 'l')
970	{
971	chArgSize = 'L';
972	ch = *pszFormat++;
973	}
974	break;
975
976	case 'h':
977	chArgSize = ch;
978	ch = *pszFormat++;
979	if (ch == 'h')
980	{
981	chArgSize = 'H';
982	ch = *pszFormat++;
983	}
984	break;
985	}
986
987	/*
988	* Do type specific formatting.
989	*/
990	switch (ch)
991	{
992	case 'c':
993	ch = (char)va_arg(va, int);
994	suplibHardenedPrintChr(ch);
995	break;
996
997	case 's':
998	if (chArgSize == 'l')
999	{
1000	PCRTUTF16 pwszStr = va_arg(va, PCRTUTF16 );
1001	if (RT_VALID_PTR(pwszStr))
1002	suplibHardenedPrintWideStr(pwszStr);
1003	else
1004	suplibHardenedPrintStr("<NULL>");
1005	}
1006	else
1007	{
1008	const char pszStr = va_arg(va, const char );
1009	if (!RT_VALID_PTR(pszStr))
1010	pszStr = "<NULL>";
1011	suplibHardenedPrintStr(pszStr);
1012	}
1013	break;
1014
1015	case 'd':
1016	case 'i':
1017	{
1018	int64_t iValue;
1019	if (chArgSize == 'L' \|\| chArgSize == 'j')
1020	iValue = va_arg(va, int64_t);
1021	else if (chArgSize == 'l')
1022	iValue = va_arg(va, signed long);
1023	else if (chArgSize == 'z' \|\| chArgSize == 't')
1024	iValue = va_arg(va, intptr_t);
1025	else
1026	iValue = va_arg(va, signed int);
1027	if (iValue < 0)
1028	{
1029	suplibHardenedPrintChr('-');
1030	iValue = -iValue;
1031	}
1032	suplibHardenedPrintDecimal(iValue);
1033	break;
1034	}
1035
1036	case 'p':
1037	case 'x':
1038	case 'X':
1039	case 'u':
1040	case 'o':
1041	{
1042	unsigned uBase = 10;
1043	uint64_t uValue;
1044
1045	switch (ch)
1046	{
1047	case 'p':
1048	fFlags \|= RTSTR_F_ZEROPAD; /* Note not standard behaviour (but I like it this way!) */
1049	uBase = 16;
1050	break;
1051	case 'X':
1052	fFlags \|= RTSTR_F_CAPITAL;
1053	RT_FALL_THRU();
1054	case 'x':
1055	uBase = 16;
1056	break;
1057	case 'u':
1058	uBase = 10;
1059	break;
1060	case 'o':
1061	uBase = 8;
1062	break;
1063	}
1064
1065	if (ch == 'p' \|\| chArgSize == 'z' \|\| chArgSize == 't')
1066	uValue = va_arg(va, uintptr_t);
1067	else if (chArgSize == 'L' \|\| chArgSize == 'j')
1068	uValue = va_arg(va, uint64_t);
1069	else if (chArgSize == 'l')
1070	uValue = va_arg(va, unsigned long);
1071	else
1072	uValue = va_arg(va, unsigned int);
1073
1074	if (uBase == 10)
1075	suplibHardenedPrintDecimal(uValue);
1076	else
1077	suplibHardenedPrintHexOctal(uValue, uBase, fFlags);
1078	break;
1079	}
1080
1081	case 'R':
1082	if (pszFormat[0] == 'r' && pszFormat[1] == 'c')
1083	{
1084	int iValue = va_arg(va, int);
1085	if (iValue < 0)
1086	{
1087	suplibHardenedPrintChr('-');
1088	iValue = -iValue;
1089	}
1090	suplibHardenedPrintDecimal(iValue);
1091	pszFormat += 2;
1092	break;
1093	}
1094	RT_FALL_THRU();
1095
1096	/*
1097	* Custom format.
1098	*/
1099	default:
1100	suplibHardenedPrintStr("[bad format: ");
1101	suplibHardenedPrintStrN(pszLast, pszFormat - pszLast);
1102	suplibHardenedPrintChr(']');
1103	break;
1104	}
1105
1106	/* continue */
1107	pszLast = pszFormat;
1108	}
1109	}
1110
1111	/* Flush the last bits of the string. */
1112	if (pszLast != pszFormat)
1113	suplibHardenedPrintStrN(pszLast, pszFormat - pszLast);
1114	#endif /* !IPRT_NO_CRT */
1115	}
1116
1117
1118	/**
1119	* Prints to standard error.
1120	*
1121	* @param pszFormat The format string.
1122	* @param ... Arguments to format.
1123	*/
1124	DECLHIDDEN(void) suplibHardenedPrintF(const char *pszFormat, ...)
1125	{
1126	va_list va;
1127	va_start(va, pszFormat);
1128	suplibHardenedPrintFV(pszFormat, va);
1129	va_end(va);
1130	}
1131
1132
1133	/**
1134	* @copydoc RTPathStripFilename
1135	*/
1136	static void suplibHardenedPathStripFilename(char *pszPath)
1137	{
1138	char *psz = pszPath;
1139	char *pszLastSep = pszPath;
1140
1141	for (;; psz++)
1142	{
1143	switch (*psz)
1144	{
1145	/* handle separators. */
1146	#if defined(RT_OS_WINDOWS) \|\| defined(RT_OS_OS2)
1147	case ':':
1148	pszLastSep = psz + 1;
1149	break;
1150
1151	case '\\':
1152	#endif
1153	case '/':
1154	pszLastSep = psz;
1155	break;
1156
1157	/* the end */
1158	case '\0':
1159	if (pszLastSep == pszPath)
1160	*pszLastSep++ = '.';
1161	*pszLastSep = '\0';
1162	return;
1163	}
1164	}
1165	/* will never get here */
1166	}
1167
1168
1169	/**
1170	* @copydoc RTPathFilename
1171	*/
1172	DECLHIDDEN(char ) supR3HardenedPathFilename(const char pszPath)
1173	{
1174	const char *psz = pszPath;
1175	const char *pszLastComp = pszPath;
1176
1177	for (;; psz++)
1178	{
1179	switch (*psz)
1180	{
1181	/* handle separators. */
1182	#if defined(RT_OS_WINDOWS) \|\| defined(RT_OS_OS2)
1183	case ':':
1184	pszLastComp = psz + 1;
1185	break;
1186
1187	case '\\':
1188	#endif
1189	case '/':
1190	pszLastComp = psz + 1;
1191	break;
1192
1193	/* the end */
1194	case '\0':
1195	if (*pszLastComp)
1196	return (char )(void )pszLastComp;
1197	return NULL;
1198	}
1199	}
1200
1201	/* will never get here */
1202	}
1203
1204
1205	/**
1206	* @copydoc RTPathAppPrivateNoArch
1207	*/
1208	DECLHIDDEN(int) supR3HardenedPathAppPrivateNoArch(char *pszPath, size_t cchPath)
1209	{
1210	#if !defined(RT_OS_WINDOWS) && defined(RTPATH_APP_PRIVATE)
1211	const char *pszSrcPath = RTPATH_APP_PRIVATE;
1212	size_t cchPathPrivateNoArch = suplibHardenedStrLen(pszSrcPath);
1213	if (cchPathPrivateNoArch >= cchPath)
1214	supR3HardenedFatal("supR3HardenedPathAppPrivateNoArch: Buffer overflow, %zu >= %zu\n", cchPathPrivateNoArch, cchPath);
1215	suplibHardenedMemCopy(pszPath, pszSrcPath, cchPathPrivateNoArch + 1);
1216	return VINF_SUCCESS;
1217
1218	#else
1219	return supR3HardenedPathAppBin(pszPath, cchPath);
1220	#endif
1221	}
1222
1223
1224	/**
1225	* @copydoc RTPathAppPrivateArch
1226	*/
1227	DECLHIDDEN(int) supR3HardenedPathAppPrivateArch(char *pszPath, size_t cchPath)
1228	{
1229	#if !defined(RT_OS_WINDOWS) && defined(RTPATH_APP_PRIVATE_ARCH)
1230	const char *pszSrcPath = RTPATH_APP_PRIVATE_ARCH;
1231	size_t cchPathPrivateArch = suplibHardenedStrLen(pszSrcPath);
1232	if (cchPathPrivateArch >= cchPath)
1233	supR3HardenedFatal("supR3HardenedPathAppPrivateArch: Buffer overflow, %zu >= %zu\n", cchPathPrivateArch, cchPath);
1234	suplibHardenedMemCopy(pszPath, pszSrcPath, cchPathPrivateArch + 1);
1235	return VINF_SUCCESS;
1236
1237	#else
1238	return supR3HardenedPathAppBin(pszPath, cchPath);
1239	#endif
1240	}
1241
1242
1243	/**
1244	* @copydoc RTPathSharedLibs
1245	*/
1246	DECLHIDDEN(int) supR3HardenedPathAppSharedLibs(char *pszPath, size_t cchPath)
1247	{
1248	#if !defined(RT_OS_WINDOWS) && defined(RTPATH_SHARED_LIBS)
1249	const char *pszSrcPath = RTPATH_SHARED_LIBS;
1250	size_t cchPathSharedLibs = suplibHardenedStrLen(pszSrcPath);
1251	if (cchPathSharedLibs >= cchPath)
1252	supR3HardenedFatal("supR3HardenedPathAppSharedLibs: Buffer overflow, %zu >= %zu\n", cchPathSharedLibs, cchPath);
1253	suplibHardenedMemCopy(pszPath, pszSrcPath, cchPathSharedLibs + 1);
1254	return VINF_SUCCESS;
1255
1256	#else
1257	return supR3HardenedPathAppBin(pszPath, cchPath);
1258	#endif
1259	}
1260
1261
1262	/**
1263	* @copydoc RTPathAppDocs
1264	*/
1265	DECLHIDDEN(int) supR3HardenedPathAppDocs(char *pszPath, size_t cchPath)
1266	{
1267	#if !defined(RT_OS_WINDOWS) && defined(RTPATH_APP_DOCS)
1268	const char *pszSrcPath = RTPATH_APP_DOCS;
1269	size_t cchPathAppDocs = suplibHardenedStrLen(pszSrcPath);
1270	if (cchPathAppDocs >= cchPath)
1271	supR3HardenedFatal("supR3HardenedPathAppDocs: Buffer overflow, %zu >= %zu\n", cchPathAppDocs, cchPath);
1272	suplibHardenedMemCopy(pszPath, pszSrcPath, cchPathAppDocs + 1);
1273	return VINF_SUCCESS;
1274
1275	#else
1276	return supR3HardenedPathAppBin(pszPath, cchPath);
1277	#endif
1278	}
1279
1280
1281	/**
1282	* Returns the full path to the executable in g_szSupLibHardenedExePath.
