SUPHardenedVerifyImage-win.cpp@ 52414

Last change on this file since 52414 was 52414, checked in by vboxsync, 10 years ago
SUP: Need per thread recursion counters for WinVerifyTrust or we risk deadlocking. This is new after hooking LdrLoadDll.
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1	/* $Id: SUPHardenedVerifyImage-win.cpp 52414 2014-08-19 14:05:18Z vboxsync $ */
2	/** @file
3	* VirtualBox Support Library/Driver - Hardened Image Verification, Windows.
4	*/
5
6	/*
7	* Copyright (C) 2006-2014 Oracle Corporation
8	*
9	* This file is part of VirtualBox Open Source Edition (OSE), as
10	* available from http://www.virtualbox.org. This file is free software;
11	* you can redistribute it and/or modify it under the terms of the GNU
12	* General Public License (GPL) as published by the Free Software
13	* Foundation, in version 2 as it comes in the "COPYING" file of the
14	* VirtualBox OSE distribution. VirtualBox OSE is distributed in the
15	* hope that it will be useful, but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY of any kind.
16	*
17	* The contents of this file may alternatively be used under the terms
18	* of the Common Development and Distribution License Version 1.0
19	* (CDDL) only, as it comes in the "COPYING.CDDL" file of the
20	* VirtualBox OSE distribution, in which case the provisions of the
21	* CDDL are applicable instead of those of the GPL.
22	*
23	* You may elect to license modified versions of this file under the
24	* terms and conditions of either the GPL or the CDDL or both.
25	*/
26
27	/*******************************************************************************
28	* Header Files *
29	*******************************************************************************/
30	#ifdef IN_RING0
31	# define IPRT_NT_MAP_TO_ZW
32	# include <iprt/nt/nt.h>
33	# include <ntimage.h>
34	#else
35	# include <iprt/nt/nt-and-windows.h>
36	# include "Wintrust.h"
37	# include "Softpub.h"
38	# include "mscat.h"
39	# ifndef LOAD_LIBRARY_SEARCH_APPLICATION_DIR
40	# define LOAD_LIBRARY_SEARCH_SYSTEM32 0x800
41	# endif
42	#endif
43
44	#include <VBox/sup.h>
45	#include <VBox/err.h>
46	#include <iprt/ctype.h>
47	#include <iprt/ldr.h>
48	#include <iprt/log.h>
49	#include <iprt/path.h>
50	#include <iprt/string.h>
51	#include <iprt/crypto/pkcs7.h>
52	#include <iprt/crypto/store.h>
53
54	#ifdef IN_RING0
55	# include "SUPDrvInternal.h"
56	#else
57	# include "SUPLibInternal.h"
58	#endif
59	#include "win/SUPHardenedVerify-win.h"
60
61
62	/*******************************************************************************
63	* Defined Constants And Macros *
64	*******************************************************************************/
65	/** The size of static hash (output) buffers.
66	* Avoids dynamic allocations and cleanups for of small buffers as well as extra
67	* calls for getting the appropriate buffer size. The largest digest in regular
68	* use by current windows version is SHA-512, we double this and hope it's
69	* enough a good while. */
70	#define SUPHARDNTVI_MAX_CAT_HASH_SIZE 128
71
72
73	#if defined(VBOX_PERMIT_EVEN_MORE) && !defined(VBOX_PERMIT_MORE)
74	# error "VBOX_PERMIT_EVEN_MORE without VBOX_PERMIT_MORE!"
75	#endif
76
77
78	/*******************************************************************************
79	* Structures and Typedefs *
80	*******************************************************************************/
81
82	#ifdef IN_RING3
83	typedef LONG (WINAPI * PFNWINVERIFYTRUST)(HWND hwnd, GUID const *pgActionID, PVOID pWVTData);
84	typedef BOOL (WINAPI * PFNCRYPTCATADMINACQUIRECONTEXT)(HCATADMIN phCatAdmin, const GUID pGuidSubsystem, DWORD dwFlags);
85	typedef BOOL (WINAPI * PFNCRYPTCATADMINACQUIRECONTEXT2)(HCATADMIN phCatAdmin, const GUID pGuidSubsystem, PCWSTR pwszHashAlgorithm,
86	struct _CERT_STRONG_SIGN_PARA const *pStrongHashPolicy, DWORD dwFlags);
87	typedef BOOL (WINAPI * PFNCRYPTCATADMINCALCHASHFROMFILEHANDLE)(HANDLE hFile, DWORD pcbHash, BYTE pbHash, DWORD dwFlags);
88	typedef BOOL (WINAPI * PFNCRYPTCATADMINCALCHASHFROMFILEHANDLE2)(HCATADMIN hCatAdmin, HANDLE hFile, DWORD *pcbHash,
89	BYTE *pbHash, DWORD dwFlags);
90	typedef HCATINFO (WINAPI PFNCRYPTCATADMINENUMCATALOGFROMHASH)(HCATADMIN hCatAdmin, BYTE pbHash, DWORD cbHash,
91	DWORD dwFlags, HCATINFO *phPrevCatInfo);
92	typedef BOOL (WINAPI * PFNCRYPTCATADMINRELEASECATALOGCONTEXT)(HCATADMIN hCatAdmin, HCATINFO hCatInfo, DWORD dwFlags);
93	typedef BOOL (WINAPI * PFNCRYPTCATDADMINRELEASECONTEXT)(HCATADMIN hCatAdmin, DWORD dwFlags);
94	typedef BOOL (WINAPI * PFNCRYPTCATCATALOGINFOFROMCONTEXT)(HCATINFO hCatInfo, CATALOG_INFO *psCatInfo, DWORD dwFlags);
95
96	typedef HCERTSTORE (WINAPI *PFNCERTOPENSTORE)(PCSTR pszStoreProvider, DWORD dwEncodingType, HCRYPTPROV_LEGACY hCryptProv,
97	DWORD dwFlags, const void *pvParam);
98	typedef BOOL (WINAPI *PFNCERTCLOSESTORE)(HCERTSTORE hCertStore, DWORD dwFlags);
99	typedef PCCERT_CONTEXT (WINAPI *PFNCERTENUMCERTIFICATESINSTORE)(HCERTSTORE hCertStore, PCCERT_CONTEXT pPrevCertContext);
100	#endif
101
102
103	/*******************************************************************************
104	* Global Variables *
105	*******************************************************************************/
106	/** The build certificate. */
107	static RTCRX509CERTIFICATE g_BuildX509Cert;
108
109	/** Store for root software publisher certificates. */
110	static RTCRSTORE g_hSpcRootStore = NIL_RTCRSTORE;
111	/** Store for root NT kernel certificates. */
112	static RTCRSTORE g_hNtKernelRootStore = NIL_RTCRSTORE;
113
114	/** Store containing SPC, NT kernel signing, and timestamp root certificates. */
115	static RTCRSTORE g_hSpcAndNtKernelRootStore = NIL_RTCRSTORE;
116	/** Store for supplemental certificates for use with
117	* g_hSpcAndNtKernelRootStore. */
118	static RTCRSTORE g_hSpcAndNtKernelSuppStore = NIL_RTCRSTORE;
119
120	/** The full \\SystemRoot\\System32 path. */
121	SUPSYSROOTDIRBUF g_System32NtPath;
122	/** The full \\SystemRoot\\WinSxS path. */
123	SUPSYSROOTDIRBUF g_WinSxSNtPath;
124	#ifdef IN_RING3
125	/** The full 'Program Files' path. */
126	SUPSYSROOTDIRBUF g_ProgramFilesNtPath;
127	# ifdef RT_ARCH_AMD64
128	/** The full 'Program Files (x86)' path. */
129	SUPSYSROOTDIRBUF g_ProgramFilesX86NtPath;
130	# endif
131	/** The full 'Common Files' path. */
132	SUPSYSROOTDIRBUF g_CommonFilesNtPath;
133	# ifdef RT_ARCH_AMD64
134	/** The full 'Common Files (x86)' path. */
135	SUPSYSROOTDIRBUF g_CommonFilesX86NtPath;
136	# endif
137	#endif /* IN_RING3 */
138
139	/** The TrustedInstaller SID (Vista+). */
140	static union
141	{
142	SID Sid;
143	uint8_t abPadding[SECURITY_MAX_SID_SIZE];
144	} g_TrustedInstallerSid;
145
146	/** Set after we've retrived other SPC root certificates from the system. */
147	static bool g_fHaveOtherRoots = false;
148
149	#if defined(IN_RING3) && !defined(IN_SUP_HARDENED_R3)
150	/** Combined windows NT version number. See SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_COMBINED and
151	* SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_SIMPLE. */
152	uint32_t g_uNtVerCombined;
153	#endif
154
155	#ifdef IN_RING3
156	/** Timestamp hack working around issues with old DLLs that we ship.
157	* See supHardenedWinVerifyImageByHandle() for details. */
158	static uint64_t g_uBuildTimestampHack = 0;
159	#endif
160
161	#ifdef IN_RING3
162	/** Pointer to WinVerifyTrust. */
163	PFNWINVERIFYTRUST g_pfnWinVerifyTrust;
164	/** Pointer to CryptCATAdminAcquireContext. */
165	PFNCRYPTCATADMINACQUIRECONTEXT g_pfnCryptCATAdminAcquireContext;
166	/** Pointer to CryptCATAdminAcquireContext2 if available. */
167	PFNCRYPTCATADMINACQUIRECONTEXT2 g_pfnCryptCATAdminAcquireContext2;
168	/** Pointer to CryptCATAdminCalcHashFromFileHandle. */
169	PFNCRYPTCATADMINCALCHASHFROMFILEHANDLE g_pfnCryptCATAdminCalcHashFromFileHandle;
170	/** Pointer to CryptCATAdminCalcHashFromFileHandle2. */
171	PFNCRYPTCATADMINCALCHASHFROMFILEHANDLE2 g_pfnCryptCATAdminCalcHashFromFileHandle2;
172	/** Pointer to CryptCATAdminEnumCatalogFromHash. */
173	PFNCRYPTCATADMINENUMCATALOGFROMHASH g_pfnCryptCATAdminEnumCatalogFromHash;
174	/** Pointer to CryptCATAdminReleaseCatalogContext. */
175	PFNCRYPTCATADMINRELEASECATALOGCONTEXT g_pfnCryptCATAdminReleaseCatalogContext;
176	/** Pointer to CryptCATAdminReleaseContext. */
177	PFNCRYPTCATDADMINRELEASECONTEXT g_pfnCryptCATAdminReleaseContext;
178	/** Pointer to CryptCATCatalogInfoFromContext. */
179	PFNCRYPTCATCATALOGINFOFROMCONTEXT g_pfnCryptCATCatalogInfoFromContext;
180
181	/** Where we store the TLS entry for detecting WinVerifyTrustRecursion. */
182	static uint32_t g_iTlsWinVerifyTrustRecursion = UINT32_MAX;
183	/** Fallback WinVerifyTrust recursion protection. */
184	static uint32_t volatile g_idActiveThread = UINT32_MAX;
185
186	#endif
187
188
189	/*******************************************************************************
190	* Internal Functions *
191	*******************************************************************************/
192	#ifdef IN_RING3
193	static int supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrust(HANDLE hFile, PCRTUTF16 pwszName, uint32_t fFlags, PRTERRINFO pErrInfo,
194	PFNWINVERIFYTRUST pfnWinVerifyTrust);
195	static int supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrustCatFile(HANDLE hFile, PCRTUTF16 pwszName, uint32_t fFlags, PRTERRINFO pErrInfo,
196	PFNWINVERIFYTRUST pfnWinVerifyTrust);
197	#endif
198
199
200
201
202	/** @copydoc RTLDRREADER::pfnRead */
203	static DECLCALLBACK(int) supHardNtViRdrRead(PRTLDRREADER pReader, void *pvBuf, size_t cb, RTFOFF off)
204	{
205	PSUPHNTVIRDR pNtViRdr = (PSUPHNTVIRDR)pReader;
206	Assert(pNtViRdr->Core.uMagic == RTLDRREADER_MAGIC);
207
208	if ((ULONG)cb != cb)
209	return VERR_OUT_OF_RANGE;
210
211
212	/*
213	* For some reason I'm getting occational read error in an XP VM with
214	* STATUS_FAILED_DRIVER_ENTRY. Redoing the call again works in the
215	* debugger, so try do that automatically.
216	*/
217	for (uint32_t iTry = 0;; iTry++)
218	{
219	LARGE_INTEGER offNt;
220	offNt.QuadPart = off;
221
222	IO_STATUS_BLOCK Ios = RTNT_IO_STATUS_BLOCK_INITIALIZER;
223	NTSTATUS rcNt = NtReadFile(pNtViRdr->hFile,
224	NULL /hEvent/,
225	NULL /ApcRoutine/,
226	NULL /ApcContext/,
227	&Ios,
228	pvBuf,
229	(ULONG)cb,
230	&offNt,
231	NULL);
232	if (NT_SUCCESS(rcNt))
233	rcNt = Ios.Status;
234	if (NT_SUCCESS(rcNt))
235	{
236	if (Ios.Information == cb)
237	{
238	pNtViRdr->off = off + cb;
239	return VINF_SUCCESS;
240	}
241	#ifdef IN_RING3
242	supR3HardenedError(VERR_READ_ERROR, false,
243	"supHardNtViRdrRead: Only got %#zx bytes when requesting %#zx bytes at %#llx in '%s'.\n",
244	Ios.Information, off, cb, pNtViRdr->szFilename);
245	#endif
246	pNtViRdr->off = -1;
247	return VERR_READ_ERROR;
248	}
249
250	/*
251	* Delay a little before we retry?
252	*/
253	#ifdef IN_RING3
254	if (iTry == 0)
255	NtYieldExecution();
256	else if (iTry >= 1)
257	{
258	LARGE_INTEGER Time;
259	Time.QuadPart = -1000000 / 100; /* 1ms in 100ns units, relative time. */
260	NtDelayExecution(TRUE, &Time);
261	}
262	#endif
263	/*
264	* Before we give up, we'll try split up the request in case the
265	* kernel is low on memory or similar. For simplicity reasons, we do
266	* this in a recursion fashion.
267	*/
268	if (iTry >= 2)
269	{
270	if (cb >= _8K)
271	{
272	size_t const cbBlock = RT_ALIGN_Z(cb / 4, 512);
273	while (cb > 0)
274	{
275	size_t cbThisRead = RT_MIN(cb, cbBlock);
276	int rc = supHardNtViRdrRead(&pNtViRdr->Core, pvBuf, cbThisRead, off);
277	if (RT_FAILURE(rc))
278	return rc;
279	off += cbThisRead;
280	cb -= cbThisRead;
281	pvBuf = (uint8_t *)pvBuf + cbThisRead;
282	}
283	return VINF_SUCCESS;
284	}
285
286	#ifdef IN_RING3
287	supR3HardenedError(VERR_READ_ERROR, false, "supHardNtViRdrRead: Error %#x reading %#zx bytes at %#llx in '%s'.\n",
288	rcNt, off, cb, pNtViRdr->szFilename);
289	#endif
290	pNtViRdr->off = -1;
291	return VERR_READ_ERROR;
292	}
293	}
294	}
295
296
297	/** @copydoc RTLDRREADER::pfnTell */
298	static DECLCALLBACK(RTFOFF) supHardNtViRdrTell(PRTLDRREADER pReader)
299	{
300	PSUPHNTVIRDR pNtViRdr = (PSUPHNTVIRDR)pReader;
301	Assert(pNtViRdr->Core.uMagic == RTLDRREADER_MAGIC);
302	return pNtViRdr->off;
303	}
304
305
306	/** @copydoc RTLDRREADER::pfnSize */
307	static DECLCALLBACK(RTFOFF) supHardNtViRdrSize(PRTLDRREADER pReader)
308	{
309	PSUPHNTVIRDR pNtViRdr = (PSUPHNTVIRDR)pReader;
310	Assert(pNtViRdr->Core.uMagic == RTLDRREADER_MAGIC);
311	return pNtViRdr->cbFile;
312	}
313
314
315	/** @copydoc RTLDRREADER::pfnLogName */
316	static DECLCALLBACK(const char *) supHardNtViRdrLogName(PRTLDRREADER pReader)
317	{
318	PSUPHNTVIRDR pNtViRdr = (PSUPHNTVIRDR)pReader;
319	return pNtViRdr->szFilename;
320	}
321
322
323	/** @copydoc RTLDRREADER::pfnMap */
324	static DECLCALLBACK(int) supHardNtViRdrMap(PRTLDRREADER pReader, const void **ppvBits)
325	{
326	return VERR_NOT_SUPPORTED;
327	}
328
329
330	/** @copydoc RTLDRREADER::pfnUnmap */
331	static DECLCALLBACK(int) supHardNtViRdrUnmap(PRTLDRREADER pReader, const void *pvBits)
332	{
333	return VERR_NOT_SUPPORTED;
334	}
335
336
337	/** @copydoc RTLDRREADER::pfnDestroy */
338	static DECLCALLBACK(int) supHardNtViRdrDestroy(PRTLDRREADER pReader)
339	{
340	PSUPHNTVIRDR pNtViRdr = (PSUPHNTVIRDR)pReader;
341	Assert(pNtViRdr->Core.uMagic == RTLDRREADER_MAGIC);
342
343	pNtViRdr->Core.uMagic = ~RTLDRREADER_MAGIC;
344	pNtViRdr->hFile = NULL;
345
346	RTMemFree(pNtViRdr);
347	return VINF_SUCCESS;
348	}
349
350
351	/**
352	* Creates a loader reader instance for the given NT file handle.
