SUPHardenedVerifyImage-win.cpp@ 52600

Last change on this file since 52600 was 52600, checked in by vboxsync, 10 years ago
IPRT: Added support for microsoft timestamp counter signatures. This required making the PKCS #7 code accept some of the CMS (RFC-5652) stuff.
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1	/* $Id: SUPHardenedVerifyImage-win.cpp 52600 2014-09-04 22:59:00Z vboxsync $ */
2	/** @file
3	* VirtualBox Support Library/Driver - Hardened Image Verification, Windows.
4	*/
5
6	/*
7	* Copyright (C) 2006-2014 Oracle Corporation
8	*
9	* This file is part of VirtualBox Open Source Edition (OSE), as
10	* available from http://www.virtualbox.org. This file is free software;
11	* you can redistribute it and/or modify it under the terms of the GNU
12	* General Public License (GPL) as published by the Free Software
13	* Foundation, in version 2 as it comes in the "COPYING" file of the
14	* VirtualBox OSE distribution. VirtualBox OSE is distributed in the
15	* hope that it will be useful, but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY of any kind.
16	*
17	* The contents of this file may alternatively be used under the terms
18	* of the Common Development and Distribution License Version 1.0
19	* (CDDL) only, as it comes in the "COPYING.CDDL" file of the
20	* VirtualBox OSE distribution, in which case the provisions of the
21	* CDDL are applicable instead of those of the GPL.
22	*
23	* You may elect to license modified versions of this file under the
24	* terms and conditions of either the GPL or the CDDL or both.
25	*/
26
27	/*******************************************************************************
28	* Header Files *
29	*******************************************************************************/
30	#ifdef IN_RING0
31	# define IPRT_NT_MAP_TO_ZW
32	# include <iprt/nt/nt.h>
33	# include <ntimage.h>
34	#else
35	# include <iprt/nt/nt-and-windows.h>
36	# include "Wintrust.h"
37	# include "Softpub.h"
38	# include "mscat.h"
39	# ifndef LOAD_LIBRARY_SEARCH_APPLICATION_DIR
40	# define LOAD_LIBRARY_SEARCH_SYSTEM32 0x800
41	# endif
42	#endif
43
44	#include <VBox/sup.h>
45	#include <VBox/err.h>
46	#include <iprt/ctype.h>
47	#include <iprt/ldr.h>
48	#include <iprt/log.h>
49	#include <iprt/path.h>
50	#include <iprt/string.h>
51	#include <iprt/crypto/pkcs7.h>
52	#include <iprt/crypto/store.h>
53
54	#ifdef IN_RING0
55	# include "SUPDrvInternal.h"
56	#else
57	# include "SUPLibInternal.h"
58	#endif
59	#include "win/SUPHardenedVerify-win.h"
60
61
62	/*******************************************************************************
63	* Defined Constants And Macros *
64	*******************************************************************************/
65	/** The size of static hash (output) buffers.
66	* Avoids dynamic allocations and cleanups for of small buffers as well as extra
67	* calls for getting the appropriate buffer size. The largest digest in regular
68	* use by current windows version is SHA-512, we double this and hope it's
69	* enough a good while. */
70	#define SUPHARDNTVI_MAX_CAT_HASH_SIZE 128
71
72
73	#if defined(VBOX_PERMIT_EVEN_MORE) && !defined(VBOX_PERMIT_MORE)
74	# error "VBOX_PERMIT_EVEN_MORE without VBOX_PERMIT_MORE!"
75	#endif
76
77
78	/*******************************************************************************
79	* Structures and Typedefs *
80	*******************************************************************************/
81
82	#ifdef IN_RING3
83	typedef LONG (WINAPI * PFNWINVERIFYTRUST)(HWND hwnd, GUID const *pgActionID, PVOID pWVTData);
84	typedef BOOL (WINAPI * PFNCRYPTCATADMINACQUIRECONTEXT)(HCATADMIN phCatAdmin, const GUID pGuidSubsystem, DWORD dwFlags);
85	typedef BOOL (WINAPI * PFNCRYPTCATADMINACQUIRECONTEXT2)(HCATADMIN phCatAdmin, const GUID pGuidSubsystem, PCWSTR pwszHashAlgorithm,
86	struct _CERT_STRONG_SIGN_PARA const *pStrongHashPolicy, DWORD dwFlags);
87	typedef BOOL (WINAPI * PFNCRYPTCATADMINCALCHASHFROMFILEHANDLE)(HANDLE hFile, DWORD pcbHash, BYTE pbHash, DWORD dwFlags);
88	typedef BOOL (WINAPI * PFNCRYPTCATADMINCALCHASHFROMFILEHANDLE2)(HCATADMIN hCatAdmin, HANDLE hFile, DWORD *pcbHash,
89	BYTE *pbHash, DWORD dwFlags);
90	typedef HCATINFO (WINAPI PFNCRYPTCATADMINENUMCATALOGFROMHASH)(HCATADMIN hCatAdmin, BYTE pbHash, DWORD cbHash,
91	DWORD dwFlags, HCATINFO *phPrevCatInfo);
92	typedef BOOL (WINAPI * PFNCRYPTCATADMINRELEASECATALOGCONTEXT)(HCATADMIN hCatAdmin, HCATINFO hCatInfo, DWORD dwFlags);
93	typedef BOOL (WINAPI * PFNCRYPTCATDADMINRELEASECONTEXT)(HCATADMIN hCatAdmin, DWORD dwFlags);
94	typedef BOOL (WINAPI * PFNCRYPTCATCATALOGINFOFROMCONTEXT)(HCATINFO hCatInfo, CATALOG_INFO *psCatInfo, DWORD dwFlags);
95
96	typedef HCERTSTORE (WINAPI *PFNCERTOPENSTORE)(PCSTR pszStoreProvider, DWORD dwEncodingType, HCRYPTPROV_LEGACY hCryptProv,
97	DWORD dwFlags, const void *pvParam);
98	typedef BOOL (WINAPI *PFNCERTCLOSESTORE)(HCERTSTORE hCertStore, DWORD dwFlags);
99	typedef PCCERT_CONTEXT (WINAPI *PFNCERTENUMCERTIFICATESINSTORE)(HCERTSTORE hCertStore, PCCERT_CONTEXT pPrevCertContext);
100	#endif
101
102
103	/*******************************************************************************
104	* Global Variables *
105	*******************************************************************************/
106	/** The build certificate. */
107	static RTCRX509CERTIFICATE g_BuildX509Cert;
108
109	/** Store for root software publisher certificates. */
110	static RTCRSTORE g_hSpcRootStore = NIL_RTCRSTORE;
111	/** Store for root NT kernel certificates. */
112	static RTCRSTORE g_hNtKernelRootStore = NIL_RTCRSTORE;
113
114	/** Store containing SPC, NT kernel signing, and timestamp root certificates. */
115	static RTCRSTORE g_hSpcAndNtKernelRootStore = NIL_RTCRSTORE;
116	/** Store for supplemental certificates for use with
117	* g_hSpcAndNtKernelRootStore. */
118	static RTCRSTORE g_hSpcAndNtKernelSuppStore = NIL_RTCRSTORE;
119
120	/** The full \\SystemRoot\\System32 path. */
121	SUPSYSROOTDIRBUF g_System32NtPath;
122	/** The full \\SystemRoot\\WinSxS path. */
123	SUPSYSROOTDIRBUF g_WinSxSNtPath;
124	#ifdef IN_RING3
125	/** The full 'Program Files' path. */
126	SUPSYSROOTDIRBUF g_ProgramFilesNtPath;
127	# ifdef RT_ARCH_AMD64
128	/** The full 'Program Files (x86)' path. */
129	SUPSYSROOTDIRBUF g_ProgramFilesX86NtPath;
130	# endif
131	/** The full 'Common Files' path. */
132	SUPSYSROOTDIRBUF g_CommonFilesNtPath;
133	# ifdef RT_ARCH_AMD64
134	/** The full 'Common Files (x86)' path. */
135	SUPSYSROOTDIRBUF g_CommonFilesX86NtPath;
136	# endif
137	#endif /* IN_RING3 */
138
139	static union
140	{
141	SID Sid;
142	uint8_t abPadding[SECURITY_MAX_SID_SIZE];
143	}
144	/** The TrustedInstaller SID (Vista+). */
145	g_TrustedInstallerSid,
146	/** Local system ID (S-1-5-21). */
147	g_LocalSystemSid;
148
149
150	/** Set after we've retrived other SPC root certificates from the system. */
151	static bool g_fHaveOtherRoots = false;
152
153	#if defined(IN_RING3) && !defined(IN_SUP_HARDENED_R3)
154	/** Combined windows NT version number. See SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_COMBINED and
155	* SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_SIMPLE. */
156	uint32_t g_uNtVerCombined;
157	#endif
158
159	#ifdef IN_RING3
160	/** Timestamp hack working around issues with old DLLs that we ship.
161	* See supHardenedWinVerifyImageByHandle() for details. */
162	static uint64_t g_uBuildTimestampHack = 0;
163	#endif
164
165	#ifdef IN_RING3
166	/** Pointer to WinVerifyTrust. */
167	PFNWINVERIFYTRUST g_pfnWinVerifyTrust;
168	/** Pointer to CryptCATAdminAcquireContext. */
169	PFNCRYPTCATADMINACQUIRECONTEXT g_pfnCryptCATAdminAcquireContext;
170	/** Pointer to CryptCATAdminAcquireContext2 if available. */
171	PFNCRYPTCATADMINACQUIRECONTEXT2 g_pfnCryptCATAdminAcquireContext2;
172	/** Pointer to CryptCATAdminCalcHashFromFileHandle. */
173	PFNCRYPTCATADMINCALCHASHFROMFILEHANDLE g_pfnCryptCATAdminCalcHashFromFileHandle;
174	/** Pointer to CryptCATAdminCalcHashFromFileHandle2. */
175	PFNCRYPTCATADMINCALCHASHFROMFILEHANDLE2 g_pfnCryptCATAdminCalcHashFromFileHandle2;
176	/** Pointer to CryptCATAdminEnumCatalogFromHash. */
177	PFNCRYPTCATADMINENUMCATALOGFROMHASH g_pfnCryptCATAdminEnumCatalogFromHash;
178	/** Pointer to CryptCATAdminReleaseCatalogContext. */
179	PFNCRYPTCATADMINRELEASECATALOGCONTEXT g_pfnCryptCATAdminReleaseCatalogContext;
180	/** Pointer to CryptCATAdminReleaseContext. */
181	PFNCRYPTCATDADMINRELEASECONTEXT g_pfnCryptCATAdminReleaseContext;
182	/** Pointer to CryptCATCatalogInfoFromContext. */
183	PFNCRYPTCATCATALOGINFOFROMCONTEXT g_pfnCryptCATCatalogInfoFromContext;
184
185	/** Where we store the TLS entry for detecting WinVerifyTrustRecursion. */
186	static uint32_t g_iTlsWinVerifyTrustRecursion = UINT32_MAX;
187	/** Fallback WinVerifyTrust recursion protection. */
188	static uint32_t volatile g_idActiveThread = UINT32_MAX;
189
190	#endif
191
192
193	/*******************************************************************************
194	* Internal Functions *
195	*******************************************************************************/
196	#ifdef IN_RING3
197	static int supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrust(HANDLE hFile, PCRTUTF16 pwszName, uint32_t fFlags, PRTERRINFO pErrInfo,
198	PFNWINVERIFYTRUST pfnWinVerifyTrust);
199	static int supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrustCatFile(HANDLE hFile, PCRTUTF16 pwszName, uint32_t fFlags, PRTERRINFO pErrInfo,
200	PFNWINVERIFYTRUST pfnWinVerifyTrust);
201	#endif
202
203
204
205
206	/** @copydoc RTLDRREADER::pfnRead */
207	static DECLCALLBACK(int) supHardNtViRdrRead(PRTLDRREADER pReader, void *pvBuf, size_t cb, RTFOFF off)
208	{
209	PSUPHNTVIRDR pNtViRdr = (PSUPHNTVIRDR)pReader;
210	Assert(pNtViRdr->Core.uMagic == RTLDRREADER_MAGIC);
211
212	if ((ULONG)cb != cb)
213	return VERR_OUT_OF_RANGE;
214
215
216	/*
217	* For some reason I'm getting occational read error in an XP VM with
218	* STATUS_FAILED_DRIVER_ENTRY. Redoing the call again works in the
219	* debugger, so try do that automatically.
220	*/
221	for (uint32_t iTry = 0;; iTry++)
222	{
223	LARGE_INTEGER offNt;
224	offNt.QuadPart = off;
225
226	IO_STATUS_BLOCK Ios = RTNT_IO_STATUS_BLOCK_INITIALIZER;
227	NTSTATUS rcNt = NtReadFile(pNtViRdr->hFile,
228	NULL /hEvent/,
229	NULL /ApcRoutine/,
230	NULL /ApcContext/,
231	&Ios,
232	pvBuf,
233	(ULONG)cb,
234	&offNt,
235	NULL);
236	if (NT_SUCCESS(rcNt))
237	rcNt = Ios.Status;
238	if (NT_SUCCESS(rcNt))
239	{
240	if (Ios.Information == cb)
241	{
242	pNtViRdr->off = off + cb;
243	return VINF_SUCCESS;
244	}
245	#ifdef IN_RING3
246	supR3HardenedError(VERR_READ_ERROR, false,
247	"supHardNtViRdrRead: Only got %#zx bytes when requesting %#zx bytes at %#llx in '%s'.\n",
248	Ios.Information, off, cb, pNtViRdr->szFilename);
249	#endif
250	pNtViRdr->off = -1;
251	return VERR_READ_ERROR;
252	}
253
254	/*
255	* Delay a little before we retry?
256	*/
257	#ifdef IN_RING3
258	if (iTry == 0)
259	NtYieldExecution();
260	else if (iTry >= 1)
261	{
262	LARGE_INTEGER Time;
263	Time.QuadPart = -1000000 / 100; /* 1ms in 100ns units, relative time. */
264	NtDelayExecution(TRUE, &Time);
265	}
266	#endif
267	/*
268	* Before we give up, we'll try split up the request in case the
269	* kernel is low on memory or similar. For simplicity reasons, we do
270	* this in a recursion fashion.
271	*/
272	if (iTry >= 2)
273	{
274	if (cb >= _8K)
275	{
276	size_t const cbBlock = RT_ALIGN_Z(cb / 4, 512);
277	while (cb > 0)
278	{
279	size_t cbThisRead = RT_MIN(cb, cbBlock);
280	int rc = supHardNtViRdrRead(&pNtViRdr->Core, pvBuf, cbThisRead, off);
281	if (RT_FAILURE(rc))
282	return rc;
283	off += cbThisRead;
284	cb -= cbThisRead;
285	pvBuf = (uint8_t *)pvBuf + cbThisRead;
286	}
287	return VINF_SUCCESS;
288	}
289
290	#ifdef IN_RING3
291	supR3HardenedError(VERR_READ_ERROR, false, "supHardNtViRdrRead: Error %#x reading %#zx bytes at %#llx in '%s'.\n",
292	rcNt, off, cb, pNtViRdr->szFilename);
293	#endif
294	pNtViRdr->off = -1;
295	return VERR_READ_ERROR;
296	}
297	}
298	}
299
300
301	/** @copydoc RTLDRREADER::pfnTell */
302	static DECLCALLBACK(RTFOFF) supHardNtViRdrTell(PRTLDRREADER pReader)
303	{
304	PSUPHNTVIRDR pNtViRdr = (PSUPHNTVIRDR)pReader;
305	Assert(pNtViRdr->Core.uMagic == RTLDRREADER_MAGIC);
306	return pNtViRdr->off;
307	}
308
309
310	/** @copydoc RTLDRREADER::pfnSize */
311	static DECLCALLBACK(RTFOFF) supHardNtViRdrSize(PRTLDRREADER pReader)
312	{
313	PSUPHNTVIRDR pNtViRdr = (PSUPHNTVIRDR)pReader;
314	Assert(pNtViRdr->Core.uMagic == RTLDRREADER_MAGIC);
315	return pNtViRdr->cbFile;
316	}
317
318
319	/** @copydoc RTLDRREADER::pfnLogName */
320	static DECLCALLBACK(const char *) supHardNtViRdrLogName(PRTLDRREADER pReader)
321	{
322	PSUPHNTVIRDR pNtViRdr = (PSUPHNTVIRDR)pReader;
323	return pNtViRdr->szFilename;
324	}
325
326
327	/** @copydoc RTLDRREADER::pfnMap */
328	static DECLCALLBACK(int) supHardNtViRdrMap(PRTLDRREADER pReader, const void **ppvBits)
329	{
330	return VERR_NOT_SUPPORTED;
331	}
332
333
334	/** @copydoc RTLDRREADER::pfnUnmap */
335	static DECLCALLBACK(int) supHardNtViRdrUnmap(PRTLDRREADER pReader, const void *pvBits)
336	{
337	return VERR_NOT_SUPPORTED;
338	}
339
340
341	/** @copydoc RTLDRREADER::pfnDestroy */
342	static DECLCALLBACK(int) supHardNtViRdrDestroy(PRTLDRREADER pReader)
343	{
344	PSUPHNTVIRDR pNtViRdr = (PSUPHNTVIRDR)pReader;
345	Assert(pNtViRdr->Core.uMagic == RTLDRREADER_MAGIC);
346
347	pNtViRdr->Core.uMagic = ~RTLDRREADER_MAGIC;
348	pNtViRdr->hFile = NULL;
349
350	RTMemFree(pNtViRdr);
351	return VINF_SUCCESS;
352	}
353
354
355	/**
356	* Creates a loader reader instance for the given NT file handle.
