SUPHardenedVerifyImage-win.cpp@ 52634

Last change on this file since 52634 was 52634, checked in by vboxsync, 10 years ago
SUP: Fix deadlock problem when mounting ISO on vista. (Never all WinVerifyTrust while holding the loader semaphore.)
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1	/* $Id: SUPHardenedVerifyImage-win.cpp 52634 2014-09-06 20:21:03Z vboxsync $ */
2	/** @file
3	* VirtualBox Support Library/Driver - Hardened Image Verification, Windows.
4	*/
5
6	/*
7	* Copyright (C) 2006-2014 Oracle Corporation
8	*
9	* This file is part of VirtualBox Open Source Edition (OSE), as
10	* available from http://www.virtualbox.org. This file is free software;
11	* you can redistribute it and/or modify it under the terms of the GNU
12	* General Public License (GPL) as published by the Free Software
13	* Foundation, in version 2 as it comes in the "COPYING" file of the
14	* VirtualBox OSE distribution. VirtualBox OSE is distributed in the
15	* hope that it will be useful, but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY of any kind.
16	*
17	* The contents of this file may alternatively be used under the terms
18	* of the Common Development and Distribution License Version 1.0
19	* (CDDL) only, as it comes in the "COPYING.CDDL" file of the
20	* VirtualBox OSE distribution, in which case the provisions of the
21	* CDDL are applicable instead of those of the GPL.
22	*
23	* You may elect to license modified versions of this file under the
24	* terms and conditions of either the GPL or the CDDL or both.
25	*/
26
27	/*******************************************************************************
28	* Header Files *
29	*******************************************************************************/
30	#ifdef IN_RING0
31	# define IPRT_NT_MAP_TO_ZW
32	# include <iprt/nt/nt.h>
33	# include <ntimage.h>
34	#else
35	# include <iprt/nt/nt-and-windows.h>
36	# include "Wintrust.h"
37	# include "Softpub.h"
38	# include "mscat.h"
39	# ifndef LOAD_LIBRARY_SEARCH_APPLICATION_DIR
40	# define LOAD_LIBRARY_SEARCH_SYSTEM32 0x800
41	# endif
42	#endif
43
44	#include <VBox/sup.h>
45	#include <VBox/err.h>
46	#include <iprt/ctype.h>
47	#include <iprt/ldr.h>
48	#include <iprt/log.h>
49	#include <iprt/path.h>
50	#include <iprt/string.h>
51	#include <iprt/crypto/pkcs7.h>
52	#include <iprt/crypto/store.h>
53
54	#ifdef IN_RING0
55	# include "SUPDrvInternal.h"
56	#else
57	# include "SUPLibInternal.h"
58	#endif
59	#include "win/SUPHardenedVerify-win.h"
60
61
62	/*******************************************************************************
63	* Defined Constants And Macros *
64	*******************************************************************************/
65	/** The size of static hash (output) buffers.
66	* Avoids dynamic allocations and cleanups for of small buffers as well as extra
67	* calls for getting the appropriate buffer size. The largest digest in regular
68	* use by current windows version is SHA-512, we double this and hope it's
69	* enough a good while. */
70	#define SUPHARDNTVI_MAX_CAT_HASH_SIZE 128
71
72
73	#if defined(VBOX_PERMIT_EVEN_MORE) && !defined(VBOX_PERMIT_MORE)
74	# error "VBOX_PERMIT_EVEN_MORE without VBOX_PERMIT_MORE!"
75	#endif
76
77
78	/*******************************************************************************
79	* Structures and Typedefs *
80	*******************************************************************************/
81
82	#ifdef IN_RING3
83	typedef LONG (WINAPI * PFNWINVERIFYTRUST)(HWND hwnd, GUID const *pgActionID, PVOID pWVTData);
84	typedef BOOL (WINAPI * PFNCRYPTCATADMINACQUIRECONTEXT)(HCATADMIN phCatAdmin, const GUID pGuidSubsystem, DWORD dwFlags);
85	typedef BOOL (WINAPI * PFNCRYPTCATADMINACQUIRECONTEXT2)(HCATADMIN phCatAdmin, const GUID pGuidSubsystem, PCWSTR pwszHashAlgorithm,
86	struct _CERT_STRONG_SIGN_PARA const *pStrongHashPolicy, DWORD dwFlags);
87	typedef BOOL (WINAPI * PFNCRYPTCATADMINCALCHASHFROMFILEHANDLE)(HANDLE hFile, DWORD pcbHash, BYTE pbHash, DWORD dwFlags);
88	typedef BOOL (WINAPI * PFNCRYPTCATADMINCALCHASHFROMFILEHANDLE2)(HCATADMIN hCatAdmin, HANDLE hFile, DWORD *pcbHash,
89	BYTE *pbHash, DWORD dwFlags);
90	typedef HCATINFO (WINAPI PFNCRYPTCATADMINENUMCATALOGFROMHASH)(HCATADMIN hCatAdmin, BYTE pbHash, DWORD cbHash,
91	DWORD dwFlags, HCATINFO *phPrevCatInfo);
92	typedef BOOL (WINAPI * PFNCRYPTCATADMINRELEASECATALOGCONTEXT)(HCATADMIN hCatAdmin, HCATINFO hCatInfo, DWORD dwFlags);
93	typedef BOOL (WINAPI * PFNCRYPTCATDADMINRELEASECONTEXT)(HCATADMIN hCatAdmin, DWORD dwFlags);
94	typedef BOOL (WINAPI * PFNCRYPTCATCATALOGINFOFROMCONTEXT)(HCATINFO hCatInfo, CATALOG_INFO *psCatInfo, DWORD dwFlags);
95
96	typedef HCERTSTORE (WINAPI *PFNCERTOPENSTORE)(PCSTR pszStoreProvider, DWORD dwEncodingType, HCRYPTPROV_LEGACY hCryptProv,
97	DWORD dwFlags, const void *pvParam);
98	typedef BOOL (WINAPI *PFNCERTCLOSESTORE)(HCERTSTORE hCertStore, DWORD dwFlags);
99	typedef PCCERT_CONTEXT (WINAPI *PFNCERTENUMCERTIFICATESINSTORE)(HCERTSTORE hCertStore, PCCERT_CONTEXT pPrevCertContext);
100	#endif
101
102
103	/*******************************************************************************
104	* Global Variables *
105	*******************************************************************************/
106	/** The build certificate. */
107	static RTCRX509CERTIFICATE g_BuildX509Cert;
108
109	/** Store for root software publisher certificates. */
110	static RTCRSTORE g_hSpcRootStore = NIL_RTCRSTORE;
111	/** Store for root NT kernel certificates. */
112	static RTCRSTORE g_hNtKernelRootStore = NIL_RTCRSTORE;
113
114	/** Store containing SPC, NT kernel signing, and timestamp root certificates. */
115	static RTCRSTORE g_hSpcAndNtKernelRootStore = NIL_RTCRSTORE;
116	/** Store for supplemental certificates for use with
117	* g_hSpcAndNtKernelRootStore. */
118	static RTCRSTORE g_hSpcAndNtKernelSuppStore = NIL_RTCRSTORE;
119
120	/** The full \\SystemRoot\\System32 path. */
121	SUPSYSROOTDIRBUF g_System32NtPath;
122	/** The full \\SystemRoot\\WinSxS path. */
123	SUPSYSROOTDIRBUF g_WinSxSNtPath;
124	#ifdef IN_RING3
125	/** The full 'Program Files' path. */
126	SUPSYSROOTDIRBUF g_ProgramFilesNtPath;
127	# ifdef RT_ARCH_AMD64
128	/** The full 'Program Files (x86)' path. */
129	SUPSYSROOTDIRBUF g_ProgramFilesX86NtPath;
130	# endif
131	/** The full 'Common Files' path. */
132	SUPSYSROOTDIRBUF g_CommonFilesNtPath;
133	# ifdef RT_ARCH_AMD64
134	/** The full 'Common Files (x86)' path. */
135	SUPSYSROOTDIRBUF g_CommonFilesX86NtPath;
136	# endif
137	#endif /* IN_RING3 */
138
139	static union
140	{
141	SID Sid;
142	uint8_t abPadding[SECURITY_MAX_SID_SIZE];
143	}
144	/** The TrustedInstaller SID (Vista+). */
145	g_TrustedInstallerSid,
146	/** Local system ID (S-1-5-21). */
147	g_LocalSystemSid;
148
149
150	/** Set after we've retrived other SPC root certificates from the system. */
151	static bool g_fHaveOtherRoots = false;
152
153	#if defined(IN_RING3) && !defined(IN_SUP_HARDENED_R3)
154	/** Combined windows NT version number. See SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_COMBINED and
155	* SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_SIMPLE. */
156	uint32_t g_uNtVerCombined;
157	#endif
158
159	#ifdef IN_RING3
160	/** Timestamp hack working around issues with old DLLs that we ship.
161	* See supHardenedWinVerifyImageByHandle() for details. */
162	static uint64_t g_uBuildTimestampHack = 0;
163	#endif
164
165	#ifdef IN_RING3
166	/** Pointer to WinVerifyTrust. */
167	PFNWINVERIFYTRUST g_pfnWinVerifyTrust;
168	/** Pointer to CryptCATAdminAcquireContext. */
169	PFNCRYPTCATADMINACQUIRECONTEXT g_pfnCryptCATAdminAcquireContext;
170	/** Pointer to CryptCATAdminAcquireContext2 if available. */
171	PFNCRYPTCATADMINACQUIRECONTEXT2 g_pfnCryptCATAdminAcquireContext2;
172	/** Pointer to CryptCATAdminCalcHashFromFileHandle. */
173	PFNCRYPTCATADMINCALCHASHFROMFILEHANDLE g_pfnCryptCATAdminCalcHashFromFileHandle;
174	/** Pointer to CryptCATAdminCalcHashFromFileHandle2. */
175	PFNCRYPTCATADMINCALCHASHFROMFILEHANDLE2 g_pfnCryptCATAdminCalcHashFromFileHandle2;
176	/** Pointer to CryptCATAdminEnumCatalogFromHash. */
177	PFNCRYPTCATADMINENUMCATALOGFROMHASH g_pfnCryptCATAdminEnumCatalogFromHash;
178	/** Pointer to CryptCATAdminReleaseCatalogContext. */
179	PFNCRYPTCATADMINRELEASECATALOGCONTEXT g_pfnCryptCATAdminReleaseCatalogContext;
180	/** Pointer to CryptCATAdminReleaseContext. */
181	PFNCRYPTCATDADMINRELEASECONTEXT g_pfnCryptCATAdminReleaseContext;
182	/** Pointer to CryptCATCatalogInfoFromContext. */
183	PFNCRYPTCATCATALOGINFOFROMCONTEXT g_pfnCryptCATCatalogInfoFromContext;
184
185	/** Where we store the TLS entry for detecting WinVerifyTrustRecursion. */
186	static uint32_t g_iTlsWinVerifyTrustRecursion = UINT32_MAX;
187	/** Fallback WinVerifyTrust recursion protection. */
188	static uint32_t volatile g_idActiveThread = UINT32_MAX;
189
190	#endif
191
192
193	/*******************************************************************************
194	* Internal Functions *
195	*******************************************************************************/
196	#ifdef IN_RING3
197	static int supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrust(HANDLE hFile, PCRTUTF16 pwszName, uint32_t fFlags, PRTERRINFO pErrInfo,
198	PFNWINVERIFYTRUST pfnWinVerifyTrust);
199	static int supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrustCatFile(HANDLE hFile, PCRTUTF16 pwszName, uint32_t fFlags, PRTERRINFO pErrInfo,
200	PFNWINVERIFYTRUST pfnWinVerifyTrust);
201	#endif
202
203
204
205
206	/** @copydoc RTLDRREADER::pfnRead */
207	static DECLCALLBACK(int) supHardNtViRdrRead(PRTLDRREADER pReader, void *pvBuf, size_t cb, RTFOFF off)
208	{
209	PSUPHNTVIRDR pNtViRdr = (PSUPHNTVIRDR)pReader;
210	Assert(pNtViRdr->Core.uMagic == RTLDRREADER_MAGIC);
211
212	if ((ULONG)cb != cb)
213	return VERR_OUT_OF_RANGE;
214
215
216	/*
217	* For some reason I'm getting occational read error in an XP VM with
218	* STATUS_FAILED_DRIVER_ENTRY. Redoing the call again works in the
219	* debugger, so try do that automatically.
220	*/
221	for (uint32_t iTry = 0;; iTry++)
222	{
223	LARGE_INTEGER offNt;
224	offNt.QuadPart = off;
225
226	IO_STATUS_BLOCK Ios = RTNT_IO_STATUS_BLOCK_INITIALIZER;
227	NTSTATUS rcNt = NtReadFile(pNtViRdr->hFile,
228	NULL /hEvent/,
229	NULL /ApcRoutine/,
230	NULL /ApcContext/,
231	&Ios,
232	pvBuf,
233	(ULONG)cb,
234	&offNt,
235	NULL);
236	if (NT_SUCCESS(rcNt))
237	rcNt = Ios.Status;
238	if (NT_SUCCESS(rcNt))
239	{
240	if (Ios.Information == cb)
241	{
242	pNtViRdr->off = off + cb;
243	return VINF_SUCCESS;
244	}
245	#ifdef IN_RING3
246	supR3HardenedError(VERR_READ_ERROR, false,
247	"supHardNtViRdrRead: Only got %#zx bytes when requesting %#zx bytes at %#llx in '%s'.\n",
248	Ios.Information, off, cb, pNtViRdr->szFilename);
249	#endif
250	pNtViRdr->off = -1;
251	return VERR_READ_ERROR;
252	}
253
254	/*
255	* Delay a little before we retry?
256	*/
257	#ifdef IN_RING3
258	if (iTry == 0)
259	NtYieldExecution();
260	else if (iTry >= 1)
261	{
262	LARGE_INTEGER Time;
263	Time.QuadPart = -1000000 / 100; /* 1ms in 100ns units, relative time. */
264	NtDelayExecution(TRUE, &Time);
265	}
266	#endif
267	/*
268	* Before we give up, we'll try split up the request in case the
269	* kernel is low on memory or similar. For simplicity reasons, we do
270	* this in a recursion fashion.
271	*/
272	if (iTry >= 2)
273	{
274	if (cb >= _8K)
275	{
276	size_t const cbBlock = RT_ALIGN_Z(cb / 4, 512);
277	while (cb > 0)
278	{
279	size_t cbThisRead = RT_MIN(cb, cbBlock);
280	int rc = supHardNtViRdrRead(&pNtViRdr->Core, pvBuf, cbThisRead, off);
281	if (RT_FAILURE(rc))
282	return rc;
283	off += cbThisRead;
284	cb -= cbThisRead;
285	pvBuf = (uint8_t *)pvBuf + cbThisRead;
286	}
287	return VINF_SUCCESS;
288	}
289
290	#ifdef IN_RING3
291	supR3HardenedError(VERR_READ_ERROR, false, "supHardNtViRdrRead: Error %#x reading %#zx bytes at %#llx in '%s'.\n",
292	rcNt, off, cb, pNtViRdr->szFilename);
293	#endif
294	pNtViRdr->off = -1;
295	return VERR_READ_ERROR;
296	}
297	}
298	}
299
300
301	/** @copydoc RTLDRREADER::pfnTell */
302	static DECLCALLBACK(RTFOFF) supHardNtViRdrTell(PRTLDRREADER pReader)
303	{
304	PSUPHNTVIRDR pNtViRdr = (PSUPHNTVIRDR)pReader;
305	Assert(pNtViRdr->Core.uMagic == RTLDRREADER_MAGIC);
306	return pNtViRdr->off;
307	}
308
309
310	/** @copydoc RTLDRREADER::pfnSize */
311	static DECLCALLBACK(RTFOFF) supHardNtViRdrSize(PRTLDRREADER pReader)
312	{
313	PSUPHNTVIRDR pNtViRdr = (PSUPHNTVIRDR)pReader;
314	Assert(pNtViRdr->Core.uMagic == RTLDRREADER_MAGIC);
315	return pNtViRdr->cbFile;
316	}
317
318
319	/** @copydoc RTLDRREADER::pfnLogName */
320	static DECLCALLBACK(const char *) supHardNtViRdrLogName(PRTLDRREADER pReader)
321	{
322	PSUPHNTVIRDR pNtViRdr = (PSUPHNTVIRDR)pReader;
323	return pNtViRdr->szFilename;
324	}
325
326
327	/** @copydoc RTLDRREADER::pfnMap */
328	static DECLCALLBACK(int) supHardNtViRdrMap(PRTLDRREADER pReader, const void **ppvBits)
329	{
330	return VERR_NOT_SUPPORTED;
331	}
332
333
334	/** @copydoc RTLDRREADER::pfnUnmap */
335	static DECLCALLBACK(int) supHardNtViRdrUnmap(PRTLDRREADER pReader, const void *pvBits)
336	{
337	return VERR_NOT_SUPPORTED;
338	}
339
340
341	/** @copydoc RTLDRREADER::pfnDestroy */
342	static DECLCALLBACK(int) supHardNtViRdrDestroy(PRTLDRREADER pReader)
343	{
344	PSUPHNTVIRDR pNtViRdr = (PSUPHNTVIRDR)pReader;
345	Assert(pNtViRdr->Core.uMagic == RTLDRREADER_MAGIC);
346
347	pNtViRdr->Core.uMagic = ~RTLDRREADER_MAGIC;
348	pNtViRdr->hFile = NULL;
349
350	RTMemFree(pNtViRdr);
351	return VINF_SUCCESS;
352	}
353
354
355	/**
356	* Creates a loader reader instance for the given NT file handle.