353	*
354	* @returns iprt status code.
355	* @param hFile Native NT file handle.
356	* @param pwszName Optional file name.
357	* @param fFlags Flags, SUPHNTVI_F_XXX.
358	* @param ppNtViRdr Where to store the reader instance on success.
359	*/
360	DECLHIDDEN(int) supHardNtViRdrCreate(HANDLE hFile, PCRTUTF16 pwszName, uint32_t fFlags, PSUPHNTVIRDR *ppNtViRdr)
361	{
362	/*
363	* Try determine the size of the file.
364	*/
365	IO_STATUS_BLOCK Ios = RTNT_IO_STATUS_BLOCK_INITIALIZER;
366	FILE_STANDARD_INFORMATION StdInfo;
367	NTSTATUS rcNt = NtQueryInformationFile(hFile, &Ios, &StdInfo, sizeof(StdInfo), FileStandardInformation);
368	if (!NT_SUCCESS(rcNt) \|\| !NT_SUCCESS(Ios.Status))
369	return VERR_LDRVI_FILE_LENGTH_ERROR;
370
371	/*
372	* Calc the file name length and allocate memory for the reader instance.
373	*/
374	size_t cchFilename = 0;
375	if (pwszName)
376	cchFilename = RTUtf16CalcUtf8Len(pwszName);
377
378	int rc = VERR_NO_MEMORY;
379	PSUPHNTVIRDR pNtViRdr = (PSUPHNTVIRDR)RTMemAllocZ(sizeof(*pNtViRdr) + cchFilename);
380	if (!pNtViRdr)
381	return VERR_NO_MEMORY;
382
383	/*
384	* Initialize the structure.
385	*/
386	if (cchFilename)
387	{
388	char *pszName = &pNtViRdr->szFilename[0];
389	rc = RTUtf16ToUtf8Ex(pwszName, RTSTR_MAX, &pszName, cchFilename + 1, NULL);
390	AssertStmt(RT_SUCCESS(rc), pNtViRdr->szFilename[0] = '\0');
391	}
392	else
393	pNtViRdr->szFilename[0] = '\0';
394
395	pNtViRdr->Core.uMagic = RTLDRREADER_MAGIC;
396	pNtViRdr->Core.pfnRead = supHardNtViRdrRead;
397	pNtViRdr->Core.pfnTell = supHardNtViRdrTell;
398	pNtViRdr->Core.pfnSize = supHardNtViRdrSize;
399	pNtViRdr->Core.pfnLogName = supHardNtViRdrLogName;
400	pNtViRdr->Core.pfnMap = supHardNtViRdrMap;
401	pNtViRdr->Core.pfnUnmap = supHardNtViRdrUnmap;
402	pNtViRdr->Core.pfnDestroy = supHardNtViRdrDestroy;
403	pNtViRdr->hFile = hFile;
404	pNtViRdr->off = 0;
405	pNtViRdr->cbFile = StdInfo.EndOfFile.QuadPart;
406	pNtViRdr->fFlags = fFlags;
407	*ppNtViRdr = pNtViRdr;
408	return VINF_SUCCESS;
409	}
410
411
412	/**
413	* Checks if the file is owned by TrustedInstaller on Vista and later.
414	*
415	* @returns true if owned by TrustedInstaller of pre-Vista, false if not.
416	*
417	* @param hFile The handle to the file.
418	* @param pwszName The name of the file.
419	*/
420	static bool supHardNtViCheckIsOwnedByTrustedInstaller(HANDLE hFile, PCRTUTF16 pwszName)
421	{
422	if (g_uNtVerCombined < SUP_NT_VER_VISTA)
423	return true;
424
425	/*
426	* Get the ownership information.
427	*/
428	union
429	{
430	SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR_RELATIVE Rel;
431	SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR Abs;
432	uint8_t abView[256];
433	} uBuf;
434	ULONG cbActual;
435	NTSTATUS rcNt = NtQuerySecurityObject(hFile, OWNER_SECURITY_INFORMATION, &uBuf.Abs, sizeof(uBuf), &cbActual);
436	if (!NT_SUCCESS(rcNt))
437	{
438	SUP_DPRINTF(("NtQuerySecurityObject failed with rcNt=%#x on '%ls'\n", rcNt, pwszName));
439	return false;
440	}
441
442	/*
443	* Check the owner.
444	*/
445	PSID pOwner = uBuf.Rel.Control & SE_SELF_RELATIVE ? &uBuf.abView[uBuf.Rel.Owner] : uBuf.Abs.Owner;
446	Assert((uintptr_t)pOwner - (uintptr_t)&uBuf < sizeof(uBuf) - sizeof(SID));
447	if (RtlEqualSid(pOwner, &g_TrustedInstallerSid))
448	return true;
449
450	SUP_DPRINTF(("%ls: Owner is not trusted installer (%.*Rhxs)\n",
451	pwszName, ((uint8_t )pOwner)[1] /SubAuthorityCount/ sizeof(ULONG) + 8, pOwner));
452	return false;
453	}
454
455
456	/**
457	* Simple case insensitive UTF-16 / ASCII path compare.
458	*
459	* @returns true if equal, false if not.
460	* @param pwszLeft The UTF-16 path string.
461	* @param pszRight The ascii string.
462	*/
463	static bool supHardViUtf16PathIsEqual(PCRTUTF16 pwszLeft, const char *pszRight)
464	{
465	for (;;)
466	{
467	RTUTF16 wc = *pwszLeft++;
468	uint8_t b = *pszRight++;
469	if (b != wc)
470	{
471	if (wc >= 0x80)
472	return false;
473	wc = RT_C_TO_LOWER(wc);
474	if (wc != b)
475	{
476	b = RT_C_TO_LOWER(b);
477	if (wc != b)
478	{
479	if (wc == '/')
480	wc = '\\';
481	if (b == '/')
482	b = '\\';
483	if (wc != b)
484	return false;
485	}
486	}
487	}
488	if (!b)
489	return true;
490	}
491	}
492
493
494	/**
495	* Simple case insensitive UTF-16 / ASCII ends-with path predicate.
496	*
497	* @returns true if equal, false if not.
498	* @param pwsz The UTF-16 path string.
499	* @param pszSuffix The ascii suffix string.
500	*/
501	static bool supHardViUtf16PathEndsWith(PCRTUTF16 pwsz, const char *pszSuffix)
502	{
503	size_t cwc = RTUtf16Len(pwsz);
504	size_t cchSuffix = strlen(pszSuffix);
505	if (cwc >= cchSuffix)
506	return supHardViUtf16PathIsEqual(pwsz + cwc - cchSuffix, pszSuffix);
507	return false;
508	}
509
510
511	/**
512	* Simple case insensitive UTF-16 / ASCII starts-with path predicate.
513	*
514	* @returns true if starts with given string, false if not.
515	* @param pwsz The UTF-16 path string.
516	* @param pszPrefix The ascii prefix string.
517	*/
518	static bool supHardViUtf16PathStartsWithAscii(PCRTUTF16 pwszLeft, const char *pszRight)
519	{
520	for (;;)
521	{
522	RTUTF16 wc = *pwszLeft++;
523	uint8_t b = *pszRight++;
524	if (b != wc)
525	{
526	if (!b)
527	return true;
528	if (wc >= 0x80 \|\| wc == 0)
529	return false;
530	wc = RT_C_TO_LOWER(wc);
531	if (wc != b)
532	{
533	b = RT_C_TO_LOWER(b);
534	if (wc != b)
535	{
536	if (wc == '/')
537	wc = '\\';
538	if (b == '/')
539	b = '\\';
540	if (wc != b)
541	return false;
542	}
543	}
544	}
545	}
546	}
547
548
549	/**
550	* Simple case insensitive UNICODE_STRING starts-with path predicate.
551	*
552	* @returns true if starts with given string, false if not.
553	* @param pwszLeft The path to check.
554	* @param cwcLeft The length of @a pwszLeft
555	* @param pwszRight The starts-with path.
556	* @param cwcRight The length of @a pwszRight.
557	* @param fCheckSlash Check for a slash following the prefix.
558	*/
559	DECLHIDDEN(bool) supHardViUtf16PathStartsWithEx(PCRTUTF16 pwszLeft, uint32_t cwcLeft,
560	PCRTUTF16 pwszRight, uint32_t cwcRight, bool fCheckSlash)
561	{
562	if (cwcLeft < cwcRight \|\| !cwcRight \|\| !pwszRight)
563	return false;
564
565	/* See if we can get away with a case sensitive compare first. */
566	if (memcmp(pwszLeft, pwszRight, cwcRight * sizeof(RTUTF16)) == 0)
567	pwszLeft += cwcRight;
568	else
569	{
570	/* No luck, do a slow case insensitive comapre. */
571	uint32_t cLeft = cwcRight;
572	while (cLeft-- > 0)
573	{
574	RTUTF16 wcLeft = *pwszLeft++;
575	RTUTF16 wcRight = *pwszRight++;
576	if (wcLeft != wcRight)
577	{
578	wcLeft = wcLeft < 0x80 ? wcLeft == '/' ? '\\' : RT_C_TO_LOWER(wcLeft) : wcLeft;
579	wcRight = wcRight < 0x80 ? wcRight == '/' ? '\\' : RT_C_TO_LOWER(wcRight) : wcRight;
580	if (wcLeft != wcRight)
581	return false;
582	}
583	}
584	}
585
586	/* Check for slash following the prefix, if request. */
587	if ( !fCheckSlash
588	\|\| *pwszLeft == '\\'
589	\|\| *pwszLeft == '/')
590	return true;
591	return false;
592	}
593
594
595	/**
596	* Simple case insensitive UNICODE_STRING starts-with path predicate.
597	*
598	* @returns true if starts with given string, false if not.
599	* @param pUniStrLeft The path to check.
600	* @param pUniStrRight The starts-with path.
601	* @param fCheckSlash Check for a slash following the prefix.
602	*/
603	DECLHIDDEN(bool) supHardViUniStrPathStartsWithUniStr(UNICODE_STRING const pUniStrLeft, UNICODE_STRING const pUniStrRight,
604	bool fCheckSlash)
605	{
606	return supHardViUtf16PathStartsWithEx(pUniStrLeft->Buffer, pUniStrLeft->Length / sizeof(WCHAR),
607	pUniStrRight->Buffer, pUniStrRight->Length / sizeof(WCHAR), fCheckSlash);
608	}
609
610
611
612	/**
613	* Counts slashes in the given UTF-8 path string.
614	*
615	* @returns Number of slashes.
616	* @param pwsz The UTF-16 path string.
617	*/
618	static uint32_t supHardViUtf16PathCountSlashes(PCRTUTF16 pwsz)
619	{
620	uint32_t cSlashes = 0;
621	RTUTF16 wc;
622	while ((wc = *pwsz++) != '\0')
623	if (wc == '/' \|\| wc == '\\')
624	cSlashes++;
625	return cSlashes;
626	}
627
628
629	#ifdef VBOX_PERMIT_MORE
630	/**
631	* Checks if the path goes into %windir%\apppatch\.
632	*
633	* @returns true if apppatch, false if not.
634	* @param pwszPath The path to examine.
635	*/
636	DECLHIDDEN(bool) supHardViIsAppPatchDir(PCRTUTF16 pwszPath, uint32_t cwcName)
637	{
638	uint32_t cwcWinDir = (g_System32NtPath.UniStr.Length - sizeof(L"System32")) / sizeof(WCHAR);
639
640	if (cwcName <= cwcWinDir + sizeof("AppPatch"))
641	return false;
642
643	if (memcmp(pwszPath, g_System32NtPath.UniStr.Buffer, cwcWinDir * sizeof(WCHAR)))
644	return false;
645
646	if (!supHardViUtf16PathStartsWithAscii(&pwszPath[cwcWinDir], "\\AppPatch\\"))
647	return false;
648
649	return g_uNtVerCombined >= SUP_NT_VER_VISTA;
650	}
651	#else
652	# error should not get here..
653	#endif
654
655
656
657	/**
658	* Checks if the unsigned DLL is fine or not.
659	*
660	* @returns VINF_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED or @a rc.
661	* @param hLdrMod The loader module handle.
662	* @param pwszName The NT name of the DLL/EXE.
663	* @param fFlags Flags.
664	* @param hFile The file handle.
665	* @param rc The status code..
666	*/
667	static int supHardNtViCheckIfNotSignedOk(RTLDRMOD hLdrMod, PCRTUTF16 pwszName, uint32_t fFlags, HANDLE hFile, int rc)
668	{
669	if (fFlags & (SUPHNTVI_F_REQUIRE_BUILD_CERT \| SUPHNTVI_F_REQUIRE_KERNEL_CODE_SIGNING))
670	return rc;
671
672	/*
673	* Version macros.
674	*/
675	uint32_t const uNtVer = g_uNtVerCombined;
676	#define IS_XP() ( uNtVer >= SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_SIMPLE(5, 1) && uNtVer < SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_SIMPLE(5, 2) )
677	#define IS_W2K3() ( uNtVer >= SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_SIMPLE(5, 2) && uNtVer < SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_SIMPLE(5, 3) )
678	#define IS_VISTA() ( uNtVer >= SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_SIMPLE(6, 0) && uNtVer < SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_SIMPLE(6, 1) )
679	#define IS_W70() ( uNtVer >= SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_SIMPLE(6, 1) && uNtVer < SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_SIMPLE(6, 2) )
680	#define IS_W80() ( uNtVer >= SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_SIMPLE(6, 2) && uNtVer < SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_SIMPLE(6, 3) )
681	#define IS_W81() ( uNtVer >= SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_SIMPLE(6, 3) && uNtVer < SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_SIMPLE(6, 4) )
682
683	/*
684	* The System32 directory.
685	*
686	* System32 is full of unsigned DLLs shipped by microsoft, graphics
687	* hardware vendors, input device/method vendors and whatnot else that
688	* actually needs to be loaded into a process for it to work correctly.
689	* We have to ASSUME that anything our process attempts to load from
690	* System32 is trustworthy and that the Windows system with the help of
691	* anti-virus software make sure there is nothing evil lurking in System32
692	* or being loaded from it.
693	*
694	* A small measure of protection is to list DLLs we know should be signed
695	* and decline loading unsigned versions of them, assuming they have been
696	* replaced by an adversary with evil intentions.