357	*
358	* @returns iprt status code.
359	* @param hFile Native NT file handle.
360	* @param pwszName Optional file name.
361	* @param fFlags Flags, SUPHNTVI_F_XXX.
362	* @param ppNtViRdr Where to store the reader instance on success.
363	*/
364	DECLHIDDEN(int) supHardNtViRdrCreate(HANDLE hFile, PCRTUTF16 pwszName, uint32_t fFlags, PSUPHNTVIRDR *ppNtViRdr)
365	{
366	/*
367	* Try determine the size of the file.
368	*/
369	IO_STATUS_BLOCK Ios = RTNT_IO_STATUS_BLOCK_INITIALIZER;
370	FILE_STANDARD_INFORMATION StdInfo;
371	NTSTATUS rcNt = NtQueryInformationFile(hFile, &Ios, &StdInfo, sizeof(StdInfo), FileStandardInformation);
372	if (!NT_SUCCESS(rcNt) \|\| !NT_SUCCESS(Ios.Status))
373	return VERR_LDRVI_FILE_LENGTH_ERROR;
374
375	/*
376	* Calc the file name length and allocate memory for the reader instance.
377	*/
378	size_t cchFilename = 0;
379	if (pwszName)
380	cchFilename = RTUtf16CalcUtf8Len(pwszName);
381
382	int rc = VERR_NO_MEMORY;
383	PSUPHNTVIRDR pNtViRdr = (PSUPHNTVIRDR)RTMemAllocZ(sizeof(*pNtViRdr) + cchFilename);
384	if (!pNtViRdr)
385	return VERR_NO_MEMORY;
386
387	/*
388	* Initialize the structure.
389	*/
390	if (cchFilename)
391	{
392	char *pszName = &pNtViRdr->szFilename[0];
393	rc = RTUtf16ToUtf8Ex(pwszName, RTSTR_MAX, &pszName, cchFilename + 1, NULL);
394	AssertStmt(RT_SUCCESS(rc), pNtViRdr->szFilename[0] = '\0');
395	}
396	else
397	pNtViRdr->szFilename[0] = '\0';
398
399	pNtViRdr->Core.uMagic = RTLDRREADER_MAGIC;
400	pNtViRdr->Core.pfnRead = supHardNtViRdrRead;
401	pNtViRdr->Core.pfnTell = supHardNtViRdrTell;
402	pNtViRdr->Core.pfnSize = supHardNtViRdrSize;
403	pNtViRdr->Core.pfnLogName = supHardNtViRdrLogName;
404	pNtViRdr->Core.pfnMap = supHardNtViRdrMap;
405	pNtViRdr->Core.pfnUnmap = supHardNtViRdrUnmap;
406	pNtViRdr->Core.pfnDestroy = supHardNtViRdrDestroy;
407	pNtViRdr->hFile = hFile;
408	pNtViRdr->off = 0;
409	pNtViRdr->cbFile = StdInfo.EndOfFile.QuadPart;
410	pNtViRdr->fFlags = fFlags;
411	*ppNtViRdr = pNtViRdr;
412	return VINF_SUCCESS;
413	}
414
415
416	/**
417	* Checks if the file is owned by TrustedInstaller (Vista+) or similar.
418	*
419	* @returns true if owned by TrustedInstaller of pre-Vista, false if not.
420	*
421	* @param hFile The handle to the file.
422	* @param pwszName The name of the file.
423	*/
424	static bool supHardNtViCheckIsOwnedByTrustedInstallerOrSimilar(HANDLE hFile, PCRTUTF16 pwszName)
425	{
426	if (g_uNtVerCombined < SUP_NT_VER_VISTA)
427	return true;
428
429	/*
430	* Get the ownership information.
431	*/
432	union
433	{
434	SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR_RELATIVE Rel;
435	SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR Abs;
436	uint8_t abView[256];
437	} uBuf;
438	ULONG cbActual;
439	NTSTATUS rcNt = NtQuerySecurityObject(hFile, OWNER_SECURITY_INFORMATION, &uBuf.Abs, sizeof(uBuf), &cbActual);
440	if (!NT_SUCCESS(rcNt))
441	{
442	SUP_DPRINTF(("NtQuerySecurityObject failed with rcNt=%#x on '%ls'\n", rcNt, pwszName));
443	return false;
444	}
445
446	/*
447	* Check the owner.
448	*
449	* Initially we wished to only allow TrustedInstaller. But a Windows CAPI
450	* plugin "Program Files\Tumbleweed\Desktop Validator\tmwdcapiclient.dll"
451	* turned up owned by the local system user, and we cannot operate without
452	* the plugin loaded once it's installed (WinVerityTrust fails).
453	*
454	* Note! We cannot really allow Builtin\Administrators here it's the default
455	* owner of anything an admin user creates. (We must, unforutnately,
456	* allow that in system32 though.)
457	*/
458	PSID pOwner = uBuf.Rel.Control & SE_SELF_RELATIVE ? &uBuf.abView[uBuf.Rel.Owner] : uBuf.Abs.Owner;
459	Assert((uintptr_t)pOwner - (uintptr_t)&uBuf < sizeof(uBuf) - sizeof(SID));
460	if (RtlEqualSid(pOwner, &g_TrustedInstallerSid))
461	return true;
462	if (RtlEqualSid(pOwner, &g_LocalSystemSid))
463	return true;
464
465	SUP_DPRINTF(("%ls: Owner is not trusted installer (%.*Rhxs)\n",
466	pwszName, ((uint8_t )pOwner)[1] /SubAuthorityCount/ sizeof(ULONG) + 8, pOwner));
467	return false;
468	}
469
470
471	/**
472	* Simple case insensitive UTF-16 / ASCII path compare.
473	*
474	* @returns true if equal, false if not.
475	* @param pwszLeft The UTF-16 path string.
476	* @param pszRight The ascii string.
477	*/
478	static bool supHardViUtf16PathIsEqual(PCRTUTF16 pwszLeft, const char *pszRight)
479	{
480	for (;;)
481	{
482	RTUTF16 wc = *pwszLeft++;
483	uint8_t b = *pszRight++;
484	if (b != wc)
485	{
486	if (wc >= 0x80)
487	return false;
488	wc = RT_C_TO_LOWER(wc);
489	if (wc != b)
490	{
491	b = RT_C_TO_LOWER(b);
492	if (wc != b)
493	{
494	if (wc == '/')
495	wc = '\\';
496	if (b == '/')
497	b = '\\';
498	if (wc != b)
499	return false;
500	}
501	}
502	}
503	if (!b)
504	return true;
505	}
506	}
507
508
509	/**
510	* Simple case insensitive UTF-16 / ASCII ends-with path predicate.
511	*
512	* @returns true if equal, false if not.
513	* @param pwsz The UTF-16 path string.
514	* @param pszSuffix The ascii suffix string.
515	*/
516	static bool supHardViUtf16PathEndsWith(PCRTUTF16 pwsz, const char *pszSuffix)
517	{
518	size_t cwc = RTUtf16Len(pwsz);
519	size_t cchSuffix = strlen(pszSuffix);
520	if (cwc >= cchSuffix)
521	return supHardViUtf16PathIsEqual(pwsz + cwc - cchSuffix, pszSuffix);
522	return false;
523	}
524
525
526	/**
527	* Simple case insensitive UTF-16 / ASCII starts-with path predicate.
528	*
529	* @returns true if starts with given string, false if not.
530	* @param pwsz The UTF-16 path string.
531	* @param pszPrefix The ascii prefix string.
532	*/
533	static bool supHardViUtf16PathStartsWithAscii(PCRTUTF16 pwszLeft, const char *pszRight)
534	{
535	for (;;)
536	{
537	RTUTF16 wc = *pwszLeft++;
538	uint8_t b = *pszRight++;
539	if (b != wc)
540	{
541	if (!b)
542	return true;
543	if (wc >= 0x80 \|\| wc == 0)
544	return false;
545	wc = RT_C_TO_LOWER(wc);
546	if (wc != b)
547	{
548	b = RT_C_TO_LOWER(b);
549	if (wc != b)
550	{
551	if (wc == '/')
552	wc = '\\';
553	if (b == '/')
554	b = '\\';
555	if (wc != b)
556	return false;
557	}
558	}
559	}
560	}
561	}
562
563
564	/**
565	* Simple case insensitive UNICODE_STRING starts-with path predicate.
566	*
567	* @returns true if starts with given string, false if not.
568	* @param pwszLeft The path to check.
569	* @param cwcLeft The length of @a pwszLeft
570	* @param pwszRight The starts-with path.
571	* @param cwcRight The length of @a pwszRight.
572	* @param fCheckSlash Check for a slash following the prefix.
573	*/
574	DECLHIDDEN(bool) supHardViUtf16PathStartsWithEx(PCRTUTF16 pwszLeft, uint32_t cwcLeft,
575	PCRTUTF16 pwszRight, uint32_t cwcRight, bool fCheckSlash)
576	{
577	if (cwcLeft < cwcRight \|\| !cwcRight \|\| !pwszRight)
578	return false;
579
580	/* See if we can get away with a case sensitive compare first. */
581	if (memcmp(pwszLeft, pwszRight, cwcRight * sizeof(RTUTF16)) == 0)
582	pwszLeft += cwcRight;
583	else
584	{
585	/* No luck, do a slow case insensitive comapre. */
586	uint32_t cLeft = cwcRight;
587	while (cLeft-- > 0)
588	{
589	RTUTF16 wcLeft = *pwszLeft++;
590	RTUTF16 wcRight = *pwszRight++;
591	if (wcLeft != wcRight)
592	{
593	wcLeft = wcLeft < 0x80 ? wcLeft == '/' ? '\\' : RT_C_TO_LOWER(wcLeft) : wcLeft;
594	wcRight = wcRight < 0x80 ? wcRight == '/' ? '\\' : RT_C_TO_LOWER(wcRight) : wcRight;
595	if (wcLeft != wcRight)
596	return false;
597	}
598	}
599	}
600
601	/* Check for slash following the prefix, if request. */
602	if ( !fCheckSlash
603	\|\| *pwszLeft == '\\'
604	\|\| *pwszLeft == '/')
605	return true;
606	return false;
607	}
608
609
610	/**
611	* Simple case insensitive UNICODE_STRING starts-with path predicate.
612	*
613	* @returns true if starts with given string, false if not.
614	* @param pUniStrLeft The path to check.
615	* @param pUniStrRight The starts-with path.
616	* @param fCheckSlash Check for a slash following the prefix.
617	*/
618	DECLHIDDEN(bool) supHardViUniStrPathStartsWithUniStr(UNICODE_STRING const pUniStrLeft, UNICODE_STRING const pUniStrRight,
619	bool fCheckSlash)
620	{
621	return supHardViUtf16PathStartsWithEx(pUniStrLeft->Buffer, pUniStrLeft->Length / sizeof(WCHAR),
622	pUniStrRight->Buffer, pUniStrRight->Length / sizeof(WCHAR), fCheckSlash);
623	}
624
625
626
627	/**
628	* Counts slashes in the given UTF-8 path string.
629	*
630	* @returns Number of slashes.
631	* @param pwsz The UTF-16 path string.
632	*/
633	static uint32_t supHardViUtf16PathCountSlashes(PCRTUTF16 pwsz)
634	{
635	uint32_t cSlashes = 0;
636	RTUTF16 wc;
637	while ((wc = *pwsz++) != '\0')
638	if (wc == '/' \|\| wc == '\\')
639	cSlashes++;
640	return cSlashes;
641	}
642
643
644	#ifdef VBOX_PERMIT_MORE
645	/**
646	* Checks if the path goes into %windir%\apppatch\.
647	*
648	* @returns true if apppatch, false if not.
649	* @param pwszPath The path to examine.
650	*/
651	DECLHIDDEN(bool) supHardViIsAppPatchDir(PCRTUTF16 pwszPath, uint32_t cwcName)
652	{
653	uint32_t cwcWinDir = (g_System32NtPath.UniStr.Length - sizeof(L"System32")) / sizeof(WCHAR);
654
655	if (cwcName <= cwcWinDir + sizeof("AppPatch"))
656	return false;
657
658	if (memcmp(pwszPath, g_System32NtPath.UniStr.Buffer, cwcWinDir * sizeof(WCHAR)))
659	return false;
660
661	if (!supHardViUtf16PathStartsWithAscii(&pwszPath[cwcWinDir], "\\AppPatch\\"))
662	return false;
663
664	return g_uNtVerCombined >= SUP_NT_VER_VISTA;
665	}
666	#else
667	# error should not get here..
668	#endif
669
670
671
672	/**
673	* Checks if the unsigned DLL is fine or not.
674	*
675	* @returns VINF_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED or @a rc.
676	* @param hLdrMod The loader module handle.
677	* @param pwszName The NT name of the DLL/EXE.
678	* @param fFlags Flags.
679	* @param hFile The file handle.
680	* @param rc The status code..
681	*/
682	static int supHardNtViCheckIfNotSignedOk(RTLDRMOD hLdrMod, PCRTUTF16 pwszName, uint32_t fFlags, HANDLE hFile, int rc)
683	{
684	if (fFlags & (SUPHNTVI_F_REQUIRE_BUILD_CERT \| SUPHNTVI_F_REQUIRE_KERNEL_CODE_SIGNING))
685	return rc;
686
687	/*
688	* Version macros.
689	*/
690	uint32_t const uNtVer = g_uNtVerCombined;
691	#define IS_XP() ( uNtVer >= SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_SIMPLE(5, 1) && uNtVer < SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_SIMPLE(5, 2) )
692	#define IS_W2K3() ( uNtVer >= SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_SIMPLE(5, 2) && uNtVer < SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_SIMPLE(5, 3) )
693	#define IS_VISTA() ( uNtVer >= SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_SIMPLE(6, 0) && uNtVer < SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_SIMPLE(6, 1) )
694	#define IS_W70() ( uNtVer >= SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_SIMPLE(6, 1) && uNtVer < SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_SIMPLE(6, 2) )
695	#define IS_W80() ( uNtVer >= SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_SIMPLE(6, 2) && uNtVer < SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_SIMPLE(6, 3) )
696	#define IS_W81() ( uNtVer >= SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_SIMPLE(6, 3) && uNtVer < SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_SIMPLE(6, 4) )
697
698	/*
699	* The System32 directory.
700	*
701	* System32 is full of unsigned DLLs shipped by microsoft, graphics
702	* hardware vendors, input device/method vendors and whatnot else that
703	* actually needs to be loaded into a process for it to work correctly.
704	* We have to ASSUME that anything our process attempts to load from
705	* System32 is trustworthy and that the Windows system with the help of
706	* anti-virus software make sure there is nothing evil lurking in System32
707	* or being loaded from it.
708	*
709	* A small measure of protection is to list DLLs we know should be signed
710	* and decline loading unsigned versions of them, assuming they have been
711	* replaced by an adversary with evil intentions.
712	*/
713	PCRTUTF16 pwsz;
714	uint32_t cwcName = (uint32_t)RTUtf16Len(pwszName);
715	uint32_t cwcOther = g_System32NtPath.UniStr.Length / sizeof(WCHAR);
716	if (supHardViUtf16PathStartsWithEx(pwszName, cwcName, g_System32NtPath.UniStr.Buffer, cwcOther, true /fCheckSlash/))
717	{
718	pwsz = pwszName + cwcOther + 1;
719
720	/* Must be owned by trusted installer. (This test is superfuous, thus no relaxation here.) */
721	if ( !(fFlags & SUPHNTVI_F_TRUSTED_INSTALLER_OWNER)
722	&& !supHardNtViCheckIsOwnedByTrustedInstallerOrSimilar(hFile, pwszName))
723	return rc;
724
725	/* Core DLLs. */
726	if (supHardViUtf16PathIsEqual(pwsz, "ntdll.dll"))
727	return uNtVer < SUP_NT_VER_VISTA ? VINF_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED : rc;
728	if (supHardViUtf16PathIsEqual(pwsz, "kernel32.dll"))
729	return uNtVer < SUP_NT_VER_W81 ? VINF_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED : rc;
730	if (supHardViUtf16PathIsEqual(pwsz, "kernelbase.dll"))
731	return IS_W80() \|\| IS_W70() ? VINF_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED : rc;
732	if (supHardViUtf16PathIsEqual(pwsz, "apisetschema.dll"))
733	return IS_W70() ? VINF_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED : rc;
734	if (supHardViUtf16PathIsEqual(pwsz, "apphelp.dll"))
735	return uNtVer < SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_SIMPLE(6, 4) ? VINF_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED : rc;
736	#ifdef VBOX_PERMIT_VERIFIER_DLL
737	if (supHardViUtf16PathIsEqual(pwsz, "verifier.dll"))
738	return uNtVer < SUP_NT_VER_W81 ? VINF_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED : rc;
739	#endif
740	#ifdef VBOX_PERMIT_MORE
741	if (uNtVer >= SUP_NT_VER_W70) /* hard limit: user32.dll is unwanted prior to w7. */
742	{
743	if (supHardViUtf16PathIsEqual(pwsz, "sfc.dll"))
744	return uNtVer < SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_SIMPLE(6, 4) ? VINF_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED : rc;
745	if (supHardViUtf16PathIsEqual(pwsz, "sfc_os.dll"))
746	return uNtVer < SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_SIMPLE(6, 4) ? VINF_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED : rc;
747	if (supHardViUtf16PathIsEqual(pwsz, "user32.dll"))
748	return uNtVer < SUP_NT_VER_W81 ? VINF_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED : rc;
749	}
750	#endif
751
752	#ifndef IN_RING0
753	/* Check that this DLL isn't supposed to be signed on this windows
754	version. If it should, it's likely to be a fake. */
755	/** @todo list of signed dlls for various windows versions. */
756	return VINF_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED;
757	#else
758	return rc;
759	#endif /* IN_RING0 */
760	}
761
762
763	#ifndef IN_RING0
764	/*
765	* The WinSxS white list.