1283	*
1284	* @returns IPRT status code.
1285	*/
1286	static void supR3HardenedGetFullExePath(void)
1287	{
1288	/*
1289	* Get the program filename.
1290	*
1291	* Most UNIXes have no API for obtaining the executable path, but provides a symbolic
1292	* link in the proc file system that tells who was exec'ed. The bad thing about this
1293	* is that we have to use readlink, one of the weirder UNIX APIs.
1294	*
1295	* Darwin, OS/2 and Windows all have proper APIs for getting the program file name.
1296	*/
1297	#if defined(RT_OS_LINUX) \|\| defined(RT_OS_FREEBSD) \|\| defined(RT_OS_SOLARIS)
1298	# ifdef RT_OS_LINUX
1299	int cchLink = readlink("/proc/self/exe", &g_szSupLibHardenedExePath[0], sizeof(g_szSupLibHardenedExePath) - 1);
1300
1301	# elif defined(RT_OS_SOLARIS)
1302	char szFileBuf[PATH_MAX + 1];
1303	sprintf(szFileBuf, "/proc/%ld/path/a.out", (long)getpid());
1304	int cchLink = readlink(szFileBuf, &g_szSupLibHardenedExePath[0], sizeof(g_szSupLibHardenedExePath) - 1);
1305
1306	# else /* RT_OS_FREEBSD */
1307	int aiName[4];
1308	aiName[0] = CTL_KERN;
1309	aiName[1] = KERN_PROC;
1310	aiName[2] = KERN_PROC_PATHNAME;
1311	aiName[3] = getpid();
1312
1313	size_t cbPath = sizeof(g_szSupLibHardenedExePath);
1314	if (sysctl(aiName, RT_ELEMENTS(aiName), g_szSupLibHardenedExePath, &cbPath, NULL, 0) < 0)
1315	supR3HardenedFatal("supR3HardenedExecDir: sysctl failed\n");
1316	g_szSupLibHardenedExePath[sizeof(g_szSupLibHardenedExePath) - 1] = '\0';
1317	int cchLink = suplibHardenedStrLen(g_szSupLibHardenedExePath); /* paranoid? can't we use cbPath? */
1318
1319	# endif
1320	if (cchLink < 0 \|\| cchLink == sizeof(g_szSupLibHardenedExePath) - 1)
1321	supR3HardenedFatal("supR3HardenedExecDir: couldn't read \"%s\", errno=%d cchLink=%d\n",
1322	g_szSupLibHardenedExePath, errno, cchLink);
1323	g_szSupLibHardenedExePath[cchLink] = '\0';
1324
1325	#elif defined(RT_OS_OS2) \|\| defined(RT_OS_L4)
1326	_execname(g_szSupLibHardenedExePath, sizeof(g_szSupLibHardenedExePath));
1327
1328	#elif defined(RT_OS_DARWIN)
1329	const char *pszImageName = _dyld_get_image_name(0);
1330	if (!pszImageName)
1331	supR3HardenedFatal("supR3HardenedExecDir: _dyld_get_image_name(0) failed\n");
1332	size_t cchImageName = suplibHardenedStrLen(pszImageName);
1333	if (!cchImageName \|\| cchImageName >= sizeof(g_szSupLibHardenedExePath))
1334	supR3HardenedFatal("supR3HardenedExecDir: _dyld_get_image_name(0) failed, cchImageName=%d\n", cchImageName);
1335	suplibHardenedMemCopy(g_szSupLibHardenedExePath, pszImageName, cchImageName + 1);
1336	/** @todo abspath the string or this won't work:
1337	* cd /Applications/VirtualBox.app/Contents/Resources/VirtualBoxVM.app/Contents/MacOS/ && ./VirtualBoxVM --startvm name */
1338
1339	#elif defined(RT_OS_WINDOWS)
1340	char *pszDst = g_szSupLibHardenedExePath;
1341	int rc = RTUtf16ToUtf8Ex(g_wszSupLibHardenedExePath, RTSTR_MAX, &pszDst, sizeof(g_szSupLibHardenedExePath), NULL);
1342	if (RT_FAILURE(rc))
1343	supR3HardenedFatal("supR3HardenedExecDir: RTUtf16ToUtf8Ex failed, rc=%Rrc\n", rc);
1344	#else
1345	# error needs porting.
1346	#endif
1347
1348	/*
1349	* Determine the application binary directory location.
1350	*/
1351	suplibHardenedStrCopy(g_szSupLibHardenedAppBinPath, g_szSupLibHardenedExePath);
1352	suplibHardenedPathStripFilename(g_szSupLibHardenedAppBinPath);
1353
1354	g_offSupLibHardenedExecName = suplibHardenedStrLen(g_szSupLibHardenedAppBinPath);
1355	while (RTPATH_IS_SEP(g_szSupLibHardenedExePath[g_offSupLibHardenedExecName]))
1356	g_offSupLibHardenedExecName++;
1357	g_cchSupLibHardenedExecName = suplibHardenedStrLen(&g_szSupLibHardenedExePath[g_offSupLibHardenedExecName]);
1358
1359	if (g_enmSupR3HardenedMainState < SUPR3HARDENEDMAINSTATE_HARDENED_MAIN_CALLED)
1360	supR3HardenedFatal("supR3HardenedExecDir: Called before SUPR3HardenedMain! (%d)\n", g_enmSupR3HardenedMainState);
1361	switch (g_fSupHardenedMain & SUPSECMAIN_FLAGS_LOC_MASK)
1362	{
1363	case SUPSECMAIN_FLAGS_LOC_APP_BIN:
1364	break;
1365	case SUPSECMAIN_FLAGS_LOC_TESTCASE:
1366	suplibHardenedPathStripFilename(g_szSupLibHardenedAppBinPath);
1367	break;
1368	#ifdef RT_OS_DARWIN
1369	case SUPSECMAIN_FLAGS_LOC_OSX_HLP_APP:
1370	{
1371	/* We must ascend to the parent bundle's Contents directory then decend into its MacOS: */
1372	static const RTSTRTUPLE s_aComponentsToSkip[] =
1373	{ { RT_STR_TUPLE("MacOS") }, { RT_STR_TUPLE("Contents") }, { NULL /some.app/, 0 }, { RT_STR_TUPLE("Resources") } };
1374	size_t cchPath = suplibHardenedStrLen(g_szSupLibHardenedAppBinPath);
1375	for (uintptr_t i = 0; i < RT_ELEMENTS(s_aComponentsToSkip); i++)
1376	{
1377	while (cchPath > 1 && g_szSupLibHardenedAppBinPath[cchPath - 1] == '/')
1378	cchPath--;
1379	size_t const cchMatch = s_aComponentsToSkip[i].cch;
1380	if (cchMatch > 0)
1381	{
1382	if ( cchPath >= cchMatch + sizeof("VirtualBox.app/Contents")
1383	&& g_szSupLibHardenedAppBinPath[cchPath - cchMatch - 1] == '/'
1384	&& suplibHardenedMemComp(&g_szSupLibHardenedAppBinPath[cchPath - cchMatch],
1385	s_aComponentsToSkip[i].psz, cchMatch) == 0)
1386	cchPath -= cchMatch;
1387	else
1388	supR3HardenedFatal("supR3HardenedExecDir: Bad helper app path (tail component #%u '%s'): %s\n",
1389	i, s_aComponentsToSkip[i].psz, g_szSupLibHardenedAppBinPath);
1390	}
1391	else if ( cchPath > g_cchSupLibHardenedExecName + sizeof("VirtualBox.app/Contents/Resources/.app")
1392	&& suplibHardenedMemComp(&g_szSupLibHardenedAppBinPath[cchPath - 4], ".app", 4) == 0
1393	&& suplibHardenedMemComp(&g_szSupLibHardenedAppBinPath[cchPath - 4 - g_cchSupLibHardenedExecName],
1394	&g_szSupLibHardenedExePath[g_offSupLibHardenedExecName],
1395	g_cchSupLibHardenedExecName) == 0)
1396	cchPath -= g_cchSupLibHardenedExecName + 4;
1397	else
1398	supR3HardenedFatal("supR3HardenedExecDir: Bad helper app path (tail component #%u '%s.app'): %s\n",
1399	i, &g_szSupLibHardenedExePath[g_offSupLibHardenedExecName], g_szSupLibHardenedAppBinPath);
1400	}
1401	suplibHardenedMemCopy(&g_szSupLibHardenedAppBinPath[cchPath], "MacOS", sizeof("MacOS"));
1402	break;
1403	}
1404	#endif /* RT_OS_DARWIN */
1405	default:
1406	supR3HardenedFatal("supR3HardenedExecDir: Unknown program binary location: %#x\n", g_fSupHardenedMain);
1407	}
1408	}
1409
1410
1411	#ifdef RT_OS_LINUX
1412	/**
1413	* Checks if we can read /proc/self/exe.
1414	*
1415	* This is used on linux to see if we have to call init
1416	* with program path or not.
1417	*
1418	* @returns true / false.
1419	*/
1420	static bool supR3HardenedMainIsProcSelfExeAccssible(void)
1421	{
1422	char szPath[RTPATH_MAX];
1423	int cchLink = readlink("/proc/self/exe", szPath, sizeof(szPath));
1424	return cchLink != -1;
1425	}
1426	#endif /* RT_OS_LINUX */
1427
1428
1429
1430	/**
1431	* @remarks not quite like RTPathExecDir actually...