697	*/
698	PCRTUTF16 pwsz;
699	uint32_t cwcName = (uint32_t)RTUtf16Len(pwszName);
700	uint32_t cwcOther = g_System32NtPath.UniStr.Length / sizeof(WCHAR);
701	if (supHardViUtf16PathStartsWithEx(pwszName, cwcName, g_System32NtPath.UniStr.Buffer, cwcOther, true /fCheckSlash/))
702	{
703	pwsz = pwszName + cwcOther + 1;
704
705	/* Must be owned by trusted installer. */
706	if ( !(fFlags & SUPHNTVI_F_TRUSTED_INSTALLER_OWNER)
707	&& !supHardNtViCheckIsOwnedByTrustedInstaller(hFile, pwszName))
708	return rc;
709
710	/* Core DLLs. */
711	if (supHardViUtf16PathIsEqual(pwsz, "ntdll.dll"))
712	return uNtVer < SUP_NT_VER_VISTA ? VINF_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED : rc;
713	if (supHardViUtf16PathIsEqual(pwsz, "kernel32.dll"))
714	return uNtVer < SUP_NT_VER_W81 ? VINF_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED : rc;
715	if (supHardViUtf16PathIsEqual(pwsz, "kernelbase.dll"))
716	return IS_W80() \|\| IS_W70() ? VINF_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED : rc;
717	if (supHardViUtf16PathIsEqual(pwsz, "apisetschema.dll"))
718	return IS_W70() ? VINF_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED : rc;
719	if (supHardViUtf16PathIsEqual(pwsz, "apphelp.dll"))
720	return uNtVer < SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_SIMPLE(6, 4) ? VINF_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED : rc;
721	#ifdef VBOX_PERMIT_MORE
722	if (uNtVer >= SUP_NT_VER_W70) /* hard limit: user32.dll is unwanted prior to w7. */
723	{
724	if (supHardViUtf16PathIsEqual(pwsz, "sfc.dll"))
725	return uNtVer < SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_SIMPLE(6, 4) ? VINF_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED : rc;
726	if (supHardViUtf16PathIsEqual(pwsz, "sfc_os.dll"))
727	return uNtVer < SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_SIMPLE(6, 4) ? VINF_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED : rc;
728	if (supHardViUtf16PathIsEqual(pwsz, "user32.dll"))
729	return uNtVer < SUP_NT_VER_W81 ? VINF_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED : rc;
730	}
731	#endif
732
733	#ifndef IN_RING0
734	/* Check that this DLL isn't supposed to be signed on this windows
735	version. If it should, it's likely to be a fake. */
736	/** @todo list of signed dlls for various windows versions. */
737	return VINF_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED;
738	#else
739	return rc;
740	#endif /* IN_RING0 */
741	}
742
743
744	#ifndef IN_RING0
745	/*
746	* The WinSxS white list.
747	*
748	* Just like with System32 there are potentially a number of DLLs that
749	* could be required from WinSxS.
750	*/
751	cwcOther = g_WinSxSNtPath.UniStr.Length / sizeof(WCHAR);
752	if (supHardViUtf16PathStartsWithEx(pwszName, cwcName, g_WinSxSNtPath.UniStr.Buffer, cwcOther, true /fCheckSlash/))
753	{
754	pwsz = pwszName + cwcOther + 1;
755	cwcName -= cwcOther + 1;
756
757	/* The WinSxS layout means everything worth loading is exactly one level down. */
758	uint32_t cSlashes = supHardViUtf16PathCountSlashes(pwsz);
759	if (cSlashes != 1)
760	return rc;
761
762	/* Must be owned by trusted installer. */
763	if ( !(fFlags & SUPHNTVI_F_TRUSTED_INSTALLER_OWNER)
764	&& !supHardNtViCheckIsOwnedByTrustedInstaller(hFile, pwszName))
765	return rc;
766	return VINF_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED;
767	}
768	#endif /* !IN_RING0 */
769
770
771	#ifdef VBOX_PERMIT_MORE
772	/*
773	* AppPatch whitelist.
774	*/
775	if (supHardViIsAppPatchDir(pwszName, cwcName))
776	{
777	cwcOther = g_System32NtPath.UniStr.Length / sizeof(WCHAR); /* ASSUMES System32 is called System32. */
778	pwsz = pwszName + cwcOther + 1;
779
780	if ( !(fFlags & SUPHNTVI_F_TRUSTED_INSTALLER_OWNER)
781	&& !supHardNtViCheckIsOwnedByTrustedInstaller(hFile, pwszName))
782	return rc;
783
784	# ifndef VBOX_PERMIT_EVEN_MORE
785	if (supHardViUtf16PathIsEqual(pwsz, "acres.dll"))
786	return VINF_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED;
787
788	# ifdef RT_ARCH_AMD64
789	if (supHardViUtf16PathIsEqual(pwsz, "AppPatch64\\AcGenral.dll"))
790	return VINF_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED;
791	# elif defined(RT_ARCH_X86)
792	if (supHardViUtf16PathIsEqual(pwsz, "AcGenral.dll"))
793	return VINF_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED;
794	# endif
795	# endif /* !VBOX_PERMIT_EVEN_MORE */
796
797	# ifdef IN_RING0
798	return rc;
799	# else
800	return VINF_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED;
801	# endif
802	}
803	#endif /* VBOX_PERMIT_MORE */
804
805
806	#ifndef IN_RING0
807	# if defined(VBOX_PERMIT_MORE) && !defined(VBOX_PERMIT_EVEN_MORE)
808	/*
809	* Program files and common files.
810	* Permit anything that's signed and correctly installed.
811	*/
812	if ( supHardViUtf16PathStartsWithEx(pwszName, cwcName,
813	g_ProgramFilesNtPath.UniStr.Buffer, g_ProgramFilesNtPath.UniStr.Length,
814	true /fCheckSlash/)
815	\|\| supHardViUtf16PathStartsWithEx(pwszName, cwcName,
816	g_CommonFilesNtPath.UniStr.Buffer, g_CommonFilesNtPath.UniStr.Length,
817	true /fCheckSlash/)
818	# ifdef RT_ARCH_AMD64
819	\|\| supHardViUtf16PathStartsWithEx(pwszName, cwcName,
820	g_ProgramFilesX86NtPath.UniStr.Buffer, g_ProgramFilesX86NtPath.UniStr.Length,
821	true /fCheckSlash/)
822	\|\| supHardViUtf16PathStartsWithEx(pwszName, cwcName,
823	g_CommonFilesX86NtPath.UniStr.Buffer, g_CommonFilesX86NtPath.UniStr.Length,
824	true /fCheckSlash/)
825	# endif
826	)
827	{
828	if ( !(fFlags & SUPHNTVI_F_TRUSTED_INSTALLER_OWNER)
829	&& !supHardNtViCheckIsOwnedByTrustedInstaller(hFile, pwszName))
830	return rc;
831	return VINF_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED;
832	}
833
834	# elif defined(VBOX_PERMIT_MORE) && defined(VBOX_PERMIT_EVEN_MORE)
835	/*
836	* Anything that's owned by the trusted installer.
837	*/
838	if ( (fFlags & SUPHNTVI_F_TRUSTED_INSTALLER_OWNER)
839	\|\| supHardNtViCheckIsOwnedByTrustedInstaller(hFile, pwszName))
840	return VINF_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED;
841
842	# endif
843	#endif /* !IN_RING0 */
844
845	/*
846	* Not permitted.
847	*/
848	return rc;
849	}
850
851
852	/**
853	* @callback_method_impl{RTCRPKCS7VERIFYCERTCALLBACK,
854	* Standard code signing. Use this for Microsoft SPC.}
855	*/
856	static DECLCALLBACK(int) supHardNtViCertVerifyCallback(PCRTCRX509CERTIFICATE pCert, RTCRX509CERTPATHS hCertPaths,
857	void *pvUser, PRTERRINFO pErrInfo)
858	{
859	PSUPHNTVIRDR pNtViRdr = (PSUPHNTVIRDR)pvUser;
860	Assert(pNtViRdr->Core.uMagic == RTLDRREADER_MAGIC);
861
862	/*
863	* If there is no certificate path build & validator associated with this
864	* callback, it must be because of the build certificate. We trust the
865	* build certificate without any second thoughts.
866	*/
867	if (hCertPaths == NIL_RTCRX509CERTPATHS)
868	{
869	if (RTCrX509Certificate_Compare(pCert, &g_BuildX509Cert) == 0) /* healthy paranoia */
870	return VINF_SUCCESS;
871	return RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, VERR_SUP_VP_NOT_BUILD_CERT_IPE, "Not valid kernel code signature.");
872	}
873
874	/*
875	* Standard code signing capabilites required.
876	*/
877	int rc = RTCrPkcs7VerifyCertCallbackCodeSigning(pCert, hCertPaths, NULL, pErrInfo);
878	if (RT_SUCCESS(rc))
879	{
880	/*
881	* If kernel signing, a valid certificate path must be anchored by the
882	* microsoft kernel signing root certificate.
883	*/
884	if (pNtViRdr->fFlags & SUPHNTVI_F_REQUIRE_KERNEL_CODE_SIGNING)
885	{
886	uint32_t cPaths = RTCrX509CertPathsGetPathCount(hCertPaths);
887	uint32_t cFound = 0;
888	uint32_t cValid = 0;
889	for (uint32_t iPath = 0; iPath < cPaths; iPath++)
890	{
891	bool fTrusted;
892	PCRTCRX509NAME pSubject;
893	PCRTCRX509SUBJECTPUBLICKEYINFO pPublicKeyInfo;
894	int rcVerify;
895	rc = RTCrX509CertPathsQueryPathInfo(hCertPaths, iPath, &fTrusted, NULL /pcNodes/, &pSubject, &pPublicKeyInfo,
896	NULL, NULL /pCertCtx/, &rcVerify);
897	AssertRCBreak(rc);
898
899	if (RT_SUCCESS(rcVerify))
900	{
901	Assert(fTrusted);
902	cValid++;
903
904	/*
905	* Search the kernel signing root store for a matching anchor.
906	*/
907	RTCRSTORECERTSEARCH Search;
908	rc = RTCrStoreCertFindBySubjectOrAltSubjectByRfc5280(g_hNtKernelRootStore, pSubject, &Search);
909	AssertRCBreak(rc);
910
911	PCRTCRCERTCTX pCertCtx;
912	while ((pCertCtx = RTCrStoreCertSearchNext(g_hNtKernelRootStore, &Search)) != NULL)
913	{
914	PCRTCRX509SUBJECTPUBLICKEYINFO pCertPubKeyInfo = NULL;
915	if (pCertCtx->pCert)
916	pCertPubKeyInfo = &pCertCtx->pCert->TbsCertificate.SubjectPublicKeyInfo;
917	else if (pCertCtx->pTaInfo)
918	pCertPubKeyInfo = &pCertCtx->pTaInfo->PubKey;
919	else
920	pCertPubKeyInfo = NULL;
921	if ( pCertPubKeyInfo
922	&& RTCrX509SubjectPublicKeyInfo_Compare(pCertPubKeyInfo, pPublicKeyInfo) == 0)
923	cFound++;
924	RTCrCertCtxRelease(pCertCtx);
925	}
926
927	int rc2 = RTCrStoreCertSearchDestroy(g_hNtKernelRootStore, &Search); AssertRC(rc2);
928	}
929	}
930	if (RT_SUCCESS(rc) && cFound == 0)
931	rc = RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, VERR_SUP_VP_NOT_VALID_KERNEL_CODE_SIGNATURE, "Not valid kernel code signature.");
932	if (RT_SUCCESS(rc) && cValid < 2 && g_fHaveOtherRoots)
933	rc = RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, VERR_SUP_VP_UNEXPECTED_VALID_PATH_COUNT,
934	"Expected at least %u valid paths, not %u.", 2, cValid);
935	}
936	}
937
938	/*
939	* More requirements? NT5 build lab?
940	*/
941
942	return rc;
943	}
944
945
946	static DECLCALLBACK(int) supHardNtViCallback(RTLDRMOD hLdrMod, RTLDRSIGNATURETYPE enmSignature,
947	void const *pvSignature, size_t cbSignature,
948	PRTERRINFO pErrInfo, void *pvUser)
949	{
950	/*
951	* Check out the input.
952	*/
953	PSUPHNTVIRDR pNtViRdr = (PSUPHNTVIRDR)pvUser;
954	Assert(pNtViRdr->Core.uMagic == RTLDRREADER_MAGIC);
955
956	AssertReturn(cbSignature == sizeof(RTCRPKCS7CONTENTINFO), VERR_INTERNAL_ERROR_5);
957	PCRTCRPKCS7CONTENTINFO pContentInfo = (PCRTCRPKCS7CONTENTINFO)pvSignature;
958	AssertReturn(RTCrPkcs7ContentInfo_IsSignedData(pContentInfo), VERR_INTERNAL_ERROR_5);
959	AssertReturn(pContentInfo->u.pSignedData->SignerInfos.cItems == 1, VERR_INTERNAL_ERROR_5);
960	PCRTCRPKCS7SIGNERINFO pSignerInfo = &pContentInfo->u.pSignedData->SignerInfos.paItems[0];
961
962	/*
963	* If special certificate requirements, check them out before validating
964	* the signature.
965	*/
966	if (pNtViRdr->fFlags & SUPHNTVI_F_REQUIRE_BUILD_CERT)
967	{
968	if (!RTCrX509Certificate_MatchIssuerAndSerialNumber(&g_BuildX509Cert,
969	&pSignerInfo->IssuerAndSerialNumber.Name,
970	&pSignerInfo->IssuerAndSerialNumber.SerialNumber))
971	return RTErrInfoSet(pErrInfo, VERR_SUP_VP_NOT_SIGNED_WITH_BUILD_CERT, "Not signed with the build certificate.");
972	}
973
974	/*
975	* Verify the signature.
976	*/
977	RTTIMESPEC ValidationTime;
978	RTTimeSpecSetSeconds(&ValidationTime, pNtViRdr->uTimestamp);
979
980	return RTCrPkcs7VerifySignedData(pContentInfo, 0, g_hSpcAndNtKernelSuppStore, g_hSpcAndNtKernelRootStore, &ValidationTime,
981	supHardNtViCertVerifyCallback, pNtViRdr, pErrInfo);
982	}
983
984
985	/**
986	* Verifies the given loader image.
987	*
988	* @returns IPRT status code.
989	* @param hLdrMod File handle to the executable file.
990	* @param pwszName Full NT path to the DLL in question, used for
991	* dealing with unsigned system dlls as well as for
992	* error/logging.
993	* @param pNtViRdr The reader instance /w flags.
994	* @param pfWinVerifyTrust Where to return whether WinVerifyTrust was used.
995	* @param pErrInfo Pointer to error info structure. Optional.
996	*/
997	DECLHIDDEN(int) supHardenedWinVerifyImageByLdrMod(RTLDRMOD hLdrMod, PCRTUTF16 pwszName, PSUPHNTVIRDR pNtViRdr,
998	bool *pfWinVerifyTrust, PRTERRINFO pErrInfo)
999	{
1000	if (pfWinVerifyTrust)
1001	*pfWinVerifyTrust = false;
1002
1003	#ifdef IN_RING3
1004	/* Check that the caller has performed the necessary library initialization. */
1005	if (!RTCrX509Certificate_IsPresent(&g_BuildX509Cert))
1006	return RTErrInfoSet(pErrInfo, VERR_WRONG_ORDER,
1007	"supHardenedWinVerifyImageByHandle: supHardenedWinInitImageVerifier was not called.");
1008	#endif
1009
1010	/*
1011	* Check the trusted installer bit first, if requested as it's somewhat
1012	* cheaper than the rest.
1013	*/
1014	if ( (pNtViRdr->fFlags & SUPHNTVI_F_TRUSTED_INSTALLER_OWNER)
1015	&& !supHardNtViCheckIsOwnedByTrustedInstaller(pNtViRdr->hFile, pwszName))
1016	return RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, VERR_SUP_VP_NOT_OWNED_BY_TRUSTED_INSTALLER,
1017	"supHardenedWinVerifyImageByHandle: TrustedInstaller is not the owner of '%ls'.", pwszName);
1018
1019	/*
1020	* Verify it.
1021	*
1022	* The PKCS #7 SignedData signature is checked in the callback. Any
1023	* signing certificate restrictions are also enforced there.
1024	*
1025	* For the time being, we use the executable timestamp as the
1026	* certificate validation date. We must query that first to avoid
1027	* potential issues re-entering the loader code from the callback.
1028	*
1029	* Update: Save the first timestamp we validate with build cert and
1030	* use this as a minimum timestamp for further build cert
1031	* validations. This works around issues with old DLLs that
1032	* we sign against with our certificate (crt, sdl, qt).