766	*
767	* Just like with System32 there are potentially a number of DLLs that
768	* could be required from WinSxS.
769	*/
770	cwcOther = g_WinSxSNtPath.UniStr.Length / sizeof(WCHAR);
771	if (supHardViUtf16PathStartsWithEx(pwszName, cwcName, g_WinSxSNtPath.UniStr.Buffer, cwcOther, true /fCheckSlash/))
772	{
773	pwsz = pwszName + cwcOther + 1;
774	cwcName -= cwcOther + 1;
775
776	/* The WinSxS layout means everything worth loading is exactly one level down. */
777	uint32_t cSlashes = supHardViUtf16PathCountSlashes(pwsz);
778	if (cSlashes != 1)
779	return rc;
780
781	/* Must be owned by trusted installer. */
782	if ( !(fFlags & SUPHNTVI_F_TRUSTED_INSTALLER_OWNER)
783	&& !supHardNtViCheckIsOwnedByTrustedInstallerOrSimilar(hFile, pwszName))
784	return rc;
785	return VINF_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED;
786	}
787	#endif /* !IN_RING0 */
788
789
790	#ifdef VBOX_PERMIT_MORE
791	/*
792	* AppPatch whitelist.
793	*/
794	if (supHardViIsAppPatchDir(pwszName, cwcName))
795	{
796	cwcOther = g_System32NtPath.UniStr.Length / sizeof(WCHAR); /* ASSUMES System32 is called System32. */
797	pwsz = pwszName + cwcOther + 1;
798
799	if ( !(fFlags & SUPHNTVI_F_TRUSTED_INSTALLER_OWNER)
800	&& !supHardNtViCheckIsOwnedByTrustedInstallerOrSimilar(hFile, pwszName))
801	return rc;
802
803	# ifndef VBOX_PERMIT_EVEN_MORE
804	if (supHardViUtf16PathIsEqual(pwsz, "acres.dll"))
805	return VINF_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED;
806
807	# ifdef RT_ARCH_AMD64
808	if (supHardViUtf16PathIsEqual(pwsz, "AppPatch64\\AcGenral.dll"))
809	return VINF_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED;
810	# elif defined(RT_ARCH_X86)
811	if (supHardViUtf16PathIsEqual(pwsz, "AcGenral.dll"))
812	return VINF_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED;
813	# endif
814	# endif /* !VBOX_PERMIT_EVEN_MORE */
815
816	# ifdef IN_RING0
817	return rc;
818	# else
819	return VINF_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED;
820	# endif
821	}
822	#endif /* VBOX_PERMIT_MORE */
823
824
825	#ifndef IN_RING0
826	# if defined(VBOX_PERMIT_MORE) && !defined(VBOX_PERMIT_EVEN_MORE)
827	/*
828	* Program files and common files.
829	* Permit anything that's signed and correctly installed.
830	*/
831	if ( supHardViUtf16PathStartsWithEx(pwszName, cwcName,
832	g_ProgramFilesNtPath.UniStr.Buffer, g_ProgramFilesNtPath.UniStr.Length,
833	true /fCheckSlash/)
834	\|\| supHardViUtf16PathStartsWithEx(pwszName, cwcName,
835	g_CommonFilesNtPath.UniStr.Buffer, g_CommonFilesNtPath.UniStr.Length,
836	true /fCheckSlash/)
837	# ifdef RT_ARCH_AMD64
838	\|\| supHardViUtf16PathStartsWithEx(pwszName, cwcName,
839	g_ProgramFilesX86NtPath.UniStr.Buffer, g_ProgramFilesX86NtPath.UniStr.Length,
840	true /fCheckSlash/)
841	\|\| supHardViUtf16PathStartsWithEx(pwszName, cwcName,
842	g_CommonFilesX86NtPath.UniStr.Buffer, g_CommonFilesX86NtPath.UniStr.Length,
843	true /fCheckSlash/)
844	# endif
845	)
846	{
847	if ( !(fFlags & SUPHNTVI_F_TRUSTED_INSTALLER_OWNER)
848	&& !supHardNtViCheckIsOwnedByTrustedInstallerOrSimilar(hFile, pwszName))
849	return rc;
850	return VINF_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED;
851	}
852
853	# elif defined(VBOX_PERMIT_MORE) && defined(VBOX_PERMIT_EVEN_MORE)
854	/*
855	* Anything that's owned by the trusted installer.
856	*/
857	if ( (fFlags & SUPHNTVI_F_TRUSTED_INSTALLER_OWNER)
858	\|\| supHardNtViCheckIsOwnedByTrustedInstallerOrSimilar(hFile, pwszName))
859	return VINF_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED;
860
861	# endif
862	#endif /* !IN_RING0 */
863
864	/*
865	* Not permitted.
866	*/
867	return rc;
868	}
869
870
871	/**
872	* @callback_method_impl{RTCRPKCS7VERIFYCERTCALLBACK,
873	* Standard code signing. Use this for Microsoft SPC.}
874	*/
875	static DECLCALLBACK(int) supHardNtViCertVerifyCallback(PCRTCRX509CERTIFICATE pCert, RTCRX509CERTPATHS hCertPaths,
876	uint32_t fFlags, void *pvUser, PRTERRINFO pErrInfo)
877	{
878	PSUPHNTVIRDR pNtViRdr = (PSUPHNTVIRDR)pvUser;
879	Assert(pNtViRdr->Core.uMagic == RTLDRREADER_MAGIC);
880
881	/*
882	* If there is no certificate path build & validator associated with this
883	* callback, it must be because of the build certificate. We trust the
884	* build certificate without any second thoughts.
885	*/
886	if (hCertPaths == NIL_RTCRX509CERTPATHS)
887	{
888	if (RTCrX509Certificate_Compare(pCert, &g_BuildX509Cert) == 0) /* healthy paranoia */
889	return VINF_SUCCESS;
890	return RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, VERR_SUP_VP_NOT_BUILD_CERT_IPE, "Not valid kernel code signature.");
891	}
892
893	/*
894	* Standard code signing capabilites required.
895	*/
896	int rc = RTCrPkcs7VerifyCertCallbackCodeSigning(pCert, hCertPaths, fFlags, NULL, pErrInfo);
897	if ( RT_SUCCESS(rc)
898	&& (fFlags & RTCRPKCS7VCC_F_SIGNED_DATA))
899	{
900	/*
901	* If kernel signing, a valid certificate path must be anchored by the
902	* microsoft kernel signing root certificate.
903	*/
904	if (pNtViRdr->fFlags & SUPHNTVI_F_REQUIRE_KERNEL_CODE_SIGNING)
905	{
906	uint32_t cPaths = RTCrX509CertPathsGetPathCount(hCertPaths);
907	uint32_t cFound = 0;
908	uint32_t cValid = 0;
909	for (uint32_t iPath = 0; iPath < cPaths; iPath++)
910	{
911	bool fTrusted;
912	PCRTCRX509NAME pSubject;
913	PCRTCRX509SUBJECTPUBLICKEYINFO pPublicKeyInfo;
914	int rcVerify;
915	rc = RTCrX509CertPathsQueryPathInfo(hCertPaths, iPath, &fTrusted, NULL /pcNodes/, &pSubject, &pPublicKeyInfo,
916	NULL, NULL /pCertCtx/, &rcVerify);
917	AssertRCBreak(rc);
918
919	if (RT_SUCCESS(rcVerify))
920	{
921	Assert(fTrusted);
922	cValid++;
923
924	/*
925	* Search the kernel signing root store for a matching anchor.
926	*/
927	RTCRSTORECERTSEARCH Search;
928	rc = RTCrStoreCertFindBySubjectOrAltSubjectByRfc5280(g_hNtKernelRootStore, pSubject, &Search);
929	AssertRCBreak(rc);
930
931	PCRTCRCERTCTX pCertCtx;
932	while ((pCertCtx = RTCrStoreCertSearchNext(g_hNtKernelRootStore, &Search)) != NULL)
933	{
934	PCRTCRX509SUBJECTPUBLICKEYINFO pCertPubKeyInfo = NULL;
935	if (pCertCtx->pCert)
936	pCertPubKeyInfo = &pCertCtx->pCert->TbsCertificate.SubjectPublicKeyInfo;
937	else if (pCertCtx->pTaInfo)
938	pCertPubKeyInfo = &pCertCtx->pTaInfo->PubKey;
939	else
940	pCertPubKeyInfo = NULL;
941	if ( pCertPubKeyInfo
942	&& RTCrX509SubjectPublicKeyInfo_Compare(pCertPubKeyInfo, pPublicKeyInfo) == 0)
943	cFound++;
944	RTCrCertCtxRelease(pCertCtx);
945	}
946
947	int rc2 = RTCrStoreCertSearchDestroy(g_hNtKernelRootStore, &Search); AssertRC(rc2);
948	}
949	}
950	if (RT_SUCCESS(rc) && cFound == 0)
951	rc = RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, VERR_SUP_VP_NOT_VALID_KERNEL_CODE_SIGNATURE, "Not valid kernel code signature.");
952	if (RT_SUCCESS(rc) && cValid < 2 && g_fHaveOtherRoots)
953	rc = RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, VERR_SUP_VP_UNEXPECTED_VALID_PATH_COUNT,
954	"Expected at least %u valid paths, not %u.", 2, cValid);
955	}
956	}
957
958	/*
959	* More requirements? NT5 build lab?
960	*/
961
962	return rc;
963	}
964
965
966	static DECLCALLBACK(int) supHardNtViCallback(RTLDRMOD hLdrMod, RTLDRSIGNATURETYPE enmSignature,
967	void const *pvSignature, size_t cbSignature,
968	PRTERRINFO pErrInfo, void *pvUser)
969	{
970	/*
971	* Check out the input.
972	*/
973	PSUPHNTVIRDR pNtViRdr = (PSUPHNTVIRDR)pvUser;
974	Assert(pNtViRdr->Core.uMagic == RTLDRREADER_MAGIC);
975
976	AssertReturn(cbSignature == sizeof(RTCRPKCS7CONTENTINFO), VERR_INTERNAL_ERROR_5);
977	PCRTCRPKCS7CONTENTINFO pContentInfo = (PCRTCRPKCS7CONTENTINFO)pvSignature;
978	AssertReturn(RTCrPkcs7ContentInfo_IsSignedData(pContentInfo), VERR_INTERNAL_ERROR_5);
979	AssertReturn(pContentInfo->u.pSignedData->SignerInfos.cItems == 1, VERR_INTERNAL_ERROR_5);
980	PCRTCRPKCS7SIGNERINFO pSignerInfo = &pContentInfo->u.pSignedData->SignerInfos.paItems[0];
981
982	/*
983	* If special certificate requirements, check them out before validating
984	* the signature.
985	*/
986	if (pNtViRdr->fFlags & SUPHNTVI_F_REQUIRE_BUILD_CERT)
987	{
988	if (!RTCrX509Certificate_MatchIssuerAndSerialNumber(&g_BuildX509Cert,
989	&pSignerInfo->IssuerAndSerialNumber.Name,
990	&pSignerInfo->IssuerAndSerialNumber.SerialNumber))
991	return RTErrInfoSet(pErrInfo, VERR_SUP_VP_NOT_SIGNED_WITH_BUILD_CERT, "Not signed with the build certificate.");
992	}
993
994	/*
995	* Verify the signature. We instruct the verifier to use the signing time
996	* counter signature present when present, falling back on the timestamp
997	* planted by the linker when absent. In ring-0 we don't have all the
998	* necessary timestamp server root certificate info, so we have to allow
999	* using counter signatures unverified there. Ditto for the early period
1000	* of ring-3 hardened stub execution.
1001	*/
1002	RTTIMESPEC ValidationTime;
1003	RTTimeSpecSetSeconds(&ValidationTime, pNtViRdr->uTimestamp);
1004
1005	uint32_t fFlags = RTCRPKCS7VERIFY_SD_F_ALWAYS_USE_SIGNING_TIME_IF_PRESENT
1006	\| RTCRPKCS7VERIFY_SD_F_ALWAYS_USE_MS_TIMESTAMP_IF_PRESENT
1007	\| RTCRPKCS7VERIFY_SD_F_COUNTER_SIGNATURE_SIGNING_TIME_ONLY;
1008	#ifndef IN_RING0
1009	if (!g_fHaveOtherRoots)
1010	#endif
1011	fFlags \|= RTCRPKCS7VERIFY_SD_F_USE_SIGNING_TIME_UNVERIFIED \| RTCRPKCS7VERIFY_SD_F_USE_MS_TIMESTAMP_UNVERIFIED;
1012	return RTCrPkcs7VerifySignedData(pContentInfo, fFlags, g_hSpcAndNtKernelSuppStore, g_hSpcAndNtKernelRootStore,
1013	&ValidationTime, supHardNtViCertVerifyCallback, pNtViRdr, pErrInfo);
1014	}
1015
1016
1017	/**
1018	* Verifies the given loader image.
1019	*
1020	* @returns IPRT status code.
1021	* @param hLdrMod File handle to the executable file.
1022	* @param pwszName Full NT path to the DLL in question, used for
1023	* dealing with unsigned system dlls as well as for
1024	* error/logging.
1025	* @param pNtViRdr The reader instance /w flags.
1026	* @param pfWinVerifyTrust Where to return whether WinVerifyTrust was used.
1027	* @param pErrInfo Pointer to error info structure. Optional.
1028	*/
1029	DECLHIDDEN(int) supHardenedWinVerifyImageByLdrMod(RTLDRMOD hLdrMod, PCRTUTF16 pwszName, PSUPHNTVIRDR pNtViRdr,
1030	bool *pfWinVerifyTrust, PRTERRINFO pErrInfo)
1031	{
1032	if (pfWinVerifyTrust)
1033	*pfWinVerifyTrust = false;
1034
1035	#ifdef IN_RING3
1036	/* Check that the caller has performed the necessary library initialization. */
1037	if (!RTCrX509Certificate_IsPresent(&g_BuildX509Cert))
1038	return RTErrInfoSet(pErrInfo, VERR_WRONG_ORDER,
1039	"supHardenedWinVerifyImageByHandle: supHardenedWinInitImageVerifier was not called.");
1040	#endif
1041
1042	/*
1043	* Check the trusted installer bit first, if requested as it's somewhat
1044	* cheaper than the rest.
1045	*
1046	* We relax this for system32, like we used to, as there are apparently
1047	* some systems out there where the user, admin, or someone has changed the
1048	* ownership of core windows DLLs like user32.dll. Since we need user32.dll
1049	* and will be checking it's digital signature, it's reasonably safe to let
1050	* this thru. (The report was of SECURITY_BUILTIN_DOMAIN_RID + DOMAIN_ALIAS_RID_ADMINS
1051	* owning user32.dll, see public ticket 13187, VBoxStartup.3.log.)
1052	*
1053	* We've also had problems with graphics driver components like ig75icd64.dll
1054	* and atig6pxx.dll not being owned by TrustedInstaller, with the result
1055	* that 3D got broken (mod by zero issue in test build 5). These were also
1056	* SECURITY_BUILTIN_DOMAIN_RID + DOMAIN_ALIAS_RID_ADMINS.
1057	*/
1058	if ( (pNtViRdr->fFlags & SUPHNTVI_F_TRUSTED_INSTALLER_OWNER)
1059	&& !supHardNtViCheckIsOwnedByTrustedInstallerOrSimilar(pNtViRdr->hFile, pwszName))
1060	{
1061	if (!supHardViUtf16PathStartsWithEx(pwszName, (uint32_t)RTUtf16Len(pwszName),
1062	g_System32NtPath.UniStr.Buffer, g_System32NtPath.UniStr.Length / sizeof(WCHAR),
1063	true /fCheckSlash/))
1064	return RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, VERR_SUP_VP_NOT_OWNED_BY_TRUSTED_INSTALLER,
1065	"supHardenedWinVerifyImageByHandle: TrustedInstaller is not the owner of '%ls'.", pwszName);
1066	SUP_DPRINTF(("%ls: Relaxing the TrustedInstaller requirement for this DLL (it's in system32).\n", pwszName));
1067	}
1068
1069	/*
1070	* Verify it.