1432	*/
1433	DECLHIDDEN(int) supR3HardenedPathAppBin(char *pszPath, size_t cchPath)
1434	{
1435	/*
1436	* Lazy init (probably not required).
1437	*/
1438	if (!g_szSupLibHardenedAppBinPath[0])
1439	supR3HardenedGetFullExePath();
1440
1441	/*
1442	* Calc the length and check if there is space before copying.
1443	*/
1444	size_t cch = suplibHardenedStrLen(g_szSupLibHardenedAppBinPath) + 1;
1445	if (cch <= cchPath)
1446	{
1447	suplibHardenedMemCopy(pszPath, g_szSupLibHardenedAppBinPath, cch + 1);
1448	return VINF_SUCCESS;
1449	}
1450
1451	supR3HardenedFatal("supR3HardenedPathAppBin: Buffer too small (%u < %u)\n", cchPath, cch);
1452	/* not reached */
1453	}
1454
1455
1456	#ifdef RT_OS_WINDOWS
1457	extern "C" uint32_t g_uNtVerCombined;
1458	#endif
1459
1460	DECLHIDDEN(void) supR3HardenedOpenLog(int pcArgs, char *papszArgs)
1461	{
1462	static const char s_szLogOption[] = "--sup-hardening-log=";
1463
1464	/*
1465	* Scan the argument vector.
1466	*/
1467	int cArgs = *pcArgs;
1468	for (int iArg = 1; iArg < cArgs; iArg++)
1469	if (strncmp(papszArgs[iArg], s_szLogOption, sizeof(s_szLogOption) - 1) == 0)
1470	{
1471	#ifdef RT_OS_WINDOWS
1472	const char *pszLogFile = &papszArgs[iArg][sizeof(s_szLogOption) - 1];
1473	#endif
1474
1475	/*
1476	* Drop the argument from the vector (has trailing NULL entry).
1477	*/
1478	// memmove(&papszArgs[iArg], &papszArgs[iArg + 1], (cArgs - iArg) * sizeof(papszArgs[0]));
1479	*pcArgs -= 1;
1480	cArgs -= 1;
1481
1482	/*
1483	* Open the log file, unless we've already opened one.
1484	* First argument takes precedence
1485	*/
1486	#ifdef RT_OS_WINDOWS
1487	if (g_hStartupLog == NULL)
1488	{
1489	int rc = RTNtPathOpen(pszLogFile,
1490	GENERIC_WRITE \| SYNCHRONIZE,
1491	FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL,
1492	FILE_SHARE_READ \| FILE_SHARE_WRITE,
1493	FILE_OPEN_IF,
1494	FILE_NON_DIRECTORY_FILE \| FILE_SYNCHRONOUS_IO_NONALERT,
1495	OBJ_CASE_INSENSITIVE,
1496	&g_hStartupLog,
1497	NULL);
1498	if (RT_SUCCESS(rc))
1499	{
1500	// SUP_DPRINTF(("Log file opened: " VBOX_VERSION_STRING "r%u g_hStartupLog=%p g_uNtVerCombined=%#x\n",
1501	// VBOX_SVN_REV, g_hStartupLog, g_uNtVerCombined));
1502
1503	/*
1504	* If the path contains a drive volume, save it so we can
1505	* use it to flush the volume containing the log file.
1506	*/
1507	if (RT_C_IS_ALPHA(pszLogFile[0]) && pszLogFile[1] == ':')
1508	{
1509	// RTUtf16CopyAscii(g_wszStartupLogVol, RT_ELEMENTS(g_wszStartupLogVol), "\\??\\");
1510	g_wszStartupLogVol[sizeof("\\??\\") - 1] = RT_C_TO_UPPER(pszLogFile[0]);
1511	g_wszStartupLogVol[sizeof("\\??\\") + 0] = ':';
1512	g_wszStartupLogVol[sizeof("\\??\\") + 1] = '\0';
1513	}
1514	}
1515	else
1516	g_hStartupLog = NULL;
1517	}
1518	#else
1519	/* Just some mumbo jumbo to shut up the compiler. */
1520	g_hStartupLog -= 1;
1521	g_cbStartupLog += 1;
1522	//g_hStartupLog = open()
1523	#endif
1524	}
1525	}
1526
1527
1528	DECLHIDDEN(void) supR3HardenedLogV(const char *pszFormat, va_list va)
1529	{
1530	#ifdef RT_OS_WINDOWS
1531	if ( g_hStartupLog != NULL
1532	&& g_cbStartupLog < 16*_1M)
1533	{
1534	char szBuf[5120];
1535	PCLIENT_ID pSelfId = &((PTEB)NtCurrentTeb())->ClientId;
1536	size_t cchPrefix = RTStrPrintf(szBuf, sizeof(szBuf), "%x.%x: ", pSelfId->UniqueProcess, pSelfId->UniqueThread);
1537	size_t cch = RTStrPrintfV(&szBuf[cchPrefix], sizeof(szBuf) - cchPrefix, pszFormat, va) + cchPrefix;
1538
1539	if ((size_t)cch >= sizeof(szBuf))
1540	cch = sizeof(szBuf) - 1;
1541
1542	if (!cch \|\| szBuf[cch - 1] != '\n')
1543	szBuf[cch++] = '\n';
1544
1545	ASMAtomicAddU32(&g_cbStartupLog, (uint32_t)cch);
1546
1547	IO_STATUS_BLOCK Ios = RTNT_IO_STATUS_BLOCK_INITIALIZER;
1548	LARGE_INTEGER Offset;
1549	Offset.QuadPart = -1; /* Write to end of file. */
1550	NtWriteFile(g_hStartupLog, NULL /Event/, NULL /ApcRoutine/, NULL /ApcContext/,
1551	&Ios, szBuf, (ULONG)cch, &Offset, NULL /Key/);
1552	}
1553	#else
1554	RT_NOREF(pszFormat, va);
1555	/* later */
1556	#endif
1557	}
1558
1559
1560	DECLHIDDEN(void) supR3HardenedLog(const char *pszFormat, ...)
1561	{
1562	va_list va;
1563	va_start(va, pszFormat);
1564	supR3HardenedLogV(pszFormat, va);
1565	va_end(va);
1566	}
1567
1568
1569	DECLHIDDEN(void) supR3HardenedLogFlush(void)
1570	{
1571	#ifdef RT_OS_WINDOWS
1572	if ( g_hStartupLog != NULL
1573	&& g_cbStartupLog < 16*_1M)
1574	{
1575	IO_STATUS_BLOCK Ios = RTNT_IO_STATUS_BLOCK_INITIALIZER;
1576	NTSTATUS rcNt = NtFlushBuffersFile(g_hStartupLog, &Ios);
1577
1578	/*
1579	* Try flush the volume containing the log file too.
1580	*/
1581	if (g_wszStartupLogVol[0])
1582	{
1583	HANDLE hLogVol = RTNT_INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE;
1584	UNICODE_STRING NtName;
1585	NtName.Buffer = g_wszStartupLogVol;
1586	NtName.Length = (USHORT)(RTUtf16Len(g_wszStartupLogVol) * sizeof(RTUTF16));
1587	NtName.MaximumLength = NtName.Length + 1;
1588	OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES ObjAttr;
1589	InitializeObjectAttributes(&ObjAttr, &NtName, OBJ_CASE_INSENSITIVE, NULL /hRootDir/, NULL /pSecDesc/);
1590	RTNT_IO_STATUS_BLOCK_REINIT(&Ios);
1591	rcNt = NtCreateFile(&hLogVol,
1592	GENERIC_WRITE \| GENERIC_READ \| SYNCHRONIZE \| FILE_READ_ATTRIBUTES,
1593	&ObjAttr,
1594	&Ios,
1595	NULL /* Allocation Size*/,
1596	0 /FileAttributes/,
1597	FILE_SHARE_READ \| FILE_SHARE_WRITE \| FILE_SHARE_DELETE,
1598	FILE_OPEN,
1599	FILE_NON_DIRECTORY_FILE \| FILE_SYNCHRONOUS_IO_NONALERT,
1600	NULL /EaBuffer/,
1601	0 /EaLength/);
1602	if (NT_SUCCESS(rcNt))
1603	rcNt = Ios.Status;
1604	if (NT_SUCCESS(rcNt))
1605	{
1606	RTNT_IO_STATUS_BLOCK_REINIT(&Ios);
1607	rcNt = NtFlushBuffersFile(hLogVol, &Ios);
1608	NtClose(hLogVol);
1609	}
1610	else
1611	{
1612	/* This may have sideeffects similar to what we want... */
1613	hLogVol = RTNT_INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE;
1614	RTNT_IO_STATUS_BLOCK_REINIT(&Ios);
1615	rcNt = NtCreateFile(&hLogVol,
1616	GENERIC_READ \| SYNCHRONIZE \| FILE_READ_ATTRIBUTES,
1617	&ObjAttr,
1618	&Ios,
1619	NULL /* Allocation Size*/,
1620	0 /FileAttributes/,
1621	FILE_SHARE_READ \| FILE_SHARE_WRITE \| FILE_SHARE_DELETE,
1622	FILE_OPEN,
1623	FILE_NON_DIRECTORY_FILE \| FILE_SYNCHRONOUS_IO_NONALERT,
1624	NULL /EaBuffer/,
1625	0 /EaLength/);
1626	if (NT_SUCCESS(rcNt) && NT_SUCCESS(Ios.Status))
1627	NtClose(hLogVol);
1628	}
1629	}
1630	}
1631	#else
1632	/* later */
1633	#endif
1634	}
1635
1636
1637	/**
1638	* Prints the message prefix.
1639	*/
1640	static void suplibHardenedPrintPrefix(void)
1641	{
1642	if (g_pszSupLibHardenedProgName)
1643	suplibHardenedPrintStr(g_pszSupLibHardenedProgName);
1644	suplibHardenedPrintStr(": ");
1645	}
1646
1647
1648	DECL_NO_RETURN(DECLHIDDEN(void)) supR3HardenedFatalMsgV(const char *pszWhere, SUPINITOP enmWhat, int rc,
1649	const char *pszMsgFmt, va_list va)
1650	{
1651	/*
1652	* First to the log.