1033	*/
1034	int rc = RTLdrQueryProp(hLdrMod, RTLDRPROP_TIMESTAMP_SECONDS, &pNtViRdr->uTimestamp, sizeof(pNtViRdr->uTimestamp));
1035	if (RT_SUCCESS(rc))
1036	{
1037	#ifdef IN_RING3 /* Hack alert! (see above) */
1038	if ( (pNtViRdr->fFlags & SUPHNTVI_F_REQUIRE_KERNEL_CODE_SIGNING)
1039	&& (pNtViRdr->fFlags & SUPHNTVI_F_REQUIRE_SIGNATURE_ENFORCEMENT)
1040	&& pNtViRdr->uTimestamp < g_uBuildTimestampHack)
1041	pNtViRdr->uTimestamp = g_uBuildTimestampHack;
1042	#endif
1043
1044	rc = RTLdrVerifySignature(hLdrMod, supHardNtViCallback, pNtViRdr, pErrInfo);
1045
1046	#ifdef IN_RING3 /* Hack alert! (see above) */
1047	if ((pNtViRdr->fFlags & SUPHNTVI_F_REQUIRE_BUILD_CERT) && g_uBuildTimestampHack == 0 && RT_SUCCESS(rc))
1048	g_uBuildTimestampHack = pNtViRdr->uTimestamp;
1049	#endif
1050
1051	/*
1052	* Microsoft doesn't sign a whole bunch of DLLs, so we have to
1053	* ASSUME that a bunch of system DLLs are fine.
1054	*/
1055	if (rc == VERR_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED)
1056	rc = supHardNtViCheckIfNotSignedOk(hLdrMod, pwszName, pNtViRdr->fFlags, pNtViRdr->hFile, rc);
1057	if (RT_FAILURE(rc))
1058	RTErrInfoAddF(pErrInfo, rc, ": %ls", pwszName);
1059
1060	/*
1061	* Check for the signature checking enforcement, if requested to do so.
1062	*/
1063	if (RT_SUCCESS(rc) && (pNtViRdr->fFlags & SUPHNTVI_F_REQUIRE_SIGNATURE_ENFORCEMENT))
1064	{
1065	bool fEnforced = false;
1066	int rc2 = RTLdrQueryProp(hLdrMod, RTLDRPROP_SIGNATURE_CHECKS_ENFORCED, &fEnforced, sizeof(fEnforced));
1067	if (RT_FAILURE(rc2))
1068	rc = RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, rc2, "Querying RTLDRPROP_SIGNATURE_CHECKS_ENFORCED failed on %ls: %Rrc.",
1069	pwszName, rc2);
1070	else if (!fEnforced)
1071	rc = RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, VERR_SUP_VP_SIGNATURE_CHECKS_NOT_ENFORCED,
1072	"The image '%ls' was not linked with /IntegrityCheck.", pwszName);
1073	}
1074	}
1075	else
1076	RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, rc, "RTLdrQueryProp/RTLDRPROP_TIMESTAMP_SECONDS failed on %ls: %Rrc", pwszName, rc);
1077
1078	#ifdef IN_RING3
1079	/*
1080	* Pass it thru WinVerifyTrust when possible.
1081	*/
1082	rc = supHardenedWinVerifyImageTrust(pNtViRdr->hFile, pwszName, pNtViRdr->fFlags, rc, pfWinVerifyTrust, pErrInfo);
1083	#endif
1084
1085	#ifdef IN_SUP_HARDENED_R3
1086	/*
1087	* Hook for the LdrLoadDll code to schedule scanning of imports.
1088	*/
1089	if (RT_SUCCESS(rc))
1090	supR3HardenedWinVerifyCacheScheduleImports(hLdrMod, pwszName);
1091	#endif
1092
1093	return rc;
1094	}
1095
1096
1097	/**
1098	* Verifies the given executable image.
1099	*
1100	* @returns IPRT status code.
1101	* @param hFile File handle to the executable file.
1102	* @param pwszName Full NT path to the DLL in question, used for
1103	* dealing with unsigned system dlls as well as for
1104	* error/logging.
1105	* @param fFlags Flags, SUPHNTVI_F_XXX.
1106	* @param pfWinVerifyTrust Where to return whether WinVerifyTrust was used.
1107	* @param pErrInfo Pointer to error info structure. Optional.
1108	*/
1109	DECLHIDDEN(int) supHardenedWinVerifyImageByHandle(HANDLE hFile, PCRTUTF16 pwszName, uint32_t fFlags,
1110	bool *pfWinVerifyTrust, PRTERRINFO pErrInfo)
1111	{
1112	/*
1113	* Create a reader instance.
1114	*/
1115	PSUPHNTVIRDR pNtViRdr;
1116	int rc = supHardNtViRdrCreate(hFile, pwszName, fFlags, &pNtViRdr);
1117	if (RT_SUCCESS(rc))
1118	{
1119	/*
1120	* Open the image.
1121	*/
1122	RTLDRMOD hLdrMod;
1123	RTLDRARCH enmArch = fFlags & SUPHNTVI_F_RC_IMAGE ? RTLDRARCH_X86_32 : RTLDRARCH_HOST;
1124	if (fFlags & SUPHNTVI_F_RESOURCE_IMAGE)
1125	enmArch = RTLDRARCH_WHATEVER;
1126	rc = RTLdrOpenWithReader(&pNtViRdr->Core, RTLDR_O_FOR_VALIDATION, enmArch, &hLdrMod, pErrInfo);
1127	if (RT_SUCCESS(rc))
1128	{
1129	/*
1130	* Verify it.
1131	*/
1132	rc = supHardenedWinVerifyImageByLdrMod(hLdrMod, pwszName, pNtViRdr, pfWinVerifyTrust, pErrInfo);
1133	int rc2 = RTLdrClose(hLdrMod); AssertRC(rc2);
1134	}
1135	else
1136	supHardNtViRdrDestroy(&pNtViRdr->Core);
1137	}
1138	SUP_DPRINTF(("supHardenedWinVerifyImageByHandle: -> %d (%ls)%s\n",
1139	rc, pwszName, pfWinVerifyTrust && *pfWinVerifyTrust ? "WinVerifyTrust" : ""));
1140	return rc;
1141	}
1142
1143
1144	#ifdef IN_RING3
1145	/**
1146	* supHardenedWinVerifyImageByHandle version without the name.
1147	*
1148	* The name is derived from the handle.
1149	*
1150	* @returns IPRT status code.
1151	* @param hFile File handle to the executable file.
1152	* @param fFlags Flags, SUPHNTVI_F_XXX.
1153	* @param pErrInfo Pointer to error info structure. Optional.
1154	*/
1155	DECLHIDDEN(int) supHardenedWinVerifyImageByHandleNoName(HANDLE hFile, uint32_t fFlags, PRTERRINFO pErrInfo)
1156	{
1157	/*
1158	* Determine the NT name and call the verification function.
1159	*/
1160	union
1161	{
1162	UNICODE_STRING UniStr;
1163	uint8_t abBuffer[(MAX_PATH + 8 + 1) * 2];
1164	} uBuf;
1165
1166	ULONG cbIgn;
1167	NTSTATUS rcNt = NtQueryObject(hFile,
1168	ObjectNameInformation,
1169	&uBuf,
1170	sizeof(uBuf) - sizeof(WCHAR),
1171	&cbIgn);
1172	if (NT_SUCCESS(rcNt))
1173	uBuf.UniStr.Buffer[uBuf.UniStr.Length / sizeof(WCHAR)] = '\0';
1174	else
1175	uBuf.UniStr.Buffer = (WCHAR *)L"TODO3";
1176
1177	return supHardenedWinVerifyImageByHandle(hFile, uBuf.UniStr.Buffer, fFlags, NULL /pfWinVerifyTrust/, pErrInfo);
1178	}
1179	#endif /* IN_RING3 */
1180
1181
1182	/**
1183	* Retrieves the full official path to the system root or one of it's sub
1184	* directories.
1185	*
1186	* This code is also used by the support driver.
1187	*
1188	* @returns VBox status code.
1189	* @param pvBuf The output buffer. This will contain a
1190	* UNICODE_STRING followed (at the kernel's
1191	* discretion) the string buffer.
1192	* @param cbBuf The size of the buffer @a pvBuf points to.
1193	* @param enmDir Which directory under the system root we're
1194	* interested in.
1195	* @param pErrInfo Pointer to error info structure. Optional.
1196	*/
1197	DECLHIDDEN(int) supHardNtGetSystemRootDir(void *pvBuf, uint32_t cbBuf, SUPHARDNTSYSROOTDIR enmDir, PRTERRINFO pErrInfo)
1198	{
1199	HANDLE hFile = RTNT_INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE;
1200	IO_STATUS_BLOCK Ios = RTNT_IO_STATUS_BLOCK_INITIALIZER;
1201
1202	UNICODE_STRING NtName;
1203	switch (enmDir)
1204	{
1205	case kSupHardNtSysRootDir_System32:
1206	{
1207	static const WCHAR s_wszNameSystem32[] = L"\\SystemRoot\\System32\\";
1208	NtName.Buffer = (PWSTR)s_wszNameSystem32;
1209	NtName.Length = sizeof(s_wszNameSystem32) - sizeof(WCHAR);
1210	NtName.MaximumLength = sizeof(s_wszNameSystem32);
1211	break;
1212	}
1213	case kSupHardNtSysRootDir_WinSxS:
1214	{
1215	static const WCHAR s_wszNameWinSxS[] = L"\\SystemRoot\\WinSxS\\";
1216	NtName.Buffer = (PWSTR)s_wszNameWinSxS;
1217	NtName.Length = sizeof(s_wszNameWinSxS) - sizeof(WCHAR);
1218	NtName.MaximumLength = sizeof(s_wszNameWinSxS);
1219	break;
1220	}
1221	default:
1222	AssertFailed();
1223	return VERR_INVALID_PARAMETER;
1224	}
1225
1226	OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES ObjAttr;
1227	InitializeObjectAttributes(&ObjAttr, &NtName, OBJ_CASE_INSENSITIVE, NULL /hRootDir/, NULL /pSecDesc/);
1228
1229	NTSTATUS rcNt = NtCreateFile(&hFile,
1230	FILE_READ_DATA \| SYNCHRONIZE,
1231	&ObjAttr,
1232	&Ios,
1233	NULL /* Allocation Size*/,
1234	FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL,
1235	FILE_SHARE_READ \| FILE_SHARE_WRITE,
1236	FILE_OPEN,
1237	FILE_DIRECTORY_FILE \| FILE_OPEN_FOR_BACKUP_INTENT \| FILE_SYNCHRONOUS_IO_NONALERT,
1238	NULL /EaBuffer/,
1239	0 /EaLength/);
1240	if (NT_SUCCESS(rcNt))
1241	rcNt = Ios.Status;
1242	if (NT_SUCCESS(rcNt))
1243	{
1244	ULONG cbIgn;
1245	rcNt = NtQueryObject(hFile,
1246	ObjectNameInformation,
1247	pvBuf,
1248	cbBuf - sizeof(WCHAR),
1249	&cbIgn);
1250	NtClose(hFile);
1251	if (NT_SUCCESS(rcNt))
1252	{
1253	PUNICODE_STRING pUniStr = (PUNICODE_STRING)pvBuf;
1254	if (pUniStr->Length > 0)
1255	{
1256	/* Make sure it's terminated so it can safely be printed.*/
1257	pUniStr->Buffer[pUniStr->Length / sizeof(WCHAR)] = '\0';
1258	return VINF_SUCCESS;
1259	}
1260
1261	return RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, VERR_SUP_VP_SYSTEM32_PATH,
1262	"NtQueryObject returned an empty path for '%ls'", NtName.Buffer);
1263	}
1264	return RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, VERR_SUP_VP_SYSTEM32_PATH, "NtQueryObject failed on '%ls' dir: %#x", NtName.Buffer, rcNt);
1265	}
1266	return RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, VERR_SUP_VP_SYSTEM32_PATH, "Failure to open '%ls': %#x", NtName.Buffer, rcNt);
1267	}
1268
1269
1270	/**
1271	* Initialize one certificate entry.
1272	*
1273	* @returns VBox status code.
1274	* @param pCert The X.509 certificate representation to init.
1275	* @param pabCert The raw DER encoded certificate.
1276	* @param cbCert The size of the raw certificate.
1277	* @param pErrInfo Where to return extended error info. Optional.
1278	* @param pszErrorTag Error tag.
1279	*/
1280	static int supHardNtViCertInit(PRTCRX509CERTIFICATE pCert, unsigned char const *pabCert, unsigned cbCert,
1281	PRTERRINFO pErrInfo, const char *pszErrorTag)
1282	{
1283	AssertReturn(cbCert > 16 && cbCert < _128K,
1284	RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, VERR_INTERNAL_ERROR_3, "%s: cbCert=%#x out of range", pszErrorTag, cbCert));
1285	AssertReturn(!RTCrX509Certificate_IsPresent(pCert),
1286	RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, VERR_WRONG_ORDER, "%s: Certificate already decoded?", pszErrorTag));
1287
1288	RTASN1CURSORPRIMARY PrimaryCursor;
1289	RTAsn1CursorInitPrimary(&PrimaryCursor, pabCert, cbCert, pErrInfo, &g_RTAsn1DefaultAllocator, RTASN1CURSOR_FLAGS_DER, NULL);
1290	int rc = RTCrX509Certificate_DecodeAsn1(&PrimaryCursor.Cursor, 0, pCert, pszErrorTag);
1291	if (RT_SUCCESS(rc))
1292	rc = RTCrX509Certificate_CheckSanity(pCert, 0, pErrInfo, pszErrorTag);
1293	return rc;
1294	}
1295
1296
1297	static int supHardNtViCertStoreAddArray(RTCRSTORE hStore, PCSUPTAENTRY paCerts, unsigned cCerts, PRTERRINFO pErrInfo)
1298	{
1299	for (uint32_t i = 0; i < cCerts; i++)
1300	{
1301	int rc = RTCrStoreCertAddEncoded(hStore, RTCRCERTCTX_F_ENC_TAF_DER, paCerts[i].pch, paCerts[i].cb, pErrInfo);
1302	if (RT_FAILURE(rc))
1303	return rc;
1304	}
1305	return VINF_SUCCESS;
1306	}
1307
1308
1309	/**
1310	* Initialize a certificate table.
1311	*
1312	* @param phStore Where to return the store pointer.
1313	* @param paCerts1 Pointer to the first certificate table.
1314	* @param cCerts1 Entries in the first certificate table.
1315	* @param paCerts2 Pointer to the second certificate table.
1316	* @param cCerts2 Entries in the second certificate table.
1317	* @param paCerts3 Pointer to the third certificate table.
1318	* @param cCerts3 Entries in the third certificate table.
1319	* @param pErrInfo Where to return extended error info. Optional.
1320	* @param pszErrorTag Error tag.
1321	*/
1322	static int supHardNtViCertStoreInit(PRTCRSTORE phStore,
1323	PCSUPTAENTRY paCerts1, unsigned cCerts1,
1324	PCSUPTAENTRY paCerts2, unsigned cCerts2,
1325	PCSUPTAENTRY paCerts3, unsigned cCerts3,
1326	PRTERRINFO pErrInfo, const char *pszErrorTag)
1327	{
1328	AssertReturn(*phStore == NIL_RTCRSTORE, VERR_WRONG_ORDER);
1329
1330	int rc = RTCrStoreCreateInMem(phStore, cCerts1 + cCerts2);
1331	if (RT_FAILURE(rc))
1332	return RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, rc, "RTCrStoreCreateMemoryStore failed: %Rrc", rc);
1333
1334	rc = supHardNtViCertStoreAddArray(*phStore, paCerts1, cCerts1, pErrInfo);
1335	if (RT_SUCCESS(rc))
1336	rc = supHardNtViCertStoreAddArray(*phStore, paCerts2, cCerts2, pErrInfo);
1337	if (RT_SUCCESS(rc))
1338	rc = supHardNtViCertStoreAddArray(*phStore, paCerts3, cCerts3, pErrInfo);
1339	return rc;
1340	}
1341
1342
1343
1344	#ifdef IN_RING3
1345	/**
1346	* Initializes the windows paths.
1347	*/
1348	static void supHardenedWinInitImageVerifierWinPaths(void)
1349	{
1350	/*
1351	* Windows paths that we're interested in.
1352	*/
1353	static const struct
1354	{
1355	SUPSYSROOTDIRBUF *pNtPath;
1356	WCHAR const *pwszRegValue;
1357	const char *pszLogName;
1358	} s_aPaths[] =
1359	{
1360	{ &g_ProgramFilesNtPath, L"ProgramFilesDir", "ProgDir" },
1361	{ &g_CommonFilesNtPath, L"CommonFilesDir", "ComDir" },
1362	# ifdef RT_ARCH_AMD64
1363	{ &g_ProgramFilesX86NtPath, L"ProgramFilesDir (x86)", "ProgDir32" },
1364	{ &g_CommonFilesX86NtPath, L"CommonFilesDir (x86)", "ComDir32" },
1365	# endif
1366	};
1367
1368	/*
1369	* Open the registry key containing the paths.