1071	*
1072	* The PKCS #7 SignedData signature is checked in the callback. Any
1073	* signing certificate restrictions are also enforced there.
1074	*
1075	* For the time being, we use the executable timestamp as the
1076	* certificate validation date. We must query that first to avoid
1077	* potential issues re-entering the loader code from the callback.
1078	*
1079	* Update: Save the first timestamp we validate with build cert and
1080	* use this as a minimum timestamp for further build cert
1081	* validations. This works around issues with old DLLs that
1082	* we sign against with our certificate (crt, sdl, qt).
1083	*/
1084	int rc = RTLdrQueryProp(hLdrMod, RTLDRPROP_TIMESTAMP_SECONDS, &pNtViRdr->uTimestamp, sizeof(pNtViRdr->uTimestamp));
1085	if (RT_SUCCESS(rc))
1086	{
1087	#ifdef IN_RING3 /* Hack alert! (see above) */
1088	if ( (pNtViRdr->fFlags & SUPHNTVI_F_REQUIRE_KERNEL_CODE_SIGNING)
1089	&& (pNtViRdr->fFlags & SUPHNTVI_F_REQUIRE_SIGNATURE_ENFORCEMENT)
1090	&& pNtViRdr->uTimestamp < g_uBuildTimestampHack)
1091	pNtViRdr->uTimestamp = g_uBuildTimestampHack;
1092	#endif
1093
1094	rc = RTLdrVerifySignature(hLdrMod, supHardNtViCallback, pNtViRdr, pErrInfo);
1095
1096	#ifdef IN_RING3 /* Hack alert! (see above) */
1097	if ((pNtViRdr->fFlags & SUPHNTVI_F_REQUIRE_BUILD_CERT) && g_uBuildTimestampHack == 0 && RT_SUCCESS(rc))
1098	g_uBuildTimestampHack = pNtViRdr->uTimestamp;
1099	#endif
1100
1101	/*
1102	* Microsoft doesn't sign a whole bunch of DLLs, so we have to
1103	* ASSUME that a bunch of system DLLs are fine.
1104	*/
1105	if (rc == VERR_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED)
1106	rc = supHardNtViCheckIfNotSignedOk(hLdrMod, pwszName, pNtViRdr->fFlags, pNtViRdr->hFile, rc);
1107	if (RT_FAILURE(rc))
1108	RTErrInfoAddF(pErrInfo, rc, ": %ls", pwszName);
1109
1110	/*
1111	* Check for the signature checking enforcement, if requested to do so.
1112	*/
1113	if (RT_SUCCESS(rc) && (pNtViRdr->fFlags & SUPHNTVI_F_REQUIRE_SIGNATURE_ENFORCEMENT))
1114	{
1115	bool fEnforced = false;
1116	int rc2 = RTLdrQueryProp(hLdrMod, RTLDRPROP_SIGNATURE_CHECKS_ENFORCED, &fEnforced, sizeof(fEnforced));
1117	if (RT_FAILURE(rc2))
1118	rc = RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, rc2, "Querying RTLDRPROP_SIGNATURE_CHECKS_ENFORCED failed on %ls: %Rrc.",
1119	pwszName, rc2);
1120	else if (!fEnforced)
1121	rc = RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, VERR_SUP_VP_SIGNATURE_CHECKS_NOT_ENFORCED,
1122	"The image '%ls' was not linked with /IntegrityCheck.", pwszName);
1123	}
1124	}
1125	else
1126	RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, rc, "RTLdrQueryProp/RTLDRPROP_TIMESTAMP_SECONDS failed on %ls: %Rrc", pwszName, rc);
1127
1128	#ifdef IN_RING3
1129	/*
1130	* Pass it thru WinVerifyTrust when possible.
1131	*/
1132	rc = supHardenedWinVerifyImageTrust(pNtViRdr->hFile, pwszName, pNtViRdr->fFlags, rc, pfWinVerifyTrust, pErrInfo);
1133	#endif
1134
1135	#ifdef IN_SUP_HARDENED_R3
1136	/*
1137	* Hook for the LdrLoadDll code to schedule scanning of imports.
1138	*/
1139	if (RT_SUCCESS(rc))
1140	supR3HardenedWinVerifyCacheScheduleImports(hLdrMod, pwszName);
1141	#endif
1142
1143	return rc;
1144	}
1145
1146
1147	/**
1148	* Verifies the given executable image.
1149	*
1150	* @returns IPRT status code.
1151	* @param hFile File handle to the executable file.
1152	* @param pwszName Full NT path to the DLL in question, used for
1153	* dealing with unsigned system dlls as well as for
1154	* error/logging.
1155	* @param fFlags Flags, SUPHNTVI_F_XXX.
1156	* @param pfWinVerifyTrust Where to return whether WinVerifyTrust was used.
1157	* @param pErrInfo Pointer to error info structure. Optional.
1158	*/
1159	DECLHIDDEN(int) supHardenedWinVerifyImageByHandle(HANDLE hFile, PCRTUTF16 pwszName, uint32_t fFlags,
1160	bool *pfWinVerifyTrust, PRTERRINFO pErrInfo)
1161	{
1162	/*
1163	* Create a reader instance.
1164	*/
1165	PSUPHNTVIRDR pNtViRdr;
1166	int rc = supHardNtViRdrCreate(hFile, pwszName, fFlags, &pNtViRdr);
1167	if (RT_SUCCESS(rc))
1168	{
1169	/*
1170	* Open the image.
1171	*/
1172	RTLDRMOD hLdrMod;
1173	RTLDRARCH enmArch = fFlags & SUPHNTVI_F_RC_IMAGE ? RTLDRARCH_X86_32 : RTLDRARCH_HOST;
1174	if (fFlags & SUPHNTVI_F_RESOURCE_IMAGE)
1175	enmArch = RTLDRARCH_WHATEVER;
1176	rc = RTLdrOpenWithReader(&pNtViRdr->Core, RTLDR_O_FOR_VALIDATION, enmArch, &hLdrMod, pErrInfo);
1177	if (RT_SUCCESS(rc))
1178	{
1179	/*
1180	* Verify it.
1181	*/
1182	rc = supHardenedWinVerifyImageByLdrMod(hLdrMod, pwszName, pNtViRdr, pfWinVerifyTrust, pErrInfo);
1183	int rc2 = RTLdrClose(hLdrMod); AssertRC(rc2);
1184	}
1185	else
1186	supHardNtViRdrDestroy(&pNtViRdr->Core);
1187	}
1188	SUP_DPRINTF(("supHardenedWinVerifyImageByHandle: -> %d (%ls)%s\n",
1189	rc, pwszName, pfWinVerifyTrust && *pfWinVerifyTrust ? "WinVerifyTrust" : ""));
1190	return rc;
1191	}
1192
1193
1194	#ifdef IN_RING3
1195	/**
1196	* supHardenedWinVerifyImageByHandle version without the name.
1197	*
1198	* The name is derived from the handle.
1199	*
1200	* @returns IPRT status code.
1201	* @param hFile File handle to the executable file.
1202	* @param fFlags Flags, SUPHNTVI_F_XXX.
1203	* @param pErrInfo Pointer to error info structure. Optional.
1204	*/
1205	DECLHIDDEN(int) supHardenedWinVerifyImageByHandleNoName(HANDLE hFile, uint32_t fFlags, PRTERRINFO pErrInfo)
1206	{
1207	/*
1208	* Determine the NT name and call the verification function.
1209	*/
1210	union
1211	{
1212	UNICODE_STRING UniStr;
1213	uint8_t abBuffer[(MAX_PATH + 8 + 1) * 2];
1214	} uBuf;
1215
1216	ULONG cbIgn;
1217	NTSTATUS rcNt = NtQueryObject(hFile,
1218	ObjectNameInformation,
1219	&uBuf,
1220	sizeof(uBuf) - sizeof(WCHAR),
1221	&cbIgn);
1222	if (NT_SUCCESS(rcNt))
1223	uBuf.UniStr.Buffer[uBuf.UniStr.Length / sizeof(WCHAR)] = '\0';
1224	else
1225	uBuf.UniStr.Buffer = (WCHAR *)L"TODO3";
1226
1227	return supHardenedWinVerifyImageByHandle(hFile, uBuf.UniStr.Buffer, fFlags, NULL /pfWinVerifyTrust/, pErrInfo);
1228	}
1229	#endif /* IN_RING3 */
1230
1231
1232	/**
1233	* Retrieves the full official path to the system root or one of it's sub
1234	* directories.
1235	*
1236	* This code is also used by the support driver.
1237	*
1238	* @returns VBox status code.
1239	* @param pvBuf The output buffer. This will contain a
1240	* UNICODE_STRING followed (at the kernel's
1241	* discretion) the string buffer.
1242	* @param cbBuf The size of the buffer @a pvBuf points to.
1243	* @param enmDir Which directory under the system root we're
1244	* interested in.
1245	* @param pErrInfo Pointer to error info structure. Optional.
1246	*/
1247	DECLHIDDEN(int) supHardNtGetSystemRootDir(void *pvBuf, uint32_t cbBuf, SUPHARDNTSYSROOTDIR enmDir, PRTERRINFO pErrInfo)
1248	{
1249	HANDLE hFile = RTNT_INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE;
1250	IO_STATUS_BLOCK Ios = RTNT_IO_STATUS_BLOCK_INITIALIZER;
1251
1252	UNICODE_STRING NtName;
1253	switch (enmDir)
1254	{
1255	case kSupHardNtSysRootDir_System32:
1256	{
1257	static const WCHAR s_wszNameSystem32[] = L"\\SystemRoot\\System32\\";
1258	NtName.Buffer = (PWSTR)s_wszNameSystem32;
1259	NtName.Length = sizeof(s_wszNameSystem32) - sizeof(WCHAR);
1260	NtName.MaximumLength = sizeof(s_wszNameSystem32);
1261	break;
1262	}
1263	case kSupHardNtSysRootDir_WinSxS:
1264	{
1265	static const WCHAR s_wszNameWinSxS[] = L"\\SystemRoot\\WinSxS\\";
1266	NtName.Buffer = (PWSTR)s_wszNameWinSxS;
1267	NtName.Length = sizeof(s_wszNameWinSxS) - sizeof(WCHAR);
1268	NtName.MaximumLength = sizeof(s_wszNameWinSxS);
1269	break;
1270	}
1271	default:
1272	AssertFailed();
1273	return VERR_INVALID_PARAMETER;
1274	}
1275
1276	OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES ObjAttr;
1277	InitializeObjectAttributes(&ObjAttr, &NtName, OBJ_CASE_INSENSITIVE, NULL /hRootDir/, NULL /pSecDesc/);
1278
1279	NTSTATUS rcNt = NtCreateFile(&hFile,
1280	FILE_READ_DATA \| SYNCHRONIZE,
1281	&ObjAttr,
1282	&Ios,
1283	NULL /* Allocation Size*/,
1284	FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL,
1285	FILE_SHARE_READ \| FILE_SHARE_WRITE,
1286	FILE_OPEN,
1287	FILE_DIRECTORY_FILE \| FILE_OPEN_FOR_BACKUP_INTENT \| FILE_SYNCHRONOUS_IO_NONALERT,
1288	NULL /EaBuffer/,
1289	0 /EaLength/);
1290	if (NT_SUCCESS(rcNt))
1291	rcNt = Ios.Status;
1292	if (NT_SUCCESS(rcNt))
1293	{
1294	ULONG cbIgn;
1295	rcNt = NtQueryObject(hFile,
1296	ObjectNameInformation,
1297	pvBuf,
1298	cbBuf - sizeof(WCHAR),
1299	&cbIgn);
1300	NtClose(hFile);
1301	if (NT_SUCCESS(rcNt))
1302	{
1303	PUNICODE_STRING pUniStr = (PUNICODE_STRING)pvBuf;
1304	if (pUniStr->Length > 0)
1305	{
1306	/* Make sure it's terminated so it can safely be printed.*/
1307	pUniStr->Buffer[pUniStr->Length / sizeof(WCHAR)] = '\0';
1308	return VINF_SUCCESS;
1309	}
1310
1311	return RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, VERR_SUP_VP_SYSTEM32_PATH,
1312	"NtQueryObject returned an empty path for '%ls'", NtName.Buffer);
1313	}
1314	return RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, VERR_SUP_VP_SYSTEM32_PATH, "NtQueryObject failed on '%ls' dir: %#x", NtName.Buffer, rcNt);
1315	}
1316	return RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, VERR_SUP_VP_SYSTEM32_PATH, "Failure to open '%ls': %#x", NtName.Buffer, rcNt);
1317	}
1318
1319
1320	/**
1321	* Initialize one certificate entry.
1322	*
1323	* @returns VBox status code.
1324	* @param pCert The X.509 certificate representation to init.
1325	* @param pabCert The raw DER encoded certificate.
1326	* @param cbCert The size of the raw certificate.
1327	* @param pErrInfo Where to return extended error info. Optional.
1328	* @param pszErrorTag Error tag.
1329	*/
1330	static int supHardNtViCertInit(PRTCRX509CERTIFICATE pCert, unsigned char const *pabCert, unsigned cbCert,
1331	PRTERRINFO pErrInfo, const char *pszErrorTag)
1332	{
1333	AssertReturn(cbCert > 16 && cbCert < _128K,
1334	RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, VERR_INTERNAL_ERROR_3, "%s: cbCert=%#x out of range", pszErrorTag, cbCert));
1335	AssertReturn(!RTCrX509Certificate_IsPresent(pCert),
1336	RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, VERR_WRONG_ORDER, "%s: Certificate already decoded?", pszErrorTag));
1337
1338	RTASN1CURSORPRIMARY PrimaryCursor;
1339	RTAsn1CursorInitPrimary(&PrimaryCursor, pabCert, cbCert, pErrInfo, &g_RTAsn1DefaultAllocator, RTASN1CURSOR_FLAGS_DER, NULL);
1340	int rc = RTCrX509Certificate_DecodeAsn1(&PrimaryCursor.Cursor, 0, pCert, pszErrorTag);
1341	if (RT_SUCCESS(rc))
1342	rc = RTCrX509Certificate_CheckSanity(pCert, 0, pErrInfo, pszErrorTag);
1343	return rc;
1344	}
1345
1346
1347	static int supHardNtViCertStoreAddArray(RTCRSTORE hStore, PCSUPTAENTRY paCerts, unsigned cCerts, PRTERRINFO pErrInfo)
1348	{
1349	for (uint32_t i = 0; i < cCerts; i++)
1350	{
1351	int rc = RTCrStoreCertAddEncoded(hStore, RTCRCERTCTX_F_ENC_TAF_DER, paCerts[i].pch, paCerts[i].cb, pErrInfo);
1352	if (RT_FAILURE(rc))
1353	return rc;
1354	}
1355	return VINF_SUCCESS;
1356	}
1357
1358
1359	/**
1360	* Initialize a certificate table.
1361	*
1362	* @param phStore Where to return the store pointer.
1363	* @param paCerts1 Pointer to the first certificate table.
1364	* @param cCerts1 Entries in the first certificate table.
1365	* @param paCerts2 Pointer to the second certificate table.
1366	* @param cCerts2 Entries in the second certificate table.
1367	* @param paCerts3 Pointer to the third certificate table.
1368	* @param cCerts3 Entries in the third certificate table.
1369	* @param pErrInfo Where to return extended error info. Optional.
1370	* @param pszErrorTag Error tag.
1371	*/
1372	static int supHardNtViCertStoreInit(PRTCRSTORE phStore,
1373	PCSUPTAENTRY paCerts1, unsigned cCerts1,
1374	PCSUPTAENTRY paCerts2, unsigned cCerts2,
1375	PCSUPTAENTRY paCerts3, unsigned cCerts3,
1376	PRTERRINFO pErrInfo, const char *pszErrorTag)
1377	{
1378	AssertReturn(*phStore == NIL_RTCRSTORE, VERR_WRONG_ORDER);
1379
1380	int rc = RTCrStoreCreateInMem(phStore, cCerts1 + cCerts2);
1381	if (RT_FAILURE(rc))
1382	return RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, rc, "RTCrStoreCreateMemoryStore failed: %Rrc", rc);
1383
1384	rc = supHardNtViCertStoreAddArray(*phStore, paCerts1, cCerts1, pErrInfo);
1385	if (RT_SUCCESS(rc))
1386	rc = supHardNtViCertStoreAddArray(*phStore, paCerts2, cCerts2, pErrInfo);
1387	if (RT_SUCCESS(rc))
1388	rc = supHardNtViCertStoreAddArray(*phStore, paCerts3, cCerts3, pErrInfo);
1389	return rc;
1390	}
1391
1392
1393
1394	#ifdef IN_RING3
1395	/**
1396	* Initializes the windows paths.