357	*
358	* @returns iprt status code.
359	* @param hFile Native NT file handle.
360	* @param pwszName Optional file name.
361	* @param fFlags Flags, SUPHNTVI_F_XXX.
362	* @param ppNtViRdr Where to store the reader instance on success.
363	*/
364	DECLHIDDEN(int) supHardNtViRdrCreate(HANDLE hFile, PCRTUTF16 pwszName, uint32_t fFlags, PSUPHNTVIRDR *ppNtViRdr)
365	{
366	/*
367	* Try determine the size of the file.
368	*/
369	IO_STATUS_BLOCK Ios = RTNT_IO_STATUS_BLOCK_INITIALIZER;
370	FILE_STANDARD_INFORMATION StdInfo;
371	NTSTATUS rcNt = NtQueryInformationFile(hFile, &Ios, &StdInfo, sizeof(StdInfo), FileStandardInformation);
372	if (!NT_SUCCESS(rcNt) \|\| !NT_SUCCESS(Ios.Status))
373	return VERR_LDRVI_FILE_LENGTH_ERROR;
374
375	/*
376	* Calc the file name length and allocate memory for the reader instance.
377	*/
378	size_t cchFilename = 0;
379	if (pwszName)
380	cchFilename = RTUtf16CalcUtf8Len(pwszName);
381
382	int rc = VERR_NO_MEMORY;
383	PSUPHNTVIRDR pNtViRdr = (PSUPHNTVIRDR)RTMemAllocZ(sizeof(*pNtViRdr) + cchFilename);
384	if (!pNtViRdr)
385	return VERR_NO_MEMORY;
386
387	/*
388	* Initialize the structure.
389	*/
390	if (cchFilename)
391	{
392	char *pszName = &pNtViRdr->szFilename[0];
393	rc = RTUtf16ToUtf8Ex(pwszName, RTSTR_MAX, &pszName, cchFilename + 1, NULL);
394	AssertStmt(RT_SUCCESS(rc), pNtViRdr->szFilename[0] = '\0');
395	}
396	else
397	pNtViRdr->szFilename[0] = '\0';
398
399	pNtViRdr->Core.uMagic = RTLDRREADER_MAGIC;
400	pNtViRdr->Core.pfnRead = supHardNtViRdrRead;
401	pNtViRdr->Core.pfnTell = supHardNtViRdrTell;
402	pNtViRdr->Core.pfnSize = supHardNtViRdrSize;
403	pNtViRdr->Core.pfnLogName = supHardNtViRdrLogName;
404	pNtViRdr->Core.pfnMap = supHardNtViRdrMap;
405	pNtViRdr->Core.pfnUnmap = supHardNtViRdrUnmap;
406	pNtViRdr->Core.pfnDestroy = supHardNtViRdrDestroy;
407	pNtViRdr->hFile = hFile;
408	pNtViRdr->off = 0;
409	pNtViRdr->cbFile = StdInfo.EndOfFile.QuadPart;
410	pNtViRdr->fFlags = fFlags;
411	*ppNtViRdr = pNtViRdr;
412	return VINF_SUCCESS;
413	}
414
415
416	/**
417	* Checks if the file is owned by TrustedInstaller (Vista+) or similar.
418	*
419	* @returns true if owned by TrustedInstaller of pre-Vista, false if not.
420	*
421	* @param hFile The handle to the file.
422	* @param pwszName The name of the file.
423	*/
424	static bool supHardNtViCheckIsOwnedByTrustedInstallerOrSimilar(HANDLE hFile, PCRTUTF16 pwszName)
425	{
426	if (g_uNtVerCombined < SUP_NT_VER_VISTA)
427	return true;
428
429	/*
430	* Get the ownership information.
431	*/
432	union
433	{
434	SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR_RELATIVE Rel;
435	SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR Abs;
436	uint8_t abView[256];
437	} uBuf;
438	ULONG cbActual;
439	NTSTATUS rcNt = NtQuerySecurityObject(hFile, OWNER_SECURITY_INFORMATION, &uBuf.Abs, sizeof(uBuf), &cbActual);
440	if (!NT_SUCCESS(rcNt))
441	{
442	SUP_DPRINTF(("NtQuerySecurityObject failed with rcNt=%#x on '%ls'\n", rcNt, pwszName));
443	return false;
444	}
445
446	/*
447	* Check the owner.
448	*
449	* Initially we wished to only allow TrustedInstaller. But a Windows CAPI
450	* plugin "Program Files\Tumbleweed\Desktop Validator\tmwdcapiclient.dll"
451	* turned up owned by the local system user, and we cannot operate without
452	* the plugin loaded once it's installed (WinVerityTrust fails).
453	*
454	* Note! We cannot really allow Builtin\Administrators here it's the default
455	* owner of anything an admin user creates. (We must, unforutnately,
456	* allow that in system32 though.)
457	*/
458	PSID pOwner = uBuf.Rel.Control & SE_SELF_RELATIVE ? &uBuf.abView[uBuf.Rel.Owner] : uBuf.Abs.Owner;
459	Assert((uintptr_t)pOwner - (uintptr_t)&uBuf < sizeof(uBuf) - sizeof(SID));
460	if (RtlEqualSid(pOwner, &g_TrustedInstallerSid))
461	return true;
462	if (RtlEqualSid(pOwner, &g_LocalSystemSid))
463	return true;
464
465	SUP_DPRINTF(("%ls: Owner is not trusted installer (%.*Rhxs)\n",
466	pwszName, ((uint8_t )pOwner)[1] /SubAuthorityCount/ sizeof(ULONG) + 8, pOwner));
467	return false;
468	}
469
470
471	/**
472	* Simple case insensitive UTF-16 / ASCII path compare.
473	*
474	* @returns true if equal, false if not.
475	* @param pawcLeft The UTF-16 path string, not necessarily null
476	* terminated.
477	* @param cwcLeft The number of chars in the left string,
478	* RTSTR_MAX if unknown but terminated.
479	* @param pszRight The ascii string.
480	*/
481	DECLHIDDEN(bool) supHardViUtf16PathIsEqualEx(PCRTUTF16 pawcLeft, size_t cwcLeft, const char *pszRight)
482	{
483	for (;;)
484	{
485	RTUTF16 wc;
486	if (cwcLeft-- > 0)
487	wc =*pawcLeft++;
488	else
489	wc = 0;
490	uint8_t b = *pszRight++;
491	if (b != wc)
492	{
493	if (wc >= 0x80)
494	return false;
495	wc = RT_C_TO_LOWER(wc);
496	if (wc != b)
497	{
498	b = RT_C_TO_LOWER(b);
499	if (wc != b)
500	{
501	if (wc == '/')
502	wc = '\\';
503	if (b == '/')
504	b = '\\';
505	if (wc != b)
506	return false;
507	}
508	}
509	}
510	if (!b)
511	return true;
512	}
513	}
514
515
516	/**
517	* Simple case insensitive UTF-16 / ASCII path compare.
518	*
519	* @returns true if equal, false if not.
520	* @param pwszLeft The UTF-16 path string.
521	* @param pszRight The ascii string.
522	*/
523	static bool supHardViUtf16PathIsEqual(PCRTUTF16 pwszLeft, const char *pszRight)
524	{
525	return supHardViUtf16PathIsEqualEx(pwszLeft, RTSTR_MAX, pszRight);
526	}
527
528
529	/**
530	* Simple case insensitive UTF-16 / ASCII ends-with path predicate.
531	*
532	* @returns true if equal, false if not.
533	* @param pwsz The UTF-16 path string.
534	* @param pszSuffix The ascii suffix string.
535	*/
536	static bool supHardViUtf16PathEndsWith(PCRTUTF16 pwsz, const char *pszSuffix)
537	{
538	size_t cwc = RTUtf16Len(pwsz);
539	size_t cchSuffix = strlen(pszSuffix);
540	if (cwc >= cchSuffix)
541	return supHardViUtf16PathIsEqual(pwsz + cwc - cchSuffix, pszSuffix);
542	return false;
543	}
544
545
546	/**
547	* Simple case insensitive UTF-16 / ASCII starts-with path predicate.
548	*
549	* @returns true if starts with given string, false if not.
550	* @param pwsz The UTF-16 path string.
551	* @param pszPrefix The ascii prefix string.
552	*/
553	static bool supHardViUtf16PathStartsWithAscii(PCRTUTF16 pwszLeft, const char *pszRight)
554	{
555	for (;;)
556	{
557	RTUTF16 wc = *pwszLeft++;
558	uint8_t b = *pszRight++;
559	if (b != wc)
560	{
561	if (!b)
562	return true;
563	if (wc >= 0x80 \|\| wc == 0)
564	return false;
565	wc = RT_C_TO_LOWER(wc);
566	if (wc != b)
567	{
568	b = RT_C_TO_LOWER(b);
569	if (wc != b)
570	{
571	if (wc == '/')
572	wc = '\\';
573	if (b == '/')
574	b = '\\';
575	if (wc != b)
576	return false;
577	}
578	}
579	}
580	}
581	}
582
583
584	/**
585	* Simple case insensitive UNICODE_STRING starts-with path predicate.
586	*
587	* @returns true if starts with given string, false if not.
588	* @param pwszLeft The path to check.
589	* @param cwcLeft The length of @a pwszLeft
590	* @param pwszRight The starts-with path.
591	* @param cwcRight The length of @a pwszRight.
592	* @param fCheckSlash Check for a slash following the prefix.
593	*/
594	DECLHIDDEN(bool) supHardViUtf16PathStartsWithEx(PCRTUTF16 pwszLeft, uint32_t cwcLeft,
595	PCRTUTF16 pwszRight, uint32_t cwcRight, bool fCheckSlash)
596	{
597	if (cwcLeft < cwcRight \|\| !cwcRight \|\| !pwszRight)
598	return false;
599
600	/* See if we can get away with a case sensitive compare first. */
601	if (memcmp(pwszLeft, pwszRight, cwcRight * sizeof(RTUTF16)) == 0)
602	pwszLeft += cwcRight;
603	else
604	{
605	/* No luck, do a slow case insensitive comapre. */
606	uint32_t cLeft = cwcRight;
607	while (cLeft-- > 0)
608	{
609	RTUTF16 wcLeft = *pwszLeft++;
610	RTUTF16 wcRight = *pwszRight++;
611	if (wcLeft != wcRight)
612	{
613	wcLeft = wcLeft < 0x80 ? wcLeft == '/' ? '\\' : RT_C_TO_LOWER(wcLeft) : wcLeft;
614	wcRight = wcRight < 0x80 ? wcRight == '/' ? '\\' : RT_C_TO_LOWER(wcRight) : wcRight;
615	if (wcLeft != wcRight)
616	return false;
617	}
618	}
619	}
620
621	/* Check for slash following the prefix, if request. */
622	if ( !fCheckSlash
623	\|\| *pwszLeft == '\\'
624	\|\| *pwszLeft == '/')
625	return true;
626	return false;
627	}
628
629
630	/**
631	* Simple case insensitive UNICODE_STRING starts-with path predicate.
632	*
633	* @returns true if starts with given string, false if not.
634	* @param pUniStrLeft The path to check.
635	* @param pUniStrRight The starts-with path.
636	* @param fCheckSlash Check for a slash following the prefix.
637	*/
638	DECLHIDDEN(bool) supHardViUniStrPathStartsWithUniStr(UNICODE_STRING const pUniStrLeft, UNICODE_STRING const pUniStrRight,
639	bool fCheckSlash)
640	{
641	return supHardViUtf16PathStartsWithEx(pUniStrLeft->Buffer, pUniStrLeft->Length / sizeof(WCHAR),
642	pUniStrRight->Buffer, pUniStrRight->Length / sizeof(WCHAR), fCheckSlash);
643	}
644
645
646
647	/**
648	* Counts slashes in the given UTF-8 path string.
649	*
650	* @returns Number of slashes.
651	* @param pwsz The UTF-16 path string.
652	*/
653	static uint32_t supHardViUtf16PathCountSlashes(PCRTUTF16 pwsz)
654	{
655	uint32_t cSlashes = 0;
656	RTUTF16 wc;
657	while ((wc = *pwsz++) != '\0')
658	if (wc == '/' \|\| wc == '\\')
659	cSlashes++;
660	return cSlashes;
661	}
662
663
664	#ifdef VBOX_PERMIT_MORE
665	/**
666	* Checks if the path goes into %windir%\apppatch\.
667	*
668	* @returns true if apppatch, false if not.
669	* @param pwszPath The path to examine.
670	*/
671	DECLHIDDEN(bool) supHardViIsAppPatchDir(PCRTUTF16 pwszPath, uint32_t cwcName)
672	{
673	uint32_t cwcWinDir = (g_System32NtPath.UniStr.Length - sizeof(L"System32")) / sizeof(WCHAR);
674
675	if (cwcName <= cwcWinDir + sizeof("AppPatch"))
676	return false;
677
678	if (memcmp(pwszPath, g_System32NtPath.UniStr.Buffer, cwcWinDir * sizeof(WCHAR)))
679	return false;
680
681	if (!supHardViUtf16PathStartsWithAscii(&pwszPath[cwcWinDir], "\\AppPatch\\"))
682	return false;
683
684	return g_uNtVerCombined >= SUP_NT_VER_VISTA;
685	}
686	#else
687	# error should not get here..
688	#endif
689
690
691
692	/**
693	* Checks if the unsigned DLL is fine or not.
694	*
695	* @returns VINF_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED or @a rc.
696	* @param hLdrMod The loader module handle.
697	* @param pwszName The NT name of the DLL/EXE.
698	* @param fFlags Flags.
699	* @param hFile The file handle.
700	* @param rc The status code..
701	*/
702	static int supHardNtViCheckIfNotSignedOk(RTLDRMOD hLdrMod, PCRTUTF16 pwszName, uint32_t fFlags, HANDLE hFile, int rc)
703	{
704	if (fFlags & (SUPHNTVI_F_REQUIRE_BUILD_CERT \| SUPHNTVI_F_REQUIRE_KERNEL_CODE_SIGNING))
705	return rc;
706
707	/*
708	* Version macros.
709	*/
710	uint32_t const uNtVer = g_uNtVerCombined;
711	#define IS_XP() ( uNtVer >= SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_SIMPLE(5, 1) && uNtVer < SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_SIMPLE(5, 2) )
712	#define IS_W2K3() ( uNtVer >= SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_SIMPLE(5, 2) && uNtVer < SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_SIMPLE(5, 3) )
713	#define IS_VISTA() ( uNtVer >= SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_SIMPLE(6, 0) && uNtVer < SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_SIMPLE(6, 1) )
714	#define IS_W70() ( uNtVer >= SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_SIMPLE(6, 1) && uNtVer < SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_SIMPLE(6, 2) )
715	#define IS_W80() ( uNtVer >= SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_SIMPLE(6, 2) && uNtVer < SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_SIMPLE(6, 3) )
716	#define IS_W81() ( uNtVer >= SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_SIMPLE(6, 3) && uNtVer < SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_SIMPLE(6, 4) )
717
718	/*
719	* The System32 directory.
720	*
721	* System32 is full of unsigned DLLs shipped by microsoft, graphics
722	* hardware vendors, input device/method vendors and whatnot else that
723	* actually needs to be loaded into a process for it to work correctly.
724	* We have to ASSUME that anything our process attempts to load from
725	* System32 is trustworthy and that the Windows system with the help of
726	* anti-virus software make sure there is nothing evil lurking in System32
727	* or being loaded from it.
728	*
729	* A small measure of protection is to list DLLs we know should be signed
730	* and decline loading unsigned versions of them, assuming they have been
731	* replaced by an adversary with evil intentions.