1370	*/
1371	UNICODE_STRING NtName = RTNT_CONSTANT_UNISTR(L"\\Registry\\Machine\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion");
1372	OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES ObjAttr;
1373	InitializeObjectAttributes(&ObjAttr, &NtName, OBJ_CASE_INSENSITIVE, NULL /hRootDir/, NULL /pSecDesc/);
1374	HANDLE hKey;
1375	NTSTATUS rcNt = NtOpenKey(&hKey, KEY_QUERY_VALUE, &ObjAttr);
1376	if (NT_SUCCESS(rcNt))
1377	{
1378	/*
1379	* Loop over the paths and resolve their NT paths.
1380	*/
1381	for (uint32_t i = 0; i < RT_ELEMENTS(s_aPaths); i++)
1382	{
1383	/*
1384	* Query the value first.
1385	*/
1386	UNICODE_STRING ValueName;
1387	ValueName.Buffer = (WCHAR *)s_aPaths[i].pwszRegValue;
1388	ValueName.Length = (USHORT)(RTUtf16Len(s_aPaths[i].pwszRegValue) * sizeof(WCHAR));
1389	ValueName.MaximumLength = ValueName.Length + sizeof(WCHAR);
1390
1391	union
1392	{
1393	KEY_VALUE_PARTIAL_INFORMATION PartialInfo;
1394	uint8_t abPadding[sizeof(KEY_VALUE_PARTIAL_INFORMATION) + sizeof(WCHAR) * 128];
1395	uint64_t uAlign;
1396	} uBuf;
1397
1398	ULONG cbActual = 0;
1399	rcNt = NtQueryValueKey(hKey, &ValueName, KeyValuePartialInformation, &uBuf, sizeof(uBuf) - sizeof(WCHAR), &cbActual);
1400	if (NT_SUCCESS(rcNt))
1401	{
1402	/*
1403	* Must be a simple string value, terminate it.
1404	*/
1405	if ( uBuf.PartialInfo.Type == REG_EXPAND_SZ
1406	\|\| uBuf.PartialInfo.Type == REG_SZ)
1407	{
1408	/*
1409	* Expand any environment variable references before opening it.
1410	* We use the result buffer as storage for the expaneded path,
1411	* reserving space for the windows name space prefix.
1412	*/
1413	UNICODE_STRING Src;
1414	Src.Buffer = (WCHAR *)uBuf.PartialInfo.Data;
1415	Src.Length = uBuf.PartialInfo.DataLength;
1416	if (Src.Length >= sizeof(WCHAR) && Src.Buffer[Src.Length / sizeof(WCHAR) - 1] == '\0')
1417	Src.Length -= sizeof(WCHAR);
1418	Src.MaximumLength = Src.Length + sizeof(WCHAR);
1419	Src.Buffer[uBuf.PartialInfo.DataLength / sizeof(WCHAR)] = '\0';
1420
1421	s_aPaths[i].pNtPath->awcBuffer[0] = '\\';
1422	s_aPaths[i].pNtPath->awcBuffer[1] = '?';
1423	s_aPaths[i].pNtPath->awcBuffer[2] = '?';
1424	s_aPaths[i].pNtPath->awcBuffer[3] = '\\';
1425	UNICODE_STRING Dst;
1426	Dst.Buffer = &s_aPaths[i].pNtPath->awcBuffer[4];
1427	Dst.MaximumLength = sizeof(s_aPaths[i].pNtPath->awcBuffer) - sizeof(WCHAR) * 5;
1428	Dst.Length = Dst.MaximumLength;
1429
1430	if (uBuf.PartialInfo.Type == REG_EXPAND_SZ)
1431	rcNt = RtlExpandEnvironmentStrings_U(NULL, &Src, &Dst, NULL);
1432	else
1433	{
1434	memcpy(Dst.Buffer, Src.Buffer, Src.Length);
1435	Dst.Length = Src.Length;
1436	}
1437	if (NT_SUCCESS(rcNt))
1438	{
1439	Dst.Buffer[Dst.Length / sizeof(WCHAR)] = '\0';
1440
1441	/*
1442	* Include the \\??\\ prefix in the result and open the path.
1443	*/
1444	Dst.Buffer -= 4;
1445	Dst.Length += 4 * sizeof(WCHAR);
1446	Dst.MaximumLength += 4 * sizeof(WCHAR);
1447	InitializeObjectAttributes(&ObjAttr, &Dst, OBJ_CASE_INSENSITIVE, NULL /hRootDir/, NULL /pSecDesc/);
1448	HANDLE hFile = INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE;
1449	IO_STATUS_BLOCK Ios = RTNT_IO_STATUS_BLOCK_INITIALIZER;
1450	NTSTATUS rcNt = NtCreateFile(&hFile,
1451	FILE_READ_DATA \| SYNCHRONIZE,
1452	&ObjAttr,
1453	&Ios,
1454	NULL /* Allocation Size*/,
1455	FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL,
1456	FILE_SHARE_READ \| FILE_SHARE_WRITE,
1457	FILE_OPEN,
1458	FILE_DIRECTORY_FILE \| FILE_OPEN_FOR_BACKUP_INTENT
1459	\| FILE_SYNCHRONOUS_IO_NONALERT,
1460	NULL /EaBuffer/,
1461	0 /EaLength/);
1462	if (NT_SUCCESS(rcNt))
1463	rcNt = Ios.Status;
1464	if (NT_SUCCESS(rcNt))
1465	{
1466	/*
1467	* Query the real NT name.
1468	*/
1469	ULONG cbIgn;
1470	rcNt = NtQueryObject(hFile,
1471	ObjectNameInformation,
1472	s_aPaths[i].pNtPath,
1473	sizeof(*s_aPaths[i].pNtPath) - sizeof(WCHAR),
1474	&cbIgn);
1475	if (NT_SUCCESS(rcNt))
1476	{
1477	if (s_aPaths[i].pNtPath->UniStr.Length > 0)
1478	{
1479	/* Make sure it's terminated.*/
1480	s_aPaths[i].pNtPath->UniStr.Buffer[s_aPaths[i].pNtPath->UniStr.Length / sizeof(WCHAR)] = '\0';
1481	SUP_DPRINTF(("%s:%*s %ls\n", s_aPaths[i].pszLogName, 9 - strlen(s_aPaths[i].pszLogName), "",
1482	s_aPaths[i].pNtPath->UniStr.Buffer));
1483	}
1484	else
1485	{
1486	SUP_DPRINTF(("%s: NtQueryObject returned empty string\n", s_aPaths[i].pszLogName));
1487	rcNt = STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
1488	}
1489	}
1490	else
1491	SUP_DPRINTF(("%s: NtQueryObject failed: %#x\n", s_aPaths[i].pszLogName, rcNt));
1492	NtClose(hFile);
1493	}
1494	else
1495	SUP_DPRINTF(("%s: NtCreateFile failed: %#x (%ls)\n",
1496	s_aPaths[i].pszLogName, rcNt, Dst.Buffer));
1497	}
1498	else
1499	SUP_DPRINTF(("%s: RtlExpandEnvironmentStrings_U failed: %#x (%ls)\n",
1500	s_aPaths[i].pszLogName, rcNt, Src.Buffer));
1501	}
1502	else
1503	{
1504	SUP_DPRINTF(("%s: type mismatch: %#x\n", s_aPaths[i].pszLogName, uBuf.PartialInfo.Type));
1505	rcNt = STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
1506	}
1507	}
1508	else
1509	SUP_DPRINTF(("%s: NtQueryValueKey failed: %#x\n", s_aPaths[i].pszLogName, rcNt));
1510
1511	/* Stub the entry on failure. */
1512	if (!NT_SUCCESS(rcNt))
1513	{
1514	s_aPaths[i].pNtPath->UniStr.Length = 0;
1515	s_aPaths[i].pNtPath->UniStr.Buffer = NULL;
1516	}
1517	}
1518	NtClose(hKey);
1519	}
1520	else
1521	{
1522	SUP_DPRINTF(("NtOpenKey(%ls) failed: %#x\n", NtName.Buffer, rcNt));
1523
1524	/* Stub all the entries on failure. */
1525	for (uint32_t i = 0; i < RT_ELEMENTS(s_aPaths); i++)
1526	{
1527	s_aPaths[i].pNtPath->UniStr.Length = 0;
1528	s_aPaths[i].pNtPath->UniStr.Buffer = NULL;
1529	}
1530	}
1531	}
1532	#endif /* IN_RING3 */
1533
1534
1535	/**
1536	* This initializes the certificates globals so we don't have to reparse them
1537	* every time we need to verify an image.
1538	*
1539	* @returns IPRT status code.
1540	* @param pErrInfo Where to return extended error info. Optional.
1541	*/
1542	DECLHIDDEN(int) supHardenedWinInitImageVerifier(PRTERRINFO pErrInfo)
1543	{
1544	AssertReturn(!RTCrX509Certificate_IsPresent(&g_BuildX509Cert), VERR_WRONG_ORDER);
1545
1546	/*
1547	* Get the system root paths.
1548	*/
1549	int rc = supHardNtGetSystemRootDir(&g_System32NtPath, sizeof(g_System32NtPath), kSupHardNtSysRootDir_System32, pErrInfo);
1550	if (RT_SUCCESS(rc))
1551	rc = supHardNtGetSystemRootDir(&g_WinSxSNtPath, sizeof(g_WinSxSNtPath), kSupHardNtSysRootDir_WinSxS, pErrInfo);
1552	if (RT_SUCCESS(rc))
1553	{
1554	SUP_DPRINTF(("System32: %ls\n", g_System32NtPath.UniStr.Buffer));
1555	SUP_DPRINTF(("WinSxS: %ls\n", g_WinSxSNtPath.UniStr.Buffer));
1556	#ifdef IN_RING3
1557	supHardenedWinInitImageVerifierWinPaths();
1558	#endif
1559
1560	/*
1561	* Initialize it, leaving the cleanup to the termination call.
1562	*/
1563	rc = supHardNtViCertInit(&g_BuildX509Cert, g_abSUPBuildCert, g_cbSUPBuildCert, pErrInfo, "BuildCertificate");
1564	if (RT_SUCCESS(rc))
1565	rc = supHardNtViCertStoreInit(&g_hSpcRootStore, g_aSUPSpcRootTAs, g_cSUPSpcRootTAs,
1566	NULL, 0, NULL, 0, pErrInfo, "SpcRoot");
1567	if (RT_SUCCESS(rc))
1568	rc = supHardNtViCertStoreInit(&g_hNtKernelRootStore, g_aSUPNtKernelRootTAs, g_cSUPNtKernelRootTAs,
1569	NULL, 0, NULL, 0, pErrInfo, "NtKernelRoot");
1570	if (RT_SUCCESS(rc))
1571	rc = supHardNtViCertStoreInit(&g_hSpcAndNtKernelRootStore,
1572	g_aSUPSpcRootTAs, g_cSUPSpcRootTAs,
1573	g_aSUPNtKernelRootTAs, g_cSUPNtKernelRootTAs,
1574	g_aSUPTimestampTAs, g_cSUPTimestampTAs,
1575	pErrInfo, "SpcAndNtKernelRoot");
1576	if (RT_SUCCESS(rc))
1577	rc = supHardNtViCertStoreInit(&g_hSpcAndNtKernelSuppStore,
1578	NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0,
1579	pErrInfo, "SpcAndNtKernelSupplemental");
1580
1581	#if 0 /* For the time being, always trust the build certificate. It bypasses the timestamp issues of CRT and SDL. */
1582	/* If the build certificate is a test singing certificate, it must be a
1583	trusted root or we'll fail to validate anything. */
1584	if ( RT_SUCCESS(rc)
1585	&& RTCrX509Name_Compare(&g_BuildX509Cert.TbsCertificate.Subject, &g_BuildX509Cert.TbsCertificate.Issuer) == 0)
1586	#else
1587	if (RT_SUCCESS(rc))
1588	#endif
1589	rc = RTCrStoreCertAddEncoded(g_hSpcAndNtKernelRootStore, RTCRCERTCTX_F_ENC_X509_DER,
1590	g_abSUPBuildCert, g_cbSUPBuildCert, pErrInfo);
1591
1592	if (RT_SUCCESS(rc))
1593	{
1594	/*
1595	* Finally initialize known SIDs that we use.
1596	*/
1597	SID_IDENTIFIER_AUTHORITY s_NtAuth = SECURITY_NT_AUTHORITY;
1598	NTSTATUS rcNt = RtlInitializeSid(&g_TrustedInstallerSid, &s_NtAuth, SECURITY_SERVICE_ID_RID_COUNT);
1599	if (NT_SUCCESS(rcNt))
1600	{
1601	*RtlSubAuthoritySid(&g_TrustedInstallerSid, 0) = SECURITY_SERVICE_ID_BASE_RID;
1602	*RtlSubAuthoritySid(&g_TrustedInstallerSid, 1) = 956008885;
1603	*RtlSubAuthoritySid(&g_TrustedInstallerSid, 2) = 3418522649;
1604	*RtlSubAuthoritySid(&g_TrustedInstallerSid, 3) = 1831038044;
1605	*RtlSubAuthoritySid(&g_TrustedInstallerSid, 4) = 1853292631;
1606	*RtlSubAuthoritySid(&g_TrustedInstallerSid, 5) = 2271478464;
1607	return VINF_SUCCESS;
1608	}
1609	rc = RTErrConvertFromNtStatus(rcNt);
1610	}
1611	supHardenedWinTermImageVerifier();
1612	}
1613	return rc;
1614	}
1615
1616
1617	/**
1618	* Releases resources allocated by supHardenedWinInitImageVerifier.
1619	*/
1620	DECLHIDDEN(void) supHardenedWinTermImageVerifier(void)
1621	{
1622	if (RTCrX509Certificate_IsPresent(&g_BuildX509Cert))
1623	RTAsn1VtDelete(&g_BuildX509Cert.SeqCore.Asn1Core);
1624
1625	RTCrStoreRelease(g_hSpcAndNtKernelSuppStore);
1626	g_hSpcAndNtKernelSuppStore = NIL_RTCRSTORE;
1627	RTCrStoreRelease(g_hSpcAndNtKernelRootStore);
1628	g_hSpcAndNtKernelRootStore = NIL_RTCRSTORE;
1629
1630	RTCrStoreRelease(g_hNtKernelRootStore);
1631	g_hNtKernelRootStore = NIL_RTCRSTORE;
1632	RTCrStoreRelease(g_hSpcRootStore);
1633	g_hSpcRootStore = NIL_RTCRSTORE;
1634	}
1635
1636	#ifdef IN_RING3
1637
1638	/**
1639	* This is a hardcoded list of certificates we thing we might need.
1640	*
1641	* @returns true if wanted, false if not.
1642	* @param pCert The certificate.
1643	*/
1644	static bool supR3HardenedWinIsDesiredRootCA(PCRTCRX509CERTIFICATE pCert)
1645	{
1646	/*
1647	* Check that it's a plausible root certificate.
1648	*/
1649	if (!RTCrX509Certificate_IsSelfSigned(pCert))
1650	return false;
1651	if (RTAsn1Integer_UnsignedCompareWithU32(&pCert->TbsCertificate.T0.Version, 3) > 0)
1652	{
1653	if ( !(pCert->TbsCertificate.T3.fExtKeyUsage & RTCRX509CERT_KEY_USAGE_F_KEY_CERT_SIGN)
1654	&& (pCert->TbsCertificate.T3.fFlags & RTCRX509TBSCERTIFICATE_F_PRESENT_KEY_USAGE) )
1655	return false;
1656	if ( pCert->TbsCertificate.T3.pBasicConstraints
1657	&& !pCert->TbsCertificate.T3.pBasicConstraints->CA.fValue)
1658	return false;
1659	}
1660	if (pCert->TbsCertificate.SubjectPublicKeyInfo.SubjectPublicKey.cBits < 256) /* mostly for u64KeyId reading. */
1661	return false;
1662
1663	/*
1664	* Array of names and key clues of the certificates we want.