1397	*/
1398	static void supHardenedWinInitImageVerifierWinPaths(void)
1399	{
1400	/*
1401	* Windows paths that we're interested in.
1402	*/
1403	static const struct
1404	{
1405	SUPSYSROOTDIRBUF *pNtPath;
1406	WCHAR const *pwszRegValue;
1407	const char *pszLogName;
1408	} s_aPaths[] =
1409	{
1410	{ &g_ProgramFilesNtPath, L"ProgramFilesDir", "ProgDir" },
1411	{ &g_CommonFilesNtPath, L"CommonFilesDir", "ComDir" },
1412	# ifdef RT_ARCH_AMD64
1413	{ &g_ProgramFilesX86NtPath, L"ProgramFilesDir (x86)", "ProgDir32" },
1414	{ &g_CommonFilesX86NtPath, L"CommonFilesDir (x86)", "ComDir32" },
1415	# endif
1416	};
1417
1418	/*
1419	* Open the registry key containing the paths.
1420	*/
1421	UNICODE_STRING NtName = RTNT_CONSTANT_UNISTR(L"\\Registry\\Machine\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion");
1422	OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES ObjAttr;
1423	InitializeObjectAttributes(&ObjAttr, &NtName, OBJ_CASE_INSENSITIVE, NULL /hRootDir/, NULL /pSecDesc/);
1424	HANDLE hKey;
1425	NTSTATUS rcNt = NtOpenKey(&hKey, KEY_QUERY_VALUE, &ObjAttr);
1426	if (NT_SUCCESS(rcNt))
1427	{
1428	/*
1429	* Loop over the paths and resolve their NT paths.
1430	*/
1431	for (uint32_t i = 0; i < RT_ELEMENTS(s_aPaths); i++)
1432	{
1433	/*
1434	* Query the value first.
1435	*/
1436	UNICODE_STRING ValueName;
1437	ValueName.Buffer = (WCHAR *)s_aPaths[i].pwszRegValue;
1438	ValueName.Length = (USHORT)(RTUtf16Len(s_aPaths[i].pwszRegValue) * sizeof(WCHAR));
1439	ValueName.MaximumLength = ValueName.Length + sizeof(WCHAR);
1440
1441	union
1442	{
1443	KEY_VALUE_PARTIAL_INFORMATION PartialInfo;
1444	uint8_t abPadding[sizeof(KEY_VALUE_PARTIAL_INFORMATION) + sizeof(WCHAR) * 128];
1445	uint64_t uAlign;
1446	} uBuf;
1447
1448	ULONG cbActual = 0;
1449	rcNt = NtQueryValueKey(hKey, &ValueName, KeyValuePartialInformation, &uBuf, sizeof(uBuf) - sizeof(WCHAR), &cbActual);
1450	if (NT_SUCCESS(rcNt))
1451	{
1452	/*
1453	* Must be a simple string value, terminate it.
1454	*/
1455	if ( uBuf.PartialInfo.Type == REG_EXPAND_SZ
1456	\|\| uBuf.PartialInfo.Type == REG_SZ)
1457	{
1458	/*
1459	* Expand any environment variable references before opening it.
1460	* We use the result buffer as storage for the expaneded path,
1461	* reserving space for the windows name space prefix.
1462	*/
1463	UNICODE_STRING Src;
1464	Src.Buffer = (WCHAR *)uBuf.PartialInfo.Data;
1465	Src.Length = uBuf.PartialInfo.DataLength;
1466	if (Src.Length >= sizeof(WCHAR) && Src.Buffer[Src.Length / sizeof(WCHAR) - 1] == '\0')
1467	Src.Length -= sizeof(WCHAR);
1468	Src.MaximumLength = Src.Length + sizeof(WCHAR);
1469	Src.Buffer[uBuf.PartialInfo.DataLength / sizeof(WCHAR)] = '\0';
1470
1471	s_aPaths[i].pNtPath->awcBuffer[0] = '\\';
1472	s_aPaths[i].pNtPath->awcBuffer[1] = '?';
1473	s_aPaths[i].pNtPath->awcBuffer[2] = '?';
1474	s_aPaths[i].pNtPath->awcBuffer[3] = '\\';
1475	UNICODE_STRING Dst;
1476	Dst.Buffer = &s_aPaths[i].pNtPath->awcBuffer[4];
1477	Dst.MaximumLength = sizeof(s_aPaths[i].pNtPath->awcBuffer) - sizeof(WCHAR) * 5;
1478	Dst.Length = Dst.MaximumLength;
1479
1480	if (uBuf.PartialInfo.Type == REG_EXPAND_SZ)
1481	rcNt = RtlExpandEnvironmentStrings_U(NULL, &Src, &Dst, NULL);
1482	else
1483	{
1484	memcpy(Dst.Buffer, Src.Buffer, Src.Length);
1485	Dst.Length = Src.Length;
1486	}
1487	if (NT_SUCCESS(rcNt))
1488	{
1489	Dst.Buffer[Dst.Length / sizeof(WCHAR)] = '\0';
1490
1491	/*
1492	* Include the \\??\\ prefix in the result and open the path.
1493	*/
1494	Dst.Buffer -= 4;
1495	Dst.Length += 4 * sizeof(WCHAR);
1496	Dst.MaximumLength += 4 * sizeof(WCHAR);
1497	InitializeObjectAttributes(&ObjAttr, &Dst, OBJ_CASE_INSENSITIVE, NULL /hRootDir/, NULL /pSecDesc/);
1498	HANDLE hFile = INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE;
1499	IO_STATUS_BLOCK Ios = RTNT_IO_STATUS_BLOCK_INITIALIZER;
1500	NTSTATUS rcNt = NtCreateFile(&hFile,
1501	FILE_READ_DATA \| SYNCHRONIZE,
1502	&ObjAttr,
1503	&Ios,
1504	NULL /* Allocation Size*/,
1505	FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL,
1506	FILE_SHARE_READ \| FILE_SHARE_WRITE,
1507	FILE_OPEN,
1508	FILE_DIRECTORY_FILE \| FILE_OPEN_FOR_BACKUP_INTENT
1509	\| FILE_SYNCHRONOUS_IO_NONALERT,
1510	NULL /EaBuffer/,
1511	0 /EaLength/);
1512	if (NT_SUCCESS(rcNt))
1513	rcNt = Ios.Status;
1514	if (NT_SUCCESS(rcNt))
1515	{
1516	/*
1517	* Query the real NT name.
1518	*/
1519	ULONG cbIgn;
1520	rcNt = NtQueryObject(hFile,
1521	ObjectNameInformation,
1522	s_aPaths[i].pNtPath,
1523	sizeof(*s_aPaths[i].pNtPath) - sizeof(WCHAR),
1524	&cbIgn);
1525	if (NT_SUCCESS(rcNt))
1526	{
1527	if (s_aPaths[i].pNtPath->UniStr.Length > 0)
1528	{
1529	/* Make sure it's terminated.*/
1530	s_aPaths[i].pNtPath->UniStr.Buffer[s_aPaths[i].pNtPath->UniStr.Length / sizeof(WCHAR)] = '\0';
1531	SUP_DPRINTF(("%s:%*s %ls\n", s_aPaths[i].pszLogName, 9 - strlen(s_aPaths[i].pszLogName), "",
1532	s_aPaths[i].pNtPath->UniStr.Buffer));
1533	}
1534	else
1535	{
1536	SUP_DPRINTF(("%s: NtQueryObject returned empty string\n", s_aPaths[i].pszLogName));
1537	rcNt = STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
1538	}
1539	}
1540	else
1541	SUP_DPRINTF(("%s: NtQueryObject failed: %#x\n", s_aPaths[i].pszLogName, rcNt));
1542	NtClose(hFile);
1543	}
1544	else
1545	SUP_DPRINTF(("%s: NtCreateFile failed: %#x (%ls)\n",
1546	s_aPaths[i].pszLogName, rcNt, Dst.Buffer));
1547	}
1548	else
1549	SUP_DPRINTF(("%s: RtlExpandEnvironmentStrings_U failed: %#x (%ls)\n",
1550	s_aPaths[i].pszLogName, rcNt, Src.Buffer));
1551	}
1552	else
1553	{
1554	SUP_DPRINTF(("%s: type mismatch: %#x\n", s_aPaths[i].pszLogName, uBuf.PartialInfo.Type));
1555	rcNt = STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
1556	}
1557	}
1558	else
1559	SUP_DPRINTF(("%s: NtQueryValueKey failed: %#x\n", s_aPaths[i].pszLogName, rcNt));
1560
1561	/* Stub the entry on failure. */
1562	if (!NT_SUCCESS(rcNt))
1563	{
1564	s_aPaths[i].pNtPath->UniStr.Length = 0;
1565	s_aPaths[i].pNtPath->UniStr.Buffer = NULL;
1566	}
1567	}
1568	NtClose(hKey);
1569	}
1570	else
1571	{
1572	SUP_DPRINTF(("NtOpenKey(%ls) failed: %#x\n", NtName.Buffer, rcNt));
1573
1574	/* Stub all the entries on failure. */
1575	for (uint32_t i = 0; i < RT_ELEMENTS(s_aPaths); i++)
1576	{
1577	s_aPaths[i].pNtPath->UniStr.Length = 0;
1578	s_aPaths[i].pNtPath->UniStr.Buffer = NULL;
1579	}
1580	}
1581	}
1582	#endif /* IN_RING3 */
1583
1584
1585	/**
1586	* This initializes the certificates globals so we don't have to reparse them
1587	* every time we need to verify an image.
1588	*
1589	* @returns IPRT status code.
1590	* @param pErrInfo Where to return extended error info. Optional.
1591	*/
1592	DECLHIDDEN(int) supHardenedWinInitImageVerifier(PRTERRINFO pErrInfo)
1593	{
1594	AssertReturn(!RTCrX509Certificate_IsPresent(&g_BuildX509Cert), VERR_WRONG_ORDER);
1595
1596	/*
1597	* Get the system root paths.
1598	*/
1599	int rc = supHardNtGetSystemRootDir(&g_System32NtPath, sizeof(g_System32NtPath), kSupHardNtSysRootDir_System32, pErrInfo);
1600	if (RT_SUCCESS(rc))
1601	rc = supHardNtGetSystemRootDir(&g_WinSxSNtPath, sizeof(g_WinSxSNtPath), kSupHardNtSysRootDir_WinSxS, pErrInfo);
1602	if (RT_SUCCESS(rc))
1603	{
1604	SUP_DPRINTF(("System32: %ls\n", g_System32NtPath.UniStr.Buffer));
1605	SUP_DPRINTF(("WinSxS: %ls\n", g_WinSxSNtPath.UniStr.Buffer));
1606	#ifdef IN_RING3
1607	supHardenedWinInitImageVerifierWinPaths();
1608	#endif
1609
1610	/*
1611	* Initialize it, leaving the cleanup to the termination call.
1612	*/
1613	rc = supHardNtViCertInit(&g_BuildX509Cert, g_abSUPBuildCert, g_cbSUPBuildCert, pErrInfo, "BuildCertificate");
1614	if (RT_SUCCESS(rc))
1615	rc = supHardNtViCertStoreInit(&g_hSpcRootStore, g_aSUPSpcRootTAs, g_cSUPSpcRootTAs,
1616	NULL, 0, NULL, 0, pErrInfo, "SpcRoot");
1617	if (RT_SUCCESS(rc))
1618	rc = supHardNtViCertStoreInit(&g_hNtKernelRootStore, g_aSUPNtKernelRootTAs, g_cSUPNtKernelRootTAs,
1619	NULL, 0, NULL, 0, pErrInfo, "NtKernelRoot");
1620	if (RT_SUCCESS(rc))
1621	rc = supHardNtViCertStoreInit(&g_hSpcAndNtKernelRootStore,
1622	g_aSUPSpcRootTAs, g_cSUPSpcRootTAs,
1623	g_aSUPNtKernelRootTAs, g_cSUPNtKernelRootTAs,
1624	g_aSUPTimestampTAs, g_cSUPTimestampTAs,
1625	pErrInfo, "SpcAndNtKernelRoot");
1626	if (RT_SUCCESS(rc))
1627	rc = supHardNtViCertStoreInit(&g_hSpcAndNtKernelSuppStore,
1628	NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0,
1629	pErrInfo, "SpcAndNtKernelSupplemental");
1630
1631	#if 0 /* For the time being, always trust the build certificate. It bypasses the timestamp issues of CRT and SDL. */
1632	/* If the build certificate is a test singing certificate, it must be a
1633	trusted root or we'll fail to validate anything. */
1634	if ( RT_SUCCESS(rc)
1635	&& RTCrX509Name_Compare(&g_BuildX509Cert.TbsCertificate.Subject, &g_BuildX509Cert.TbsCertificate.Issuer) == 0)
1636	#else
1637	if (RT_SUCCESS(rc))
1638	#endif
1639	rc = RTCrStoreCertAddEncoded(g_hSpcAndNtKernelRootStore, RTCRCERTCTX_F_ENC_X509_DER,
1640	g_abSUPBuildCert, g_cbSUPBuildCert, pErrInfo);
1641
1642	if (RT_SUCCESS(rc))
1643	{
1644	/*
1645	* Finally initialize known SIDs that we use.
1646	*/
1647	SID_IDENTIFIER_AUTHORITY s_NtAuth = SECURITY_NT_AUTHORITY;
1648	NTSTATUS rcNt = RtlInitializeSid(&g_TrustedInstallerSid, &s_NtAuth, SECURITY_SERVICE_ID_RID_COUNT);
1649	if (NT_SUCCESS(rcNt))
1650	{
1651	*RtlSubAuthoritySid(&g_TrustedInstallerSid, 0) = SECURITY_SERVICE_ID_BASE_RID;
1652	*RtlSubAuthoritySid(&g_TrustedInstallerSid, 1) = 956008885;
1653	*RtlSubAuthoritySid(&g_TrustedInstallerSid, 2) = 3418522649;
1654	*RtlSubAuthoritySid(&g_TrustedInstallerSid, 3) = 1831038044;
1655	*RtlSubAuthoritySid(&g_TrustedInstallerSid, 4) = 1853292631;
1656	*RtlSubAuthoritySid(&g_TrustedInstallerSid, 5) = 2271478464;
1657
1658	if (NT_SUCCESS(rcNt))
1659	rcNt = RtlInitializeSid(&g_LocalSystemSid, &s_NtAuth, 1);
1660	if (NT_SUCCESS(rcNt))
1661	{
1662	*RtlSubAuthoritySid(&g_LocalSystemSid, 0) = SECURITY_LOCAL_SYSTEM_RID;
1663	return VINF_SUCCESS;
1664	}
1665	}
1666	rc = RTErrConvertFromNtStatus(rcNt);
1667	}
1668	supHardenedWinTermImageVerifier();
1669	}
1670	return rc;
1671	}
1672
1673
1674	/**
1675	* Releases resources allocated by supHardenedWinInitImageVerifier.
1676	*/
1677	DECLHIDDEN(void) supHardenedWinTermImageVerifier(void)
1678	{
1679	if (RTCrX509Certificate_IsPresent(&g_BuildX509Cert))
1680	RTAsn1VtDelete(&g_BuildX509Cert.SeqCore.Asn1Core);
1681
1682	RTCrStoreRelease(g_hSpcAndNtKernelSuppStore);
1683	g_hSpcAndNtKernelSuppStore = NIL_RTCRSTORE;
1684	RTCrStoreRelease(g_hSpcAndNtKernelRootStore);
1685	g_hSpcAndNtKernelRootStore = NIL_RTCRSTORE;
1686
1687	RTCrStoreRelease(g_hNtKernelRootStore);
1688	g_hNtKernelRootStore = NIL_RTCRSTORE;
1689	RTCrStoreRelease(g_hSpcRootStore);
1690	g_hSpcRootStore = NIL_RTCRSTORE;
1691	}
1692
1693	#ifdef IN_RING3
1694
1695	/**
1696	* This is a hardcoded list of certificates we thing we might need.
1697	*
1698	* @returns true if wanted, false if not.
1699	* @param pCert The certificate.
1700	*/
1701	static bool supR3HardenedWinIsDesiredRootCA(PCRTCRX509CERTIFICATE pCert)
1702	{
1703	char szSubject[512];
1704	szSubject[sizeof(szSubject) - 1] = '\0';
1705	RTCrX509Name_FormatAsString(&pCert->TbsCertificate.Subject, szSubject, sizeof(szSubject) - 1, NULL);
1706
1707	/*
1708	* Check that it's a plausible root certificate.