1653	*/
1654	supR3HardenedLog("Error %d in %s! (enmWhat=%d)\n", rc, pszWhere, enmWhat);
1655	va_list vaCopy;
1656	va_copy(vaCopy, va);
1657	supR3HardenedLogV(pszMsgFmt, vaCopy);
1658	va_end(vaCopy);
1659
1660	#ifdef RT_OS_WINDOWS
1661	/*
1662	* The release log.
1663	*/
1664	if (g_pfnRTLogRelPrintf)
1665	{
1666	va_copy(vaCopy, va);
1667	g_pfnRTLogRelPrintf("supR3HardenedFatalMsgV: %s enmWhat=%d rc=%Rrc (%#x)\n", pszWhere, enmWhat, rc);
1668	g_pfnRTLogRelPrintf("supR3HardenedFatalMsgV: %N\n", pszMsgFmt, &vaCopy);
1669	va_end(vaCopy);
1670	}
1671	#endif
1672
1673	/*
1674	* Then to the console.
1675	*/
1676	suplibHardenedPrintPrefix();
1677	suplibHardenedPrintF("Error %d in %s!\n", rc, pszWhere);
1678
1679	suplibHardenedPrintPrefix();
1680	va_copy(vaCopy, va);
1681	suplibHardenedPrintFV(pszMsgFmt, vaCopy);
1682	va_end(vaCopy);
1683	suplibHardenedPrintChr('\n');
1684
1685	switch (enmWhat)
1686	{
1687	case kSupInitOp_Driver:
1688	suplibHardenedPrintChr('\n');
1689	suplibHardenedPrintPrefix();
1690	suplibHardenedPrintStr("Tip! Make sure the kernel module is loaded. It may also help to reinstall VirtualBox.\n");
1691	break;
1692
1693	case kSupInitOp_Misc:
1694	case kSupInitOp_IPRT:
1695	case kSupInitOp_Integrity:
1696	case kSupInitOp_RootCheck:
1697	suplibHardenedPrintChr('\n');
1698	suplibHardenedPrintPrefix();
1699	suplibHardenedPrintStr("Tip! It may help to reinstall VirtualBox.\n");
1700	break;
1701
1702	default:
1703	/* no hints here */
1704	break;
1705	}
1706
1707	/*
1708	* Finally, TrustedError if appropriate.
1709	*/
1710	if (g_enmSupR3HardenedMainState >= SUPR3HARDENEDMAINSTATE_WIN_IMPORTS_RESOLVED)
1711	{
1712	#ifdef SUP_HARDENED_SUID
1713	/* Drop any root privileges we might be holding, this won't return
1714	if it fails but end up calling supR3HardenedFatal[V]. */
1715	supR3HardenedMainDropPrivileges();
1716	#endif
1717	/* Close the driver, if we succeeded opening it. Both because
1718	TrustedError may be untrustworthy and because the driver deosn't
1719	like us if we fork(). @bugref{8838} */
1720	suplibOsTerm(&g_SupPreInitData.Data);
1721
1722	/*
1723	* Now try resolve and call the TrustedError entry point if we can find it.
1724	* Note! Loader involved, so we must guard against loader hooks calling us.
1725	*/
1726	static volatile bool s_fRecursive = false;
1727	if (!s_fRecursive)
1728	{
1729	s_fRecursive = true;
1730
1731	PFNSUPTRUSTEDERROR pfnTrustedError = supR3HardenedMainGetTrustedError(g_pszSupLibHardenedProgName);
1732	if (pfnTrustedError)
1733	{
1734	/* We'll fork before we make the call because that way the session management
1735	in main will see us exiting immediately (if it's involved with us) and possibly
1736	get an error back to the API / user. */
1737	#if !defined(RT_OS_WINDOWS) && !defined(RT_OS_OS2)
1738	int pid = fork();
1739	if (pid <= 0)
1740	#endif
1741	{
1742	pfnTrustedError(pszWhere, enmWhat, rc, pszMsgFmt, va);
1743	}
1744	}
1745
1746	s_fRecursive = false;
1747	}
1748	}
1749	#if defined(RT_OS_WINDOWS)
1750	/*
1751	* Report the error to the parent if this happens during early VM init.
1752	*/
1753	else if ( g_enmSupR3HardenedMainState < SUPR3HARDENEDMAINSTATE_WIN_IMPORTS_RESOLVED
1754	&& g_enmSupR3HardenedMainState != SUPR3HARDENEDMAINSTATE_NOT_YET_CALLED)
1755	supR3HardenedWinReportErrorToParent(pszWhere, enmWhat, rc, pszMsgFmt, va);
1756	#endif
1757
1758	/*
1759	* Quit
1760	*/
1761	suplibHardenedExit(RTEXITCODE_FAILURE);
1762	}
1763
1764
1765	DECL_NO_RETURN(DECLHIDDEN(void)) supR3HardenedFatalMsg(const char *pszWhere, SUPINITOP enmWhat, int rc,
1766	const char *pszMsgFmt, ...)
1767	{
1768	va_list va;
1769	va_start(va, pszMsgFmt);
1770	supR3HardenedFatalMsgV(pszWhere, enmWhat, rc, pszMsgFmt, va);
1771	/* not reached */
1772	}
1773
1774
1775	DECL_NO_RETURN(DECLHIDDEN(void)) supR3HardenedFatalV(const char *pszFormat, va_list va)
1776	{
1777	supR3HardenedLog("Fatal error:\n");
1778	va_list vaCopy;
1779	va_copy(vaCopy, va);
1780	supR3HardenedLogV(pszFormat, vaCopy);
1781	va_end(vaCopy);
1782
1783	#if defined(RT_OS_WINDOWS)
1784	/*
1785	* Report the error to the parent if this happens during early VM init.
1786	*/
1787	if ( g_enmSupR3HardenedMainState < SUPR3HARDENEDMAINSTATE_WIN_IMPORTS_RESOLVED
1788	&& g_enmSupR3HardenedMainState != SUPR3HARDENEDMAINSTATE_NOT_YET_CALLED)
1789	supR3HardenedWinReportErrorToParent(NULL, kSupInitOp_Invalid, VERR_INTERNAL_ERROR, pszFormat, va);
1790	else
1791	#endif
1792	{
1793	#ifdef RT_OS_WINDOWS
1794	if (g_pfnRTLogRelPrintf)
1795	{
1796	va_copy(vaCopy, va);
1797	g_pfnRTLogRelPrintf("supR3HardenedFatalV: %N", pszFormat, &vaCopy);
1798	va_end(vaCopy);
1799	}
1800	#endif
1801
1802	suplibHardenedPrintPrefix();
1803	suplibHardenedPrintFV(pszFormat, va);
1804	}
1805
1806	suplibHardenedExit(RTEXITCODE_FAILURE);
1807	}
1808
1809
1810	DECL_NO_RETURN(DECLHIDDEN(void)) supR3HardenedFatal(const char *pszFormat, ...)
1811	{
1812	va_list va;
1813	va_start(va, pszFormat);
1814	supR3HardenedFatalV(pszFormat, va);
1815	/* not reached */
1816	}
1817
1818
1819	DECLHIDDEN(int) supR3HardenedErrorV(int rc, bool fFatal, const char *pszFormat, va_list va)
1820	{
1821	if (fFatal)
1822	supR3HardenedFatalV(pszFormat, va);
1823
1824	supR3HardenedLog("Error (rc=%d):\n", rc);
1825	va_list vaCopy;
1826	va_copy(vaCopy, va);
1827	supR3HardenedLogV(pszFormat, vaCopy);
1828	va_end(vaCopy);
1829
1830	#ifdef RT_OS_WINDOWS
1831	if (g_pfnRTLogRelPrintf)
1832	{
1833	va_copy(vaCopy, va);
1834	g_pfnRTLogRelPrintf("supR3HardenedErrorV: %N", pszFormat, &vaCopy);
1835	va_end(vaCopy);
1836	}
1837	#endif
1838
1839	suplibHardenedPrintPrefix();
1840	suplibHardenedPrintFV(pszFormat, va);
1841
1842	return rc;
1843	}
1844
1845
1846	DECLHIDDEN(int) supR3HardenedError(int rc, bool fFatal, const char *pszFormat, ...)
1847	{
1848	va_list va;
1849	va_start(va, pszFormat);
1850	supR3HardenedErrorV(rc, fFatal, pszFormat, va);
1851	va_end(va);
1852	return rc;
1853	}
1854
1855
1856
1857	/**
1858	* Attempts to open /dev/vboxdrv (or equvivalent).
1859	*
1860	* @remarks This function will not return on failure.