1665	*/
1666	static struct
1667	{
1668	uint64_t u64KeyId;
1669	const char *pszName;
1670	} const s_aWanted[] =
1671	{
1672	/* SPC */
1673	{ UINT64_C(0xffffffffffffffff), "C=US, O=VeriSign, Inc., OU=Class 3 Public Primary Certification Authority" },
1674	{ UINT64_C(0xffffffffffffffff), "L=Internet, O=VeriSign, Inc., OU=VeriSign Commercial Software Publishers CA" },
1675	{ UINT64_C(0x491857ead79dde00), "C=US, O=The Go Daddy Group, Inc., OU=Go Daddy Class 2 Certification Authority" },
1676
1677	/* TS */
1678	{ UINT64_C(0xffffffffffffffff), "O=Microsoft Trust Network, OU=Microsoft Corporation, OU=Microsoft Time Stamping Service Root, OU=Copyright (c) 1997 Microsoft Corp." },
1679	{ UINT64_C(0xffffffffffffffff), "O=VeriSign Trust Network, OU=VeriSign, Inc., OU=VeriSign Time Stamping Service Root, OU=NO LIABILITY ACCEPTED, (c)97 VeriSign, Inc." },
1680	{ UINT64_C(0xffffffffffffffff), "C=ZA, ST=Western Cape, L=Durbanville, O=Thawte, OU=Thawte Certification, CN=Thawte Timestamping CA" },
1681
1682	/* Additional Windows 8.1 list: */
1683	{ UINT64_C(0x5ad46780fa5df300), "DC=com, DC=microsoft, CN=Microsoft Root Certificate Authority" },
1684	{ UINT64_C(0x3be670c1bd02a900), "OU=Copyright (c) 1997 Microsoft Corp., OU=Microsoft Corporation, CN=Microsoft Root Authority" },
1685	{ UINT64_C(0x4d3835aa4180b200), "C=US, ST=Washington, L=Redmond, O=Microsoft Corporation, CN=Microsoft Root Certificate Authority 2011" },
1686	{ UINT64_C(0x646e3fe3ba08df00), "C=US, O=MSFT, CN=Microsoft Authenticode(tm) Root Authority" },
1687	{ UINT64_C(0xece4e4289e08b900), "C=US, ST=Washington, L=Redmond, O=Microsoft Corporation, CN=Microsoft Root Certificate Authority 2010" },
1688	{ UINT64_C(0x59faf1086271bf00), "C=US, ST=Arizona, L=Scottsdale, O=GoDaddy.com, Inc., CN=Go Daddy Root Certificate Authority - G2" },
1689	{ UINT64_C(0x3d98ab22bb04a300), "C=IE, O=Baltimore, OU=CyberTrust, CN=Baltimore CyberTrust Root" },
1690	{ UINT64_C(0x91e3728b8b40d000), "C=GB, ST=Greater Manchester, L=Salford, O=COMODO CA Limited, CN=COMODO Certification Authority" },
1691	{ UINT64_C(0x61a3a33f81aace00), "C=US, ST=UT, L=Salt Lake City, O=The USERTRUST Network, OU=http://www.usertrust.com, CN=UTN-USERFirst-Object" },
1692	{ UINT64_C(0x9e5bc2d78b6a3636), "C=ZA, ST=Western Cape, L=Cape Town, O=Thawte Consulting cc, OU=Certification Services Division, CN=Thawte Premium Server CA, [email protected]" },
1693	{ UINT64_C(0xf4fd306318ccda00), "C=US, O=GeoTrust Inc., CN=GeoTrust Global CA" },
1694	{ UINT64_C(0xa0ee62086758b15d), "C=US, O=Equifax, OU=Equifax Secure Certificate Authority" },
1695	{ UINT64_C(0x8ff6fc03c1edbd00), "C=US, ST=Arizona, L=Scottsdale, O=Starfield Technologies, Inc., CN=Starfield Root Certificate Authority - G2" },
1696	{ UINT64_C(0xa3ce8d99e60eda00), "C=BE, O=GlobalSign nv-sa, OU=Root CA, CN=GlobalSign Root CA" },
1697	{ UINT64_C(0xa671e9fec832b700), "C=US, O=Starfield Technologies, Inc., OU=Starfield Class 2 Certification Authority" },
1698	{ UINT64_C(0xa8de7211e13be200), "C=US, O=DigiCert Inc, OU=www.digicert.com, CN=DigiCert Global Root CA" },
1699	{ UINT64_C(0x0ff3891b54348328), "C=US, O=Entrust.net, OU=www.entrust.net/CPS incorp. by ref. (limits liab.), OU=(c) 1999 Entrust.net Limited, CN=Entrust.netSecure Server Certification Authority" },
1700	{ UINT64_C(0x7ae89c50f0b6a00f), "C=US, O=GTE Corporation, OU=GTE CyberTrust Solutions, Inc., CN=GTE CyberTrust Global Root" },
1701	{ UINT64_C(0xd45980fbf0a0ac00), "C=US, O=thawte, Inc., OU=Certification Services Division, OU=(c) 2006 thawte, Inc. - For authorized use only, CN=thawte Primary Root CA" },
1702	{ UINT64_C(0x9e5bc2d78b6a3636), "C=ZA, ST=Western Cape, L=Cape Town, O=Thawte Consulting cc, OU=Certification Services Division, CN=Thawte Premium Server CA, [email protected]" },
1703	{ UINT64_C(0x7c4fd32ec1b1ce00), "C=PL, O=Unizeto Sp. z o.o., CN=Certum CA" },
1704	{ UINT64_C(0xd4fbe673e5ccc600), "C=US, O=DigiCert Inc, OU=www.digicert.com, CN=DigiCert High Assurance EV Root CA" },
1705	{ UINT64_C(0x16e64d2a56ccf200), "C=US, ST=Arizona, L=Scottsdale, O=Starfield Technologies, Inc., OU=http://certificates.starfieldtech.com/repository/, CN=Starfield Services Root Certificate Authority" },
1706	{ UINT64_C(0x6e2ba21058eedf00), "C=US, ST=UT, L=Salt Lake City, O=The USERTRUST Network, OU=http://www.usertrust.com, CN=UTN - DATACorp SGC" },
1707	{ UINT64_C(0xb28612a94b4dad00), "O=Entrust.net, OU=www.entrust.net/CPS_2048 incorp. by ref. (limits liab.), OU=(c) 1999 Entrust.net Limited, CN=Entrust.netCertification Authority (2048)" },
1708	{ UINT64_C(0x357a29080824af00), "C=US, O=VeriSign, Inc., OU=VeriSign Trust Network, OU=(c) 2006 VeriSign, Inc. - For authorized use only, CN=VeriSign Class3 Public Primary Certification Authority - G5" },
1709	{ UINT64_C(0x466cbc09db88c100), "C=IL, O=StartCom Ltd., OU=Secure Digital Certificate Signing, CN=StartCom Certification Authority" },
1710	{ UINT64_C(0x9259c8abe5ca713a), "L=ValiCert Validation Network, O=ValiCert, Inc., OU=ValiCert Class 2 Policy Validation Authority, CN=http://www.valicert.com/, [email protected]" },
1711	{ UINT64_C(0x1f78fc529cbacb00), "C=US, O=VeriSign, Inc., OU=VeriSign Trust Network, OU=(c) 1999 VeriSign, Inc. - For authorized use only, CN=VeriSign Class3 Public Primary Certification Authority - G3" },
1712	{ UINT64_C(0x8043e4ce150ead00), "C=US, O=DigiCert Inc, OU=www.digicert.com, CN=DigiCert Assured ID Root CA" },
1713	{ UINT64_C(0x00f2e6331af7b700), "C=SE, O=AddTrust AB, OU=AddTrust External TTP Network, CN=AddTrust External CA Root" },
1714	};
1715
1716
1717	uint64_t const u64KeyId = pCert->TbsCertificate.SubjectPublicKeyInfo.SubjectPublicKey.uBits.pu64[1];
1718	uint32_t i = RT_ELEMENTS(s_aWanted);
1719	while (i-- > 0)
1720	if ( s_aWanted[i].u64KeyId == u64KeyId
1721	\|\| s_aWanted[i].u64KeyId == UINT64_MAX)
1722	if (RTCrX509Name_MatchWithString(&pCert->TbsCertificate.Subject, s_aWanted[i].pszName))
1723	return true;
1724
1725	#ifdef DEBUG_bird
1726	char szTmp[512];
1727	szTmp[sizeof(szTmp) - 1] = '\0';
1728	RTCrX509Name_FormatAsString(&pCert->TbsCertificate.Issuer, szTmp, sizeof(szTmp) - 1, NULL);
1729	SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardenedWinIsDesiredRootCA: %#llx %s\n", u64KeyId, szTmp));
1730	#endif
1731	return false;
1732	}
1733
1734
1735	/**
1736	* Loads a module in the system32 directory.
1737	*
1738	* @returns Module handle on success. Won't return on faliure.
1739	* @param pszName The name of the DLL to load.
1740	*/
1741	DECLHIDDEN(HMODULE) supR3HardenedWinLoadSystem32Dll(const char *pszName)
1742	{
1743	WCHAR wszName[200+60];
1744	UINT cwcDir = GetSystemDirectoryW(wszName, RT_ELEMENTS(wszName) - 60);
1745	wszName[cwcDir] = '\\';
1746	RTUtf16CopyAscii(&wszName[cwcDir + 1], RT_ELEMENTS(wszName) - cwcDir, pszName);
1747
1748	DWORD fFlags = 0;
1749	if (g_uNtVerCombined >= SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_SIMPLE(6, 0))
1750	fFlags = LOAD_LIBRARY_SEARCH_SYSTEM32;
1751	HMODULE hMod = LoadLibraryExW(wszName, NULL, fFlags);
1752	if ( hMod == NULL
1753	&& fFlags
1754	&& g_uNtVerCombined < SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_SIMPLE(6, 2)
1755	&& GetLastError() == ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER)
1756	{
1757	fFlags = 0;
1758	hMod = LoadLibraryExW(wszName, NULL, fFlags);
1759	}
1760	if (hMod == NULL)
1761	supR3HardenedFatal("Error loading '%s': %u [%ls]", pszName, GetLastError(), wszName);
1762	return hMod;
1763	}
1764
1765
1766	/**
1767	* Called by supR3HardenedWinResolveVerifyTrustApiAndHookThreadCreation to
1768	* import selected root CAs from the system certificate store.
1769	*
1770	* These certificates permits us to correctly validate third party DLLs.
1771	*/
1772	static void supR3HardenedWinRetrieveTrustedRootCAs(void)
1773	{
1774	uint32_t cAdded = 0;
1775
1776	/*
1777	* Load crypt32.dll and resolve the APIs we need.
1778	*/
1779	HMODULE hCrypt32 = supR3HardenedWinLoadSystem32Dll("crypt32.dll");
1780
1781	#define RESOLVE_CRYPT32_API(a_Name, a_pfnType) \
1782	a_pfnType pfn##a_Name = (a_pfnType)GetProcAddress(hCrypt32, #a_Name); \
1783	if (pfn##a_Name == NULL) supR3HardenedFatal("Error locating '" #a_Name "' in 'crypt32.dll': %u", GetLastError())
1784	RESOLVE_CRYPT32_API(CertOpenStore, PFNCERTOPENSTORE);
1785	RESOLVE_CRYPT32_API(CertCloseStore, PFNCERTCLOSESTORE);
1786	RESOLVE_CRYPT32_API(CertEnumCertificatesInStore, PFNCERTENUMCERTIFICATESINSTORE);
1787	#undef RESOLVE_CRYPT32_API
1788
1789	/*
1790	* Open the root store and look for the certificates we wish to use.
1791	*/
1792	DWORD fOpenStore = CERT_STORE_OPEN_EXISTING_FLAG \| CERT_STORE_READONLY_FLAG;
1793	HCERTSTORE hStore = pfnCertOpenStore(CERT_STORE_PROV_SYSTEM_W, PKCS_7_ASN_ENCODING \| X509_ASN_ENCODING,
1794	NULL /* hCryptProv = default */, CERT_SYSTEM_STORE_LOCAL_MACHINE \| fOpenStore, L"Root");
1795	if (!hStore)
1796	hStore = pfnCertOpenStore(CERT_STORE_PROV_SYSTEM_W, PKCS_7_ASN_ENCODING \| X509_ASN_ENCODING,
1797	NULL /* hCryptProv = default */, CERT_SYSTEM_STORE_CURRENT_USER \| fOpenStore, L"Root");
1798	if (hStore)
1799	{
1800	PCCERT_CONTEXT pCurCtx = NULL;
1801	while ((pCurCtx = pfnCertEnumCertificatesInStore(hStore, pCurCtx)) != NULL)
1802	{
1803	if (pCurCtx->dwCertEncodingType & X509_ASN_ENCODING)
1804	{
1805	RTERRINFOSTATIC StaticErrInfo;
1806	RTASN1CURSORPRIMARY PrimaryCursor;
1807	RTAsn1CursorInitPrimary(&PrimaryCursor, pCurCtx->pbCertEncoded, pCurCtx->cbCertEncoded,
1808	RTErrInfoInitStatic(&StaticErrInfo),
1809	&g_RTAsn1DefaultAllocator, RTASN1CURSOR_FLAGS_DER, "CurCtx");
1810	RTCRX509CERTIFICATE MyCert;
1811	int rc = RTCrX509Certificate_DecodeAsn1(&PrimaryCursor.Cursor, 0, &MyCert, "Cert");
1812	if (RT_SUCCESS(rc))
1813	{
1814	if (supR3HardenedWinIsDesiredRootCA(&MyCert))
1815	{
1816	rc = RTCrStoreCertAddEncoded(g_hSpcRootStore, RTCRCERTCTX_F_ENC_X509_DER,
1817	pCurCtx->pbCertEncoded, pCurCtx->cbCertEncoded, NULL /pErrInfo/);
1818	AssertRC(rc);
1819
1820	rc = RTCrStoreCertAddEncoded(g_hSpcAndNtKernelRootStore, RTCRCERTCTX_F_ENC_X509_DER,
1821	pCurCtx->pbCertEncoded, pCurCtx->cbCertEncoded, NULL /pErrInfo/);
1822	AssertRC(rc);
1823	cAdded++;
1824	}
1825
1826	RTCrX509Certificate_Delete(&MyCert);
1827	}
1828	/* XP root certificate "C&W HKT SecureNet CA SGC Root" has non-standard validity
1829	timestamps, the UTC formatting isn't Zulu time but specifies timezone offsets.
1830	Ignore these failures and certificates. */
1831	else if (rc != VERR_ASN1_INVALID_UTC_TIME_ENCODING)
1832	AssertMsgFailed(("RTCrX509Certificate_DecodeAsn1 failed: rc=%#x: %s\n", rc, StaticErrInfo.szMsg));
1833	}
1834	}
1835	pfnCertCloseStore(hStore, CERT_CLOSE_STORE_CHECK_FLAG);
1836	g_fHaveOtherRoots = true;
1837	}
1838	SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardenedWinRetrieveTrustedRootCAs: cAdded=%u\n", cAdded));
1839	}
1840
1841
1842	/**
1843	* Resolves the WinVerifyTrust API after the process has been verified and
1844	* installs a thread creation hook.
1845	*
1846	* The WinVerifyTrust API is used in addition our own Authenticode verification
1847	* code. If the image has the IMAGE_DLLCHARACTERISTICS_FORCE_INTEGRITY flag
1848	* set, it will be checked again by the kernel. All our image has this flag set
1849	* and we require all VBox extensions to have it set as well. In effect, the
1850	* authenticode signature will be checked two or three times.
1851	*
1852	* @param pszProgName The program name.
1853	*/
1854	DECLHIDDEN(void) supR3HardenedWinResolveVerifyTrustApiAndHookThreadCreation(const char *pszProgName)
1855	{
1856	# ifdef IN_SUP_HARDENED_R3
1857	/*
1858	* Load our the support library DLL that does the thread hooking as the
1859	* security API may trigger the creation of COM worker threads (or
1860	* whatever they are).
1861	*
1862	* The thread creation hook makes the threads very slippery to debuggers by
1863	* irreversably disabling most (if not all) debug events for them.