732	*/
733	PCRTUTF16 pwsz;
734	uint32_t cwcName = (uint32_t)RTUtf16Len(pwszName);
735	uint32_t cwcOther = g_System32NtPath.UniStr.Length / sizeof(WCHAR);
736	if (supHardViUtf16PathStartsWithEx(pwszName, cwcName, g_System32NtPath.UniStr.Buffer, cwcOther, true /fCheckSlash/))
737	{
738	pwsz = pwszName + cwcOther + 1;
739
740	/* Must be owned by trusted installer. (This test is superfuous, thus no relaxation here.) */
741	if ( !(fFlags & SUPHNTVI_F_TRUSTED_INSTALLER_OWNER)
742	&& !supHardNtViCheckIsOwnedByTrustedInstallerOrSimilar(hFile, pwszName))
743	return rc;
744
745	/* Core DLLs. */
746	if (supHardViUtf16PathIsEqual(pwsz, "ntdll.dll"))
747	return uNtVer < SUP_NT_VER_VISTA ? VINF_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED : rc;
748	if (supHardViUtf16PathIsEqual(pwsz, "kernel32.dll"))
749	return uNtVer < SUP_NT_VER_W81 ? VINF_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED : rc;
750	if (supHardViUtf16PathIsEqual(pwsz, "kernelbase.dll"))
751	return IS_W80() \|\| IS_W70() ? VINF_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED : rc;
752	if (supHardViUtf16PathIsEqual(pwsz, "apisetschema.dll"))
753	return IS_W70() ? VINF_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED : rc;
754	if (supHardViUtf16PathIsEqual(pwsz, "apphelp.dll"))
755	return uNtVer < SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_SIMPLE(6, 4) ? VINF_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED : rc;
756	#ifdef VBOX_PERMIT_VERIFIER_DLL
757	if (supHardViUtf16PathIsEqual(pwsz, "verifier.dll"))
758	return uNtVer < SUP_NT_VER_W81 ? VINF_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED : rc;
759	#endif
760	#ifdef VBOX_PERMIT_MORE
761	if (uNtVer >= SUP_NT_VER_W70) /* hard limit: user32.dll is unwanted prior to w7. */
762	{
763	if (supHardViUtf16PathIsEqual(pwsz, "sfc.dll"))
764	return uNtVer < SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_SIMPLE(6, 4) ? VINF_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED : rc;
765	if (supHardViUtf16PathIsEqual(pwsz, "sfc_os.dll"))
766	return uNtVer < SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_SIMPLE(6, 4) ? VINF_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED : rc;
767	if (supHardViUtf16PathIsEqual(pwsz, "user32.dll"))
768	return uNtVer < SUP_NT_VER_W81 ? VINF_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED : rc;
769	}
770	#endif
771
772	#ifndef IN_RING0
773	/* Check that this DLL isn't supposed to be signed on this windows
774	version. If it should, it's likely to be a fake. */
775	/** @todo list of signed dlls for various windows versions. */
776	return VINF_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED;
777	#else
778	return rc;
779	#endif /* IN_RING0 */
780	}
781
782
783	#ifndef IN_RING0
784	/*
785	* The WinSxS white list.
786	*
787	* Just like with System32 there are potentially a number of DLLs that
788	* could be required from WinSxS.
789	*/
790	cwcOther = g_WinSxSNtPath.UniStr.Length / sizeof(WCHAR);
791	if (supHardViUtf16PathStartsWithEx(pwszName, cwcName, g_WinSxSNtPath.UniStr.Buffer, cwcOther, true /fCheckSlash/))
792	{
793	pwsz = pwszName + cwcOther + 1;
794	cwcName -= cwcOther + 1;
795
796	/* The WinSxS layout means everything worth loading is exactly one level down. */
797	uint32_t cSlashes = supHardViUtf16PathCountSlashes(pwsz);
798	if (cSlashes != 1)
799	return rc;
800
801	/* Must be owned by trusted installer. */
802	if ( !(fFlags & SUPHNTVI_F_TRUSTED_INSTALLER_OWNER)
803	&& !supHardNtViCheckIsOwnedByTrustedInstallerOrSimilar(hFile, pwszName))
804	return rc;
805	return VINF_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED;
806	}
807	#endif /* !IN_RING0 */
808
809
810	#ifdef VBOX_PERMIT_MORE
811	/*
812	* AppPatch whitelist.
813	*/
814	if (supHardViIsAppPatchDir(pwszName, cwcName))
815	{
816	cwcOther = g_System32NtPath.UniStr.Length / sizeof(WCHAR); /* ASSUMES System32 is called System32. */
817	pwsz = pwszName + cwcOther + 1;
818
819	if ( !(fFlags & SUPHNTVI_F_TRUSTED_INSTALLER_OWNER)
820	&& !supHardNtViCheckIsOwnedByTrustedInstallerOrSimilar(hFile, pwszName))
821	return rc;
822
823	# ifndef VBOX_PERMIT_EVEN_MORE
824	if (supHardViUtf16PathIsEqual(pwsz, "acres.dll"))
825	return VINF_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED;
826
827	# ifdef RT_ARCH_AMD64
828	if (supHardViUtf16PathIsEqual(pwsz, "AppPatch64\\AcGenral.dll"))
829	return VINF_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED;
830	# elif defined(RT_ARCH_X86)
831	if (supHardViUtf16PathIsEqual(pwsz, "AcGenral.dll"))
832	return VINF_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED;
833	# endif
834	# endif /* !VBOX_PERMIT_EVEN_MORE */
835
836	# ifdef IN_RING0
837	return rc;
838	# else
839	return VINF_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED;
840	# endif
841	}
842	#endif /* VBOX_PERMIT_MORE */
843
844
845	#ifndef IN_RING0
846	# if defined(VBOX_PERMIT_MORE) && !defined(VBOX_PERMIT_EVEN_MORE)
847	/*
848	* Program files and common files.
849	* Permit anything that's signed and correctly installed.
850	*/
851	if ( supHardViUtf16PathStartsWithEx(pwszName, cwcName,
852	g_ProgramFilesNtPath.UniStr.Buffer, g_ProgramFilesNtPath.UniStr.Length,
853	true /fCheckSlash/)
854	\|\| supHardViUtf16PathStartsWithEx(pwszName, cwcName,
855	g_CommonFilesNtPath.UniStr.Buffer, g_CommonFilesNtPath.UniStr.Length,
856	true /fCheckSlash/)
857	# ifdef RT_ARCH_AMD64
858	\|\| supHardViUtf16PathStartsWithEx(pwszName, cwcName,
859	g_ProgramFilesX86NtPath.UniStr.Buffer, g_ProgramFilesX86NtPath.UniStr.Length,
860	true /fCheckSlash/)
861	\|\| supHardViUtf16PathStartsWithEx(pwszName, cwcName,
862	g_CommonFilesX86NtPath.UniStr.Buffer, g_CommonFilesX86NtPath.UniStr.Length,
863	true /fCheckSlash/)
864	# endif
865	)
866	{
867	if ( !(fFlags & SUPHNTVI_F_TRUSTED_INSTALLER_OWNER)
868	&& !supHardNtViCheckIsOwnedByTrustedInstallerOrSimilar(hFile, pwszName))
869	return rc;
870	return VINF_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED;
871	}
872
873	# elif defined(VBOX_PERMIT_MORE) && defined(VBOX_PERMIT_EVEN_MORE)
874	/*
875	* Anything that's owned by the trusted installer.
876	*/
877	if ( (fFlags & SUPHNTVI_F_TRUSTED_INSTALLER_OWNER)
878	\|\| supHardNtViCheckIsOwnedByTrustedInstallerOrSimilar(hFile, pwszName))
879	return VINF_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED;
880
881	# endif
882	#endif /* !IN_RING0 */
883
884	/*
885	* Not permitted.
886	*/
887	return rc;
888	}
889
890
891	/**
892	* @callback_method_impl{RTCRPKCS7VERIFYCERTCALLBACK,
893	* Standard code signing. Use this for Microsoft SPC.}
894	*/
895	static DECLCALLBACK(int) supHardNtViCertVerifyCallback(PCRTCRX509CERTIFICATE pCert, RTCRX509CERTPATHS hCertPaths,
896	uint32_t fFlags, void *pvUser, PRTERRINFO pErrInfo)
897	{
898	PSUPHNTVIRDR pNtViRdr = (PSUPHNTVIRDR)pvUser;
899	Assert(pNtViRdr->Core.uMagic == RTLDRREADER_MAGIC);
900
901	/*
902	* If there is no certificate path build & validator associated with this
903	* callback, it must be because of the build certificate. We trust the
904	* build certificate without any second thoughts.
905	*/
906	if (hCertPaths == NIL_RTCRX509CERTPATHS)
907	{
908	if (RTCrX509Certificate_Compare(pCert, &g_BuildX509Cert) == 0) /* healthy paranoia */
909	return VINF_SUCCESS;
910	return RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, VERR_SUP_VP_NOT_BUILD_CERT_IPE, "Not valid kernel code signature.");
911	}
912
913	/*
914	* Standard code signing capabilites required.
915	*/
916	int rc = RTCrPkcs7VerifyCertCallbackCodeSigning(pCert, hCertPaths, fFlags, NULL, pErrInfo);
917	if ( RT_SUCCESS(rc)
918	&& (fFlags & RTCRPKCS7VCC_F_SIGNED_DATA))
919	{
920	/*
921	* If kernel signing, a valid certificate path must be anchored by the
922	* microsoft kernel signing root certificate.
923	*/
924	if (pNtViRdr->fFlags & SUPHNTVI_F_REQUIRE_KERNEL_CODE_SIGNING)
925	{
926	uint32_t cPaths = RTCrX509CertPathsGetPathCount(hCertPaths);
927	uint32_t cFound = 0;
928	uint32_t cValid = 0;
929	for (uint32_t iPath = 0; iPath < cPaths; iPath++)
930	{
931	bool fTrusted;
932	PCRTCRX509NAME pSubject;
933	PCRTCRX509SUBJECTPUBLICKEYINFO pPublicKeyInfo;
934	int rcVerify;
935	rc = RTCrX509CertPathsQueryPathInfo(hCertPaths, iPath, &fTrusted, NULL /pcNodes/, &pSubject, &pPublicKeyInfo,
936	NULL, NULL /pCertCtx/, &rcVerify);
937	AssertRCBreak(rc);
938
939	if (RT_SUCCESS(rcVerify))
940	{
941	Assert(fTrusted);
942	cValid++;
943
944	/*
945	* Search the kernel signing root store for a matching anchor.
946	*/
947	RTCRSTORECERTSEARCH Search;
948	rc = RTCrStoreCertFindBySubjectOrAltSubjectByRfc5280(g_hNtKernelRootStore, pSubject, &Search);
949	AssertRCBreak(rc);
950
951	PCRTCRCERTCTX pCertCtx;
952	while ((pCertCtx = RTCrStoreCertSearchNext(g_hNtKernelRootStore, &Search)) != NULL)
953	{
954	PCRTCRX509SUBJECTPUBLICKEYINFO pCertPubKeyInfo = NULL;
955	if (pCertCtx->pCert)
956	pCertPubKeyInfo = &pCertCtx->pCert->TbsCertificate.SubjectPublicKeyInfo;
957	else if (pCertCtx->pTaInfo)
958	pCertPubKeyInfo = &pCertCtx->pTaInfo->PubKey;
959	else
960	pCertPubKeyInfo = NULL;
961	if ( pCertPubKeyInfo
962	&& RTCrX509SubjectPublicKeyInfo_Compare(pCertPubKeyInfo, pPublicKeyInfo) == 0)
963	cFound++;
964	RTCrCertCtxRelease(pCertCtx);
965	}
966
967	int rc2 = RTCrStoreCertSearchDestroy(g_hNtKernelRootStore, &Search); AssertRC(rc2);
968	}
969	}
970	if (RT_SUCCESS(rc) && cFound == 0)
971	rc = RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, VERR_SUP_VP_NOT_VALID_KERNEL_CODE_SIGNATURE, "Not valid kernel code signature.");
972	if (RT_SUCCESS(rc) && cValid < 2 && g_fHaveOtherRoots)
973	rc = RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, VERR_SUP_VP_UNEXPECTED_VALID_PATH_COUNT,
974	"Expected at least %u valid paths, not %u.", 2, cValid);
975	}
976	}
977
978	/*
979	* More requirements? NT5 build lab?
980	*/
981
982	return rc;
983	}
984
985
986	static DECLCALLBACK(int) supHardNtViCallback(RTLDRMOD hLdrMod, RTLDRSIGNATURETYPE enmSignature,
987	void const *pvSignature, size_t cbSignature,
988	PRTERRINFO pErrInfo, void *pvUser)
989	{
990	/*
991	* Check out the input.
992	*/
993	PSUPHNTVIRDR pNtViRdr = (PSUPHNTVIRDR)pvUser;
994	Assert(pNtViRdr->Core.uMagic == RTLDRREADER_MAGIC);
995
996	AssertReturn(cbSignature == sizeof(RTCRPKCS7CONTENTINFO), VERR_INTERNAL_ERROR_5);
997	PCRTCRPKCS7CONTENTINFO pContentInfo = (PCRTCRPKCS7CONTENTINFO)pvSignature;
998	AssertReturn(RTCrPkcs7ContentInfo_IsSignedData(pContentInfo), VERR_INTERNAL_ERROR_5);
999	AssertReturn(pContentInfo->u.pSignedData->SignerInfos.cItems == 1, VERR_INTERNAL_ERROR_5);
1000	PCRTCRPKCS7SIGNERINFO pSignerInfo = &pContentInfo->u.pSignedData->SignerInfos.paItems[0];
1001
1002	/*
1003	* If special certificate requirements, check them out before validating
1004	* the signature.
1005	*/
1006	if (pNtViRdr->fFlags & SUPHNTVI_F_REQUIRE_BUILD_CERT)
1007	{
1008	if (!RTCrX509Certificate_MatchIssuerAndSerialNumber(&g_BuildX509Cert,
1009	&pSignerInfo->IssuerAndSerialNumber.Name,
1010	&pSignerInfo->IssuerAndSerialNumber.SerialNumber))
1011	return RTErrInfoSet(pErrInfo, VERR_SUP_VP_NOT_SIGNED_WITH_BUILD_CERT, "Not signed with the build certificate.");
1012	}
1013
1014	/*
1015	* Verify the signature. We instruct the verifier to use the signing time
1016	* counter signature present when present, falling back on the timestamp
1017	* planted by the linker when absent. In ring-0 we don't have all the
1018	* necessary timestamp server root certificate info, so we have to allow
1019	* using counter signatures unverified there. Ditto for the early period
1020	* of ring-3 hardened stub execution.
1021	*/
1022	RTTIMESPEC ValidationTime;
1023	RTTimeSpecSetSeconds(&ValidationTime, pNtViRdr->uTimestamp);
1024
1025	uint32_t fFlags = RTCRPKCS7VERIFY_SD_F_ALWAYS_USE_SIGNING_TIME_IF_PRESENT
1026	\| RTCRPKCS7VERIFY_SD_F_ALWAYS_USE_MS_TIMESTAMP_IF_PRESENT
1027	\| RTCRPKCS7VERIFY_SD_F_COUNTER_SIGNATURE_SIGNING_TIME_ONLY;
1028	#ifndef IN_RING0
1029	if (!g_fHaveOtherRoots)
1030	#endif
1031	fFlags \|= RTCRPKCS7VERIFY_SD_F_USE_SIGNING_TIME_UNVERIFIED \| RTCRPKCS7VERIFY_SD_F_USE_MS_TIMESTAMP_UNVERIFIED;
1032	return RTCrPkcs7VerifySignedData(pContentInfo, fFlags, g_hSpcAndNtKernelSuppStore, g_hSpcAndNtKernelRootStore,
1033	&ValidationTime, supHardNtViCertVerifyCallback, pNtViRdr, pErrInfo);
1034	}
1035
1036
1037	/**
1038	* Verifies the given loader image.
1039	*
1040	* @returns IPRT status code.
1041	* @param hLdrMod File handle to the executable file.
1042	* @param pwszName Full NT path to the DLL in question, used for
1043	* dealing with unsigned system dlls as well as for
1044	* error/logging.
1045	* @param pNtViRdr The reader instance /w flags.
1046	* @param fAvoidWinVerifyTrust Whether to avoid WinVerifyTrust because of
1047	* deadlock or other loader related dangers.
1048	* @param pfWinVerifyTrust Where to return whether WinVerifyTrust was used.
1049	* @param pErrInfo Pointer to error info structure. Optional.
1050	*/
1051	DECLHIDDEN(int) supHardenedWinVerifyImageByLdrMod(RTLDRMOD hLdrMod, PCRTUTF16 pwszName, PSUPHNTVIRDR pNtViRdr,
1052	bool fAvoidWinVerifyTrust, bool *pfWinVerifyTrust, PRTERRINFO pErrInfo)
1053	{
1054	if (pfWinVerifyTrust)
1055	*pfWinVerifyTrust = false;
1056
1057	#ifdef IN_RING3
1058	/* Check that the caller has performed the necessary library initialization. */
1059	if (!RTCrX509Certificate_IsPresent(&g_BuildX509Cert))
1060	return RTErrInfoSet(pErrInfo, VERR_WRONG_ORDER,
1061	"supHardenedWinVerifyImageByHandle: supHardenedWinInitImageVerifier was not called.");
1062	#endif
1063
1064	/*
1065	* Check the trusted installer bit first, if requested as it's somewhat
1066	* cheaper than the rest.
1067	*
1068	* We relax this for system32, like we used to, as there are apparently
1069	* some systems out there where the user, admin, or someone has changed the
1070	* ownership of core windows DLLs like user32.dll. Since we need user32.dll
1071	* and will be checking it's digital signature, it's reasonably safe to let
1072	* this thru. (The report was of SECURITY_BUILTIN_DOMAIN_RID + DOMAIN_ALIAS_RID_ADMINS
1073	* owning user32.dll, see public ticket 13187, VBoxStartup.3.log.)
1074	*
1075	* We've also had problems with graphics driver components like ig75icd64.dll
1076	* and atig6pxx.dll not being owned by TrustedInstaller, with the result
1077	* that 3D got broken (mod by zero issue in test build 5). These were also
1078	* SECURITY_BUILTIN_DOMAIN_RID + DOMAIN_ALIAS_RID_ADMINS.