1709	*/
1710	if (!RTCrX509Certificate_IsSelfSigned(pCert))
1711	{
1712	SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardenedWinIsDesiredRootCA: skipping - not-self-signed: %s\n", szSubject));
1713	return false;
1714	}
1715
1716	if (RTAsn1Integer_UnsignedCompareWithU32(&pCert->TbsCertificate.T0.Version, 3) > 0)
1717	{
1718	if ( !(pCert->TbsCertificate.T3.fExtKeyUsage & RTCRX509CERT_KEY_USAGE_F_KEY_CERT_SIGN)
1719	&& (pCert->TbsCertificate.T3.fFlags & RTCRX509TBSCERTIFICATE_F_PRESENT_KEY_USAGE) )
1720	{
1721	SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardenedWinIsDesiredRootCA: skipping - non-cert-sign: %s\n", szSubject));
1722	return false;
1723	}
1724	if ( pCert->TbsCertificate.T3.pBasicConstraints
1725	&& !pCert->TbsCertificate.T3.pBasicConstraints->CA.fValue)
1726	{
1727	SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardenedWinIsDesiredRootCA: skipping - non-CA: %s\n", szSubject));
1728	return false;
1729	}
1730	}
1731	if (pCert->TbsCertificate.SubjectPublicKeyInfo.SubjectPublicKey.cBits < 256) /* mostly for u64KeyId reading. */
1732	{
1733	SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardenedWinIsDesiredRootCA: skipping - key too small: %u bits %s\n",
1734	pCert->TbsCertificate.SubjectPublicKeyInfo.SubjectPublicKey.cBits, szSubject));
1735	return false;
1736	}
1737	uint64_t const u64KeyId = pCert->TbsCertificate.SubjectPublicKeyInfo.SubjectPublicKey.uBits.pu64[1];
1738
1739	# if 0
1740	/*
1741	* Whitelist - Array of names and key clues of the certificates we want.
1742	*/
1743	static struct
1744	{
1745	uint64_t u64KeyId;
1746	const char *pszName;
1747	} const s_aWanted[] =
1748	{
1749	/* SPC */
1750	{ UINT64_C(0xffffffffffffffff), "C=US, O=VeriSign, Inc., OU=Class 3 Public Primary Certification Authority" },
1751	{ UINT64_C(0xffffffffffffffff), "L=Internet, O=VeriSign, Inc., OU=VeriSign Commercial Software Publishers CA" },
1752	{ UINT64_C(0x491857ead79dde00), "C=US, O=The Go Daddy Group, Inc., OU=Go Daddy Class 2 Certification Authority" },
1753
1754	/* TS */
1755	{ UINT64_C(0xffffffffffffffff), "O=Microsoft Trust Network, OU=Microsoft Corporation, OU=Microsoft Time Stamping Service Root, OU=Copyright (c) 1997 Microsoft Corp." },
1756	{ UINT64_C(0xffffffffffffffff), "O=VeriSign Trust Network, OU=VeriSign, Inc., OU=VeriSign Time Stamping Service Root, OU=NO LIABILITY ACCEPTED, (c)97 VeriSign, Inc." },
1757	{ UINT64_C(0xffffffffffffffff), "C=ZA, ST=Western Cape, L=Durbanville, O=Thawte, OU=Thawte Certification, CN=Thawte Timestamping CA" },
1758
1759	/* Additional Windows 8.1 list: */
1760	{ UINT64_C(0x5ad46780fa5df300), "DC=com, DC=microsoft, CN=Microsoft Root Certificate Authority" },
1761	{ UINT64_C(0x3be670c1bd02a900), "OU=Copyright (c) 1997 Microsoft Corp., OU=Microsoft Corporation, CN=Microsoft Root Authority" },
1762	{ UINT64_C(0x4d3835aa4180b200), "C=US, ST=Washington, L=Redmond, O=Microsoft Corporation, CN=Microsoft Root Certificate Authority 2011" },
1763	{ UINT64_C(0x646e3fe3ba08df00), "C=US, O=MSFT, CN=Microsoft Authenticode(tm) Root Authority" },
1764	{ UINT64_C(0xece4e4289e08b900), "C=US, ST=Washington, L=Redmond, O=Microsoft Corporation, CN=Microsoft Root Certificate Authority 2010" },
1765	{ UINT64_C(0x59faf1086271bf00), "C=US, ST=Arizona, L=Scottsdale, O=GoDaddy.com, Inc., CN=Go Daddy Root Certificate Authority - G2" },
1766	{ UINT64_C(0x3d98ab22bb04a300), "C=IE, O=Baltimore, OU=CyberTrust, CN=Baltimore CyberTrust Root" },
1767	{ UINT64_C(0x91e3728b8b40d000), "C=GB, ST=Greater Manchester, L=Salford, O=COMODO CA Limited, CN=COMODO Certification Authority" },
1768	{ UINT64_C(0x61a3a33f81aace00), "C=US, ST=UT, L=Salt Lake City, O=The USERTRUST Network, OU=http://www.usertrust.com, CN=UTN-USERFirst-Object" },
1769	{ UINT64_C(0x9e5bc2d78b6a3636), "C=ZA, ST=Western Cape, L=Cape Town, O=Thawte Consulting cc, OU=Certification Services Division, CN=Thawte Premium Server CA, [email protected]" },
1770	{ UINT64_C(0xf4fd306318ccda00), "C=US, O=GeoTrust Inc., CN=GeoTrust Global CA" },
1771	{ UINT64_C(0xa0ee62086758b15d), "C=US, O=Equifax, OU=Equifax Secure Certificate Authority" },
1772	{ UINT64_C(0x8ff6fc03c1edbd00), "C=US, ST=Arizona, L=Scottsdale, O=Starfield Technologies, Inc., CN=Starfield Root Certificate Authority - G2" },
1773	{ UINT64_C(0xa3ce8d99e60eda00), "C=BE, O=GlobalSign nv-sa, OU=Root CA, CN=GlobalSign Root CA" },
1774	{ UINT64_C(0xa671e9fec832b700), "C=US, O=Starfield Technologies, Inc., OU=Starfield Class 2 Certification Authority" },
1775	{ UINT64_C(0xa8de7211e13be200), "C=US, O=DigiCert Inc, OU=www.digicert.com, CN=DigiCert Global Root CA" },
1776	{ UINT64_C(0x0ff3891b54348328), "C=US, O=Entrust.net, OU=www.entrust.net/CPS incorp. by ref. (limits liab.), OU=(c) 1999 Entrust.net Limited, CN=Entrust.netSecure Server Certification Authority" },
1777	{ UINT64_C(0x7ae89c50f0b6a00f), "C=US, O=GTE Corporation, OU=GTE CyberTrust Solutions, Inc., CN=GTE CyberTrust Global Root" },
1778	{ UINT64_C(0xd45980fbf0a0ac00), "C=US, O=thawte, Inc., OU=Certification Services Division, OU=(c) 2006 thawte, Inc. - For authorized use only, CN=thawte Primary Root CA" },
1779	{ UINT64_C(0x9e5bc2d78b6a3636), "C=ZA, ST=Western Cape, L=Cape Town, O=Thawte Consulting cc, OU=Certification Services Division, CN=Thawte Premium Server CA, [email protected]" },
1780	{ UINT64_C(0x7c4fd32ec1b1ce00), "C=PL, O=Unizeto Sp. z o.o., CN=Certum CA" },
1781	{ UINT64_C(0xd4fbe673e5ccc600), "C=US, O=DigiCert Inc, OU=www.digicert.com, CN=DigiCert High Assurance EV Root CA" },
1782	{ UINT64_C(0x16e64d2a56ccf200), "C=US, ST=Arizona, L=Scottsdale, O=Starfield Technologies, Inc., OU=http://certificates.starfieldtech.com/repository/, CN=Starfield Services Root Certificate Authority" },
1783	{ UINT64_C(0x6e2ba21058eedf00), "C=US, ST=UT, L=Salt Lake City, O=The USERTRUST Network, OU=http://www.usertrust.com, CN=UTN - DATACorp SGC" },
1784	{ UINT64_C(0xb28612a94b4dad00), "O=Entrust.net, OU=www.entrust.net/CPS_2048 incorp. by ref. (limits liab.), OU=(c) 1999 Entrust.net Limited, CN=Entrust.netCertification Authority (2048)" },
1785	{ UINT64_C(0x357a29080824af00), "C=US, O=VeriSign, Inc., OU=VeriSign Trust Network, OU=(c) 2006 VeriSign, Inc. - For authorized use only, CN=VeriSign Class3 Public Primary Certification Authority - G5" },
1786	{ UINT64_C(0x466cbc09db88c100), "C=IL, O=StartCom Ltd., OU=Secure Digital Certificate Signing, CN=StartCom Certification Authority" },
1787	{ UINT64_C(0x9259c8abe5ca713a), "L=ValiCert Validation Network, O=ValiCert, Inc., OU=ValiCert Class 2 Policy Validation Authority, CN=http://www.valicert.com/, [email protected]" },
1788	{ UINT64_C(0x1f78fc529cbacb00), "C=US, O=VeriSign, Inc., OU=VeriSign Trust Network, OU=(c) 1999 VeriSign, Inc. - For authorized use only, CN=VeriSign Class3 Public Primary Certification Authority - G3" },
1789	{ UINT64_C(0x8043e4ce150ead00), "C=US, O=DigiCert Inc, OU=www.digicert.com, CN=DigiCert Assured ID Root CA" },
1790	{ UINT64_C(0x00f2e6331af7b700), "C=SE, O=AddTrust AB, OU=AddTrust External TTP Network, CN=AddTrust External CA Root" },
1791	};
1792
1793
1794	uint32_t i = RT_ELEMENTS(s_aWanted);
1795	while (i-- > 0)
1796	if ( s_aWanted[i].u64KeyId == u64KeyId
1797	\|\| s_aWanted[i].u64KeyId == UINT64_MAX)
1798	if (RTCrX509Name_MatchWithString(&pCert->TbsCertificate.Subject, s_aWanted[i].pszName))
1799	{
1800	SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardenedWinIsDesiredRootCA: Adding %#llx %s\n", u64KeyId, szSubject));
1801	return true;
1802	}
1803
1804	SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardenedWinIsDesiredRootCA: skipping %#llx %s\n", u64KeyId, szSubject));
1805	return false;
1806	# else
1807	/*
1808	* Blacklist approach.
1809	*/
1810	static struct
1811	{
1812	uint64_t u64KeyId;
1813	const char *pszName;
1814	} const s_aUnwanted[] =
1815	{
1816	{ UINT64_C(0xffffffffffffffff), "C=US, O=U.S. Robots and Mechanical Men, Inc., OU=V.I.K.I." }, /* dummy entry */
1817	};
1818
1819	uint32_t i = RT_ELEMENTS(s_aUnwanted);
1820	while (i-- > 0)
1821	if ( s_aUnwanted[i].u64KeyId == u64KeyId
1822	\|\| s_aUnwanted[i].u64KeyId == UINT64_MAX)
1823	if (RTCrX509Name_MatchWithString(&pCert->TbsCertificate.Subject, s_aUnwanted[i].pszName))
1824	{
1825	SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardenedWinIsDesiredRootCA: skipping - blacklisted: %#llx %s\n", u64KeyId, szSubject));
1826	return false;
1827	}
1828
1829	SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardenedWinIsDesiredRootCA: Adding %#llx %s\n", u64KeyId, szSubject));
1830	return true;
1831	# endif
1832	}
1833
1834
1835	/**
1836	* Loads a module in the system32 directory.
1837	*
1838	* @returns Module handle on success. Won't return on faliure.
1839	* @param pszName The name of the DLL to load.
1840	*/
1841	DECLHIDDEN(HMODULE) supR3HardenedWinLoadSystem32Dll(const char *pszName)
1842	{
1843	WCHAR wszName[200+60];
1844	UINT cwcDir = GetSystemDirectoryW(wszName, RT_ELEMENTS(wszName) - 60);
1845	wszName[cwcDir] = '\\';
1846	RTUtf16CopyAscii(&wszName[cwcDir + 1], RT_ELEMENTS(wszName) - cwcDir, pszName);
1847
1848	DWORD fFlags = 0;
1849	if (g_uNtVerCombined >= SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_SIMPLE(6, 0))
1850	fFlags = LOAD_LIBRARY_SEARCH_SYSTEM32;
1851	HMODULE hMod = LoadLibraryExW(wszName, NULL, fFlags);
1852	if ( hMod == NULL
1853	&& fFlags
1854	&& g_uNtVerCombined < SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_SIMPLE(6, 2)
1855	&& GetLastError() == ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER)
1856	{
1857	fFlags = 0;
1858	hMod = LoadLibraryExW(wszName, NULL, fFlags);
1859	}
1860	if (hMod == NULL)
1861	supR3HardenedFatal("Error loading '%s': %u [%ls]", pszName, GetLastError(), wszName);
1862	return hMod;
1863	}
1864
1865
1866	/**
1867	* Called by supR3HardenedWinResolveVerifyTrustApiAndHookThreadCreation to
1868	* import selected root CAs from the system certificate store.
1869	*
1870	* These certificates permits us to correctly validate third party DLLs.
1871	*/
1872	static void supR3HardenedWinRetrieveTrustedRootCAs(void)
1873	{
1874	uint32_t cAdded = 0;
1875
1876	/*
1877	* Load crypt32.dll and resolve the APIs we need.
1878	*/
1879	HMODULE hCrypt32 = supR3HardenedWinLoadSystem32Dll("crypt32.dll");
1880
1881	#define RESOLVE_CRYPT32_API(a_Name, a_pfnType) \
1882	a_pfnType pfn##a_Name = (a_pfnType)GetProcAddress(hCrypt32, #a_Name); \
1883	if (pfn##a_Name == NULL) supR3HardenedFatal("Error locating '" #a_Name "' in 'crypt32.dll': %u", GetLastError())
1884	RESOLVE_CRYPT32_API(CertOpenStore, PFNCERTOPENSTORE);
1885	RESOLVE_CRYPT32_API(CertCloseStore, PFNCERTCLOSESTORE);
1886	RESOLVE_CRYPT32_API(CertEnumCertificatesInStore, PFNCERTENUMCERTIFICATESINSTORE);
1887	#undef RESOLVE_CRYPT32_API
1888
1889	/*
1890	* Open the root store and look for the certificates we wish to use.
1891	*/
1892	DWORD fOpenStore = CERT_STORE_OPEN_EXISTING_FLAG \| CERT_STORE_READONLY_FLAG;
1893	HCERTSTORE hStore = pfnCertOpenStore(CERT_STORE_PROV_SYSTEM_W, PKCS_7_ASN_ENCODING \| X509_ASN_ENCODING,
1894	NULL /* hCryptProv = default */, CERT_SYSTEM_STORE_LOCAL_MACHINE \| fOpenStore, L"Root");
1895	if (!hStore)
1896	hStore = pfnCertOpenStore(CERT_STORE_PROV_SYSTEM_W, PKCS_7_ASN_ENCODING \| X509_ASN_ENCODING,
1897	NULL /* hCryptProv = default */, CERT_SYSTEM_STORE_CURRENT_USER \| fOpenStore, L"Root");
1898	if (hStore)
1899	{
1900	PCCERT_CONTEXT pCurCtx = NULL;
1901	while ((pCurCtx = pfnCertEnumCertificatesInStore(hStore, pCurCtx)) != NULL)
1902	{
1903	if (pCurCtx->dwCertEncodingType & X509_ASN_ENCODING)
1904	{
1905	RTERRINFOSTATIC StaticErrInfo;
1906	RTASN1CURSORPRIMARY PrimaryCursor;
1907	RTAsn1CursorInitPrimary(&PrimaryCursor, pCurCtx->pbCertEncoded, pCurCtx->cbCertEncoded,
1908	RTErrInfoInitStatic(&StaticErrInfo),
1909	&g_RTAsn1DefaultAllocator, RTASN1CURSOR_FLAGS_DER, "CurCtx");
1910	RTCRX509CERTIFICATE MyCert;
1911	int rc = RTCrX509Certificate_DecodeAsn1(&PrimaryCursor.Cursor, 0, &MyCert, "Cert");
1912	if (RT_SUCCESS(rc))
1913	{
1914	if (supR3HardenedWinIsDesiredRootCA(&MyCert))
1915	{
1916	rc = RTCrStoreCertAddEncoded(g_hSpcRootStore, RTCRCERTCTX_F_ENC_X509_DER,
1917	pCurCtx->pbCertEncoded, pCurCtx->cbCertEncoded, NULL /pErrInfo/);
1918	AssertRC(rc);
1919
1920	rc = RTCrStoreCertAddEncoded(g_hSpcAndNtKernelRootStore, RTCRCERTCTX_F_ENC_X509_DER,
1921	pCurCtx->pbCertEncoded, pCurCtx->cbCertEncoded, NULL /pErrInfo/);
1922	AssertRC(rc);
1923	cAdded++;
1924	}
1925
1926	RTCrX509Certificate_Delete(&MyCert);
1927	}
1928	/* XP root certificate "C&W HKT SecureNet CA SGC Root" has non-standard validity
1929	timestamps, the UTC formatting isn't Zulu time but specifies timezone offsets.
1930	Ignore these failures and certificates. */
1931	else if (rc != VERR_ASN1_INVALID_UTC_TIME_ENCODING)
1932	AssertMsgFailed(("RTCrX509Certificate_DecodeAsn1 failed: rc=%#x: %s\n", rc, StaticErrInfo.szMsg));
1933	}
1934	}
1935	pfnCertCloseStore(hStore, CERT_CLOSE_STORE_CHECK_FLAG);
1936	g_fHaveOtherRoots = true;
1937	}
1938	SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardenedWinRetrieveTrustedRootCAs: cAdded=%u\n", cAdded));
1939	}
1940
1941
1942	/**
1943	* Resolves the WinVerifyTrust API after the process has been verified and
1944	* installs a thread creation hook.