1861	*/
1862	DECLHIDDEN(void) supR3HardenedMainOpenDevice(void)
1863	{
1864	RTERRINFOSTATIC ErrInfo;
1865	SUPINITOP enmWhat = kSupInitOp_Driver;
1866	int rc = suplibOsInit(&g_SupPreInitData.Data, false /fPreInit/, true /fUnrestricted/,
1867	&enmWhat, RTErrInfoInitStatic(&ErrInfo));
1868	if (RT_SUCCESS(rc))
1869	return;
1870
1871	if (RTErrInfoIsSet(&ErrInfo.Core))
1872	supR3HardenedFatalMsg("suplibOsInit", enmWhat, rc, "%s", ErrInfo.szMsg);
1873
1874	switch (rc)
1875	{
1876	/** @todo better messages! */
1877	case VERR_VM_DRIVER_NOT_INSTALLED:
1878	supR3HardenedFatalMsg("suplibOsInit", kSupInitOp_Driver, rc, "Kernel driver not installed");
1879	case VERR_VM_DRIVER_NOT_ACCESSIBLE:
1880	supR3HardenedFatalMsg("suplibOsInit", kSupInitOp_Driver, rc, "Kernel driver not accessible");
1881	case VERR_VM_DRIVER_LOAD_ERROR:
1882	supR3HardenedFatalMsg("suplibOsInit", kSupInitOp_Driver, rc, "VERR_VM_DRIVER_LOAD_ERROR");
1883	case VERR_VM_DRIVER_OPEN_ERROR:
1884	supR3HardenedFatalMsg("suplibOsInit", kSupInitOp_Driver, rc, "VERR_VM_DRIVER_OPEN_ERROR");
1885	case VERR_VM_DRIVER_VERSION_MISMATCH:
1886	supR3HardenedFatalMsg("suplibOsInit", kSupInitOp_Driver, rc, "Kernel driver version mismatch");
1887	case VERR_ACCESS_DENIED:
1888	supR3HardenedFatalMsg("suplibOsInit", kSupInitOp_Driver, rc, "VERR_ACCESS_DENIED");
1889	case VERR_NO_MEMORY:
1890	supR3HardenedFatalMsg("suplibOsInit", kSupInitOp_Driver, rc, "Kernel memory allocation/mapping failed");
1891	case VERR_SUPDRV_HARDENING_EVIL_HANDLE:
1892	supR3HardenedFatalMsg("suplibOsInit", kSupInitOp_Integrity, rc, "VERR_SUPDRV_HARDENING_EVIL_HANDLE");
1893	case VERR_SUPLIB_NT_PROCESS_UNTRUSTED_0:
1894	supR3HardenedFatalMsg("suplibOsInit", kSupInitOp_Integrity, rc, "VERR_SUPLIB_NT_PROCESS_UNTRUSTED_0");
1895	case VERR_SUPLIB_NT_PROCESS_UNTRUSTED_1:
1896	supR3HardenedFatalMsg("suplibOsInit", kSupInitOp_Integrity, rc, "VERR_SUPLIB_NT_PROCESS_UNTRUSTED_1");
1897	case VERR_SUPLIB_NT_PROCESS_UNTRUSTED_2:
1898	supR3HardenedFatalMsg("suplibOsInit", kSupInitOp_Integrity, rc, "VERR_SUPLIB_NT_PROCESS_UNTRUSTED_2");
1899	default:
1900	supR3HardenedFatalMsg("suplibOsInit", kSupInitOp_Driver, rc, "Unknown rc=%d (%Rrc)", rc, rc);
1901	}
1902	}
1903
1904
1905	#ifdef SUP_HARDENED_SUID
1906
1907	/**
1908	* Grabs extra non-root capabilities / privileges that we might require.
1909	*
1910	* This is currently only used for being able to do ICMP from the NAT engine
1911	* and for being able to raise thread scheduling priority
1912	*
1913	* @note We still have root privileges at the time of this call.
1914	*/
1915	static void supR3HardenedMainGrabCapabilites(void)
1916	{
1917	# if defined(RT_OS_LINUX)
1918	/*
1919	* We are about to drop all our privileges. Remove all capabilities but
1920	* keep the cap_net_raw capability for ICMP sockets for the NAT stack,
1921	* also keep cap_sys_nice capability for priority tweaking.
1922	*/
1923	if (g_uCaps != 0)
1924	{
1925	# ifdef USE_LIB_PCAP
1926	/* XXX cap_net_bind_service */
1927	if (!cap_set_proc(cap_from_text("all-eip cap_net_raw+ep cap_sys_nice+ep")))
1928	prctl(PR_SET_KEEPCAPS, 1 /keep=/, 0, 0, 0);
1929	prctl(PR_SET_DUMPABLE, 1 /dump/, 0, 0, 0);
1930	# else
1931	cap_user_header_t hdr = (cap_user_header_t)alloca(sizeof(*hdr));
1932	cap_user_data_t cap = (cap_user_data_t)alloca(2 /_LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S_3/ * sizeof(*cap));
1933	memset(hdr, 0, sizeof(*hdr));
1934	capget(hdr, NULL);
1935	if ( hdr->version != 0x19980330 /* _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_1, _LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S_1 = 1 */
1936	&& hdr->version != 0x20071026 /* _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_2, _LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S_2 = 2 */
1937	&& hdr->version != 0x20080522 /* _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_3, _LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S_3 = 2 */)
1938	hdr->version = _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION;
1939	g_uCapsVersion = hdr->version;
1940	memset(cap, 0, 2 /* _LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S_3 / sizeof(*cap));
1941	cap->effective = g_uCaps;
1942	cap->permitted = g_uCaps;
1943	if (!capset(hdr, cap))
1944	prctl(PR_SET_KEEPCAPS, 1 /keep/, 0, 0, 0);
1945	prctl(PR_SET_DUMPABLE, 1 /dump/, 0, 0, 0);
1946	# endif /* !USE_LIB_PCAP */
1947	}
1948
1949	# elif defined(RT_OS_SOLARIS)
1950	/*
1951	* Add net_icmpaccess privilege to effective privileges and limit
1952	* permitted privileges before completely dropping root privileges.
1953	* This requires dropping root privileges temporarily to get the normal
1954	* user's privileges.
1955	*/
1956	seteuid(g_uid);
1957	priv_set_t *pPrivEffective = priv_allocset();
1958	priv_set_t *pPrivNew = priv_allocset();
1959	if (pPrivEffective && pPrivNew)
1960	{
1961	int rc = getppriv(PRIV_EFFECTIVE, pPrivEffective);
1962	seteuid(0);
1963	if (!rc)
1964	{
1965	priv_copyset(pPrivEffective, pPrivNew);
1966	rc = priv_addset(pPrivNew, PRIV_NET_ICMPACCESS);
1967	if (!rc)
1968	{
1969	/* Order is important, as one can't set a privilege which is
1970	* not in the permitted privilege set. */
1971	rc = setppriv(PRIV_SET, PRIV_EFFECTIVE, pPrivNew);
1972	if (rc)
1973	supR3HardenedError(rc, false, "SUPR3HardenedMain: failed to set effective privilege set.\n");
1974	rc = setppriv(PRIV_SET, PRIV_PERMITTED, pPrivNew);
1975	if (rc)
1976	supR3HardenedError(rc, false, "SUPR3HardenedMain: failed to set permitted privilege set.\n");
1977	}
1978	else
1979	supR3HardenedError(rc, false, "SUPR3HardenedMain: failed to add NET_ICMPACCESS privilege.\n");
1980	}
1981	}
1982	else
1983	{
1984	/* for memory allocation failures just continue */
1985	seteuid(0);
1986	}
1987
1988	if (pPrivEffective)
1989	priv_freeset(pPrivEffective);
1990	if (pPrivNew)
1991	priv_freeset(pPrivNew);
1992	# endif
1993	}
1994
1995	/*
1996	* Look at the environment for some special options.
1997	*/
1998	static void supR3GrabOptions(void)
1999	{
2000	# ifdef RT_OS_LINUX
2001	g_uCaps = 0;
2002
2003	/*
2004	* Do _not_ perform any capability-related system calls for root processes
2005	* (leaving g_uCaps at 0).
2006	* (Hint: getuid gets the real user id, not the effective.)
2007	*/
2008	if (getuid() != 0)
2009	{
2010	/*
2011	* CAP_NET_RAW.
2012	* Default: enabled.
2013	* Can be disabled with 'export VBOX_HARD_CAP_NET_RAW=0'.
2014	*/
2015	const char *pszOpt = getenv("VBOX_HARD_CAP_NET_RAW");
2016	if ( !pszOpt
2017	\|\| memcmp(pszOpt, "0", sizeof("0")) != 0)
2018	g_uCaps = CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_NET_RAW);
2019
2020	/*
2021	* CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE.
2022	* Default: disabled.
2023	* Can be enabled with 'export VBOX_HARD_CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE=1'.
2024	*/
2025	pszOpt = getenv("VBOX_HARD_CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE");
2026	if ( pszOpt
2027	&& memcmp(pszOpt, "0", sizeof("0")) != 0)
2028	g_uCaps \|= CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE);
2029
2030	/*
2031	* CAP_SYS_NICE.
2032	* Default: enabled.
2033	* Can be disabled with 'export VBOX_HARD_CAP_SYS_NICE=0'.
2034	*/
2035	pszOpt = getenv("VBOX_HARD_CAP_SYS_NICE");
2036	if ( !pszOpt
2037	\|\| memcmp(pszOpt, "0", sizeof("0")) != 0)
2038	g_uCaps \|= CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_NICE);
2039	}
2040	# endif
2041	}
2042
2043	/**
2044	* Drop any root privileges we might be holding.
2045	*/
2046	static void supR3HardenedMainDropPrivileges(void)
2047	{
2048	/*
2049	* Try use setre[ug]id since this will clear the save uid/gid and thus
2050	* leave fewer traces behind that libs like GTK+ may pick up.
2051	*/
2052	uid_t euid, ruid, suid;
2053	gid_t egid, rgid, sgid;
2054	# if defined(RT_OS_DARWIN)
2055	/* The really great thing here is that setreuid isn't available on
2056	OS X 10.4, libc emulates it. While 10.4 have a slightly different and
2057	non-standard setuid implementation compared to 10.5, the following
2058	works the same way with both version since we're super user (10.5 req).
2059	The following will set all three variants of the group and user IDs. */
2060	setgid(g_gid);
2061	setuid(g_uid);
2062	euid = geteuid();
2063	ruid = suid = getuid();
2064	egid = getegid();
2065	rgid = sgid = getgid();
2066
2067	# elif defined(RT_OS_SOLARIS)
2068	/* Solaris doesn't have setresuid, but the setreuid interface is BSD
2069	compatible and will set the saved uid to euid when we pass it a ruid
2070	that isn't -1 (which we do). */
2071	setregid(g_gid, g_gid);
2072	setreuid(g_uid, g_uid);
2073	euid = geteuid();
2074	ruid = suid = getuid();
2075	egid = getegid();
2076	rgid = sgid = getgid();
2077
2078	# else
2079	/* This is the preferred one, full control no questions about semantics.