1079	*/
1080	if ( (pNtViRdr->fFlags & SUPHNTVI_F_TRUSTED_INSTALLER_OWNER)
1081	&& !supHardNtViCheckIsOwnedByTrustedInstallerOrSimilar(pNtViRdr->hFile, pwszName))
1082	{
1083	if (!supHardViUtf16PathStartsWithEx(pwszName, (uint32_t)RTUtf16Len(pwszName),
1084	g_System32NtPath.UniStr.Buffer, g_System32NtPath.UniStr.Length / sizeof(WCHAR),
1085	true /fCheckSlash/))
1086	return RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, VERR_SUP_VP_NOT_OWNED_BY_TRUSTED_INSTALLER,
1087	"supHardenedWinVerifyImageByHandle: TrustedInstaller is not the owner of '%ls'.", pwszName);
1088	SUP_DPRINTF(("%ls: Relaxing the TrustedInstaller requirement for this DLL (it's in system32).\n", pwszName));
1089	}
1090
1091	/*
1092	* Verify it.
1093	*
1094	* The PKCS #7 SignedData signature is checked in the callback. Any
1095	* signing certificate restrictions are also enforced there.
1096	*
1097	* For the time being, we use the executable timestamp as the
1098	* certificate validation date. We must query that first to avoid
1099	* potential issues re-entering the loader code from the callback.
1100	*
1101	* Update: Save the first timestamp we validate with build cert and
1102	* use this as a minimum timestamp for further build cert
1103	* validations. This works around issues with old DLLs that
1104	* we sign against with our certificate (crt, sdl, qt).
1105	*/
1106	int rc = RTLdrQueryProp(hLdrMod, RTLDRPROP_TIMESTAMP_SECONDS, &pNtViRdr->uTimestamp, sizeof(pNtViRdr->uTimestamp));
1107	if (RT_SUCCESS(rc))
1108	{
1109	#ifdef IN_RING3 /* Hack alert! (see above) */
1110	if ( (pNtViRdr->fFlags & SUPHNTVI_F_REQUIRE_KERNEL_CODE_SIGNING)
1111	&& (pNtViRdr->fFlags & SUPHNTVI_F_REQUIRE_SIGNATURE_ENFORCEMENT)
1112	&& pNtViRdr->uTimestamp < g_uBuildTimestampHack)
1113	pNtViRdr->uTimestamp = g_uBuildTimestampHack;
1114	#endif
1115
1116	rc = RTLdrVerifySignature(hLdrMod, supHardNtViCallback, pNtViRdr, pErrInfo);
1117
1118	#ifdef IN_RING3 /* Hack alert! (see above) */
1119	if ((pNtViRdr->fFlags & SUPHNTVI_F_REQUIRE_BUILD_CERT) && g_uBuildTimestampHack == 0 && RT_SUCCESS(rc))
1120	g_uBuildTimestampHack = pNtViRdr->uTimestamp;
1121	#endif
1122
1123	/*
1124	* Microsoft doesn't sign a whole bunch of DLLs, so we have to
1125	* ASSUME that a bunch of system DLLs are fine.
1126	*/
1127	if (rc == VERR_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED)
1128	rc = supHardNtViCheckIfNotSignedOk(hLdrMod, pwszName, pNtViRdr->fFlags, pNtViRdr->hFile, rc);
1129	if (RT_FAILURE(rc))
1130	RTErrInfoAddF(pErrInfo, rc, ": %ls", pwszName);
1131
1132	/*
1133	* Check for the signature checking enforcement, if requested to do so.
1134	*/
1135	if (RT_SUCCESS(rc) && (pNtViRdr->fFlags & SUPHNTVI_F_REQUIRE_SIGNATURE_ENFORCEMENT))
1136	{
1137	bool fEnforced = false;
1138	int rc2 = RTLdrQueryProp(hLdrMod, RTLDRPROP_SIGNATURE_CHECKS_ENFORCED, &fEnforced, sizeof(fEnforced));
1139	if (RT_FAILURE(rc2))
1140	rc = RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, rc2, "Querying RTLDRPROP_SIGNATURE_CHECKS_ENFORCED failed on %ls: %Rrc.",
1141	pwszName, rc2);
1142	else if (!fEnforced)
1143	rc = RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, VERR_SUP_VP_SIGNATURE_CHECKS_NOT_ENFORCED,
1144	"The image '%ls' was not linked with /IntegrityCheck.", pwszName);
1145	}
1146	}
1147	else
1148	RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, rc, "RTLdrQueryProp/RTLDRPROP_TIMESTAMP_SECONDS failed on %ls: %Rrc", pwszName, rc);
1149
1150	#ifdef IN_RING3
1151	/*
1152	* Pass it thru WinVerifyTrust when possible.
1153	*/
1154	if (!fAvoidWinVerifyTrust)
1155	rc = supHardenedWinVerifyImageTrust(pNtViRdr->hFile, pwszName, pNtViRdr->fFlags, rc, pfWinVerifyTrust, pErrInfo);
1156	#endif
1157
1158	#ifdef IN_SUP_HARDENED_R3
1159	/*
1160	* Hook for the LdrLoadDll code to schedule scanning of imports.
1161	*/
1162	if (RT_SUCCESS(rc))
1163	supR3HardenedWinVerifyCacheScheduleImports(hLdrMod, pwszName);
1164	#endif
1165
1166	return rc;
1167	}
1168
1169
1170	/**
1171	* Verifies the given executable image.
1172	*
1173	* @returns IPRT status code.
1174	* @param hFile File handle to the executable file.
1175	* @param pwszName Full NT path to the DLL in question, used for
1176	* dealing with unsigned system dlls as well as for
1177	* error/logging.
1178	* @param fFlags Flags, SUPHNTVI_F_XXX.
1179	* @param fAvoidWinVerifyTrust Whether to avoid WinVerifyTrust because of
1180	* deadlock or other loader related dangers.
1181	* @param pfWinVerifyTrust Where to return whether WinVerifyTrust was used.
1182	* @param pErrInfo Pointer to error info structure. Optional.
1183	*/
1184	DECLHIDDEN(int) supHardenedWinVerifyImageByHandle(HANDLE hFile, PCRTUTF16 pwszName, uint32_t fFlags, bool fAvoidWinVerifyTrust,
1185	bool *pfWinVerifyTrust, PRTERRINFO pErrInfo)
1186	{
1187	/*
1188	* Create a reader instance.
1189	*/
1190	PSUPHNTVIRDR pNtViRdr;
1191	int rc = supHardNtViRdrCreate(hFile, pwszName, fFlags, &pNtViRdr);
1192	if (RT_SUCCESS(rc))
1193	{
1194	/*
1195	* Open the image.
1196	*/
1197	RTLDRMOD hLdrMod;
1198	RTLDRARCH enmArch = fFlags & SUPHNTVI_F_RC_IMAGE ? RTLDRARCH_X86_32 : RTLDRARCH_HOST;
1199	if (fFlags & SUPHNTVI_F_RESOURCE_IMAGE)
1200	enmArch = RTLDRARCH_WHATEVER;
1201	rc = RTLdrOpenWithReader(&pNtViRdr->Core, RTLDR_O_FOR_VALIDATION, enmArch, &hLdrMod, pErrInfo);
1202	if (RT_SUCCESS(rc))
1203	{
1204	/*
1205	* Verify it.
1206	*/
1207	rc = supHardenedWinVerifyImageByLdrMod(hLdrMod, pwszName, pNtViRdr, fAvoidWinVerifyTrust, pfWinVerifyTrust, pErrInfo);
1208	int rc2 = RTLdrClose(hLdrMod); AssertRC(rc2);
1209	}
1210	else
1211	supHardNtViRdrDestroy(&pNtViRdr->Core);
1212	}
1213	SUP_DPRINTF(("supHardenedWinVerifyImageByHandle: -> %d (%ls)%s\n",
1214	rc, pwszName, pfWinVerifyTrust && *pfWinVerifyTrust ? "WinVerifyTrust" : ""));
1215	return rc;
1216	}
1217
1218
1219	#ifdef IN_RING3
1220	/**
1221	* supHardenedWinVerifyImageByHandle version without the name.
1222	*
1223	* The name is derived from the handle.
1224	*
1225	* @returns IPRT status code.
1226	* @param hFile File handle to the executable file.
1227	* @param fFlags Flags, SUPHNTVI_F_XXX.
1228	* @param pErrInfo Pointer to error info structure. Optional.
1229	*/
1230	DECLHIDDEN(int) supHardenedWinVerifyImageByHandleNoName(HANDLE hFile, uint32_t fFlags, PRTERRINFO pErrInfo)
1231	{
1232	/*
1233	* Determine the NT name and call the verification function.
1234	*/
1235	union
1236	{
1237	UNICODE_STRING UniStr;
1238	uint8_t abBuffer[(MAX_PATH + 8 + 1) * 2];
1239	} uBuf;
1240
1241	ULONG cbIgn;
1242	NTSTATUS rcNt = NtQueryObject(hFile,
1243	ObjectNameInformation,
1244	&uBuf,
1245	sizeof(uBuf) - sizeof(WCHAR),
1246	&cbIgn);
1247	if (NT_SUCCESS(rcNt))
1248	uBuf.UniStr.Buffer[uBuf.UniStr.Length / sizeof(WCHAR)] = '\0';
1249	else
1250	uBuf.UniStr.Buffer = (WCHAR *)L"TODO3";
1251
1252	return supHardenedWinVerifyImageByHandle(hFile, uBuf.UniStr.Buffer, fFlags, false /fAvoidWinVerifyTrust/,
1253	NULL /pfWinVerifyTrust/, pErrInfo);
1254	}
1255	#endif /* IN_RING3 */
1256
1257
1258	/**
1259	* Retrieves the full official path to the system root or one of it's sub
1260	* directories.
1261	*
1262	* This code is also used by the support driver.
1263	*
1264	* @returns VBox status code.
1265	* @param pvBuf The output buffer. This will contain a
1266	* UNICODE_STRING followed (at the kernel's
1267	* discretion) the string buffer.
1268	* @param cbBuf The size of the buffer @a pvBuf points to.
1269	* @param enmDir Which directory under the system root we're
1270	* interested in.
1271	* @param pErrInfo Pointer to error info structure. Optional.
1272	*/
1273	DECLHIDDEN(int) supHardNtGetSystemRootDir(void *pvBuf, uint32_t cbBuf, SUPHARDNTSYSROOTDIR enmDir, PRTERRINFO pErrInfo)
1274	{
1275	HANDLE hFile = RTNT_INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE;
1276	IO_STATUS_BLOCK Ios = RTNT_IO_STATUS_BLOCK_INITIALIZER;
1277
1278	UNICODE_STRING NtName;
1279	switch (enmDir)
1280	{
1281	case kSupHardNtSysRootDir_System32:
1282	{
1283	static const WCHAR s_wszNameSystem32[] = L"\\SystemRoot\\System32\\";
1284	NtName.Buffer = (PWSTR)s_wszNameSystem32;
1285	NtName.Length = sizeof(s_wszNameSystem32) - sizeof(WCHAR);
1286	NtName.MaximumLength = sizeof(s_wszNameSystem32);
1287	break;
1288	}
1289	case kSupHardNtSysRootDir_WinSxS:
1290	{
1291	static const WCHAR s_wszNameWinSxS[] = L"\\SystemRoot\\WinSxS\\";
1292	NtName.Buffer = (PWSTR)s_wszNameWinSxS;
1293	NtName.Length = sizeof(s_wszNameWinSxS) - sizeof(WCHAR);
1294	NtName.MaximumLength = sizeof(s_wszNameWinSxS);
1295	break;
1296	}
1297	default:
1298	AssertFailed();
1299	return VERR_INVALID_PARAMETER;
1300	}
1301
1302	OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES ObjAttr;
1303	InitializeObjectAttributes(&ObjAttr, &NtName, OBJ_CASE_INSENSITIVE, NULL /hRootDir/, NULL /pSecDesc/);
1304
1305	NTSTATUS rcNt = NtCreateFile(&hFile,
1306	FILE_READ_DATA \| SYNCHRONIZE,
1307	&ObjAttr,
1308	&Ios,
1309	NULL /* Allocation Size*/,
1310	FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL,
1311	FILE_SHARE_READ \| FILE_SHARE_WRITE,
1312	FILE_OPEN,
1313	FILE_DIRECTORY_FILE \| FILE_OPEN_FOR_BACKUP_INTENT \| FILE_SYNCHRONOUS_IO_NONALERT,
1314	NULL /EaBuffer/,
1315	0 /EaLength/);
1316	if (NT_SUCCESS(rcNt))
1317	rcNt = Ios.Status;
1318	if (NT_SUCCESS(rcNt))
1319	{
1320	ULONG cbIgn;
1321	rcNt = NtQueryObject(hFile,
1322	ObjectNameInformation,
1323	pvBuf,
1324	cbBuf - sizeof(WCHAR),
1325	&cbIgn);
1326	NtClose(hFile);
1327	if (NT_SUCCESS(rcNt))
1328	{
1329	PUNICODE_STRING pUniStr = (PUNICODE_STRING)pvBuf;
1330	if (pUniStr->Length > 0)
1331	{
1332	/* Make sure it's terminated so it can safely be printed.*/
1333	pUniStr->Buffer[pUniStr->Length / sizeof(WCHAR)] = '\0';
1334	return VINF_SUCCESS;
1335	}
1336
1337	return RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, VERR_SUP_VP_SYSTEM32_PATH,
1338	"NtQueryObject returned an empty path for '%ls'", NtName.Buffer);
1339	}
1340	return RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, VERR_SUP_VP_SYSTEM32_PATH, "NtQueryObject failed on '%ls' dir: %#x", NtName.Buffer, rcNt);
1341	}
1342	return RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, VERR_SUP_VP_SYSTEM32_PATH, "Failure to open '%ls': %#x", NtName.Buffer, rcNt);
1343	}
1344
1345
1346	/**
1347	* Initialize one certificate entry.
1348	*
1349	* @returns VBox status code.
1350	* @param pCert The X.509 certificate representation to init.
1351	* @param pabCert The raw DER encoded certificate.
1352	* @param cbCert The size of the raw certificate.
1353	* @param pErrInfo Where to return extended error info. Optional.
1354	* @param pszErrorTag Error tag.
1355	*/
1356	static int supHardNtViCertInit(PRTCRX509CERTIFICATE pCert, unsigned char const *pabCert, unsigned cbCert,
1357	PRTERRINFO pErrInfo, const char *pszErrorTag)
1358	{
1359	AssertReturn(cbCert > 16 && cbCert < _128K,
1360	RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, VERR_INTERNAL_ERROR_3, "%s: cbCert=%#x out of range", pszErrorTag, cbCert));
1361	AssertReturn(!RTCrX509Certificate_IsPresent(pCert),
1362	RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, VERR_WRONG_ORDER, "%s: Certificate already decoded?", pszErrorTag));
1363
1364	RTASN1CURSORPRIMARY PrimaryCursor;
1365	RTAsn1CursorInitPrimary(&PrimaryCursor, pabCert, cbCert, pErrInfo, &g_RTAsn1DefaultAllocator, RTASN1CURSOR_FLAGS_DER, NULL);
1366	int rc = RTCrX509Certificate_DecodeAsn1(&PrimaryCursor.Cursor, 0, pCert, pszErrorTag);
1367	if (RT_SUCCESS(rc))
1368	rc = RTCrX509Certificate_CheckSanity(pCert, 0, pErrInfo, pszErrorTag);
1369	return rc;
1370	}
1371
1372
1373	static int supHardNtViCertStoreAddArray(RTCRSTORE hStore, PCSUPTAENTRY paCerts, unsigned cCerts, PRTERRINFO pErrInfo)
1374	{
1375	for (uint32_t i = 0; i < cCerts; i++)
1376	{
1377	int rc = RTCrStoreCertAddEncoded(hStore, RTCRCERTCTX_F_ENC_TAF_DER, paCerts[i].pch, paCerts[i].cb, pErrInfo);
1378	if (RT_FAILURE(rc))
1379	return rc;
1380	}
1381	return VINF_SUCCESS;
1382	}
1383
1384
1385	/**
1386	* Initialize a certificate table.
1387	*
1388	* @param phStore Where to return the store pointer.
1389	* @param paCerts1 Pointer to the first certificate table.
1390	* @param cCerts1 Entries in the first certificate table.
1391	* @param paCerts2 Pointer to the second certificate table.
1392	* @param cCerts2 Entries in the second certificate table.
1393	* @param paCerts3 Pointer to the third certificate table.
1394	* @param cCerts3 Entries in the third certificate table.
1395	* @param pErrInfo Where to return extended error info. Optional.
1396	* @param pszErrorTag Error tag.
1397	*/
1398	static int supHardNtViCertStoreInit(PRTCRSTORE phStore,
1399	PCSUPTAENTRY paCerts1, unsigned cCerts1,
1400	PCSUPTAENTRY paCerts2, unsigned cCerts2,
1401	PCSUPTAENTRY paCerts3, unsigned cCerts3,
1402	PRTERRINFO pErrInfo, const char *pszErrorTag)
1403	{
1404	AssertReturn(*phStore == NIL_RTCRSTORE, VERR_WRONG_ORDER);
1405
1406	int rc = RTCrStoreCreateInMem(phStore, cCerts1 + cCerts2);
1407	if (RT_FAILURE(rc))
1408	return RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, rc, "RTCrStoreCreateMemoryStore failed: %Rrc", rc);
1409
1410	rc = supHardNtViCertStoreAddArray(*phStore, paCerts1, cCerts1, pErrInfo);
1411	if (RT_SUCCESS(rc))
1412	rc = supHardNtViCertStoreAddArray(*phStore, paCerts2, cCerts2, pErrInfo);
1413	if (RT_SUCCESS(rc))
1414	rc = supHardNtViCertStoreAddArray(*phStore, paCerts3, cCerts3, pErrInfo);
1415	return rc;
1416	}
1417
1418
1419
1420	#ifdef IN_RING3
1421	/**
1422	* Initializes the windows paths.