1945	*
1946	* The WinVerifyTrust API is used in addition our own Authenticode verification
1947	* code. If the image has the IMAGE_DLLCHARACTERISTICS_FORCE_INTEGRITY flag
1948	* set, it will be checked again by the kernel. All our image has this flag set
1949	* and we require all VBox extensions to have it set as well. In effect, the
1950	* authenticode signature will be checked two or three times.
1951	*
1952	* @param pszProgName The program name.
1953	*/
1954	DECLHIDDEN(void) supR3HardenedWinResolveVerifyTrustApiAndHookThreadCreation(const char *pszProgName)
1955	{
1956	# ifdef IN_SUP_HARDENED_R3
1957	/*
1958	* Load our the support library DLL that does the thread hooking as the
1959	* security API may trigger the creation of COM worker threads (or
1960	* whatever they are).
1961	*
1962	* The thread creation hook makes the threads very slippery to debuggers by
1963	* irreversably disabling most (if not all) debug events for them.
1964	*/
1965	char szPath[RTPATH_MAX];
1966	supR3HardenedPathSharedLibs(szPath, sizeof(szPath) - sizeof("/VBoxSupLib.DLL"));
1967	suplibHardenedStrCat(szPath, "/VBoxSupLib.DLL");
1968	HMODULE hSupLibMod = (HMODULE)supR3HardenedWinLoadLibrary(szPath, true /fSystem32Only/);
1969	if (hSupLibMod == NULL)
1970	supR3HardenedFatal("Error loading '%s': %u", szPath, GetLastError());
1971	# endif
1972
1973	/*
1974	* Allocate TLS entry for WinVerifyTrust recursion prevention.
1975	*/
1976	DWORD iTls = TlsAlloc();
1977	if (iTls != TLS_OUT_OF_INDEXES)
1978	g_iTlsWinVerifyTrustRecursion = iTls;
1979	else
1980	supR3HardenedError(GetLastError(), false /fFatal/, "TlsAlloc failed");
1981
1982	/*
1983	* Resolve it.
1984	*/
1985	HMODULE hWintrust = supR3HardenedWinLoadSystem32Dll("Wintrust.dll");
1986	#define RESOLVE_CRYPT_API(a_Name, a_pfnType, a_uMinWinVer) \
1987	do { \
1988	g_pfn##a_Name = (a_pfnType)GetProcAddress(hWintrust, #a_Name); \
1989	if (g_pfn##a_Name == NULL && (a_uMinWinVer) < g_uNtVerCombined) \
1990	supR3HardenedFatal("Error locating '" #a_Name "' in 'Wintrust.dll': %u", GetLastError()); \
1991	} while (0)
1992
1993	PFNWINVERIFYTRUST pfnWinVerifyTrust = (PFNWINVERIFYTRUST)GetProcAddress(hWintrust, "WinVerifyTrust");
1994	if (!pfnWinVerifyTrust)
1995	supR3HardenedFatal("Error locating 'WinVerifyTrust' in 'Wintrust.dll': %u", GetLastError());
1996
1997	RESOLVE_CRYPT_API(CryptCATAdminAcquireContext, PFNCRYPTCATADMINACQUIRECONTEXT, 0);
1998	RESOLVE_CRYPT_API(CryptCATAdminCalcHashFromFileHandle, PFNCRYPTCATADMINCALCHASHFROMFILEHANDLE, 0);
1999	RESOLVE_CRYPT_API(CryptCATAdminEnumCatalogFromHash, PFNCRYPTCATADMINENUMCATALOGFROMHASH, 0);
2000	RESOLVE_CRYPT_API(CryptCATAdminReleaseCatalogContext, PFNCRYPTCATADMINRELEASECATALOGCONTEXT, 0);
2001	RESOLVE_CRYPT_API(CryptCATAdminReleaseContext, PFNCRYPTCATDADMINRELEASECONTEXT, 0);
2002	RESOLVE_CRYPT_API(CryptCATCatalogInfoFromContext, PFNCRYPTCATCATALOGINFOFROMCONTEXT, 0);
2003
2004	RESOLVE_CRYPT_API(CryptCATAdminAcquireContext2, PFNCRYPTCATADMINACQUIRECONTEXT2, SUP_NT_VER_W80);
2005	RESOLVE_CRYPT_API(CryptCATAdminCalcHashFromFileHandle2, PFNCRYPTCATADMINCALCHASHFROMFILEHANDLE2, SUP_NT_VER_W80);
2006
2007	/*
2008	* Call it on ourselves and ntdll to make sure it loads all the providers
2009	* now, we would otherwise geting into recursive trouble in the
2010	* NtCreateSection hook.
2011	*/
2012	# ifdef IN_SUP_HARDENED_R3
2013	RTERRINFOSTATIC ErrInfoStatic;
2014	RTErrInfoInitStatic(&ErrInfoStatic);
2015	int rc = supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrust(NULL, g_SupLibHardenedExeNtPath.UniStr.Buffer, 0,
2016	&ErrInfoStatic.Core, pfnWinVerifyTrust);
2017	if (RT_FAILURE(rc))
2018	supR3HardenedFatalMsg(pszProgName, kSupInitOp_Integrity, rc,
2019	"WinVerifyTrust failed on stub executable: %s", ErrInfoStatic.szMsg);
2020	# endif
2021
2022	if (g_uNtVerCombined >= SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_SIMPLE(6, 0)) /* ntdll isn't signed on XP, assuming this is the case on W2K3 for now. */
2023	supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrust(NULL, L"\\SystemRoot\\System32\\ntdll.dll", 0, NULL, pfnWinVerifyTrust);
2024	supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrustCatFile(NULL, L"\\SystemRoot\\System32\\ntdll.dll", 0, NULL, pfnWinVerifyTrust);
2025
2026	g_pfnWinVerifyTrust = pfnWinVerifyTrust;
2027	SUP_DPRINTF(("g_pfnWinVerifyTrust=%p\n", pfnWinVerifyTrust));
2028
2029	# ifdef IN_SUP_HARDENED_R3
2030	/*
2031	* Load some problematic DLLs into the verifier cache to prevent
2032	* recursion trouble.
2033	*/
2034	supR3HardenedWinVerifyCachePreload(L"\\SystemRoot\\System32\\crypt32.dll");
2035	supR3HardenedWinVerifyCachePreload(L"\\SystemRoot\\System32\\Wintrust.dll");
2036	# endif
2037
2038	/*
2039	* Now, get trusted root CAs so we can verify a broader scope of signatures.
2040	*/
2041	supR3HardenedWinRetrieveTrustedRootCAs();
2042	}
2043
2044
2045	static int supR3HardNtViNtToWinPath(PCRTUTF16 pwszNtName, PCRTUTF16 *ppwszWinPath,
2046	PRTUTF16 pwszWinPathBuf, size_t cwcWinPathBuf)
2047	{
2048	static const RTUTF16 s_wszPrefix[] = L"\\\\.\\GLOBALROOT";
2049
2050	if (pwszNtName != '\\' && pwszNtName != '/')
2051	return VERR_PATH_DOES_NOT_START_WITH_ROOT;
2052
2053	size_t cwcNtName = RTUtf16Len(pwszNtName);
2054	if (RT_ELEMENTS(s_wszPrefix) + cwcNtName > cwcWinPathBuf)
2055	return VERR_FILENAME_TOO_LONG;
2056
2057	memcpy(pwszWinPathBuf, s_wszPrefix, sizeof(s_wszPrefix));
2058	memcpy(&pwszWinPathBuf[sizeof(s_wszPrefix) / sizeof(RTUTF16) - 1], pwszNtName, (cwcNtName + 1) * sizeof(RTUTF16));
2059	*ppwszWinPath = pwszWinPathBuf;
2060	return VINF_SUCCESS;
2061	}
2062
2063
2064	/**
2065	* Calls WinVerifyTrust to verify an PE image.
2066	*
2067	* @returns VBox status code.
2068	* @param hFile File handle to the executable file.
2069	* @param pwszName Full NT path to the DLL in question, used for
2070	* dealing with unsigned system dlls as well as for
2071	* error/logging.
2072	* @param fFlags Flags, SUPHNTVI_F_XXX.
2073	* @param pErrInfo Pointer to error info structure. Optional.
2074	* @param pfnWinVerifyTrust Pointer to the API.
2075	*/
2076	static int supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrust(HANDLE hFile, PCRTUTF16 pwszName, uint32_t fFlags, PRTERRINFO pErrInfo,
2077	PFNWINVERIFYTRUST pfnWinVerifyTrust)
2078	{
2079	/*
2080	* Convert the name into a Windows name.
2081	*/
2082	RTUTF16 wszWinPathBuf[MAX_PATH];
2083	PCRTUTF16 pwszWinPath;
2084	int rc = supR3HardNtViNtToWinPath(pwszName, &pwszWinPath, wszWinPathBuf, RT_ELEMENTS(wszWinPathBuf));
2085	if (RT_FAILURE(rc))
2086	return RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, rc, "Bad path passed to supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrust: rc=%Rrc '%ls'", rc, pwszName);
2087
2088	/*
2089	* Construct input parameters and call the API.
2090	*/
2091	WINTRUST_FILE_INFO FileInfo;
2092	RT_ZERO(FileInfo);
2093	FileInfo.cbStruct = sizeof(FileInfo);
2094	FileInfo.pcwszFilePath = pwszWinPath;
2095	FileInfo.hFile = hFile;
2096
2097	GUID PolicyActionGuid = WINTRUST_ACTION_GENERIC_VERIFY_V2;
2098
2099	WINTRUST_DATA TrustData;
2100	RT_ZERO(TrustData);
2101	TrustData.cbStruct = sizeof(TrustData);
2102	TrustData.fdwRevocationChecks = WTD_REVOKE_NONE; /* Keep simple for now. */
2103	TrustData.dwStateAction = WTD_STATEACTION_VERIFY;
2104	TrustData.dwUIChoice = WTD_UI_NONE;
2105	TrustData.dwProvFlags = 0;
2106	if (g_uNtVerCombined >= SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_SIMPLE(6, 0))
2107	TrustData.dwProvFlags = WTD_CACHE_ONLY_URL_RETRIEVAL;
2108	else
2109	TrustData.dwProvFlags = WTD_REVOCATION_CHECK_NONE;
2110	TrustData.dwUnionChoice = WTD_CHOICE_FILE;
2111	TrustData.pFile = &FileInfo;
2112
2113	HRESULT hrc = pfnWinVerifyTrust(NULL /hwnd/, &PolicyActionGuid, &TrustData);
2114	if (hrc == S_OK)
2115	rc = VINF_SUCCESS;
2116	else
2117	{
2118	/*
2119	* Failed. Format a nice error message.
2120	*/
2121	# ifdef DEBUG_bird
2122	if (hrc != CERT_E_CHAINING /* Un-updated vistas, XPs, ++ */)
2123	__debugbreak();
2124	# endif
2125	const char *pszErrConst = NULL;
2126	switch (hrc)
2127	{
2128	case TRUST_E_SYSTEM_ERROR: pszErrConst = "TRUST_E_SYSTEM_ERROR"; break;
2129	case TRUST_E_NO_SIGNER_CERT: pszErrConst = "TRUST_E_NO_SIGNER_CERT"; break;
2130	case TRUST_E_COUNTER_SIGNER: pszErrConst = "TRUST_E_COUNTER_SIGNER"; break;
2131	case TRUST_E_CERT_SIGNATURE: pszErrConst = "TRUST_E_CERT_SIGNATURE"; break;
2132	case TRUST_E_TIME_STAMP: pszErrConst = "TRUST_E_TIME_STAMP"; break;
2133	case TRUST_E_BAD_DIGEST: pszErrConst = "TRUST_E_BAD_DIGEST"; break;
2134	case TRUST_E_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS: pszErrConst = "TRUST_E_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS"; break;
2135	case TRUST_E_FINANCIAL_CRITERIA: pszErrConst = "TRUST_E_FINANCIAL_CRITERIA"; break;
2136	case TRUST_E_PROVIDER_UNKNOWN: pszErrConst = "TRUST_E_PROVIDER_UNKNOWN"; break;
2137	case TRUST_E_ACTION_UNKNOWN: pszErrConst = "TRUST_E_ACTION_UNKNOWN"; break;
2138	case TRUST_E_SUBJECT_FORM_UNKNOWN: pszErrConst = "TRUST_E_SUBJECT_FORM_UNKNOWN"; break;
2139	case TRUST_E_SUBJECT_NOT_TRUSTED: pszErrConst = "TRUST_E_SUBJECT_NOT_TRUSTED"; break;
2140	case TRUST_E_NOSIGNATURE: pszErrConst = "TRUST_E_NOSIGNATURE"; break;
2141	case TRUST_E_FAIL: pszErrConst = "TRUST_E_FAIL"; break;
2142	case TRUST_E_EXPLICIT_DISTRUST: pszErrConst = "TRUST_E_EXPLICIT_DISTRUST"; break;
2143	case CERT_E_CHAINING: pszErrConst = "CERT_E_CHAINING"; break;
2144	case CERT_E_REVOCATION_FAILURE: pszErrConst = "CERT_E_REVOCATION_FAILURE"; break;
2145	}
2146	if (pszErrConst)
2147	rc = RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, VERR_LDRVI_UNSUPPORTED_ARCH,
2148	"WinVerifyTrust failed with hrc=%s on '%ls'", pszErrConst, pwszName);
2149	else
2150	rc = RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, VERR_LDRVI_UNSUPPORTED_ARCH,
2151	"WinVerifyTrust failed with hrc=%Rhrc on '%ls'", hrc, pwszName);
2152	SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrust: WinVerifyTrust failed with %#x (%s) on '%ls'\n",
2153	hrc, pszErrConst, pwszName));
2154	}
2155
2156	/* clean up state data. */
2157	TrustData.dwStateAction = WTD_STATEACTION_CLOSE;
2158	FileInfo.hFile = NULL;
2159	hrc = pfnWinVerifyTrust(NULL /hwnd/, &PolicyActionGuid, &TrustData);
2160
2161	return rc;
2162	}
2163
2164
2165	/**
2166	* Calls WinVerifyTrust to verify an PE image via catalog files.
2167	*
2168	* @returns VBox status code.
2169	* @param hFile File handle to the executable file.
2170	* @param pwszName Full NT path to the DLL in question, used for
2171	* dealing with unsigned system dlls as well as for
2172	* error/logging.
2173	* @param fFlags Flags, SUPHNTVI_F_XXX.
2174	* @param pErrInfo Pointer to error info structure. Optional.
2175	* @param pfnWinVerifyTrust Pointer to the API.
2176	*/
2177	static int supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrustCatFile(HANDLE hFile, PCRTUTF16 pwszName, uint32_t fFlags, PRTERRINFO pErrInfo,
2178	PFNWINVERIFYTRUST pfnWinVerifyTrust)
2179	{
2180	SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrustCatFile: hFile=%p pwszName=%ls\n", hFile, pwszName));
2181
2182	/*
2183	* Convert the name into a Windows name.
2184	*/
2185	RTUTF16 wszWinPathBuf[MAX_PATH];
2186	PCRTUTF16 pwszWinPath;
2187	int rc = supR3HardNtViNtToWinPath(pwszName, &pwszWinPath, wszWinPathBuf, RT_ELEMENTS(wszWinPathBuf));
2188	if (RT_FAILURE(rc))
2189	return RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, rc, "Bad path passed to supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrustCatFile: rc=%Rrc '%ls'", rc, pwszName);
2190
2191	/*
2192	* Open the file if we didn't get a handle.
2193	*/
2194	HANDLE hFileClose = NULL;
2195	if (hFile == RTNT_INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE \|\| hFile == NULL)
2196	{
2197	hFile = RTNT_INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE;
2198	IO_STATUS_BLOCK Ios = RTNT_IO_STATUS_BLOCK_INITIALIZER;
2199
2200	UNICODE_STRING NtName;
2201	NtName.Buffer = (PWSTR)pwszName;
2202	NtName.Length = (USHORT)(RTUtf16Len(pwszName) * sizeof(WCHAR));
2203	NtName.MaximumLength = NtName.Length + sizeof(WCHAR);
2204
2205	OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES ObjAttr;
2206	InitializeObjectAttributes(&ObjAttr, &NtName, OBJ_CASE_INSENSITIVE, NULL /hRootDir/, NULL /pSecDesc/);
2207
2208	NTSTATUS rcNt = NtCreateFile(&hFile,
2209	FILE_READ_DATA \| READ_CONTROL \| SYNCHRONIZE,
2210	&ObjAttr,
2211	&Ios,
2212	NULL /* Allocation Size*/,
2213	FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL,
2214	FILE_SHARE_READ,
2215	FILE_OPEN,
2216	FILE_NON_DIRECTORY_FILE \| FILE_SYNCHRONOUS_IO_NONALERT,
2217	NULL /EaBuffer/,
2218	0 /EaLength/);
2219	if (NT_SUCCESS(rcNt))
2220	rcNt = Ios.Status;
2221	if (!NT_SUCCESS(rcNt))
2222	return RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, RTErrConvertFromNtStatus(rcNt),
2223	"NtCreateFile returned %#x opening '%ls'.", rcNt, pwszName);
2224	hFileClose = hFile;
2225	}
2226
2227	/*
2228	* On Windows 8.0 and later there are more than one digest choice.