2080	PORTME: If this isn't work, try join one of two other gangs above. */
2081	int res = setresgid(g_gid, g_gid, g_gid);
2082	NOREF(res);
2083	res = setresuid(g_uid, g_uid, g_uid);
2084	NOREF(res);
2085	if (getresuid(&ruid, &euid, &suid) != 0)
2086	{
2087	euid = geteuid();
2088	ruid = suid = getuid();
2089	}
2090	if (getresgid(&rgid, &egid, &sgid) != 0)
2091	{
2092	egid = getegid();
2093	rgid = sgid = getgid();
2094	}
2095	# endif
2096
2097
2098	/* Check that it worked out all right. */
2099	if ( euid != g_uid
2100	\|\| ruid != g_uid
2101	\|\| suid != g_uid
2102	\|\| egid != g_gid
2103	\|\| rgid != g_gid
2104	\|\| sgid != g_gid)
2105	supR3HardenedFatal("SUPR3HardenedMain: failed to drop root privileges!"
2106	" (euid=%d ruid=%d suid=%d egid=%d rgid=%d sgid=%d; wanted uid=%d and gid=%d)\n",
2107	euid, ruid, suid, egid, rgid, sgid, g_uid, g_gid);
2108
2109	# if RT_OS_LINUX
2110	/*
2111	* Re-enable the cap_net_raw and cap_sys_nice capabilities which were disabled during setresuid.
2112	*/
2113	if (g_uCaps != 0)
2114	{
2115	# ifdef USE_LIB_PCAP
2116	/** @todo Warn if that does not work? */
2117	/* XXX cap_net_bind_service */
2118	cap_set_proc(cap_from_text("cap_net_raw+ep cap_sys_nice+ep"));
2119	# else
2120	cap_user_header_t hdr = (cap_user_header_t)alloca(sizeof(*hdr));
2121	cap_user_data_t cap = (cap_user_data_t)alloca(2 /* _LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S_3 / sizeof(*cap));
2122	memset(hdr, 0, sizeof(*hdr));
2123	hdr->version = g_uCapsVersion;
2124	memset(cap, 0, 2 /* _LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S_3 / sizeof(*cap));
2125	cap->effective = g_uCaps;
2126	cap->permitted = g_uCaps;
2127	/** @todo Warn if that does not work? */
2128	capset(hdr, cap);
2129	# endif /* !USE_LIB_PCAP */
2130	}
2131	# endif
2132	}
2133
2134	#endif /* SUP_HARDENED_SUID */
2135
2136	/**
2137	* Purge the process environment from any environment vairable which can lead
2138	* to loading untrusted binaries compromising the process address space.
2139	*
2140	* @param envp The initial environment vector. (Can be NULL.)
2141	*/
2142	static void supR3HardenedMainPurgeEnvironment(char **envp)
2143	{
2144	for (unsigned i = 0; i < RT_ELEMENTS(g_aSupEnvPurgeDescs); i++)
2145	{
2146	/*
2147	* Update the initial environment vector, just in case someone actually cares about it.
2148	*/
2149	if (envp)
2150	{
2151	const char * const pszEnv = g_aSupEnvPurgeDescs[i].pszEnv;
2152	size_t const cchEnv = g_aSupEnvPurgeDescs[i].cchEnv;
2153	unsigned iSrc = 0;
2154	unsigned iDst = 0;
2155	char *pszTmp;
2156
2157	while ((pszTmp = envp[iSrc]) != NULL)
2158	{
2159	if ( memcmp(pszTmp, pszEnv, cchEnv) != 0
2160	\|\| (pszTmp[cchEnv] != '=' && pszTmp[cchEnv] != '\0'))
2161	{
2162	if (iDst != iSrc)
2163	envp[iDst] = pszTmp;
2164	iDst++;
2165	}
2166	else
2167	SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardenedMainPurgeEnvironment: dropping envp[%d]=%s\n", iSrc, pszTmp));
2168	iSrc++;
2169	}
2170
2171	if (iDst != iSrc)
2172	while (iDst <= iSrc)
2173	envp[iDst++] = NULL;
2174	}
2175
2176	/*
2177	* Remove from the process environment if present.
2178	*/
2179	#ifndef RT_OS_WINDOWS
2180	const char *pszTmp = getenv(g_aSupEnvPurgeDescs[i].pszEnv);
2181	if (pszTmp != NULL)
2182	{
2183	if (unsetenv((char *)g_aSupEnvPurgeDescs[i].pszEnv) == 0)
2184	SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardenedMainPurgeEnvironment: dropped %s\n", pszTmp));
2185	else
2186	if (g_aSupEnvPurgeDescs[i].fPurgeErrFatal)
2187	supR3HardenedFatal("SUPR3HardenedMain: failed to purge %s environment variable! (errno=%d %s)\n",
2188	g_aSupEnvPurgeDescs[i].pszEnv, errno, strerror(errno));
2189	else
2190	SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardenedMainPurgeEnvironment: dropping %s failed! errno=%d\n", pszTmp, errno));
2191	}
2192	#else
2193	/** @todo Call NT API to do the same. */
2194	#endif
2195	}
2196	}
2197
2198
2199	/**
2200	* Returns the argument purge descriptor of the given argument if available.
2201	*
2202	* @retval 0 if it should not be purged.
2203	* @retval 1 if it only the current argument should be purged.
2204	* @retval 2 if the argument and the following (if present) should be purged.
2205	* @param pszArg The argument to look for.
2206	*/
2207	static unsigned supR3HardenedMainShouldPurgeArg(const char *pszArg)
2208	{
2209	for (unsigned i = 0; i < RT_ELEMENTS(g_aSupArgPurgeDescs); i++)
2210	{
2211	size_t const cchPurge = g_aSupArgPurgeDescs[i].cchArg;
2212	if (!memcmp(pszArg, g_aSupArgPurgeDescs[i].pszArg, cchPurge))
2213	{
2214	if (pszArg[cchPurge] == '\0')
2215	return 1 + g_aSupArgPurgeDescs[i].fTakesValue;
2216	if ( g_aSupArgPurgeDescs[i].fTakesValue
2217	&& (pszArg[cchPurge] == ':' \|\| pszArg[cchPurge] == '='))
2218	return 1;
2219	}
2220	}
2221
2222	return 0;
2223	}
2224
2225
2226	/**
2227	* Purges any command line arguments considered harmful.
2228	*
2229	* @returns nothing.
2230	* @param cArgsOrig The original number of arguments.
2231	* @param papszArgsOrig The original argument vector.
2232	* @param pcArgsNew Where to store the new number of arguments on success.
2233	* @param ppapszArgsNew Where to store the pointer to the purged argument vector.
2234	*/
2235	static void supR3HardenedMainPurgeArgs(int cArgsOrig, char *papszArgsOrig, int pcArgsNew, char ***ppapszArgsNew)
2236	{
2237	int iDst = 0;
2238	#ifdef RT_OS_WINDOWS
2239	char *papszArgsNew = papszArgsOrig; / We allocated this, no need to allocate again. */
2240	#else
2241	char papszArgsNew = (char )malloc((cArgsOrig + 1) * sizeof(char *));
2242	#endif
2243	if (papszArgsNew)
2244	{
2245	for (int iSrc = 0; iSrc < cArgsOrig; iSrc++)
2246	{
2247	unsigned cPurgedArgs = supR3HardenedMainShouldPurgeArg(papszArgsOrig[iSrc]);
2248	if (!cPurgedArgs)
2249	papszArgsNew[iDst++] = papszArgsOrig[iSrc];
2250	else
2251	iSrc += cPurgedArgs - 1;
2252	}
2253
2254	papszArgsNew[iDst] = NULL; /* The array is NULL terminated, just like envp. */
2255	}
2256	else
2257	supR3HardenedFatal("SUPR3HardenedMain: failed to allocate memory for purged command line!\n");
2258	*pcArgsNew = iDst;
2259	*ppapszArgsNew = papszArgsNew;
2260
2261	#ifdef RT_OS_WINDOWS
2262	/** @todo Update command line pointers in PEB, wont really work without it. */
2263	#endif
2264	}
2265
2266
2267	/**
2268	* Loads the VBoxRT DLL/SO/DYLIB, hands it the open driver,
2269	* and calls RTR3InitEx.
2270	*
2271	* @param fFlags The SUPR3HardenedMain fFlags argument, passed to supR3PreInit.
2272	*
2273	* @remarks VBoxRT contains both IPRT and SUPR3.
2274	* @remarks This function will not return on failure.
2275	*/
2276	static void supR3HardenedMainInitRuntime(uint32_t fFlags)
2277	{
2278	/*
2279	* Construct the name.
2280	*/
2281	char szPath[RTPATH_MAX];
2282	supR3HardenedPathAppSharedLibs(szPath, sizeof(szPath) - sizeof("/VBoxRT" SUPLIB_DLL_SUFF));
2283	suplibHardenedStrCat(szPath, "/VBoxRT" SUPLIB_DLL_SUFF);
2284
2285	/*
2286	* Open it and resolve the symbols.