1423	*/
1424	static void supHardenedWinInitImageVerifierWinPaths(void)
1425	{
1426	/*
1427	* Windows paths that we're interested in.
1428	*/
1429	static const struct
1430	{
1431	SUPSYSROOTDIRBUF *pNtPath;
1432	WCHAR const *pwszRegValue;
1433	const char *pszLogName;
1434	} s_aPaths[] =
1435	{
1436	{ &g_ProgramFilesNtPath, L"ProgramFilesDir", "ProgDir" },
1437	{ &g_CommonFilesNtPath, L"CommonFilesDir", "ComDir" },
1438	# ifdef RT_ARCH_AMD64
1439	{ &g_ProgramFilesX86NtPath, L"ProgramFilesDir (x86)", "ProgDir32" },
1440	{ &g_CommonFilesX86NtPath, L"CommonFilesDir (x86)", "ComDir32" },
1441	# endif
1442	};
1443
1444	/*
1445	* Open the registry key containing the paths.
1446	*/
1447	UNICODE_STRING NtName = RTNT_CONSTANT_UNISTR(L"\\Registry\\Machine\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion");
1448	OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES ObjAttr;
1449	InitializeObjectAttributes(&ObjAttr, &NtName, OBJ_CASE_INSENSITIVE, NULL /hRootDir/, NULL /pSecDesc/);
1450	HANDLE hKey;
1451	NTSTATUS rcNt = NtOpenKey(&hKey, KEY_QUERY_VALUE, &ObjAttr);
1452	if (NT_SUCCESS(rcNt))
1453	{
1454	/*
1455	* Loop over the paths and resolve their NT paths.
1456	*/
1457	for (uint32_t i = 0; i < RT_ELEMENTS(s_aPaths); i++)
1458	{
1459	/*
1460	* Query the value first.
1461	*/
1462	UNICODE_STRING ValueName;
1463	ValueName.Buffer = (WCHAR *)s_aPaths[i].pwszRegValue;
1464	ValueName.Length = (USHORT)(RTUtf16Len(s_aPaths[i].pwszRegValue) * sizeof(WCHAR));
1465	ValueName.MaximumLength = ValueName.Length + sizeof(WCHAR);
1466
1467	union
1468	{
1469	KEY_VALUE_PARTIAL_INFORMATION PartialInfo;
1470	uint8_t abPadding[sizeof(KEY_VALUE_PARTIAL_INFORMATION) + sizeof(WCHAR) * 128];
1471	uint64_t uAlign;
1472	} uBuf;
1473
1474	ULONG cbActual = 0;
1475	rcNt = NtQueryValueKey(hKey, &ValueName, KeyValuePartialInformation, &uBuf, sizeof(uBuf) - sizeof(WCHAR), &cbActual);
1476	if (NT_SUCCESS(rcNt))
1477	{
1478	/*
1479	* Must be a simple string value, terminate it.
1480	*/
1481	if ( uBuf.PartialInfo.Type == REG_EXPAND_SZ
1482	\|\| uBuf.PartialInfo.Type == REG_SZ)
1483	{
1484	/*
1485	* Expand any environment variable references before opening it.
1486	* We use the result buffer as storage for the expaneded path,
1487	* reserving space for the windows name space prefix.
1488	*/
1489	UNICODE_STRING Src;
1490	Src.Buffer = (WCHAR *)uBuf.PartialInfo.Data;
1491	Src.Length = uBuf.PartialInfo.DataLength;
1492	if (Src.Length >= sizeof(WCHAR) && Src.Buffer[Src.Length / sizeof(WCHAR) - 1] == '\0')
1493	Src.Length -= sizeof(WCHAR);
1494	Src.MaximumLength = Src.Length + sizeof(WCHAR);
1495	Src.Buffer[uBuf.PartialInfo.DataLength / sizeof(WCHAR)] = '\0';
1496
1497	s_aPaths[i].pNtPath->awcBuffer[0] = '\\';
1498	s_aPaths[i].pNtPath->awcBuffer[1] = '?';
1499	s_aPaths[i].pNtPath->awcBuffer[2] = '?';
1500	s_aPaths[i].pNtPath->awcBuffer[3] = '\\';
1501	UNICODE_STRING Dst;
1502	Dst.Buffer = &s_aPaths[i].pNtPath->awcBuffer[4];
1503	Dst.MaximumLength = sizeof(s_aPaths[i].pNtPath->awcBuffer) - sizeof(WCHAR) * 5;
1504	Dst.Length = Dst.MaximumLength;
1505
1506	if (uBuf.PartialInfo.Type == REG_EXPAND_SZ)
1507	rcNt = RtlExpandEnvironmentStrings_U(NULL, &Src, &Dst, NULL);
1508	else
1509	{
1510	memcpy(Dst.Buffer, Src.Buffer, Src.Length);
1511	Dst.Length = Src.Length;
1512	}
1513	if (NT_SUCCESS(rcNt))
1514	{
1515	Dst.Buffer[Dst.Length / sizeof(WCHAR)] = '\0';
1516
1517	/*
1518	* Include the \\??\\ prefix in the result and open the path.
1519	*/
1520	Dst.Buffer -= 4;
1521	Dst.Length += 4 * sizeof(WCHAR);
1522	Dst.MaximumLength += 4 * sizeof(WCHAR);
1523	InitializeObjectAttributes(&ObjAttr, &Dst, OBJ_CASE_INSENSITIVE, NULL /hRootDir/, NULL /pSecDesc/);
1524	HANDLE hFile = INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE;
1525	IO_STATUS_BLOCK Ios = RTNT_IO_STATUS_BLOCK_INITIALIZER;
1526	NTSTATUS rcNt = NtCreateFile(&hFile,
1527	FILE_READ_DATA \| SYNCHRONIZE,
1528	&ObjAttr,
1529	&Ios,
1530	NULL /* Allocation Size*/,
1531	FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL,
1532	FILE_SHARE_READ \| FILE_SHARE_WRITE,
1533	FILE_OPEN,
1534	FILE_DIRECTORY_FILE \| FILE_OPEN_FOR_BACKUP_INTENT
1535	\| FILE_SYNCHRONOUS_IO_NONALERT,
1536	NULL /EaBuffer/,
1537	0 /EaLength/);
1538	if (NT_SUCCESS(rcNt))
1539	rcNt = Ios.Status;
1540	if (NT_SUCCESS(rcNt))
1541	{
1542	/*
1543	* Query the real NT name.
1544	*/
1545	ULONG cbIgn;
1546	rcNt = NtQueryObject(hFile,
1547	ObjectNameInformation,
1548	s_aPaths[i].pNtPath,
1549	sizeof(*s_aPaths[i].pNtPath) - sizeof(WCHAR),
1550	&cbIgn);
1551	if (NT_SUCCESS(rcNt))
1552	{
1553	if (s_aPaths[i].pNtPath->UniStr.Length > 0)
1554	{
1555	/* Make sure it's terminated.*/
1556	s_aPaths[i].pNtPath->UniStr.Buffer[s_aPaths[i].pNtPath->UniStr.Length / sizeof(WCHAR)] = '\0';
1557	SUP_DPRINTF(("%s:%*s %ls\n", s_aPaths[i].pszLogName, 9 - strlen(s_aPaths[i].pszLogName), "",
1558	s_aPaths[i].pNtPath->UniStr.Buffer));
1559	}
1560	else
1561	{
1562	SUP_DPRINTF(("%s: NtQueryObject returned empty string\n", s_aPaths[i].pszLogName));
1563	rcNt = STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
1564	}
1565	}
1566	else
1567	SUP_DPRINTF(("%s: NtQueryObject failed: %#x\n", s_aPaths[i].pszLogName, rcNt));
1568	NtClose(hFile);
1569	}
1570	else
1571	SUP_DPRINTF(("%s: NtCreateFile failed: %#x (%ls)\n",
1572	s_aPaths[i].pszLogName, rcNt, Dst.Buffer));
1573	}
1574	else
1575	SUP_DPRINTF(("%s: RtlExpandEnvironmentStrings_U failed: %#x (%ls)\n",
1576	s_aPaths[i].pszLogName, rcNt, Src.Buffer));
1577	}
1578	else
1579	{
1580	SUP_DPRINTF(("%s: type mismatch: %#x\n", s_aPaths[i].pszLogName, uBuf.PartialInfo.Type));
1581	rcNt = STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
1582	}
1583	}
1584	else
1585	SUP_DPRINTF(("%s: NtQueryValueKey failed: %#x\n", s_aPaths[i].pszLogName, rcNt));
1586
1587	/* Stub the entry on failure. */
1588	if (!NT_SUCCESS(rcNt))
1589	{
1590	s_aPaths[i].pNtPath->UniStr.Length = 0;
1591	s_aPaths[i].pNtPath->UniStr.Buffer = NULL;
1592	}
1593	}
1594	NtClose(hKey);
1595	}
1596	else
1597	{
1598	SUP_DPRINTF(("NtOpenKey(%ls) failed: %#x\n", NtName.Buffer, rcNt));
1599
1600	/* Stub all the entries on failure. */
1601	for (uint32_t i = 0; i < RT_ELEMENTS(s_aPaths); i++)
1602	{
1603	s_aPaths[i].pNtPath->UniStr.Length = 0;
1604	s_aPaths[i].pNtPath->UniStr.Buffer = NULL;
1605	}
1606	}
1607	}
1608	#endif /* IN_RING3 */
1609
1610
1611	/**
1612	* This initializes the certificates globals so we don't have to reparse them
1613	* every time we need to verify an image.
1614	*
1615	* @returns IPRT status code.
1616	* @param pErrInfo Where to return extended error info. Optional.
1617	*/
1618	DECLHIDDEN(int) supHardenedWinInitImageVerifier(PRTERRINFO pErrInfo)
1619	{
1620	AssertReturn(!RTCrX509Certificate_IsPresent(&g_BuildX509Cert), VERR_WRONG_ORDER);
1621
1622	/*
1623	* Get the system root paths.
1624	*/
1625	int rc = supHardNtGetSystemRootDir(&g_System32NtPath, sizeof(g_System32NtPath), kSupHardNtSysRootDir_System32, pErrInfo);
1626	if (RT_SUCCESS(rc))
1627	rc = supHardNtGetSystemRootDir(&g_WinSxSNtPath, sizeof(g_WinSxSNtPath), kSupHardNtSysRootDir_WinSxS, pErrInfo);
1628	if (RT_SUCCESS(rc))
1629	{
1630	SUP_DPRINTF(("System32: %ls\n", g_System32NtPath.UniStr.Buffer));
1631	SUP_DPRINTF(("WinSxS: %ls\n", g_WinSxSNtPath.UniStr.Buffer));
1632	#ifdef IN_RING3
1633	supHardenedWinInitImageVerifierWinPaths();
1634	#endif
1635
1636	/*
1637	* Initialize it, leaving the cleanup to the termination call.
1638	*/
1639	rc = supHardNtViCertInit(&g_BuildX509Cert, g_abSUPBuildCert, g_cbSUPBuildCert, pErrInfo, "BuildCertificate");
1640	if (RT_SUCCESS(rc))
1641	rc = supHardNtViCertStoreInit(&g_hSpcRootStore, g_aSUPSpcRootTAs, g_cSUPSpcRootTAs,
1642	NULL, 0, NULL, 0, pErrInfo, "SpcRoot");
1643	if (RT_SUCCESS(rc))
1644	rc = supHardNtViCertStoreInit(&g_hNtKernelRootStore, g_aSUPNtKernelRootTAs, g_cSUPNtKernelRootTAs,
1645	NULL, 0, NULL, 0, pErrInfo, "NtKernelRoot");
1646	if (RT_SUCCESS(rc))
1647	rc = supHardNtViCertStoreInit(&g_hSpcAndNtKernelRootStore,
1648	g_aSUPSpcRootTAs, g_cSUPSpcRootTAs,
1649	g_aSUPNtKernelRootTAs, g_cSUPNtKernelRootTAs,
1650	g_aSUPTimestampTAs, g_cSUPTimestampTAs,
1651	pErrInfo, "SpcAndNtKernelRoot");
1652	if (RT_SUCCESS(rc))
1653	rc = supHardNtViCertStoreInit(&g_hSpcAndNtKernelSuppStore,
1654	NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0,
1655	pErrInfo, "SpcAndNtKernelSupplemental");
1656
1657	#if 0 /* For the time being, always trust the build certificate. It bypasses the timestamp issues of CRT and SDL. */
1658	/* If the build certificate is a test singing certificate, it must be a
1659	trusted root or we'll fail to validate anything. */
1660	if ( RT_SUCCESS(rc)
1661	&& RTCrX509Name_Compare(&g_BuildX509Cert.TbsCertificate.Subject, &g_BuildX509Cert.TbsCertificate.Issuer) == 0)
1662	#else
1663	if (RT_SUCCESS(rc))
1664	#endif
1665	rc = RTCrStoreCertAddEncoded(g_hSpcAndNtKernelRootStore, RTCRCERTCTX_F_ENC_X509_DER,
1666	g_abSUPBuildCert, g_cbSUPBuildCert, pErrInfo);
1667
1668	if (RT_SUCCESS(rc))
1669	{
1670	/*
1671	* Finally initialize known SIDs that we use.
1672	*/
1673	SID_IDENTIFIER_AUTHORITY s_NtAuth = SECURITY_NT_AUTHORITY;
1674	NTSTATUS rcNt = RtlInitializeSid(&g_TrustedInstallerSid, &s_NtAuth, SECURITY_SERVICE_ID_RID_COUNT);
1675	if (NT_SUCCESS(rcNt))
1676	{
1677	*RtlSubAuthoritySid(&g_TrustedInstallerSid, 0) = SECURITY_SERVICE_ID_BASE_RID;
1678	*RtlSubAuthoritySid(&g_TrustedInstallerSid, 1) = 956008885;
1679	*RtlSubAuthoritySid(&g_TrustedInstallerSid, 2) = 3418522649;
1680	*RtlSubAuthoritySid(&g_TrustedInstallerSid, 3) = 1831038044;
1681	*RtlSubAuthoritySid(&g_TrustedInstallerSid, 4) = 1853292631;
1682	*RtlSubAuthoritySid(&g_TrustedInstallerSid, 5) = 2271478464;
1683
1684	if (NT_SUCCESS(rcNt))
1685	rcNt = RtlInitializeSid(&g_LocalSystemSid, &s_NtAuth, 1);
1686	if (NT_SUCCESS(rcNt))
1687	{
1688	*RtlSubAuthoritySid(&g_LocalSystemSid, 0) = SECURITY_LOCAL_SYSTEM_RID;
1689	return VINF_SUCCESS;
1690	}
1691	}
1692	rc = RTErrConvertFromNtStatus(rcNt);
1693	}
1694	supHardenedWinTermImageVerifier();
1695	}
1696	return rc;
1697	}
1698
1699
1700	/**
1701	* Releases resources allocated by supHardenedWinInitImageVerifier.
1702	*/
1703	DECLHIDDEN(void) supHardenedWinTermImageVerifier(void)
1704	{
1705	if (RTCrX509Certificate_IsPresent(&g_BuildX509Cert))
1706	RTAsn1VtDelete(&g_BuildX509Cert.SeqCore.Asn1Core);
1707
1708	RTCrStoreRelease(g_hSpcAndNtKernelSuppStore);
1709	g_hSpcAndNtKernelSuppStore = NIL_RTCRSTORE;
1710	RTCrStoreRelease(g_hSpcAndNtKernelRootStore);
1711	g_hSpcAndNtKernelRootStore = NIL_RTCRSTORE;
1712
1713	RTCrStoreRelease(g_hNtKernelRootStore);
1714	g_hNtKernelRootStore = NIL_RTCRSTORE;
1715	RTCrStoreRelease(g_hSpcRootStore);
1716	g_hSpcRootStore = NIL_RTCRSTORE;
1717	}
1718
1719	#ifdef IN_RING3
1720
1721	/**
1722	* This is a hardcoded list of certificates we thing we might need.
1723	*
1724	* @returns true if wanted, false if not.
1725	* @param pCert The certificate.
1726	*/
1727	static bool supR3HardenedWinIsDesiredRootCA(PCRTCRX509CERTIFICATE pCert)
1728	{
1729	char szSubject[512];
1730	szSubject[sizeof(szSubject) - 1] = '\0';
1731	RTCrX509Name_FormatAsString(&pCert->TbsCertificate.Subject, szSubject, sizeof(szSubject) - 1, NULL);
1732
1733	/*
1734	* Check that it's a plausible root certificate.