2229	*/
2230	rc = VERR_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED;
2231	static struct
2232	{
2233	/** The digest algorithm name. */
2234	const WCHAR *pszAlgorithm;
2235	/** Cached catalog admin handle. */
2236	HCATADMIN volatile hCachedCatAdmin;
2237	} s_aHashes[] =
2238	{
2239	{ NULL, NULL },
2240	{ L"SHA256", NULL },
2241	};
2242	for (uint32_t i = 0; i < RT_ELEMENTS(s_aHashes); i++)
2243	{
2244	/*
2245	* Another loop for dealing with different trust provider policies
2246	* required for successfully validating different catalog signatures.
2247	*/
2248	bool fTryNextPolicy;
2249	uint32_t iPolicy = 0;
2250	static const GUID s_aPolicies[] =
2251	{
2252	DRIVER_ACTION_VERIFY, /* Works with microsoft bits. Most frequently used, thus first. */
2253	WINTRUST_ACTION_GENERIC_VERIFY_V2, /* Works with ATI and other SPC kernel-code signed stuff. */
2254	};
2255	do
2256	{
2257	/*
2258	* Create a context.
2259	*/
2260	fTryNextPolicy = false;
2261	bool fFreshContext = false;
2262	BOOL fRc;
2263	HCATADMIN hCatAdmin = ASMAtomicXchgPtr(&s_aHashes[i].hCachedCatAdmin, NULL);
2264	if (hCatAdmin)
2265	{
2266	SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrustCatFile: Cached context %p\n", hCatAdmin));
2267	fFreshContext = false;
2268	fRc = TRUE;
2269	}
2270	else
2271	{
2272	l_fresh_context:
2273	fFreshContext = true;
2274	if (g_pfnCryptCATAdminAcquireContext2)
2275	fRc = g_pfnCryptCATAdminAcquireContext2(&hCatAdmin, &s_aPolicies[iPolicy], s_aHashes[i].pszAlgorithm,
2276	NULL /pStrongHashPolicy/, 0 /dwFlags/);
2277	else
2278	fRc = g_pfnCryptCATAdminAcquireContext(&hCatAdmin, &s_aPolicies[iPolicy], 0 /dwFlags/);
2279	SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrustCatFile: New context %p\n", hCatAdmin));
2280	}
2281	if (fRc)
2282	{
2283	SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrustCatFile: hCatAdmin=%p\n", hCatAdmin));
2284
2285	/*
2286	* Hash the file.
2287	*/
2288	BYTE abHash[SUPHARDNTVI_MAX_CAT_HASH_SIZE];
2289	DWORD cbHash = sizeof(abHash);
2290	if (g_pfnCryptCATAdminCalcHashFromFileHandle2)
2291	fRc = g_pfnCryptCATAdminCalcHashFromFileHandle2(hCatAdmin, hFile, &cbHash, abHash, 0 /dwFlags/);
2292	else
2293	fRc = g_pfnCryptCATAdminCalcHashFromFileHandle(hFile, &cbHash, abHash, 0 /dwFlags/);
2294	if (fRc)
2295	{
2296	/* Produce a string version of it that we can pass to WinVerifyTrust. */
2297	RTUTF16 wszDigest[SUPHARDNTVI_MAX_CAT_HASH_SIZE * 2 + 1];
2298	int rc2 = RTUtf16PrintHexBytes(wszDigest, RT_ELEMENTS(wszDigest), abHash, cbHash, RTSTRPRINTHEXBYTES_F_UPPER);
2299	if (RT_SUCCESS(rc2))
2300	{
2301	SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrustCatFile: cbHash=%u wszDigest=%ls\n", cbHash, wszDigest));
2302
2303	/*
2304	* Enumerate catalog information that matches the hash.
2305	*/
2306	uint32_t iCat = 0;
2307	HCATINFO hCatInfoPrev = NULL;
2308	do
2309	{
2310	/* Get the next match. */
2311	HCATINFO hCatInfo = g_pfnCryptCATAdminEnumCatalogFromHash(hCatAdmin, abHash, cbHash, 0, &hCatInfoPrev);
2312	if (!hCatInfo)
2313	{
2314	if (!fFreshContext)
2315	{
2316	SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrustCatFile: Retrying with fresh context (CryptCATAdminEnumCatalogFromHash -> %u; iCat=%#x)\n", GetLastError(), iCat));
2317	if (hCatInfoPrev != NULL)
2318	g_pfnCryptCATAdminReleaseCatalogContext(hCatAdmin, hCatInfoPrev, 0 /dwFlags/);
2319	g_pfnCryptCATAdminReleaseContext(hCatAdmin, 0 /dwFlags/);
2320	goto l_fresh_context;
2321	}
2322	if (iCat == 0)
2323	SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrustCatFile: CryptCATAdminEnumCatalogFromHash failed %u\n", GetLastError()));
2324	break;
2325	}
2326	Assert(hCatInfoPrev == NULL);
2327	hCatInfoPrev = hCatInfo;
2328
2329	/*
2330	* Call WinVerifyTrust.
2331	*/
2332	CATALOG_INFO CatInfo;
2333	CatInfo.cbStruct = sizeof(CatInfo);
2334	CatInfo.wszCatalogFile[0] = '\0';
2335	if (g_pfnCryptCATCatalogInfoFromContext(hCatInfo, &CatInfo, 0 /dwFlags/))
2336	{
2337	WINTRUST_CATALOG_INFO WtCatInfo;
2338	RT_ZERO(WtCatInfo);
2339	WtCatInfo.cbStruct = sizeof(WtCatInfo);
2340	WtCatInfo.dwCatalogVersion = 0;
2341	WtCatInfo.pcwszCatalogFilePath = CatInfo.wszCatalogFile;
2342	WtCatInfo.pcwszMemberTag = wszDigest;
2343	WtCatInfo.pcwszMemberFilePath = pwszWinPath;
2344	WtCatInfo.pbCalculatedFileHash = abHash;
2345	WtCatInfo.cbCalculatedFileHash = cbHash;
2346	WtCatInfo.pcCatalogContext = NULL;
2347
2348	WINTRUST_DATA TrustData;
2349	RT_ZERO(TrustData);
2350	TrustData.cbStruct = sizeof(TrustData);
2351	TrustData.fdwRevocationChecks = WTD_REVOKE_NONE; /* Keep simple for now. */
2352	TrustData.dwStateAction = WTD_STATEACTION_VERIFY;
2353	TrustData.dwUIChoice = WTD_UI_NONE;
2354	TrustData.dwProvFlags = 0;
2355	if (g_uNtVerCombined >= SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_SIMPLE(6, 0))
2356	TrustData.dwProvFlags = WTD_CACHE_ONLY_URL_RETRIEVAL;
2357	else
2358	TrustData.dwProvFlags = WTD_REVOCATION_CHECK_NONE;
2359	TrustData.dwUnionChoice = WTD_CHOICE_CATALOG;
2360	TrustData.pCatalog = &WtCatInfo;
2361
2362	HRESULT hrc = pfnWinVerifyTrust(NULL /hwnd/, &s_aPolicies[iPolicy], &TrustData);
2363	SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrustCatFile: WinVerifyTrust => %#x; cat='%ls'; file='%ls'\n",
2364	hrc, CatInfo.wszCatalogFile, pwszName));
2365
2366	if (SUCCEEDED(hrc))
2367	rc = VINF_SUCCESS;
2368	else if (hrc == TRUST_E_NOSIGNATURE)
2369	{ /* ignore because it's useless. */ }
2370	else if (hrc == ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER)
2371	{ /* This is returned if the given file isn't found in the catalog, it seems. */ }
2372	else
2373	{
2374	rc = RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, VERR_SUP_VP_WINTRUST_CAT_FAILURE,
2375	"WinVerifyTrust failed with hrc=%#x on '%ls' and .cat-file='%ls'.",
2376	hrc, pwszWinPath, CatInfo.wszCatalogFile);
2377	fTryNextPolicy \|= (hrc == CERT_E_UNTRUSTEDROOT);
2378	}
2379
2380	/* clean up state data. */
2381	TrustData.dwStateAction = WTD_STATEACTION_CLOSE;
2382	hrc = pfnWinVerifyTrust(NULL /hwnd/, &s_aPolicies[iPolicy], &TrustData);
2383	Assert(SUCCEEDED(hrc));
2384	}
2385	else
2386	{
2387	rc = RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, RTErrConvertFromWin32(GetLastError()),
2388	"CryptCATCatalogInfoFromContext failed: %d [file=%s]",
2389	GetLastError(), pwszName);
2390	SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrustCatFile: CryptCATCatalogInfoFromContext failed\n"));
2391	}
2392	iCat++;
2393	} while (rc == VERR_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED && iCat < 128);
2394
2395	if (hCatInfoPrev != NULL)
2396	if (!g_pfnCryptCATAdminReleaseCatalogContext(hCatAdmin, hCatInfoPrev, 0 /dwFlags/))
2397	AssertFailed();
2398	}
2399	else
2400	rc = RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, rc2, "RTUtf16PrintHexBytes failed: %Rrc", rc);
2401	}
2402	else
2403	rc = RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, RTErrConvertFromWin32(GetLastError()),
2404	"CryptCATAdminCalcHashFromFileHandle[2] failed: %d [file=%s]", GetLastError(), pwszName);
2405
2406	if (!ASMAtomicCmpXchgPtr(&s_aHashes[i].hCachedCatAdmin, hCatAdmin, NULL))
2407	if (!g_pfnCryptCATAdminReleaseContext(hCatAdmin, 0 /dwFlags/))
2408	AssertFailed();
2409	}
2410	else
2411	rc = RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, RTErrConvertFromWin32(GetLastError()),
2412	"CryptCATAdminAcquireContext[2] failed: %d [file=%s]", GetLastError(), pwszName);
2413	iPolicy++;
2414	} while ( fTryNextPolicy
2415	&& iPolicy < RT_ELEMENTS(s_aPolicies));
2416
2417	/*
2418	* Only repeat if we've got g_pfnCryptCATAdminAcquireContext2 and can specify the hash algorithm.
2419	*/
2420	if (!g_pfnCryptCATAdminAcquireContext2)
2421	break;
2422	if (rc != VERR_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED)
2423	break;
2424	}
2425
2426	if (hFileClose != NULL)
2427	NtClose(hFileClose);
2428
2429	return rc;
2430	}
2431
2432
2433	/**
2434	* Verifies the given image using WinVerifyTrust in some way.
2435	*
2436	* This is used by supHardenedWinVerifyImageByLdrMod as well as
2437	* supR3HardenedScreenImage.
2438	*
2439	* @returns IPRT status code.
2440	* @param hFile Handle of the file to verify.
2441	* @param pwszName Full NT path to the DLL in question, used for
2442	* dealing with unsigned system dlls as well as for
2443	* error/logging.
2444	* @param pfWinVerifyTrust Where to return whether WinVerifyTrust was
2445	* actually used.
2446	* @param pErrInfo Pointer to error info structure. Optional.
2447	*/
2448	DECLHIDDEN(int) supHardenedWinVerifyImageTrust(HANDLE hFile, PCRTUTF16 pwszName, uint32_t fFlags, int rc,
2449	bool *pfWinVerifyTrust, PRTERRINFO pErrInfo)
2450	{
2451	if (pfWinVerifyTrust)
2452	*pfWinVerifyTrust = false;
2453
2454	/*
2455	* Call the windows verify trust API if we've resolved it and aren't in
2456	* some obvious recursion.
2457	*/
2458	if (g_pfnWinVerifyTrust != NULL)
2459	{
2460	/* Check for recursion. */
2461	bool fNoRecursion;
2462	if (g_iTlsWinVerifyTrustRecursion != UINT32_MAX)
2463	{
2464	fNoRecursion = TlsGetValue(g_iTlsWinVerifyTrustRecursion) == 0;
2465	if (fNoRecursion)
2466	TlsSetValue(g_iTlsWinVerifyTrustRecursion, (void *)1);
2467	}
2468	else
2469	{
2470	uint32_t const idCurrentThread = GetCurrentThreadId();
2471	fNoRecursion = ASMAtomicCmpXchgU32(&g_idActiveThread, idCurrentThread, UINT32_MAX);
2472	}
2473	if (fNoRecursion)
2474	{
2475	/* We can call WinVerifyTrust. */
2476	if (pfWinVerifyTrust)
2477	*pfWinVerifyTrust = true;
2478
2479	if (rc != VERR_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED)
2480	{
2481	if (rc == VINF_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED)
2482	{
2483	if (fFlags & SUPHNTVI_F_ALLOW_CAT_FILE_VERIFICATION)
2484	{
2485	int rc2 = supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrustCatFile(hFile, pwszName, fFlags, pErrInfo, g_pfnWinVerifyTrust);
2486	SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrustCatFile -> %d (org %d)\n", rc2, rc));
2487	rc = rc2;
2488	}
2489	else
2490	{
2491	AssertFailed();
2492	rc = VERR_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED;
2493	}
2494	}
2495	else if (RT_SUCCESS(rc))
2496	{
2497	/** @todo having trouble with a 32-bit windows box when letting these calls thru */
2498	rc = supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrust(hFile, pwszName, fFlags, pErrInfo, g_pfnWinVerifyTrust);
2499	}
2500	else
2501	{
2502	int rc2 = supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrust(hFile, pwszName, fFlags, pErrInfo, g_pfnWinVerifyTrust);
2503	AssertMsg(RT_FAILURE_NP(rc2),
2504	("rc=%Rrc, rc2=%Rrc %s", rc, rc2, pErrInfo ? pErrInfo->pszMsg : "<no-err-info>"));
2505	}
2506	}
2507
2508	/* Unwind recursion. */
2509	if (g_iTlsWinVerifyTrustRecursion != UINT32_MAX)
2510	TlsSetValue(g_iTlsWinVerifyTrustRecursion, (void *)0);
2511	else
2512	ASMAtomicWriteU32(&g_idActiveThread, UINT32_MAX);
2513	}
2514	else
2515	SUP_DPRINTF(("Detected WinVerifyTrust recursion: rc=%Rrc '%ls'.\n", rc, pwszName));
2516	}
2517	return rc;
2518	}
2519
2520
2521	/**
2522	* Checks if WinVerifyTrust is callable on the current thread.
2523	*
2524	* Used by the main code to figure whether it makes sense to try revalidate an
2525	* image that hasn't passed thru WinVerifyTrust yet.
2526	*
2527	* @returns true if callable on current thread, false if not.
2528	*/
2529	DECLHIDDEN(bool) supHardenedWinIsWinVerifyTrustCallable(void)
2530	{
2531	return g_pfnWinVerifyTrust != NULL
2532	&& ( g_iTlsWinVerifyTrustRecursion != UINT32_MAX
2533	? (uintptr_t)TlsGetValue(g_iTlsWinVerifyTrustRecursion) == 0
2534	: g_idActiveThread != GetCurrentThreadId() );
2535	}
2536
2537
2538
2539	/**
2540	* Initializes g_uNtVerCombined and g_NtVerInfo.
2541	* Called from suplibHardenedWindowsMain and suplibOsInit.
2542	*/
2543	DECLHIDDEN(void) supR3HardenedWinInitVersion(void)
2544	{
2545	/*
2546	* Get the windows version. Use RtlGetVersion as GetVersionExW and
2547	* GetVersion might not be telling the whole truth (8.0 on 8.1 depending on
2548	* the application manifest).
2549	*/
2550	OSVERSIONINFOEXW NtVerInfo;
2551
2552	RT_ZERO(NtVerInfo);
2553	NtVerInfo.dwOSVersionInfoSize = sizeof(RTL_OSVERSIONINFOEXW);
2554	if (!NT_SUCCESS(RtlGetVersion((PRTL_OSVERSIONINFOW)&NtVerInfo)))
2555	{
2556	RT_ZERO(NtVerInfo);
2557	PPEB pPeb = NtCurrentPeb();
2558	NtVerInfo.dwMajorVersion = pPeb->OSMajorVersion;
2559	NtVerInfo.dwMinorVersion = pPeb->OSMinorVersion;
2560	NtVerInfo.dwBuildNumber = pPeb->OSPlatformId;
2561	}
2562
2563	g_uNtVerCombined = SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_COMBINED(NtVerInfo.dwMajorVersion, NtVerInfo.dwMinorVersion, NtVerInfo.dwBuildNumber,
2564	NtVerInfo.wServicePackMajor, NtVerInfo.wServicePackMinor);
2565	}
2566
2567	#endif /* IN_RING3 */
2568

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source: vbox/trunk/src/VBox/HostDrivers/Support/win/SUPHardenedVerifyImage-win.cpp@ 52600

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