2287	*/
2288	#if defined(RT_OS_WINDOWS)
2289	HMODULE hMod = (HMODULE)supR3HardenedWinLoadLibrary(szPath, false /fSystem32Only/, g_fSupHardenedMain);
2290	if (!hMod)
2291	supR3HardenedFatalMsg("supR3HardenedMainInitRuntime", kSupInitOp_IPRT, VERR_MODULE_NOT_FOUND,
2292	"LoadLibrary \"%s\" failed (rc=%d)",
2293	szPath, RtlGetLastWin32Error());
2294	PFNRTR3INITEX pfnRTInitEx = (PFNRTR3INITEX)GetProcAddress(hMod, SUP_HARDENED_SYM("RTR3InitEx"));
2295	if (!pfnRTInitEx)
2296	supR3HardenedFatalMsg("supR3HardenedMainInitRuntime", kSupInitOp_IPRT, VERR_SYMBOL_NOT_FOUND,
2297	"Entrypoint \"RTR3InitEx\" not found in \"%s\" (rc=%d)",
2298	szPath, RtlGetLastWin32Error());
2299
2300	PFNSUPR3PREINIT pfnSUPPreInit = (PFNSUPR3PREINIT)GetProcAddress(hMod, SUP_HARDENED_SYM("supR3PreInit"));
2301	if (!pfnSUPPreInit)
2302	supR3HardenedFatalMsg("supR3HardenedMainInitRuntime", kSupInitOp_IPRT, VERR_SYMBOL_NOT_FOUND,
2303	"Entrypoint \"supR3PreInit\" not found in \"%s\" (rc=%d)",
2304	szPath, RtlGetLastWin32Error());
2305
2306	g_pfnRTLogRelPrintf = (PFNRTLOGRELPRINTF)GetProcAddress(hMod, SUP_HARDENED_SYM("RTLogRelPrintf"));
2307	Assert(g_pfnRTLogRelPrintf); /* Not fatal in non-strict builds. */
2308
2309	#else
2310	/* the dlopen crowd */
2311	void *pvMod = dlopen(szPath, RTLD_NOW \| RTLD_GLOBAL);
2312	if (!pvMod)
2313	supR3HardenedFatalMsg("supR3HardenedMainInitRuntime", kSupInitOp_IPRT, VERR_MODULE_NOT_FOUND,
2314	"dlopen(\"%s\",) failed: %s",
2315	szPath, dlerror());
2316	PFNRTR3INITEX pfnRTInitEx = (PFNRTR3INITEX)(uintptr_t)dlsym(pvMod, SUP_HARDENED_SYM("RTR3InitEx"));
2317	if (!pfnRTInitEx)
2318	supR3HardenedFatalMsg("supR3HardenedMainInitRuntime", kSupInitOp_IPRT, VERR_SYMBOL_NOT_FOUND,
2319	"Entrypoint \"RTR3InitEx\" not found in \"%s\"!\ndlerror: %s",
2320	szPath, dlerror());
2321	PFNSUPR3PREINIT pfnSUPPreInit = (PFNSUPR3PREINIT)(uintptr_t)dlsym(pvMod, SUP_HARDENED_SYM("supR3PreInit"));
2322	if (!pfnSUPPreInit)
2323	supR3HardenedFatalMsg("supR3HardenedMainInitRuntime", kSupInitOp_IPRT, VERR_SYMBOL_NOT_FOUND,
2324	"Entrypoint \"supR3PreInit\" not found in \"%s\"!\ndlerror: %s",
2325	szPath, dlerror());
2326	#endif
2327
2328	/*
2329	* Make the calls.
2330	*/
2331	supR3HardenedGetPreInitData(&g_SupPreInitData);
2332	int rc = pfnSUPPreInit(&g_SupPreInitData, fFlags);
2333	if (RT_FAILURE(rc))
2334	supR3HardenedFatalMsg("supR3HardenedMainInitRuntime", kSupInitOp_IPRT, rc,
2335	"supR3PreInit failed with rc=%d", rc);
2336	const char *pszExePath = NULL;
2337	#ifdef RT_OS_LINUX
2338	if (!supR3HardenedMainIsProcSelfExeAccssible())
2339	pszExePath = g_szSupLibHardenedExePath;
2340	#endif
2341	rc = pfnRTInitEx(RTR3INIT_VER_1,
2342	fFlags & SUPSECMAIN_FLAGS_DONT_OPEN_DEV ? 0 : RTR3INIT_FLAGS_SUPLIB,
2343	0 /cArgs/, NULL /papszArgs/, pszExePath);
2344	if (RT_FAILURE(rc))
2345	supR3HardenedFatalMsg("supR3HardenedMainInitRuntime", kSupInitOp_IPRT, rc,
2346	"RTR3InitEx failed with rc=%d", rc);
2347
2348	#if defined(RT_OS_WINDOWS)
2349	/*
2350	* Windows: Create thread that terminates the process when the parent stub
2351	* process terminates (VBoxNetDHCP, Ctrl-C, etc).
2352	*/
2353	if (!(fFlags & SUPSECMAIN_FLAGS_DONT_OPEN_DEV))
2354	supR3HardenedWinCreateParentWatcherThread(hMod);
2355	#endif
2356	}
2357
2358
2359	/**
2360	* Construct the path to the DLL/SO/DYLIB containing the actual program.
2361	*
2362	* @returns VBox status code.
2363	* @param pszProgName The program name.
2364	* @param fMainFlags The flags passed to SUPR3HardenedMain.
2365	* @param pszPath The output buffer.
2366	* @param cbPath The size of the output buffer, in bytes. Must be at
2367	* least 128 bytes!
2368	*/
2369	static int supR3HardenedMainGetTrustedLib(const char pszProgName, uint32_t fMainFlags, char pszPath, size_t cbPath)
2370	{
2371	supR3HardenedPathAppPrivateArch(pszPath, sizeof(cbPath) - 10);
2372	const char *pszSubDirSlash;
2373	switch (g_fSupHardenedMain & SUPSECMAIN_FLAGS_LOC_MASK)
2374	{
2375	case SUPSECMAIN_FLAGS_LOC_APP_BIN:
2376	#ifdef RT_OS_DARWIN
2377	case SUPSECMAIN_FLAGS_LOC_OSX_HLP_APP:
2378	#endif
2379	pszSubDirSlash = "/";
2380	break;
2381	case SUPSECMAIN_FLAGS_LOC_TESTCASE:
2382	pszSubDirSlash = "/testcase/";
2383	break;
2384	default:
2385	pszSubDirSlash = "/";
2386	supR3HardenedFatal("supR3HardenedMainGetTrustedMain: Unknown program binary location: %#x\n", g_fSupHardenedMain);
2387	}
2388	#ifdef RT_OS_DARWIN
2389	if (fMainFlags & SUPSECMAIN_FLAGS_OSX_VM_APP)
2390	pszProgName = "VirtualBox";
2391	#else
2392	RT_NOREF1(fMainFlags);
2393	#endif
2394	size_t cch = suplibHardenedStrLen(pszPath);
2395	return suplibHardenedStrCopyEx(&pszPath[cch], cbPath - cch, pszSubDirSlash, pszProgName, SUPLIB_DLL_SUFF, NULL);
2396	}
2397
2398
2399	/**
2400	* Loads the DLL/SO/DYLIB containing the actual program and
2401	* resolves the TrustedError symbol.
2402	*
2403	* This is very similar to supR3HardenedMainGetTrustedMain().
2404	*
2405	* @returns Pointer to the trusted error symbol if it is exported, NULL
2406	* and no error messages otherwise.
2407	* @param pszProgName The program name.
2408	*/
2409	static PFNSUPTRUSTEDERROR supR3HardenedMainGetTrustedError(const char *pszProgName)
2410	{
2411	/*
2412	* Don't bother if the main() function didn't advertise any TrustedError
2413	* export. It's both a waste of time and may trigger additional problems,
2414	* confusing or obscuring the original issue.
2415	*/
2416	if (!(g_fSupHardenedMain & SUPSECMAIN_FLAGS_TRUSTED_ERROR))
2417	return NULL;
2418
2419	/*
2420	* Construct the name.
2421	*/
2422	char szPath[RTPATH_MAX];
2423	supR3HardenedMainGetTrustedLib(pszProgName, g_fSupHardenedMain, szPath, sizeof(szPath));
2424
2425	/*
2426	* Open it and resolve the symbol.
2427	*/
2428	#if defined(RT_OS_WINDOWS)
2429	supR3HardenedWinEnableThreadCreation();
2430	HMODULE hMod = (HMODULE)supR3HardenedWinLoadLibrary(szPath, false /fSystem32Only/, 0 /fMainFlags/);
2431	if (!hMod)
2432	return NULL;
2433	FARPROC pfn = GetProcAddress(hMod, SUP_HARDENED_SYM("TrustedError"));
2434	if (!pfn)
2435	return NULL;
2436	return (PFNSUPTRUSTEDERROR)pfn;
2437
2438	#else
2439	/* the dlopen crowd */
2440	void *pvMod = dlopen(szPath, RTLD_NOW \| RTLD_GLOBAL);
2441	if (!pvMod)
2442	return NULL;
2443	void *pvSym = dlsym(pvMod, SUP_HARDENED_SYM("TrustedError"));
2444	if (!pvSym)
2445	return NULL;
2446	return (PFNSUPTRUSTEDERROR)(uintptr_t)pvSym;
2447	#endif
2448	}
2449
2450
2451	/**
2452	* Loads the DLL/SO/DYLIB containing the actual program and
2453	* resolves the TrustedMain symbol.
2454	*
2455	* @returns Pointer to the trusted main of the actual program.
2456	* @param pszProgName The program name.
2457	* @param fMainFlags The flags passed to SUPR3HardenedMain.
2458	* @remarks This function will not return on failure.
2459	*/
2460	static PFNSUPTRUSTEDMAIN supR3HardenedMainGetTrustedMain(const char *pszProgName, uint32_t fMainFlags)
2461	{
2462	/*
2463	* Construct the name.
2464	*/
2465	char szPath[RTPATH_MAX];
2466	supR3HardenedMainGetTrustedLib(pszProgName, fMainFlags, szPath, sizeof(szPath));
2467
2468	/*
2469	* Open it and resolve the symbol.
2470	*/
2471	#if defined(RT_OS_WINDOWS)
2472	HMODULE hMod = (HMODULE)supR3HardenedWinLoadLibrary(szPath, false /fSystem32Only/, 0 /fMainFlags/);
2473	if (!hMod)
2474	supR3HardenedFatal("supR3HardenedMainGetTrustedMain: LoadLibrary \"%s\" failed, rc=%d\n",
2475	szPath, RtlGetLastWin32Error());
2476	FARPROC pfn = GetProcAddress(hMod, SUP_HARDENED_SYM("TrustedMain"));
2477	if (!pfn)
2478	supR3HardenedFatal("supR3HardenedMainGetTrustedMain: Entrypoint \"TrustedMain\" not found in \"%s\" (rc=%d)\n",
2479	szPath, RtlGetLastWin32Error());
2480	return (PFNSUPTRUSTEDMAIN)pfn;
2481
2482	#else
2483	/* the dlopen crowd */
2484	void *pvMod = dlopen(szPath, RTLD_NOW \| RTLD_GLOBAL);
2485	if (!pvMod)
2486	supR3HardenedFatal("supR3HardenedMainGetTrustedMain: dlopen(\"%s\",) failed: %s\n",
2487	szPath, dlerror());
2488	void *pvSym = dlsym(pvMod, SUP_HARDENED_SYM("TrustedMain"));
2489	if (!pvSym)
2490	supR3HardenedFatal("supR3HardenedMainGetTrustedMain: Entrypoint \"TrustedMain\" not found in \"%s\"!\ndlerror: %s\n",
2491	szPath, dlerror());
2492	return (PFNSUPTRUSTEDMAIN)(uintptr_t)pvSym;
2493	#endif
2494	}
2495
2496
2497	/**
2498	* Secure main.