1735	*/
1736	if (!RTCrX509Certificate_IsSelfSigned(pCert))
1737	{
1738	SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardenedWinIsDesiredRootCA: skipping - not-self-signed: %s\n", szSubject));
1739	return false;
1740	}
1741
1742	if (RTAsn1Integer_UnsignedCompareWithU32(&pCert->TbsCertificate.T0.Version, 3) > 0)
1743	{
1744	if ( !(pCert->TbsCertificate.T3.fExtKeyUsage & RTCRX509CERT_KEY_USAGE_F_KEY_CERT_SIGN)
1745	&& (pCert->TbsCertificate.T3.fFlags & RTCRX509TBSCERTIFICATE_F_PRESENT_KEY_USAGE) )
1746	{
1747	SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardenedWinIsDesiredRootCA: skipping - non-cert-sign: %s\n", szSubject));
1748	return false;
1749	}
1750	if ( pCert->TbsCertificate.T3.pBasicConstraints
1751	&& !pCert->TbsCertificate.T3.pBasicConstraints->CA.fValue)
1752	{
1753	SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardenedWinIsDesiredRootCA: skipping - non-CA: %s\n", szSubject));
1754	return false;
1755	}
1756	}
1757	if (pCert->TbsCertificate.SubjectPublicKeyInfo.SubjectPublicKey.cBits < 256) /* mostly for u64KeyId reading. */
1758	{
1759	SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardenedWinIsDesiredRootCA: skipping - key too small: %u bits %s\n",
1760	pCert->TbsCertificate.SubjectPublicKeyInfo.SubjectPublicKey.cBits, szSubject));
1761	return false;
1762	}
1763	uint64_t const u64KeyId = pCert->TbsCertificate.SubjectPublicKeyInfo.SubjectPublicKey.uBits.pu64[1];
1764
1765	# if 0
1766	/*
1767	* Whitelist - Array of names and key clues of the certificates we want.
1768	*/
1769	static struct
1770	{
1771	uint64_t u64KeyId;
1772	const char *pszName;
1773	} const s_aWanted[] =
1774	{
1775	/* SPC */
1776	{ UINT64_C(0xffffffffffffffff), "C=US, O=VeriSign, Inc., OU=Class 3 Public Primary Certification Authority" },
1777	{ UINT64_C(0xffffffffffffffff), "L=Internet, O=VeriSign, Inc., OU=VeriSign Commercial Software Publishers CA" },
1778	{ UINT64_C(0x491857ead79dde00), "C=US, O=The Go Daddy Group, Inc., OU=Go Daddy Class 2 Certification Authority" },
1779
1780	/* TS */
1781	{ UINT64_C(0xffffffffffffffff), "O=Microsoft Trust Network, OU=Microsoft Corporation, OU=Microsoft Time Stamping Service Root, OU=Copyright (c) 1997 Microsoft Corp." },
1782	{ UINT64_C(0xffffffffffffffff), "O=VeriSign Trust Network, OU=VeriSign, Inc., OU=VeriSign Time Stamping Service Root, OU=NO LIABILITY ACCEPTED, (c)97 VeriSign, Inc." },
1783	{ UINT64_C(0xffffffffffffffff), "C=ZA, ST=Western Cape, L=Durbanville, O=Thawte, OU=Thawte Certification, CN=Thawte Timestamping CA" },
1784
1785	/* Additional Windows 8.1 list: */
1786	{ UINT64_C(0x5ad46780fa5df300), "DC=com, DC=microsoft, CN=Microsoft Root Certificate Authority" },
1787	{ UINT64_C(0x3be670c1bd02a900), "OU=Copyright (c) 1997 Microsoft Corp., OU=Microsoft Corporation, CN=Microsoft Root Authority" },
1788	{ UINT64_C(0x4d3835aa4180b200), "C=US, ST=Washington, L=Redmond, O=Microsoft Corporation, CN=Microsoft Root Certificate Authority 2011" },
1789	{ UINT64_C(0x646e3fe3ba08df00), "C=US, O=MSFT, CN=Microsoft Authenticode(tm) Root Authority" },
1790	{ UINT64_C(0xece4e4289e08b900), "C=US, ST=Washington, L=Redmond, O=Microsoft Corporation, CN=Microsoft Root Certificate Authority 2010" },
1791	{ UINT64_C(0x59faf1086271bf00), "C=US, ST=Arizona, L=Scottsdale, O=GoDaddy.com, Inc., CN=Go Daddy Root Certificate Authority - G2" },
1792	{ UINT64_C(0x3d98ab22bb04a300), "C=IE, O=Baltimore, OU=CyberTrust, CN=Baltimore CyberTrust Root" },
1793	{ UINT64_C(0x91e3728b8b40d000), "C=GB, ST=Greater Manchester, L=Salford, O=COMODO CA Limited, CN=COMODO Certification Authority" },
1794	{ UINT64_C(0x61a3a33f81aace00), "C=US, ST=UT, L=Salt Lake City, O=The USERTRUST Network, OU=http://www.usertrust.com, CN=UTN-USERFirst-Object" },
1795	{ UINT64_C(0x9e5bc2d78b6a3636), "C=ZA, ST=Western Cape, L=Cape Town, O=Thawte Consulting cc, OU=Certification Services Division, CN=Thawte Premium Server CA, [email protected]" },
1796	{ UINT64_C(0xf4fd306318ccda00), "C=US, O=GeoTrust Inc., CN=GeoTrust Global CA" },
1797	{ UINT64_C(0xa0ee62086758b15d), "C=US, O=Equifax, OU=Equifax Secure Certificate Authority" },
1798	{ UINT64_C(0x8ff6fc03c1edbd00), "C=US, ST=Arizona, L=Scottsdale, O=Starfield Technologies, Inc., CN=Starfield Root Certificate Authority - G2" },
1799	{ UINT64_C(0xa3ce8d99e60eda00), "C=BE, O=GlobalSign nv-sa, OU=Root CA, CN=GlobalSign Root CA" },
1800	{ UINT64_C(0xa671e9fec832b700), "C=US, O=Starfield Technologies, Inc., OU=Starfield Class 2 Certification Authority" },
1801	{ UINT64_C(0xa8de7211e13be200), "C=US, O=DigiCert Inc, OU=www.digicert.com, CN=DigiCert Global Root CA" },
1802	{ UINT64_C(0x0ff3891b54348328), "C=US, O=Entrust.net, OU=www.entrust.net/CPS incorp. by ref. (limits liab.), OU=(c) 1999 Entrust.net Limited, CN=Entrust.netSecure Server Certification Authority" },
1803	{ UINT64_C(0x7ae89c50f0b6a00f), "C=US, O=GTE Corporation, OU=GTE CyberTrust Solutions, Inc., CN=GTE CyberTrust Global Root" },
1804	{ UINT64_C(0xd45980fbf0a0ac00), "C=US, O=thawte, Inc., OU=Certification Services Division, OU=(c) 2006 thawte, Inc. - For authorized use only, CN=thawte Primary Root CA" },
1805	{ UINT64_C(0x9e5bc2d78b6a3636), "C=ZA, ST=Western Cape, L=Cape Town, O=Thawte Consulting cc, OU=Certification Services Division, CN=Thawte Premium Server CA, [email protected]" },
1806	{ UINT64_C(0x7c4fd32ec1b1ce00), "C=PL, O=Unizeto Sp. z o.o., CN=Certum CA" },
1807	{ UINT64_C(0xd4fbe673e5ccc600), "C=US, O=DigiCert Inc, OU=www.digicert.com, CN=DigiCert High Assurance EV Root CA" },
1808	{ UINT64_C(0x16e64d2a56ccf200), "C=US, ST=Arizona, L=Scottsdale, O=Starfield Technologies, Inc., OU=http://certificates.starfieldtech.com/repository/, CN=Starfield Services Root Certificate Authority" },
1809	{ UINT64_C(0x6e2ba21058eedf00), "C=US, ST=UT, L=Salt Lake City, O=The USERTRUST Network, OU=http://www.usertrust.com, CN=UTN - DATACorp SGC" },
1810	{ UINT64_C(0xb28612a94b4dad00), "O=Entrust.net, OU=www.entrust.net/CPS_2048 incorp. by ref. (limits liab.), OU=(c) 1999 Entrust.net Limited, CN=Entrust.netCertification Authority (2048)" },
1811	{ UINT64_C(0x357a29080824af00), "C=US, O=VeriSign, Inc., OU=VeriSign Trust Network, OU=(c) 2006 VeriSign, Inc. - For authorized use only, CN=VeriSign Class3 Public Primary Certification Authority - G5" },
1812	{ UINT64_C(0x466cbc09db88c100), "C=IL, O=StartCom Ltd., OU=Secure Digital Certificate Signing, CN=StartCom Certification Authority" },
1813	{ UINT64_C(0x9259c8abe5ca713a), "L=ValiCert Validation Network, O=ValiCert, Inc., OU=ValiCert Class 2 Policy Validation Authority, CN=http://www.valicert.com/, [email protected]" },
1814	{ UINT64_C(0x1f78fc529cbacb00), "C=US, O=VeriSign, Inc., OU=VeriSign Trust Network, OU=(c) 1999 VeriSign, Inc. - For authorized use only, CN=VeriSign Class3 Public Primary Certification Authority - G3" },
1815	{ UINT64_C(0x8043e4ce150ead00), "C=US, O=DigiCert Inc, OU=www.digicert.com, CN=DigiCert Assured ID Root CA" },
1816	{ UINT64_C(0x00f2e6331af7b700), "C=SE, O=AddTrust AB, OU=AddTrust External TTP Network, CN=AddTrust External CA Root" },
1817	};
1818
1819
1820	uint32_t i = RT_ELEMENTS(s_aWanted);
1821	while (i-- > 0)
1822	if ( s_aWanted[i].u64KeyId == u64KeyId
1823	\|\| s_aWanted[i].u64KeyId == UINT64_MAX)
1824	if (RTCrX509Name_MatchWithString(&pCert->TbsCertificate.Subject, s_aWanted[i].pszName))
1825	{
1826	SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardenedWinIsDesiredRootCA: Adding %#llx %s\n", u64KeyId, szSubject));
1827	return true;
1828	}
1829
1830	SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardenedWinIsDesiredRootCA: skipping %#llx %s\n", u64KeyId, szSubject));
1831	return false;
1832	# else
1833	/*
1834	* Blacklist approach.
1835	*/
1836	static struct
1837	{
1838	uint64_t u64KeyId;
1839	const char *pszName;
1840	} const s_aUnwanted[] =
1841	{
1842	{ UINT64_C(0xffffffffffffffff), "C=US, O=U.S. Robots and Mechanical Men, Inc., OU=V.I.K.I." }, /* dummy entry */
1843	};
1844
1845	uint32_t i = RT_ELEMENTS(s_aUnwanted);
1846	while (i-- > 0)
1847	if ( s_aUnwanted[i].u64KeyId == u64KeyId
1848	\|\| s_aUnwanted[i].u64KeyId == UINT64_MAX)
1849	if (RTCrX509Name_MatchWithString(&pCert->TbsCertificate.Subject, s_aUnwanted[i].pszName))
1850	{
1851	SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardenedWinIsDesiredRootCA: skipping - blacklisted: %#llx %s\n", u64KeyId, szSubject));
1852	return false;
1853	}
1854
1855	SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardenedWinIsDesiredRootCA: Adding %#llx %s\n", u64KeyId, szSubject));
1856	return true;
1857	# endif
1858	}
1859
1860
1861	/**
1862	* Loads a module in the system32 directory.
1863	*
1864	* @returns Module handle on success. Won't return on faliure.
1865	* @param pszName The name of the DLL to load.
1866	*/
1867	DECLHIDDEN(HMODULE) supR3HardenedWinLoadSystem32Dll(const char *pszName)
1868	{
1869	WCHAR wszName[200+60];
1870	UINT cwcDir = GetSystemDirectoryW(wszName, RT_ELEMENTS(wszName) - 60);
1871	wszName[cwcDir] = '\\';
1872	RTUtf16CopyAscii(&wszName[cwcDir + 1], RT_ELEMENTS(wszName) - cwcDir, pszName);
1873
1874	DWORD fFlags = 0;
1875	if (g_uNtVerCombined >= SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_SIMPLE(6, 0))
1876	fFlags = LOAD_LIBRARY_SEARCH_SYSTEM32;
1877	HMODULE hMod = LoadLibraryExW(wszName, NULL, fFlags);
1878	if ( hMod == NULL
1879	&& fFlags
1880	&& g_uNtVerCombined < SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_SIMPLE(6, 2)
1881	&& GetLastError() == ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER)
1882	{
1883	fFlags = 0;
1884	hMod = LoadLibraryExW(wszName, NULL, fFlags);
1885	}
1886	if (hMod == NULL)
1887	supR3HardenedFatal("Error loading '%s': %u [%ls]", pszName, GetLastError(), wszName);
1888	return hMod;
1889	}
1890
1891
1892	/**
1893	* Called by supR3HardenedWinResolveVerifyTrustApiAndHookThreadCreation to
1894	* import selected root CAs from the system certificate store.
1895	*
1896	* These certificates permits us to correctly validate third party DLLs.
1897	*/
1898	static void supR3HardenedWinRetrieveTrustedRootCAs(void)
1899	{
1900	uint32_t cAdded = 0;
1901
1902	/*
1903	* Load crypt32.dll and resolve the APIs we need.
1904	*/
1905	HMODULE hCrypt32 = supR3HardenedWinLoadSystem32Dll("crypt32.dll");
1906
1907	#define RESOLVE_CRYPT32_API(a_Name, a_pfnType) \
1908	a_pfnType pfn##a_Name = (a_pfnType)GetProcAddress(hCrypt32, #a_Name); \
1909	if (pfn##a_Name == NULL) supR3HardenedFatal("Error locating '" #a_Name "' in 'crypt32.dll': %u", GetLastError())
1910	RESOLVE_CRYPT32_API(CertOpenStore, PFNCERTOPENSTORE);
1911	RESOLVE_CRYPT32_API(CertCloseStore, PFNCERTCLOSESTORE);
1912	RESOLVE_CRYPT32_API(CertEnumCertificatesInStore, PFNCERTENUMCERTIFICATESINSTORE);
1913	#undef RESOLVE_CRYPT32_API
1914
1915	/*
1916	* Open the root store and look for the certificates we wish to use.
1917	*/
1918	DWORD fOpenStore = CERT_STORE_OPEN_EXISTING_FLAG \| CERT_STORE_READONLY_FLAG;
1919	HCERTSTORE hStore = pfnCertOpenStore(CERT_STORE_PROV_SYSTEM_W, PKCS_7_ASN_ENCODING \| X509_ASN_ENCODING,
1920	NULL /* hCryptProv = default */, CERT_SYSTEM_STORE_LOCAL_MACHINE \| fOpenStore, L"Root");
1921	if (!hStore)
1922	hStore = pfnCertOpenStore(CERT_STORE_PROV_SYSTEM_W, PKCS_7_ASN_ENCODING \| X509_ASN_ENCODING,
1923	NULL /* hCryptProv = default */, CERT_SYSTEM_STORE_CURRENT_USER \| fOpenStore, L"Root");
1924	if (hStore)
1925	{
1926	PCCERT_CONTEXT pCurCtx = NULL;
1927	while ((pCurCtx = pfnCertEnumCertificatesInStore(hStore, pCurCtx)) != NULL)
1928	{
1929	if (pCurCtx->dwCertEncodingType & X509_ASN_ENCODING)
1930	{
1931	RTERRINFOSTATIC StaticErrInfo;
1932	RTASN1CURSORPRIMARY PrimaryCursor;
1933	RTAsn1CursorInitPrimary(&PrimaryCursor, pCurCtx->pbCertEncoded, pCurCtx->cbCertEncoded,
1934	RTErrInfoInitStatic(&StaticErrInfo),
1935	&g_RTAsn1DefaultAllocator, RTASN1CURSOR_FLAGS_DER, "CurCtx");
1936	RTCRX509CERTIFICATE MyCert;
1937	int rc = RTCrX509Certificate_DecodeAsn1(&PrimaryCursor.Cursor, 0, &MyCert, "Cert");
1938	if (RT_SUCCESS(rc))
1939	{
1940	if (supR3HardenedWinIsDesiredRootCA(&MyCert))
1941	{
1942	rc = RTCrStoreCertAddEncoded(g_hSpcRootStore, RTCRCERTCTX_F_ENC_X509_DER,
1943	pCurCtx->pbCertEncoded, pCurCtx->cbCertEncoded, NULL /pErrInfo/);
1944	AssertRC(rc);
1945
1946	rc = RTCrStoreCertAddEncoded(g_hSpcAndNtKernelRootStore, RTCRCERTCTX_F_ENC_X509_DER,
1947	pCurCtx->pbCertEncoded, pCurCtx->cbCertEncoded, NULL /pErrInfo/);
1948	AssertRC(rc);
1949	cAdded++;
1950	}
1951
1952	RTCrX509Certificate_Delete(&MyCert);
1953	}
1954	/* XP root certificate "C&W HKT SecureNet CA SGC Root" has non-standard validity
1955	timestamps, the UTC formatting isn't Zulu time but specifies timezone offsets.