1864	*/
1865	char szPath[RTPATH_MAX];
1866	supR3HardenedPathSharedLibs(szPath, sizeof(szPath) - sizeof("/VBoxSupLib.DLL"));
1867	suplibHardenedStrCat(szPath, "/VBoxSupLib.DLL");
1868	HMODULE hSupLibMod = (HMODULE)supR3HardenedWinLoadLibrary(szPath, true /fSystem32Only/);
1869	if (hSupLibMod == NULL)
1870	supR3HardenedFatal("Error loading '%s': %u", szPath, GetLastError());
1871	# endif
1872
1873	/*
1874	* Allocate TLS entry for WinVerifyTrust recursion prevention.
1875	*/
1876	DWORD iTls = TlsAlloc();
1877	if (iTls != TLS_OUT_OF_INDEXES)
1878	g_iTlsWinVerifyTrustRecursion = iTls;
1879	else
1880	supR3HardenedError(GetLastError(), false /fFatal/, "TlsAlloc failed");
1881
1882	/*
1883	* Resolve it.
1884	*/
1885	HMODULE hWintrust = supR3HardenedWinLoadSystem32Dll("Wintrust.dll");
1886	#define RESOLVE_CRYPT_API(a_Name, a_pfnType, a_uMinWinVer) \
1887	do { \
1888	g_pfn##a_Name = (a_pfnType)GetProcAddress(hWintrust, #a_Name); \
1889	if (g_pfn##a_Name == NULL && (a_uMinWinVer) < g_uNtVerCombined) \
1890	supR3HardenedFatal("Error locating '" #a_Name "' in 'Wintrust.dll': %u", GetLastError()); \
1891	} while (0)
1892
1893	PFNWINVERIFYTRUST pfnWinVerifyTrust = (PFNWINVERIFYTRUST)GetProcAddress(hWintrust, "WinVerifyTrust");
1894	if (!pfnWinVerifyTrust)
1895	supR3HardenedFatal("Error locating 'WinVerifyTrust' in 'Wintrust.dll': %u", GetLastError());
1896
1897	RESOLVE_CRYPT_API(CryptCATAdminAcquireContext, PFNCRYPTCATADMINACQUIRECONTEXT, 0);
1898	RESOLVE_CRYPT_API(CryptCATAdminCalcHashFromFileHandle, PFNCRYPTCATADMINCALCHASHFROMFILEHANDLE, 0);
1899	RESOLVE_CRYPT_API(CryptCATAdminEnumCatalogFromHash, PFNCRYPTCATADMINENUMCATALOGFROMHASH, 0);
1900	RESOLVE_CRYPT_API(CryptCATAdminReleaseCatalogContext, PFNCRYPTCATADMINRELEASECATALOGCONTEXT, 0);
1901	RESOLVE_CRYPT_API(CryptCATAdminReleaseContext, PFNCRYPTCATDADMINRELEASECONTEXT, 0);
1902	RESOLVE_CRYPT_API(CryptCATCatalogInfoFromContext, PFNCRYPTCATCATALOGINFOFROMCONTEXT, 0);
1903
1904	RESOLVE_CRYPT_API(CryptCATAdminAcquireContext2, PFNCRYPTCATADMINACQUIRECONTEXT2, SUP_NT_VER_W80);
1905	RESOLVE_CRYPT_API(CryptCATAdminCalcHashFromFileHandle2, PFNCRYPTCATADMINCALCHASHFROMFILEHANDLE2, SUP_NT_VER_W80);
1906
1907	/*
1908	* Call it on ourselves and ntdll to make sure it loads all the providers
1909	* now, we would otherwise geting into recursive trouble in the
1910	* NtCreateSection hook.
1911	*/
1912	# ifdef IN_SUP_HARDENED_R3
1913	RTERRINFOSTATIC ErrInfoStatic;
1914	RTErrInfoInitStatic(&ErrInfoStatic);
1915	int rc = supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrust(NULL, g_SupLibHardenedExeNtPath.UniStr.Buffer, 0,
1916	&ErrInfoStatic.Core, pfnWinVerifyTrust);
1917	if (RT_FAILURE(rc))
1918	supR3HardenedFatalMsg(pszProgName, kSupInitOp_Integrity, rc,
1919	"WinVerifyTrust failed on stub executable: %s", ErrInfoStatic.szMsg);
1920	# endif
1921
1922	if (g_uNtVerCombined >= SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_SIMPLE(6, 0)) /* ntdll isn't signed on XP, assuming this is the case on W2K3 for now. */
1923	supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrust(NULL, L"\\SystemRoot\\System32\\ntdll.dll", 0, NULL, pfnWinVerifyTrust);
1924	supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrustCatFile(NULL, L"\\SystemRoot\\System32\\ntdll.dll", 0, NULL, pfnWinVerifyTrust);
1925
1926	g_pfnWinVerifyTrust = pfnWinVerifyTrust;
1927	SUP_DPRINTF(("g_pfnWinVerifyTrust=%p\n", pfnWinVerifyTrust));
1928
1929	# ifdef IN_SUP_HARDENED_R3
1930	/*
1931	* Load some problematic DLLs into the verifier cache to prevent
1932	* recursion trouble.
1933	*/
1934	supR3HardenedWinVerifyCachePreload(L"\\SystemRoot\\System32\\crypt32.dll");
1935	supR3HardenedWinVerifyCachePreload(L"\\SystemRoot\\System32\\Wintrust.dll");
1936	# endif
1937
1938	/*
1939	* Now, get trusted root CAs so we can verify a broader scope of signatures.
1940	*/
1941	supR3HardenedWinRetrieveTrustedRootCAs();
1942	}
1943
1944
1945	static int supR3HardNtViNtToWinPath(PCRTUTF16 pwszNtName, PCRTUTF16 *ppwszWinPath,
1946	PRTUTF16 pwszWinPathBuf, size_t cwcWinPathBuf)
1947	{
1948	static const RTUTF16 s_wszPrefix[] = L"\\\\.\\GLOBALROOT";
1949
1950	if (pwszNtName != '\\' && pwszNtName != '/')
1951	return VERR_PATH_DOES_NOT_START_WITH_ROOT;
1952
1953	size_t cwcNtName = RTUtf16Len(pwszNtName);
1954	if (RT_ELEMENTS(s_wszPrefix) + cwcNtName > cwcWinPathBuf)
1955	return VERR_FILENAME_TOO_LONG;
1956
1957	memcpy(pwszWinPathBuf, s_wszPrefix, sizeof(s_wszPrefix));
1958	memcpy(&pwszWinPathBuf[sizeof(s_wszPrefix) / sizeof(RTUTF16) - 1], pwszNtName, (cwcNtName + 1) * sizeof(RTUTF16));
1959	*ppwszWinPath = pwszWinPathBuf;
1960	return VINF_SUCCESS;
1961	}
1962
1963
1964	/**
1965	* Calls WinVerifyTrust to verify an PE image.
1966	*
1967	* @returns VBox status code.
1968	* @param hFile File handle to the executable file.
1969	* @param pwszName Full NT path to the DLL in question, used for
1970	* dealing with unsigned system dlls as well as for
1971	* error/logging.
1972	* @param fFlags Flags, SUPHNTVI_F_XXX.
1973	* @param pErrInfo Pointer to error info structure. Optional.
1974	* @param pfnWinVerifyTrust Pointer to the API.
1975	*/
1976	static int supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrust(HANDLE hFile, PCRTUTF16 pwszName, uint32_t fFlags, PRTERRINFO pErrInfo,
1977	PFNWINVERIFYTRUST pfnWinVerifyTrust)
1978	{
1979	/*
1980	* Convert the name into a Windows name.
1981	*/
1982	RTUTF16 wszWinPathBuf[MAX_PATH];
1983	PCRTUTF16 pwszWinPath;
1984	int rc = supR3HardNtViNtToWinPath(pwszName, &pwszWinPath, wszWinPathBuf, RT_ELEMENTS(wszWinPathBuf));
1985	if (RT_FAILURE(rc))
1986	return RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, rc, "Bad path passed to supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrust: rc=%Rrc '%ls'", rc, pwszName);
1987
1988	/*
1989	* Construct input parameters and call the API.
1990	*/
1991	WINTRUST_FILE_INFO FileInfo;
1992	RT_ZERO(FileInfo);
1993	FileInfo.cbStruct = sizeof(FileInfo);
1994	FileInfo.pcwszFilePath = pwszWinPath;
1995	FileInfo.hFile = hFile;
1996
1997	GUID PolicyActionGuid = WINTRUST_ACTION_GENERIC_VERIFY_V2;
1998
1999	WINTRUST_DATA TrustData;
2000	RT_ZERO(TrustData);
2001	TrustData.cbStruct = sizeof(TrustData);
2002	TrustData.fdwRevocationChecks = WTD_REVOKE_NONE; /* Keep simple for now. */
2003	TrustData.dwStateAction = WTD_STATEACTION_VERIFY;
2004	TrustData.dwUIChoice = WTD_UI_NONE;
2005	TrustData.dwProvFlags = 0;
2006	if (g_uNtVerCombined >= SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_SIMPLE(6, 0))
2007	TrustData.dwProvFlags = WTD_CACHE_ONLY_URL_RETRIEVAL;
2008	else
2009	TrustData.dwProvFlags = WTD_REVOCATION_CHECK_NONE;
2010	TrustData.dwUnionChoice = WTD_CHOICE_FILE;
2011	TrustData.pFile = &FileInfo;
2012
2013	HRESULT hrc = pfnWinVerifyTrust(NULL /hwnd/, &PolicyActionGuid, &TrustData);
2014	if (hrc == S_OK)
2015	rc = VINF_SUCCESS;
2016	else
2017	{
2018	/*
2019	* Failed. Format a nice error message.
2020	*/
2021	# ifdef DEBUG_bird
2022	if (hrc != CERT_E_CHAINING /* Un-updated vistas, XPs, ++ */)
2023	__debugbreak();
2024	# endif
2025	const char *pszErrConst = NULL;
2026	switch (hrc)
2027	{
2028	case TRUST_E_SYSTEM_ERROR: pszErrConst = "TRUST_E_SYSTEM_ERROR"; break;
2029	case TRUST_E_NO_SIGNER_CERT: pszErrConst = "TRUST_E_NO_SIGNER_CERT"; break;
2030	case TRUST_E_COUNTER_SIGNER: pszErrConst = "TRUST_E_COUNTER_SIGNER"; break;
2031	case TRUST_E_CERT_SIGNATURE: pszErrConst = "TRUST_E_CERT_SIGNATURE"; break;
2032	case TRUST_E_TIME_STAMP: pszErrConst = "TRUST_E_TIME_STAMP"; break;
2033	case TRUST_E_BAD_DIGEST: pszErrConst = "TRUST_E_BAD_DIGEST"; break;
2034	case TRUST_E_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS: pszErrConst = "TRUST_E_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS"; break;
2035	case TRUST_E_FINANCIAL_CRITERIA: pszErrConst = "TRUST_E_FINANCIAL_CRITERIA"; break;
2036	case TRUST_E_PROVIDER_UNKNOWN: pszErrConst = "TRUST_E_PROVIDER_UNKNOWN"; break;
2037	case TRUST_E_ACTION_UNKNOWN: pszErrConst = "TRUST_E_ACTION_UNKNOWN"; break;
2038	case TRUST_E_SUBJECT_FORM_UNKNOWN: pszErrConst = "TRUST_E_SUBJECT_FORM_UNKNOWN"; break;
2039	case TRUST_E_SUBJECT_NOT_TRUSTED: pszErrConst = "TRUST_E_SUBJECT_NOT_TRUSTED"; break;
2040	case TRUST_E_NOSIGNATURE: pszErrConst = "TRUST_E_NOSIGNATURE"; break;
2041	case TRUST_E_FAIL: pszErrConst = "TRUST_E_FAIL"; break;
2042	case TRUST_E_EXPLICIT_DISTRUST: pszErrConst = "TRUST_E_EXPLICIT_DISTRUST"; break;
2043	case CERT_E_CHAINING: pszErrConst = "CERT_E_CHAINING"; break;
2044	case CERT_E_REVOCATION_FAILURE: pszErrConst = "CERT_E_REVOCATION_FAILURE"; break;
2045	}
2046	if (pszErrConst)
2047	rc = RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, VERR_LDRVI_UNSUPPORTED_ARCH,
2048	"WinVerifyTrust failed with hrc=%s on '%ls'", pszErrConst, pwszName);
2049	else
2050	rc = RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, VERR_LDRVI_UNSUPPORTED_ARCH,
2051	"WinVerifyTrust failed with hrc=%Rhrc on '%ls'", hrc, pwszName);
2052	SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrust: WinVerifyTrust failed with %#x (%s) on '%ls'\n",
2053	hrc, pszErrConst, pwszName));
2054	}
2055
2056	/* clean up state data. */
2057	TrustData.dwStateAction = WTD_STATEACTION_CLOSE;
2058	FileInfo.hFile = NULL;
2059	hrc = pfnWinVerifyTrust(NULL /hwnd/, &PolicyActionGuid, &TrustData);
2060
2061	return rc;
2062	}
2063
2064
2065	/**
2066	* Calls WinVerifyTrust to verify an PE image via catalog files.
2067	*
2068	* @returns VBox status code.
2069	* @param hFile File handle to the executable file.
2070	* @param pwszName Full NT path to the DLL in question, used for
2071	* dealing with unsigned system dlls as well as for
2072	* error/logging.
2073	* @param fFlags Flags, SUPHNTVI_F_XXX.
2074	* @param pErrInfo Pointer to error info structure. Optional.
2075	* @param pfnWinVerifyTrust Pointer to the API.
2076	*/
2077	static int supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrustCatFile(HANDLE hFile, PCRTUTF16 pwszName, uint32_t fFlags, PRTERRINFO pErrInfo,
2078	PFNWINVERIFYTRUST pfnWinVerifyTrust)
2079	{
2080	SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrustCatFile: hFile=%p pwszName=%ls\n", hFile, pwszName));
2081
2082	/*
2083	* Convert the name into a Windows name.
2084	*/
2085	RTUTF16 wszWinPathBuf[MAX_PATH];
2086	PCRTUTF16 pwszWinPath;
2087	int rc = supR3HardNtViNtToWinPath(pwszName, &pwszWinPath, wszWinPathBuf, RT_ELEMENTS(wszWinPathBuf));
2088	if (RT_FAILURE(rc))
2089	return RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, rc, "Bad path passed to supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrustCatFile: rc=%Rrc '%ls'", rc, pwszName);
2090
2091	/*
2092	* Open the file if we didn't get a handle.
2093	*/
2094	HANDLE hFileClose = NULL;
2095	if (hFile == RTNT_INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE \|\| hFile == NULL)
2096	{
2097	hFile = RTNT_INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE;
2098	IO_STATUS_BLOCK Ios = RTNT_IO_STATUS_BLOCK_INITIALIZER;
2099
2100	UNICODE_STRING NtName;
2101	NtName.Buffer = (PWSTR)pwszName;
2102	NtName.Length = (USHORT)(RTUtf16Len(pwszName) * sizeof(WCHAR));
2103	NtName.MaximumLength = NtName.Length + sizeof(WCHAR);
2104
2105	OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES ObjAttr;
2106	InitializeObjectAttributes(&ObjAttr, &NtName, OBJ_CASE_INSENSITIVE, NULL /hRootDir/, NULL /pSecDesc/);
2107
2108	NTSTATUS rcNt = NtCreateFile(&hFile,
2109	FILE_READ_DATA \| READ_CONTROL \| SYNCHRONIZE,
2110	&ObjAttr,
2111	&Ios,
2112	NULL /* Allocation Size*/,
2113	FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL,
2114	FILE_SHARE_READ,
2115	FILE_OPEN,
2116	FILE_NON_DIRECTORY_FILE \| FILE_SYNCHRONOUS_IO_NONALERT,
2117	NULL /EaBuffer/,
2118	0 /EaLength/);
2119	if (NT_SUCCESS(rcNt))
2120	rcNt = Ios.Status;
2121	if (!NT_SUCCESS(rcNt))
2122	return RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, RTErrConvertFromNtStatus(rcNt),
2123	"NtCreateFile returned %#x opening '%ls'.", rcNt, pwszName);
2124	hFileClose = hFile;
2125	}
2126
2127	/*
2128	* On Windows 8.0 and later there are more than one digest choice.