2499	*
2500	* This is used for the set-user-ID-on-execute binaries on unixy systems
2501	* and when using the open-vboxdrv-via-root-service setup on Windows.
2502	*
2503	* This function will perform the integrity checks of the VirtualBox
2504	* installation, open the support driver, open the root service (later),
2505	* and load the DLL corresponding to \a pszProgName and execute its main
2506	* function.
2507	*
2508	* @returns Return code appropriate for main().
2509	*
2510	* @param pszProgName The program name. This will be used to figure out which
2511	* DLL/SO/DYLIB to load and execute.
2512	* @param fFlags Flags.
2513	* @param argc The argument count.
2514	* @param argv The argument vector.
2515	* @param envp The environment vector.
2516	*/
2517	DECLHIDDEN(int) SUPR3HardenedMain(const char pszProgName, uint32_t fFlags, int argc, char argv, char *envp)
2518	{
2519	SUP_DPRINTF(("SUPR3HardenedMain: pszProgName=%s fFlags=%#x\n", pszProgName, fFlags));
2520	g_enmSupR3HardenedMainState = SUPR3HARDENEDMAINSTATE_HARDENED_MAIN_CALLED;
2521
2522	/*
2523	* Note! At this point there is no IPRT, so we will have to stick
2524	* to basic CRT functions that everyone agree upon.
2525	*/
2526	g_pszSupLibHardenedProgName = pszProgName;
2527	g_fSupHardenedMain = fFlags;
2528	g_SupPreInitData.u32Magic = SUPPREINITDATA_MAGIC;
2529	g_SupPreInitData.u32EndMagic = SUPPREINITDATA_MAGIC;
2530	#ifdef RT_OS_WINDOWS
2531	if (!g_fSupEarlyProcessInit)
2532	#endif
2533	g_SupPreInitData.Data.hDevice = SUP_HDEVICE_NIL;
2534
2535	/*
2536	* Determine the full exe path as we'll be needing it for the verify all
2537	* call(s) below. (We have to do this early on Linux because we * might
2538	* not be able to access /proc/self/exe after the seteuid call.)
2539	*/
2540	supR3HardenedGetFullExePath();
2541	#ifdef RT_OS_WINDOWS
2542	supR3HardenedWinInitAppBin(fFlags);
2543	#endif
2544
2545	#ifdef SUP_HARDENED_SUID
2546	/*
2547	* Grab any options from the environment.
2548	*/
2549	supR3GrabOptions();
2550
2551	/*
2552	* Check that we're root, if we aren't then the installation is butchered.
2553	*/
2554	g_uid = getuid();
2555	g_gid = getgid();
2556	if (geteuid() != 0 /* root */)
2557	supR3HardenedFatalMsg("SUPR3HardenedMain", kSupInitOp_RootCheck, VERR_PERMISSION_DENIED,
2558	"Effective UID is not root (euid=%d egid=%d uid=%d gid=%d)",
2559	geteuid(), getegid(), g_uid, g_gid);
2560	#endif /* SUP_HARDENED_SUID */
2561
2562	#ifdef RT_OS_WINDOWS
2563	/*
2564	* Windows: First respawn. On Windows we will respawn the process twice to establish
2565	* something we can put some kind of reliable trust in. The first respawning aims
2566	* at dropping compatibility layers and process "security" solutions.
2567	*/
2568	if ( !g_fSupEarlyProcessInit
2569	&& !(fFlags & SUPSECMAIN_FLAGS_DONT_OPEN_DEV)
2570	&& supR3HardenedWinIsReSpawnNeeded(1 /iWhich/, argc, argv))
2571	{
2572	SUP_DPRINTF(("SUPR3HardenedMain: Respawn #1\n"));
2573	supR3HardenedWinInit(SUPSECMAIN_FLAGS_DONT_OPEN_DEV \| SUPSECMAIN_FLAGS_FIRST_PROCESS, false /fAvastKludge/);
2574	supR3HardenedVerifyAll(true /* fFatal */, pszProgName, g_szSupLibHardenedExePath, fFlags);
2575	return supR3HardenedWinReSpawn(1 /iWhich/);
2576	}
2577
2578	/*
2579	* Windows: Initialize the image verification global data so we can verify the
2580	* signature of the process image and hook the core of the DLL loader API so we
2581	* can check the signature of all DLLs mapped into the process. (Already done
2582	* by early VM process init.)
2583	*/
2584	if (!g_fSupEarlyProcessInit)
2585	supR3HardenedWinInit(fFlags, true /fAvastKludge/);
2586	#endif /* RT_OS_WINDOWS */
2587
2588	/*
2589	* Validate the installation.
2590	*/
2591	supR3HardenedVerifyAll(true /* fFatal */, pszProgName, g_szSupLibHardenedExePath, fFlags);
2592
2593	/*
2594	* The next steps are only taken if we actually need to access the support
2595	* driver. (Already done by early process init.)
2596	*/
2597	if (!(fFlags & SUPSECMAIN_FLAGS_DONT_OPEN_DEV))
2598	{
2599	#ifdef RT_OS_WINDOWS
2600	/*
2601	* Windows: Must have done early process init if we get here.
2602	*/
2603	if (!g_fSupEarlyProcessInit)
2604	supR3HardenedFatalMsg("SUPR3HardenedMain", kSupInitOp_Integrity, VERR_WRONG_ORDER,
2605	"Early process init was somehow skipped.");
2606
2607	/*
2608	* Windows: The second respawn. This time we make a special arrangement
2609	* with vboxdrv to monitor access to the new process from its inception.
2610	*/
2611	if (supR3HardenedWinIsReSpawnNeeded(2 /* iWhich*/, argc, argv))
2612	{
2613	SUP_DPRINTF(("SUPR3HardenedMain: Respawn #2\n"));
2614	return supR3HardenedWinReSpawn(2 /* iWhich*/);
2615	}
2616	SUP_DPRINTF(("SUPR3HardenedMain: Final process, opening VBoxDrv...\n"));
2617	supR3HardenedWinFlushLoaderCache();
2618
2619	#else
2620	/*
2621	* Open the vboxdrv device.
2622	*/
2623	supR3HardenedMainOpenDevice();
2624	#endif /* !RT_OS_WINDOWS */
2625	}
2626
2627	#ifdef RT_OS_WINDOWS
2628	/*
2629	* Windows: Enable the use of windows APIs to verify images at load time.
2630	*/
2631	supR3HardenedWinEnableThreadCreation();
2632	supR3HardenedWinFlushLoaderCache();
2633	supR3HardenedWinResolveVerifyTrustApiAndHookThreadCreation(g_pszSupLibHardenedProgName);
2634	g_enmSupR3HardenedMainState = SUPR3HARDENEDMAINSTATE_WIN_VERIFY_TRUST_READY;
2635	#else /* !RT_OS_WINDOWS */
2636	# if defined(RT_OS_DARWIN)
2637	supR3HardenedDarwinInit();
2638	# elif !defined(RT_OS_FREEBSD) /** @todo Portme. */
2639	/*
2640	* Posix: Hook the load library interface interface.
2641	*/
2642	supR3HardenedPosixInit();
2643	# endif
2644	#endif /* !RT_OS_WINDOWS */
2645
2646	#ifdef SUP_HARDENED_SUID
2647	/*
2648	* Grab additional capabilities / privileges.
2649	*/
2650	supR3HardenedMainGrabCapabilites();
2651
2652	/*
2653	* Drop any root privileges we might be holding (won't return on failure)
2654	*/
2655	supR3HardenedMainDropPrivileges();
2656	#endif
2657
2658	/*
2659	* Purge any environment variables and command line arguments considered harmful.
2660	*/
2661	/** @todo May need to move this to a much earlier stage on windows. */
2662	supR3HardenedMainPurgeEnvironment(envp);
2663	supR3HardenedMainPurgeArgs(argc, argv, &argc, &argv);
2664
2665	/*
2666	* Load the IPRT, hand the SUPLib part the open driver and
2667	* call RTR3InitEx.
2668	*/
2669	SUP_DPRINTF(("SUPR3HardenedMain: Load Runtime...\n"));
2670	g_enmSupR3HardenedMainState = SUPR3HARDENEDMAINSTATE_INIT_RUNTIME;
2671	supR3HardenedMainInitRuntime(fFlags);
2672	#ifdef RT_OS_WINDOWS
2673	supR3HardenedWinModifyDllSearchPath(fFlags, g_szSupLibHardenedAppBinPath);
2674	#endif
2675
2676	/*
2677	* Load the DLL/SO/DYLIB containing the actual program
2678	* and pass control to it.
2679	*/
2680	SUP_DPRINTF(("SUPR3HardenedMain: Load TrustedMain...\n"));
2681	g_enmSupR3HardenedMainState = SUPR3HARDENEDMAINSTATE_GET_TRUSTED_MAIN;
2682	PFNSUPTRUSTEDMAIN pfnTrustedMain = supR3HardenedMainGetTrustedMain(pszProgName, fFlags);
2683
2684	SUP_DPRINTF(("SUPR3HardenedMain: Calling TrustedMain (%p)...\n", pfnTrustedMain));
2685	g_enmSupR3HardenedMainState = SUPR3HARDENEDMAINSTATE_CALLED_TRUSTED_MAIN;
2686	return pfnTrustedMain(argc, argv, envp);
2687	}
2688

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source: vbox/trunk/src/VBox/HostDrivers/Support/SUPR3HardenedMain.cpp@ 92270

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