1956	Ignore these failures and certificates. */
1957	else if (rc != VERR_ASN1_INVALID_UTC_TIME_ENCODING)
1958	AssertMsgFailed(("RTCrX509Certificate_DecodeAsn1 failed: rc=%#x: %s\n", rc, StaticErrInfo.szMsg));
1959	}
1960	}
1961	pfnCertCloseStore(hStore, CERT_CLOSE_STORE_CHECK_FLAG);
1962	g_fHaveOtherRoots = true;
1963	}
1964	SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardenedWinRetrieveTrustedRootCAs: cAdded=%u\n", cAdded));
1965	}
1966
1967
1968	/**
1969	* Resolves the WinVerifyTrust API after the process has been verified and
1970	* installs a thread creation hook.
1971	*
1972	* The WinVerifyTrust API is used in addition our own Authenticode verification
1973	* code. If the image has the IMAGE_DLLCHARACTERISTICS_FORCE_INTEGRITY flag
1974	* set, it will be checked again by the kernel. All our image has this flag set
1975	* and we require all VBox extensions to have it set as well. In effect, the
1976	* authenticode signature will be checked two or three times.
1977	*
1978	* @param pszProgName The program name.
1979	*/
1980	DECLHIDDEN(void) supR3HardenedWinResolveVerifyTrustApiAndHookThreadCreation(const char *pszProgName)
1981	{
1982	# ifdef IN_SUP_HARDENED_R3
1983	/*
1984	* Load our the support library DLL that does the thread hooking as the
1985	* security API may trigger the creation of COM worker threads (or
1986	* whatever they are).
1987	*
1988	* The thread creation hook makes the threads very slippery to debuggers by
1989	* irreversably disabling most (if not all) debug events for them.
1990	*/
1991	char szPath[RTPATH_MAX];
1992	supR3HardenedPathSharedLibs(szPath, sizeof(szPath) - sizeof("/VBoxSupLib.DLL"));
1993	suplibHardenedStrCat(szPath, "/VBoxSupLib.DLL");
1994	HMODULE hSupLibMod = (HMODULE)supR3HardenedWinLoadLibrary(szPath, true /fSystem32Only/);
1995	if (hSupLibMod == NULL)
1996	supR3HardenedFatal("Error loading '%s': %u", szPath, GetLastError());
1997	# endif
1998
1999	/*
2000	* Allocate TLS entry for WinVerifyTrust recursion prevention.
2001	*/
2002	DWORD iTls = TlsAlloc();
2003	if (iTls != TLS_OUT_OF_INDEXES)
2004	g_iTlsWinVerifyTrustRecursion = iTls;
2005	else
2006	supR3HardenedError(GetLastError(), false /fFatal/, "TlsAlloc failed");
2007
2008	/*
2009	* Resolve it.
2010	*/
2011	HMODULE hWintrust = supR3HardenedWinLoadSystem32Dll("Wintrust.dll");
2012	#define RESOLVE_CRYPT_API(a_Name, a_pfnType, a_uMinWinVer) \
2013	do { \
2014	g_pfn##a_Name = (a_pfnType)GetProcAddress(hWintrust, #a_Name); \
2015	if (g_pfn##a_Name == NULL && (a_uMinWinVer) < g_uNtVerCombined) \
2016	supR3HardenedFatal("Error locating '" #a_Name "' in 'Wintrust.dll': %u", GetLastError()); \
2017	} while (0)
2018
2019	PFNWINVERIFYTRUST pfnWinVerifyTrust = (PFNWINVERIFYTRUST)GetProcAddress(hWintrust, "WinVerifyTrust");
2020	if (!pfnWinVerifyTrust)
2021	supR3HardenedFatal("Error locating 'WinVerifyTrust' in 'Wintrust.dll': %u", GetLastError());
2022
2023	RESOLVE_CRYPT_API(CryptCATAdminAcquireContext, PFNCRYPTCATADMINACQUIRECONTEXT, 0);
2024	RESOLVE_CRYPT_API(CryptCATAdminCalcHashFromFileHandle, PFNCRYPTCATADMINCALCHASHFROMFILEHANDLE, 0);
2025	RESOLVE_CRYPT_API(CryptCATAdminEnumCatalogFromHash, PFNCRYPTCATADMINENUMCATALOGFROMHASH, 0);
2026	RESOLVE_CRYPT_API(CryptCATAdminReleaseCatalogContext, PFNCRYPTCATADMINRELEASECATALOGCONTEXT, 0);
2027	RESOLVE_CRYPT_API(CryptCATAdminReleaseContext, PFNCRYPTCATDADMINRELEASECONTEXT, 0);
2028	RESOLVE_CRYPT_API(CryptCATCatalogInfoFromContext, PFNCRYPTCATCATALOGINFOFROMCONTEXT, 0);
2029
2030	RESOLVE_CRYPT_API(CryptCATAdminAcquireContext2, PFNCRYPTCATADMINACQUIRECONTEXT2, SUP_NT_VER_W80);
2031	RESOLVE_CRYPT_API(CryptCATAdminCalcHashFromFileHandle2, PFNCRYPTCATADMINCALCHASHFROMFILEHANDLE2, SUP_NT_VER_W80);
2032
2033	/*
2034	* Call it on ourselves and ntdll to make sure it loads all the providers
2035	* now, we would otherwise geting into recursive trouble in the
2036	* NtCreateSection hook.
2037	*/
2038	# ifdef IN_SUP_HARDENED_R3
2039	RTERRINFOSTATIC ErrInfoStatic;
2040	RTErrInfoInitStatic(&ErrInfoStatic);
2041	int rc = supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrust(NULL, g_SupLibHardenedExeNtPath.UniStr.Buffer, 0,
2042	&ErrInfoStatic.Core, pfnWinVerifyTrust);
2043	if (RT_FAILURE(rc))
2044	supR3HardenedFatalMsg(pszProgName, kSupInitOp_Integrity, rc,
2045	"WinVerifyTrust failed on stub executable: %s", ErrInfoStatic.szMsg);
2046	# endif
2047
2048	if (g_uNtVerCombined >= SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_SIMPLE(6, 0)) /* ntdll isn't signed on XP, assuming this is the case on W2K3 for now. */
2049	supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrust(NULL, L"\\SystemRoot\\System32\\ntdll.dll", 0, NULL, pfnWinVerifyTrust);
2050	supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrustCatFile(NULL, L"\\SystemRoot\\System32\\ntdll.dll", 0, NULL, pfnWinVerifyTrust);
2051
2052	g_pfnWinVerifyTrust = pfnWinVerifyTrust;
2053	SUP_DPRINTF(("g_pfnWinVerifyTrust=%p\n", pfnWinVerifyTrust));
2054
2055	# ifdef IN_SUP_HARDENED_R3
2056	/*
2057	* Load some problematic DLLs into the verifier cache to prevent
2058	* recursion trouble.
2059	*/
2060	supR3HardenedWinVerifyCachePreload(L"\\SystemRoot\\System32\\crypt32.dll");
2061	supR3HardenedWinVerifyCachePreload(L"\\SystemRoot\\System32\\Wintrust.dll");
2062	# endif
2063
2064	/*
2065	* Now, get trusted root CAs so we can verify a broader scope of signatures.
2066	*/
2067	supR3HardenedWinRetrieveTrustedRootCAs();
2068	}
2069
2070
2071	static int supR3HardNtViNtToWinPath(PCRTUTF16 pwszNtName, PCRTUTF16 *ppwszWinPath,
2072	PRTUTF16 pwszWinPathBuf, size_t cwcWinPathBuf)
2073	{
2074	static const RTUTF16 s_wszPrefix[] = L"\\\\.\\GLOBALROOT";
2075
2076	if (pwszNtName != '\\' && pwszNtName != '/')
2077	return VERR_PATH_DOES_NOT_START_WITH_ROOT;
2078
2079	size_t cwcNtName = RTUtf16Len(pwszNtName);
2080	if (RT_ELEMENTS(s_wszPrefix) + cwcNtName > cwcWinPathBuf)
2081	return VERR_FILENAME_TOO_LONG;
2082
2083	memcpy(pwszWinPathBuf, s_wszPrefix, sizeof(s_wszPrefix));
2084	memcpy(&pwszWinPathBuf[sizeof(s_wszPrefix) / sizeof(RTUTF16) - 1], pwszNtName, (cwcNtName + 1) * sizeof(RTUTF16));
2085	*ppwszWinPath = pwszWinPathBuf;
2086	return VINF_SUCCESS;
2087	}
2088
2089
2090	/**
2091	* Calls WinVerifyTrust to verify an PE image.
2092	*
2093	* @returns VBox status code.
2094	* @param hFile File handle to the executable file.
2095	* @param pwszName Full NT path to the DLL in question, used for
2096	* dealing with unsigned system dlls as well as for
2097	* error/logging.
2098	* @param fFlags Flags, SUPHNTVI_F_XXX.
2099	* @param pErrInfo Pointer to error info structure. Optional.
2100	* @param pfnWinVerifyTrust Pointer to the API.
2101	*/
2102	static int supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrust(HANDLE hFile, PCRTUTF16 pwszName, uint32_t fFlags, PRTERRINFO pErrInfo,
2103	PFNWINVERIFYTRUST pfnWinVerifyTrust)
2104	{
2105	/*
2106	* Convert the name into a Windows name.
2107	*/
2108	RTUTF16 wszWinPathBuf[MAX_PATH];
2109	PCRTUTF16 pwszWinPath;
2110	int rc = supR3HardNtViNtToWinPath(pwszName, &pwszWinPath, wszWinPathBuf, RT_ELEMENTS(wszWinPathBuf));
2111	if (RT_FAILURE(rc))
2112	return RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, rc, "Bad path passed to supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrust: rc=%Rrc '%ls'", rc, pwszName);
2113
2114	/*
2115	* Construct input parameters and call the API.
2116	*/
2117	WINTRUST_FILE_INFO FileInfo;
2118	RT_ZERO(FileInfo);
2119	FileInfo.cbStruct = sizeof(FileInfo);
2120	FileInfo.pcwszFilePath = pwszWinPath;
2121	FileInfo.hFile = hFile;
2122
2123	GUID PolicyActionGuid = WINTRUST_ACTION_GENERIC_VERIFY_V2;
2124
2125	WINTRUST_DATA TrustData;
2126	RT_ZERO(TrustData);
2127	TrustData.cbStruct = sizeof(TrustData);
2128	TrustData.fdwRevocationChecks = WTD_REVOKE_NONE; /* Keep simple for now. */
2129	TrustData.dwStateAction = WTD_STATEACTION_VERIFY;
2130	TrustData.dwUIChoice = WTD_UI_NONE;
2131	TrustData.dwProvFlags = 0;
2132	if (g_uNtVerCombined >= SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_SIMPLE(6, 0))
2133	TrustData.dwProvFlags = WTD_CACHE_ONLY_URL_RETRIEVAL;
2134	else
2135	TrustData.dwProvFlags = WTD_REVOCATION_CHECK_NONE;
2136	TrustData.dwUnionChoice = WTD_CHOICE_FILE;
2137	TrustData.pFile = &FileInfo;
2138
2139	HRESULT hrc = pfnWinVerifyTrust(NULL /hwnd/, &PolicyActionGuid, &TrustData);
2140	if (hrc == S_OK)
2141	rc = VINF_SUCCESS;
2142	else
2143	{
2144	/*
2145	* Failed. Format a nice error message.
2146	*/
2147	# ifdef DEBUG_bird
2148	if (hrc != CERT_E_CHAINING /* Un-updated vistas, XPs, ++ */)
2149	__debugbreak();
2150	# endif
2151	const char *pszErrConst = NULL;
2152	switch (hrc)
2153	{
2154	case TRUST_E_SYSTEM_ERROR: pszErrConst = "TRUST_E_SYSTEM_ERROR"; break;
2155	case TRUST_E_NO_SIGNER_CERT: pszErrConst = "TRUST_E_NO_SIGNER_CERT"; break;
2156	case TRUST_E_COUNTER_SIGNER: pszErrConst = "TRUST_E_COUNTER_SIGNER"; break;
2157	case TRUST_E_CERT_SIGNATURE: pszErrConst = "TRUST_E_CERT_SIGNATURE"; break;
2158	case TRUST_E_TIME_STAMP: pszErrConst = "TRUST_E_TIME_STAMP"; break;
2159	case TRUST_E_BAD_DIGEST: pszErrConst = "TRUST_E_BAD_DIGEST"; break;
2160	case TRUST_E_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS: pszErrConst = "TRUST_E_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS"; break;
2161	case TRUST_E_FINANCIAL_CRITERIA: pszErrConst = "TRUST_E_FINANCIAL_CRITERIA"; break;
2162	case TRUST_E_PROVIDER_UNKNOWN: pszErrConst = "TRUST_E_PROVIDER_UNKNOWN"; break;
2163	case TRUST_E_ACTION_UNKNOWN: pszErrConst = "TRUST_E_ACTION_UNKNOWN"; break;
2164	case TRUST_E_SUBJECT_FORM_UNKNOWN: pszErrConst = "TRUST_E_SUBJECT_FORM_UNKNOWN"; break;
2165	case TRUST_E_SUBJECT_NOT_TRUSTED: pszErrConst = "TRUST_E_SUBJECT_NOT_TRUSTED"; break;
2166	case TRUST_E_NOSIGNATURE: pszErrConst = "TRUST_E_NOSIGNATURE"; break;
2167	case TRUST_E_FAIL: pszErrConst = "TRUST_E_FAIL"; break;
2168	case TRUST_E_EXPLICIT_DISTRUST: pszErrConst = "TRUST_E_EXPLICIT_DISTRUST"; break;
2169	case CERT_E_CHAINING: pszErrConst = "CERT_E_CHAINING"; break;
2170	case CERT_E_REVOCATION_FAILURE: pszErrConst = "CERT_E_REVOCATION_FAILURE"; break;
2171	}
2172	if (pszErrConst)
2173	rc = RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, VERR_LDRVI_UNSUPPORTED_ARCH,
2174	"WinVerifyTrust failed with hrc=%s on '%ls'", pszErrConst, pwszName);
2175	else
2176	rc = RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, VERR_LDRVI_UNSUPPORTED_ARCH,
2177	"WinVerifyTrust failed with hrc=%Rhrc on '%ls'", hrc, pwszName);
2178	SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrust: WinVerifyTrust failed with %#x (%s) on '%ls'\n",
2179	hrc, pszErrConst, pwszName));
2180	}
2181
2182	/* clean up state data. */
2183	TrustData.dwStateAction = WTD_STATEACTION_CLOSE;
2184	FileInfo.hFile = NULL;
2185	hrc = pfnWinVerifyTrust(NULL /hwnd/, &PolicyActionGuid, &TrustData);
2186
2187	return rc;
2188	}
2189
2190
2191	/**
2192	* Calls WinVerifyTrust to verify an PE image via catalog files.
2193	*
2194	* @returns VBox status code.
2195	* @param hFile File handle to the executable file.
2196	* @param pwszName Full NT path to the DLL in question, used for
2197	* dealing with unsigned system dlls as well as for
2198	* error/logging.
2199	* @param fFlags Flags, SUPHNTVI_F_XXX.
2200	* @param pErrInfo Pointer to error info structure. Optional.
2201	* @param pfnWinVerifyTrust Pointer to the API.
2202	*/
2203	static int supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrustCatFile(HANDLE hFile, PCRTUTF16 pwszName, uint32_t fFlags, PRTERRINFO pErrInfo,
2204	PFNWINVERIFYTRUST pfnWinVerifyTrust)
2205	{
2206	SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrustCatFile: hFile=%p pwszName=%ls\n", hFile, pwszName));
2207
2208	/*
2209	* Convert the name into a Windows name.
2210	*/
2211	RTUTF16 wszWinPathBuf[MAX_PATH];
2212	PCRTUTF16 pwszWinPath;
2213	int rc = supR3HardNtViNtToWinPath(pwszName, &pwszWinPath, wszWinPathBuf, RT_ELEMENTS(wszWinPathBuf));
2214	if (RT_FAILURE(rc))
2215	return RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, rc, "Bad path passed to supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrustCatFile: rc=%Rrc '%ls'", rc, pwszName);
2216
2217	/*
2218	* Open the file if we didn't get a handle.
2219	*/
2220	HANDLE hFileClose = NULL;
2221	if (hFile == RTNT_INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE \|\| hFile == NULL)
2222	{
2223	hFile = RTNT_INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE;
2224	IO_STATUS_BLOCK Ios = RTNT_IO_STATUS_BLOCK_INITIALIZER;
2225
2226	UNICODE_STRING NtName;
2227	NtName.Buffer = (PWSTR)pwszName;
2228	NtName.Length = (USHORT)(RTUtf16Len(pwszName) * sizeof(WCHAR));
2229	NtName.MaximumLength = NtName.Length + sizeof(WCHAR);
2230
2231	OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES ObjAttr;
2232	InitializeObjectAttributes(&ObjAttr, &NtName, OBJ_CASE_INSENSITIVE, NULL /hRootDir/, NULL /pSecDesc/);
2233
2234	NTSTATUS rcNt = NtCreateFile(&hFile,
2235	FILE_READ_DATA \| READ_CONTROL \| SYNCHRONIZE,
2236	&ObjAttr,
2237	&Ios,
2238	NULL /* Allocation Size*/,
2239	FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL,
2240	FILE_SHARE_READ,
2241	FILE_OPEN,
2242	FILE_NON_DIRECTORY_FILE \| FILE_SYNCHRONOUS_IO_NONALERT,
2243	NULL /EaBuffer/,
2244	0 /EaLength/);
2245	if (NT_SUCCESS(rcNt))
2246	rcNt = Ios.Status;
2247	if (!NT_SUCCESS(rcNt))
2248	return RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, RTErrConvertFromNtStatus(rcNt),
2249	"NtCreateFile returned %#x opening '%ls'.", rcNt, pwszName);
2250	hFileClose = hFile;
2251	}
2252
2253	/*
2254	* On Windows 8.0 and later there are more than one digest choice.