2129	*/
2130	rc = VERR_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED;
2131	static struct
2132	{
2133	/** The digest algorithm name. */
2134	const WCHAR *pszAlgorithm;
2135	/** Cached catalog admin handle. */
2136	HCATADMIN volatile hCachedCatAdmin;
2137	} s_aHashes[] =
2138	{
2139	{ NULL, NULL },
2140	{ L"SHA256", NULL },
2141	};
2142	for (uint32_t i = 0; i < RT_ELEMENTS(s_aHashes); i++)
2143	{
2144	/*
2145	* Another loop for dealing with different trust provider policies
2146	* required for successfully validating different catalog signatures.
2147	*/
2148	bool fTryNextPolicy;
2149	uint32_t iPolicy = 0;
2150	static const GUID s_aPolicies[] =
2151	{
2152	DRIVER_ACTION_VERIFY, /* Works with microsoft bits. Most frequently used, thus first. */
2153	WINTRUST_ACTION_GENERIC_VERIFY_V2, /* Works with ATI and other SPC kernel-code signed stuff. */
2154	};
2155	do
2156	{
2157	/*
2158	* Create a context.
2159	*/
2160	fTryNextPolicy = false;
2161	bool fFreshContext = false;
2162	BOOL fRc;
2163	HCATADMIN hCatAdmin = ASMAtomicXchgPtr(&s_aHashes[i].hCachedCatAdmin, NULL);
2164	if (hCatAdmin)
2165	{
2166	SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrustCatFile: Cached context %p\n", hCatAdmin));
2167	fFreshContext = false;
2168	fRc = TRUE;
2169	}
2170	else
2171	{
2172	l_fresh_context:
2173	fFreshContext = true;
2174	if (g_pfnCryptCATAdminAcquireContext2)
2175	fRc = g_pfnCryptCATAdminAcquireContext2(&hCatAdmin, &s_aPolicies[iPolicy], s_aHashes[i].pszAlgorithm,
2176	NULL /pStrongHashPolicy/, 0 /dwFlags/);
2177	else
2178	fRc = g_pfnCryptCATAdminAcquireContext(&hCatAdmin, &s_aPolicies[iPolicy], 0 /dwFlags/);
2179	SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrustCatFile: New context %p\n", hCatAdmin));
2180	}
2181	if (fRc)
2182	{
2183	SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrustCatFile: hCatAdmin=%p\n", hCatAdmin));
2184
2185	/*
2186	* Hash the file.
2187	*/
2188	BYTE abHash[SUPHARDNTVI_MAX_CAT_HASH_SIZE];
2189	DWORD cbHash = sizeof(abHash);
2190	if (g_pfnCryptCATAdminCalcHashFromFileHandle2)
2191	fRc = g_pfnCryptCATAdminCalcHashFromFileHandle2(hCatAdmin, hFile, &cbHash, abHash, 0 /dwFlags/);
2192	else
2193	fRc = g_pfnCryptCATAdminCalcHashFromFileHandle(hFile, &cbHash, abHash, 0 /dwFlags/);
2194	if (fRc)
2195	{
2196	/* Produce a string version of it that we can pass to WinVerifyTrust. */
2197	RTUTF16 wszDigest[SUPHARDNTVI_MAX_CAT_HASH_SIZE * 2 + 1];
2198	int rc2 = RTUtf16PrintHexBytes(wszDigest, RT_ELEMENTS(wszDigest), abHash, cbHash, RTSTRPRINTHEXBYTES_F_UPPER);
2199	if (RT_SUCCESS(rc2))
2200	{
2201	SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrustCatFile: cbHash=%u wszDigest=%ls\n", cbHash, wszDigest));
2202
2203	/*
2204	* Enumerate catalog information that matches the hash.
2205	*/
2206	uint32_t iCat = 0;
2207	HCATINFO hCatInfoPrev = NULL;
2208	do
2209	{
2210	/* Get the next match. */
2211	HCATINFO hCatInfo = g_pfnCryptCATAdminEnumCatalogFromHash(hCatAdmin, abHash, cbHash, 0, &hCatInfoPrev);
2212	if (!hCatInfo)
2213	{
2214	if (!fFreshContext)
2215	{
2216	SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrustCatFile: Retrying with fresh context (CryptCATAdminEnumCatalogFromHash -> %u; iCat=%#x)\n", GetLastError(), iCat));
2217	if (hCatInfoPrev != NULL)
2218	g_pfnCryptCATAdminReleaseCatalogContext(hCatAdmin, hCatInfoPrev, 0 /dwFlags/);
2219	g_pfnCryptCATAdminReleaseContext(hCatAdmin, 0 /dwFlags/);
2220	goto l_fresh_context;
2221	}
2222	if (iCat == 0)
2223	SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrustCatFile: CryptCATAdminEnumCatalogFromHash failed %u\n", GetLastError()));
2224	break;
2225	}
2226	Assert(hCatInfoPrev == NULL);
2227	hCatInfoPrev = hCatInfo;
2228
2229	/*
2230	* Call WinVerifyTrust.
2231	*/
2232	CATALOG_INFO CatInfo;
2233	CatInfo.cbStruct = sizeof(CatInfo);
2234	CatInfo.wszCatalogFile[0] = '\0';
2235	if (g_pfnCryptCATCatalogInfoFromContext(hCatInfo, &CatInfo, 0 /dwFlags/))
2236	{
2237	WINTRUST_CATALOG_INFO WtCatInfo;
2238	RT_ZERO(WtCatInfo);
2239	WtCatInfo.cbStruct = sizeof(WtCatInfo);
2240	WtCatInfo.dwCatalogVersion = 0;
2241	WtCatInfo.pcwszCatalogFilePath = CatInfo.wszCatalogFile;
2242	WtCatInfo.pcwszMemberTag = wszDigest;
2243	WtCatInfo.pcwszMemberFilePath = pwszWinPath;
2244	WtCatInfo.pbCalculatedFileHash = abHash;
2245	WtCatInfo.cbCalculatedFileHash = cbHash;
2246	WtCatInfo.pcCatalogContext = NULL;
2247
2248	WINTRUST_DATA TrustData;
2249	RT_ZERO(TrustData);
2250	TrustData.cbStruct = sizeof(TrustData);
2251	TrustData.fdwRevocationChecks = WTD_REVOKE_NONE; /* Keep simple for now. */
2252	TrustData.dwStateAction = WTD_STATEACTION_VERIFY;
2253	TrustData.dwUIChoice = WTD_UI_NONE;
2254	TrustData.dwProvFlags = 0;
2255	if (g_uNtVerCombined >= SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_SIMPLE(6, 0))
2256	TrustData.dwProvFlags = WTD_CACHE_ONLY_URL_RETRIEVAL;
2257	else
2258	TrustData.dwProvFlags = WTD_REVOCATION_CHECK_NONE;
2259	TrustData.dwUnionChoice = WTD_CHOICE_CATALOG;
2260	TrustData.pCatalog = &WtCatInfo;
2261
2262	HRESULT hrc = pfnWinVerifyTrust(NULL /hwnd/, &s_aPolicies[iPolicy], &TrustData);
2263	SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrustCatFile: WinVerifyTrust => %#x; cat='%ls'; file='%ls'\n",
2264	hrc, CatInfo.wszCatalogFile, pwszName));
2265
2266	if (SUCCEEDED(hrc))
2267	rc = VINF_SUCCESS;
2268	else if (hrc == TRUST_E_NOSIGNATURE)
2269	{ /* ignore because it's useless. */ }
2270	else if (hrc == ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER)
2271	{ /* This is returned if the given file isn't found in the catalog, it seems. */ }
2272	else
2273	{
2274	rc = RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, VERR_SUP_VP_WINTRUST_CAT_FAILURE,
2275	"WinVerifyTrust failed with hrc=%#x on '%ls' and .cat-file='%ls'.",
2276	hrc, pwszWinPath, CatInfo.wszCatalogFile);
2277	fTryNextPolicy \|= (hrc == CERT_E_UNTRUSTEDROOT);
2278	}
2279
2280	/* clean up state data. */
2281	TrustData.dwStateAction = WTD_STATEACTION_CLOSE;
2282	hrc = pfnWinVerifyTrust(NULL /hwnd/, &s_aPolicies[iPolicy], &TrustData);
2283	Assert(SUCCEEDED(hrc));
2284	}
2285	else
2286	{
2287	rc = RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, RTErrConvertFromWin32(GetLastError()),
2288	"CryptCATCatalogInfoFromContext failed: %d [file=%s]",
2289	GetLastError(), pwszName);
2290	SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrustCatFile: CryptCATCatalogInfoFromContext failed\n"));
2291	}
2292	iCat++;
2293	} while (rc == VERR_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED && iCat < 128);
2294
2295	if (hCatInfoPrev != NULL)
2296	if (!g_pfnCryptCATAdminReleaseCatalogContext(hCatAdmin, hCatInfoPrev, 0 /dwFlags/))
2297	AssertFailed();
2298	}
2299	else
2300	rc = RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, rc2, "RTUtf16PrintHexBytes failed: %Rrc", rc);
2301	}
2302	else
2303	rc = RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, RTErrConvertFromWin32(GetLastError()),
2304	"CryptCATAdminCalcHashFromFileHandle[2] failed: %d [file=%s]", GetLastError(), pwszName);
2305
2306	if (!ASMAtomicCmpXchgPtr(&s_aHashes[i].hCachedCatAdmin, hCatAdmin, NULL))
2307	if (!g_pfnCryptCATAdminReleaseContext(hCatAdmin, 0 /dwFlags/))
2308	AssertFailed();
2309	}
2310	else
2311	rc = RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, RTErrConvertFromWin32(GetLastError()),
2312	"CryptCATAdminAcquireContext[2] failed: %d [file=%s]", GetLastError(), pwszName);
2313	iPolicy++;
2314	} while ( fTryNextPolicy
2315	&& iPolicy < RT_ELEMENTS(s_aPolicies));
2316
2317	/*
2318	* Only repeat if we've got g_pfnCryptCATAdminAcquireContext2 and can specify the hash algorithm.
2319	*/
2320	if (!g_pfnCryptCATAdminAcquireContext2)
2321	break;
2322	if (rc != VERR_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED)
2323	break;
2324	}
2325
2326	if (hFileClose != NULL)
2327	NtClose(hFileClose);
2328
2329	return rc;
2330	}
2331
2332
2333	/**
2334	* Verifies the given image using WinVerifyTrust in some way.
2335	*
2336	* This is used by supHardenedWinVerifyImageByLdrMod as well as
2337	* supR3HardenedScreenImage.
2338	*
2339	* @returns IPRT status code.
2340	* @param hFile Handle of the file to verify.
2341	* @param pwszName Full NT path to the DLL in question, used for
2342	* dealing with unsigned system dlls as well as for
2343	* error/logging.
2344	* @param pfWinVerifyTrust Where to return whether WinVerifyTrust was
2345	* actually used.
2346	* @param pErrInfo Pointer to error info structure. Optional.
2347	*/
2348	DECLHIDDEN(int) supHardenedWinVerifyImageTrust(HANDLE hFile, PCRTUTF16 pwszName, uint32_t fFlags, int rc,
2349	bool *pfWinVerifyTrust, PRTERRINFO pErrInfo)
2350	{
2351	if (pfWinVerifyTrust)
2352	*pfWinVerifyTrust = false;
2353
2354	/*
2355	* Call the windows verify trust API if we've resolved it and aren't in
2356	* some obvious recursion.
2357	*/
2358	if (g_pfnWinVerifyTrust != NULL)
2359	{
2360	/* Check for recursion. */
2361	bool fNoRecursion;
2362	if (g_iTlsWinVerifyTrustRecursion != UINT32_MAX)
2363	{
2364	fNoRecursion = TlsGetValue(g_iTlsWinVerifyTrustRecursion) == 0;
2365	if (fNoRecursion)
2366	TlsSetValue(g_iTlsWinVerifyTrustRecursion, (void *)1);
2367	}
2368	else
2369	{
2370	uint32_t const idCurrentThread = GetCurrentThreadId();
2371	fNoRecursion = ASMAtomicCmpXchgU32(&g_idActiveThread, idCurrentThread, UINT32_MAX);
2372	}
2373	if (fNoRecursion)
2374	{
2375	/* We can call WinVerifyTrust. */
2376	if (pfWinVerifyTrust)
2377	*pfWinVerifyTrust = true;
2378
2379	if (rc != VERR_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED)
2380	{
2381	if (rc == VINF_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED)
2382	{
2383	if (fFlags & SUPHNTVI_F_ALLOW_CAT_FILE_VERIFICATION)
2384	{
2385	int rc2 = supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrustCatFile(hFile, pwszName, fFlags, pErrInfo, g_pfnWinVerifyTrust);
2386	SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrustCatFile -> %d (org %d)\n", rc2, rc));
2387	rc = rc2;
2388	}
2389	else
2390	{
2391	AssertFailed();
2392	rc = VERR_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED;
2393	}
2394	}
2395	else if (RT_SUCCESS(rc))
2396	{
2397	/** @todo having trouble with a 32-bit windows box when letting these calls thru */
2398	rc = supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrust(hFile, pwszName, fFlags, pErrInfo, g_pfnWinVerifyTrust);
2399	}
2400	else
2401	{
2402	int rc2 = supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrust(hFile, pwszName, fFlags, pErrInfo, g_pfnWinVerifyTrust);
2403	AssertMsg(RT_FAILURE_NP(rc2),
2404	("rc=%Rrc, rc2=%Rrc %s", rc, rc2, pErrInfo ? pErrInfo->pszMsg : "<no-err-info>"));
2405	}
2406	}
2407
2408	/* Unwind recursion. */
2409	if (g_iTlsWinVerifyTrustRecursion != UINT32_MAX)
2410	TlsSetValue(g_iTlsWinVerifyTrustRecursion, (void *)0);
2411	else
2412	ASMAtomicWriteU32(&g_idActiveThread, UINT32_MAX);
2413	}
2414	else
2415	SUP_DPRINTF(("Detected WinVerifyTrust recursion: rc=%Rrc '%ls'.\n", rc, pwszName));
2416	}
2417	return rc;
2418	}
2419
2420
2421	/**
2422	* Checks if WinVerifyTrust is callable on the current thread.
2423	*
2424	* Used by the main code to figure whether it makes sense to try revalidate an
2425	* image that hasn't passed thru WinVerifyTrust yet.
2426	*
2427	* @returns true if callable on current thread, false if not.
2428	*/
2429	DECLHIDDEN(bool) supHardenedWinIsWinVerifyTrustCallable(void)
2430	{
2431	return g_pfnWinVerifyTrust != NULL
2432	&& ( g_iTlsWinVerifyTrustRecursion != UINT32_MAX
2433	? (uintptr_t)TlsGetValue(g_iTlsWinVerifyTrustRecursion) == 0
2434	: g_idActiveThread != GetCurrentThreadId() );
2435	}
2436
2437
2438
2439	/**
2440	* Initializes g_uNtVerCombined and g_NtVerInfo.
2441	* Called from suplibHardenedWindowsMain and suplibOsInit.
2442	*/
2443	DECLHIDDEN(void) supR3HardenedWinInitVersion(void)
2444	{
2445	/*
2446	* Get the windows version. Use RtlGetVersion as GetVersionExW and
2447	* GetVersion might not be telling the whole truth (8.0 on 8.1 depending on
2448	* the application manifest).
2449	*/
2450	OSVERSIONINFOEXW NtVerInfo;
2451
2452	RT_ZERO(NtVerInfo);
2453	NtVerInfo.dwOSVersionInfoSize = sizeof(RTL_OSVERSIONINFOEXW);
2454	if (!NT_SUCCESS(RtlGetVersion((PRTL_OSVERSIONINFOW)&NtVerInfo)))
2455	{
2456	RT_ZERO(NtVerInfo);
2457	PPEB pPeb = NtCurrentPeb();
2458	NtVerInfo.dwMajorVersion = pPeb->OSMajorVersion;
2459	NtVerInfo.dwMinorVersion = pPeb->OSMinorVersion;
2460	NtVerInfo.dwBuildNumber = pPeb->OSPlatformId;
2461	}
2462
2463	g_uNtVerCombined = SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_COMBINED(NtVerInfo.dwMajorVersion, NtVerInfo.dwMinorVersion, NtVerInfo.dwBuildNumber,
2464	NtVerInfo.wServicePackMajor, NtVerInfo.wServicePackMinor);
2465	}
2466
2467	#endif /* IN_RING3 */
2468

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source: vbox/trunk/src/VBox/HostDrivers/Support/win/SUPHardenedVerifyImage-win.cpp@ 52414

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