2255	*/
2256	rc = VERR_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED;
2257	static struct
2258	{
2259	/** The digest algorithm name. */
2260	const WCHAR *pszAlgorithm;
2261	/** Cached catalog admin handle. */
2262	HCATADMIN volatile hCachedCatAdmin;
2263	} s_aHashes[] =
2264	{
2265	{ NULL, NULL },
2266	{ L"SHA256", NULL },
2267	};
2268	for (uint32_t i = 0; i < RT_ELEMENTS(s_aHashes); i++)
2269	{
2270	/*
2271	* Another loop for dealing with different trust provider policies
2272	* required for successfully validating different catalog signatures.
2273	*/
2274	bool fTryNextPolicy;
2275	uint32_t iPolicy = 0;
2276	static const GUID s_aPolicies[] =
2277	{
2278	DRIVER_ACTION_VERIFY, /* Works with microsoft bits. Most frequently used, thus first. */
2279	WINTRUST_ACTION_GENERIC_VERIFY_V2, /* Works with ATI and other SPC kernel-code signed stuff. */
2280	};
2281	do
2282	{
2283	/*
2284	* Create a context.
2285	*/
2286	fTryNextPolicy = false;
2287	bool fFreshContext = false;
2288	BOOL fRc;
2289	HCATADMIN hCatAdmin = ASMAtomicXchgPtr(&s_aHashes[i].hCachedCatAdmin, NULL);
2290	if (hCatAdmin)
2291	{
2292	SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrustCatFile: Cached context %p\n", hCatAdmin));
2293	fFreshContext = false;
2294	fRc = TRUE;
2295	}
2296	else
2297	{
2298	l_fresh_context:
2299	fFreshContext = true;
2300	if (g_pfnCryptCATAdminAcquireContext2)
2301	fRc = g_pfnCryptCATAdminAcquireContext2(&hCatAdmin, &s_aPolicies[iPolicy], s_aHashes[i].pszAlgorithm,
2302	NULL /pStrongHashPolicy/, 0 /dwFlags/);
2303	else
2304	fRc = g_pfnCryptCATAdminAcquireContext(&hCatAdmin, &s_aPolicies[iPolicy], 0 /dwFlags/);
2305	SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrustCatFile: New context %p\n", hCatAdmin));
2306	}
2307	if (fRc)
2308	{
2309	SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrustCatFile: hCatAdmin=%p\n", hCatAdmin));
2310
2311	/*
2312	* Hash the file.
2313	*/
2314	BYTE abHash[SUPHARDNTVI_MAX_CAT_HASH_SIZE];
2315	DWORD cbHash = sizeof(abHash);
2316	if (g_pfnCryptCATAdminCalcHashFromFileHandle2)
2317	fRc = g_pfnCryptCATAdminCalcHashFromFileHandle2(hCatAdmin, hFile, &cbHash, abHash, 0 /dwFlags/);
2318	else
2319	fRc = g_pfnCryptCATAdminCalcHashFromFileHandle(hFile, &cbHash, abHash, 0 /dwFlags/);
2320	if (fRc)
2321	{
2322	/* Produce a string version of it that we can pass to WinVerifyTrust. */
2323	RTUTF16 wszDigest[SUPHARDNTVI_MAX_CAT_HASH_SIZE * 2 + 1];
2324	int rc2 = RTUtf16PrintHexBytes(wszDigest, RT_ELEMENTS(wszDigest), abHash, cbHash, RTSTRPRINTHEXBYTES_F_UPPER);
2325	if (RT_SUCCESS(rc2))
2326	{
2327	SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrustCatFile: cbHash=%u wszDigest=%ls\n", cbHash, wszDigest));
2328
2329	/*
2330	* Enumerate catalog information that matches the hash.
2331	*/
2332	uint32_t iCat = 0;
2333	HCATINFO hCatInfoPrev = NULL;
2334	do
2335	{
2336	/* Get the next match. */
2337	HCATINFO hCatInfo = g_pfnCryptCATAdminEnumCatalogFromHash(hCatAdmin, abHash, cbHash, 0, &hCatInfoPrev);
2338	if (!hCatInfo)
2339	{
2340	if (!fFreshContext)
2341	{
2342	SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrustCatFile: Retrying with fresh context (CryptCATAdminEnumCatalogFromHash -> %u; iCat=%#x)\n", GetLastError(), iCat));
2343	if (hCatInfoPrev != NULL)
2344	g_pfnCryptCATAdminReleaseCatalogContext(hCatAdmin, hCatInfoPrev, 0 /dwFlags/);
2345	g_pfnCryptCATAdminReleaseContext(hCatAdmin, 0 /dwFlags/);
2346	goto l_fresh_context;
2347	}
2348	if (iCat == 0)
2349	SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrustCatFile: CryptCATAdminEnumCatalogFromHash failed %u\n", GetLastError()));
2350	break;
2351	}
2352	Assert(hCatInfoPrev == NULL);
2353	hCatInfoPrev = hCatInfo;
2354
2355	/*
2356	* Call WinVerifyTrust.
2357	*/
2358	CATALOG_INFO CatInfo;
2359	CatInfo.cbStruct = sizeof(CatInfo);
2360	CatInfo.wszCatalogFile[0] = '\0';
2361	if (g_pfnCryptCATCatalogInfoFromContext(hCatInfo, &CatInfo, 0 /dwFlags/))
2362	{
2363	WINTRUST_CATALOG_INFO WtCatInfo;
2364	RT_ZERO(WtCatInfo);
2365	WtCatInfo.cbStruct = sizeof(WtCatInfo);
2366	WtCatInfo.dwCatalogVersion = 0;
2367	WtCatInfo.pcwszCatalogFilePath = CatInfo.wszCatalogFile;
2368	WtCatInfo.pcwszMemberTag = wszDigest;
2369	WtCatInfo.pcwszMemberFilePath = pwszWinPath;
2370	WtCatInfo.pbCalculatedFileHash = abHash;
2371	WtCatInfo.cbCalculatedFileHash = cbHash;
2372	WtCatInfo.pcCatalogContext = NULL;
2373
2374	WINTRUST_DATA TrustData;
2375	RT_ZERO(TrustData);
2376	TrustData.cbStruct = sizeof(TrustData);
2377	TrustData.fdwRevocationChecks = WTD_REVOKE_NONE; /* Keep simple for now. */
2378	TrustData.dwStateAction = WTD_STATEACTION_VERIFY;
2379	TrustData.dwUIChoice = WTD_UI_NONE;
2380	TrustData.dwProvFlags = 0;
2381	if (g_uNtVerCombined >= SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_SIMPLE(6, 0))
2382	TrustData.dwProvFlags = WTD_CACHE_ONLY_URL_RETRIEVAL;
2383	else
2384	TrustData.dwProvFlags = WTD_REVOCATION_CHECK_NONE;
2385	TrustData.dwUnionChoice = WTD_CHOICE_CATALOG;
2386	TrustData.pCatalog = &WtCatInfo;
2387
2388	HRESULT hrc = pfnWinVerifyTrust(NULL /hwnd/, &s_aPolicies[iPolicy], &TrustData);
2389	SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrustCatFile: WinVerifyTrust => %#x; cat='%ls'; file='%ls'\n",
2390	hrc, CatInfo.wszCatalogFile, pwszName));
2391
2392	if (SUCCEEDED(hrc))
2393	rc = VINF_SUCCESS;
2394	else if (hrc == TRUST_E_NOSIGNATURE)
2395	{ /* ignore because it's useless. */ }
2396	else if (hrc == ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER)
2397	{ /* This is returned if the given file isn't found in the catalog, it seems. */ }
2398	else
2399	{
2400	rc = RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, VERR_SUP_VP_WINTRUST_CAT_FAILURE,
2401	"WinVerifyTrust failed with hrc=%#x on '%ls' and .cat-file='%ls'.",
2402	hrc, pwszWinPath, CatInfo.wszCatalogFile);
2403	fTryNextPolicy \|= (hrc == CERT_E_UNTRUSTEDROOT);
2404	}
2405
2406	/* clean up state data. */
2407	TrustData.dwStateAction = WTD_STATEACTION_CLOSE;
2408	hrc = pfnWinVerifyTrust(NULL /hwnd/, &s_aPolicies[iPolicy], &TrustData);
2409	Assert(SUCCEEDED(hrc));
2410	}
2411	else
2412	{
2413	rc = RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, RTErrConvertFromWin32(GetLastError()),
2414	"CryptCATCatalogInfoFromContext failed: %d [file=%s]",
2415	GetLastError(), pwszName);
2416	SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrustCatFile: CryptCATCatalogInfoFromContext failed\n"));
2417	}
2418	iCat++;
2419	} while (rc == VERR_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED && iCat < 128);
2420
2421	if (hCatInfoPrev != NULL)
2422	if (!g_pfnCryptCATAdminReleaseCatalogContext(hCatAdmin, hCatInfoPrev, 0 /dwFlags/))
2423	AssertFailed();
2424	}
2425	else
2426	rc = RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, rc2, "RTUtf16PrintHexBytes failed: %Rrc", rc);
2427	}
2428	else
2429	rc = RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, RTErrConvertFromWin32(GetLastError()),
2430	"CryptCATAdminCalcHashFromFileHandle[2] failed: %d [file=%s]", GetLastError(), pwszName);
2431
2432	if (!ASMAtomicCmpXchgPtr(&s_aHashes[i].hCachedCatAdmin, hCatAdmin, NULL))
2433	if (!g_pfnCryptCATAdminReleaseContext(hCatAdmin, 0 /dwFlags/))
2434	AssertFailed();
2435	}
2436	else
2437	rc = RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, RTErrConvertFromWin32(GetLastError()),
2438	"CryptCATAdminAcquireContext[2] failed: %d [file=%s]", GetLastError(), pwszName);
2439	iPolicy++;
2440	} while ( fTryNextPolicy
2441	&& iPolicy < RT_ELEMENTS(s_aPolicies));
2442
2443	/*
2444	* Only repeat if we've got g_pfnCryptCATAdminAcquireContext2 and can specify the hash algorithm.
2445	*/
2446	if (!g_pfnCryptCATAdminAcquireContext2)
2447	break;
2448	if (rc != VERR_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED)
2449	break;
2450	}
2451
2452	if (hFileClose != NULL)
2453	NtClose(hFileClose);
2454
2455	return rc;
2456	}
2457
2458
2459	/**
2460	* Verifies the given image using WinVerifyTrust in some way.
2461	*
2462	* This is used by supHardenedWinVerifyImageByLdrMod as well as
2463	* supR3HardenedScreenImage.
2464	*
2465	* @returns IPRT status code.
2466	* @param hFile Handle of the file to verify.
2467	* @param pwszName Full NT path to the DLL in question, used for
2468	* dealing with unsigned system dlls as well as for
2469	* error/logging.
2470	* @param pfWinVerifyTrust Where to return whether WinVerifyTrust was
2471	* actually used.
2472	* @param pErrInfo Pointer to error info structure. Optional.
2473	*/
2474	DECLHIDDEN(int) supHardenedWinVerifyImageTrust(HANDLE hFile, PCRTUTF16 pwszName, uint32_t fFlags, int rc,
2475	bool *pfWinVerifyTrust, PRTERRINFO pErrInfo)
2476	{
2477	if (pfWinVerifyTrust)
2478	*pfWinVerifyTrust = false;
2479
2480	/*
2481	* Call the windows verify trust API if we've resolved it and aren't in
2482	* some obvious recursion.
2483	*/
2484	if (g_pfnWinVerifyTrust != NULL)
2485	{
2486	/* Check for recursion. */
2487	bool fNoRecursion;
2488	if (g_iTlsWinVerifyTrustRecursion != UINT32_MAX)
2489	{
2490	fNoRecursion = TlsGetValue(g_iTlsWinVerifyTrustRecursion) == 0;
2491	if (fNoRecursion)
2492	TlsSetValue(g_iTlsWinVerifyTrustRecursion, (void *)1);
2493	}
2494	else
2495	{
2496	uint32_t const idCurrentThread = GetCurrentThreadId();
2497	fNoRecursion = ASMAtomicCmpXchgU32(&g_idActiveThread, idCurrentThread, UINT32_MAX);
2498	}
2499	if (fNoRecursion)
2500	{
2501	/* We can call WinVerifyTrust. */
2502	if (pfWinVerifyTrust)
2503	*pfWinVerifyTrust = true;
2504
2505	if (rc != VERR_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED)
2506	{
2507	if (rc == VINF_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED)
2508	{
2509	if (fFlags & SUPHNTVI_F_ALLOW_CAT_FILE_VERIFICATION)
2510	{
2511	int rc2 = supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrustCatFile(hFile, pwszName, fFlags, pErrInfo, g_pfnWinVerifyTrust);
2512	SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrustCatFile -> %d (org %d)\n", rc2, rc));
2513	rc = rc2;
2514	}
2515	else
2516	{
2517	AssertFailed();
2518	rc = VERR_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED;
2519	}
2520	}
2521	else if (RT_SUCCESS(rc))
2522	{
2523	/** @todo having trouble with a 32-bit windows box when letting these calls thru */
2524	rc = supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrust(hFile, pwszName, fFlags, pErrInfo, g_pfnWinVerifyTrust);
2525	}
2526	else
2527	{
2528	int rc2 = supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrust(hFile, pwszName, fFlags, pErrInfo, g_pfnWinVerifyTrust);
2529	AssertMsg(RT_FAILURE_NP(rc2),
2530	("rc=%Rrc, rc2=%Rrc %s", rc, rc2, pErrInfo ? pErrInfo->pszMsg : "<no-err-info>"));
2531	}
2532	}
2533
2534	/* Unwind recursion. */
2535	if (g_iTlsWinVerifyTrustRecursion != UINT32_MAX)
2536	TlsSetValue(g_iTlsWinVerifyTrustRecursion, (void *)0);
2537	else
2538	ASMAtomicWriteU32(&g_idActiveThread, UINT32_MAX);
2539	}
2540	else
2541	SUP_DPRINTF(("Detected WinVerifyTrust recursion: rc=%Rrc '%ls'.\n", rc, pwszName));
2542	}
2543	return rc;
2544	}
2545
2546
2547	/**
2548	* Checks if WinVerifyTrust is callable on the current thread.
2549	*
2550	* Used by the main code to figure whether it makes sense to try revalidate an
2551	* image that hasn't passed thru WinVerifyTrust yet.
2552	*
2553	* @returns true if callable on current thread, false if not.
2554	*/
2555	DECLHIDDEN(bool) supHardenedWinIsWinVerifyTrustCallable(void)
2556	{
2557	return g_pfnWinVerifyTrust != NULL
2558	&& ( g_iTlsWinVerifyTrustRecursion != UINT32_MAX
2559	? (uintptr_t)TlsGetValue(g_iTlsWinVerifyTrustRecursion) == 0
2560	: g_idActiveThread != GetCurrentThreadId() );
2561	}
2562
2563
2564
2565	/**
2566	* Initializes g_uNtVerCombined and g_NtVerInfo.
2567	* Called from suplibHardenedWindowsMain and suplibOsInit.
2568	*/
2569	DECLHIDDEN(void) supR3HardenedWinInitVersion(void)
2570	{
2571	/*
2572	* Get the windows version. Use RtlGetVersion as GetVersionExW and
2573	* GetVersion might not be telling the whole truth (8.0 on 8.1 depending on
2574	* the application manifest).
2575	*/
2576	OSVERSIONINFOEXW NtVerInfo;
2577
2578	RT_ZERO(NtVerInfo);
2579	NtVerInfo.dwOSVersionInfoSize = sizeof(RTL_OSVERSIONINFOEXW);
2580	if (!NT_SUCCESS(RtlGetVersion((PRTL_OSVERSIONINFOW)&NtVerInfo)))
2581	{
2582	RT_ZERO(NtVerInfo);
2583	PPEB pPeb = NtCurrentPeb();
2584	NtVerInfo.dwMajorVersion = pPeb->OSMajorVersion;
2585	NtVerInfo.dwMinorVersion = pPeb->OSMinorVersion;
2586	NtVerInfo.dwBuildNumber = pPeb->OSPlatformId;
2587	}
2588
2589	g_uNtVerCombined = SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_COMBINED(NtVerInfo.dwMajorVersion, NtVerInfo.dwMinorVersion, NtVerInfo.dwBuildNumber,
2590	NtVerInfo.wServicePackMajor, NtVerInfo.wServicePackMinor);
2591	}
2592
2593	#endif /* IN_RING3 */
2594

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source: vbox/trunk/src/VBox/HostDrivers/Support/win/SUPHardenedVerifyImage-win.cpp@ 52634

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