IEMAllCImplSvmInstr.cpp.h@ 85546

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1	/* $Id: IEMAllCImplSvmInstr.cpp.h 82968 2020-02-04 10:35:17Z vboxsync $ */
2	/** @file
3	* IEM - AMD-V (Secure Virtual Machine) instruction implementation.
4	*/
5
6	/*
7	* Copyright (C) 2011-2020 Oracle Corporation
8	*
9	* This file is part of VirtualBox Open Source Edition (OSE), as
10	* available from http://www.virtualbox.org. This file is free software;
11	* you can redistribute it and/or modify it under the terms of the GNU
12	* General Public License (GPL) as published by the Free Software
13	* Foundation, in version 2 as it comes in the "COPYING" file of the
14	* VirtualBox OSE distribution. VirtualBox OSE is distributed in the
15	* hope that it will be useful, but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY of any kind.
16	*/
17
18
19	/*********************************************************************************************************************************
20	* Defined Constants And Macros *
21	*********************************************************************************************************************************/
22	#ifdef VBOX_WITH_NESTED_HWVIRT_SVM
23	/**
24	* Check the common SVM instruction preconditions.
25	*/
26	# define IEM_SVM_INSTR_COMMON_CHECKS(a_pVCpu, a_Instr) \
27	do { \
28	if (!CPUMIsGuestSvmEnabled(IEM_GET_CTX(a_pVCpu))) \
29	{ \
30	Log((RT_STR(a_Instr) ": EFER.SVME not enabled -> #UD\n")); \
31	return iemRaiseUndefinedOpcode(a_pVCpu); \
32	} \
33	if (IEM_IS_REAL_OR_V86_MODE(a_pVCpu)) \
34	{ \
35	Log((RT_STR(a_Instr) ": Real or v8086 mode -> #UD\n")); \
36	return iemRaiseUndefinedOpcode(a_pVCpu); \
37	} \
38	if ((a_pVCpu)->iem.s.uCpl != 0) \
39	{ \
40	Log((RT_STR(a_Instr) ": CPL != 0 -> #GP(0)\n")); \
41	return iemRaiseGeneralProtectionFault0(a_pVCpu); \
42	} \
43	} while (0)
44
45
46	/**
47	* Converts an IEM exception event type to an SVM event type.
48	*
49	* @returns The SVM event type.
50	* @retval UINT8_MAX if the specified type of event isn't among the set
51	* of recognized IEM event types.
52	*
53	* @param uVector The vector of the event.
54	* @param fIemXcptFlags The IEM exception / interrupt flags.
55	*/
56	IEM_STATIC uint8_t iemGetSvmEventType(uint32_t uVector, uint32_t fIemXcptFlags)
57	{
58	if (fIemXcptFlags & IEM_XCPT_FLAGS_T_CPU_XCPT)
59	{
60	if (uVector != X86_XCPT_NMI)
61	return SVM_EVENT_EXCEPTION;
62	return SVM_EVENT_NMI;
63	}
64
65	/* See AMD spec. Table 15-1. "Guest Exception or Interrupt Types". */
66	if (fIemXcptFlags & (IEM_XCPT_FLAGS_BP_INSTR \| IEM_XCPT_FLAGS_ICEBP_INSTR \| IEM_XCPT_FLAGS_OF_INSTR))
67	return SVM_EVENT_EXCEPTION;
68
69	if (fIemXcptFlags & IEM_XCPT_FLAGS_T_EXT_INT)
70	return SVM_EVENT_EXTERNAL_IRQ;
71
72	if (fIemXcptFlags & IEM_XCPT_FLAGS_T_SOFT_INT)
73	return SVM_EVENT_SOFTWARE_INT;
74
75	AssertMsgFailed(("iemGetSvmEventType: Invalid IEM xcpt/int. type %#x, uVector=%#x\n", fIemXcptFlags, uVector));
76	return UINT8_MAX;
77	}
78
79
80	/**
81	* Performs an SVM world-switch (VMRUN, \#VMEXIT) updating PGM and IEM internals.
82	*
83	* @returns Strict VBox status code.
84	* @param pVCpu The cross context virtual CPU structure.
85	*/
86	DECLINLINE(VBOXSTRICTRC) iemSvmWorldSwitch(PVMCPUCC pVCpu)
87	{
88	/*
89	* Inform PGM about paging mode changes.
90	* We include X86_CR0_PE because PGM doesn't handle paged-real mode yet,
91	* see comment in iemMemPageTranslateAndCheckAccess().
92	*/
93	int rc = PGMChangeMode(pVCpu, pVCpu->cpum.GstCtx.cr0 \| X86_CR0_PE, pVCpu->cpum.GstCtx.cr4, pVCpu->cpum.GstCtx.msrEFER);
94	# ifdef IN_RING3
95	Assert(rc != VINF_PGM_CHANGE_MODE);
96	# endif
97	AssertRCReturn(rc, rc);
98
99	/* Inform CPUM (recompiler), can later be removed. */
100	CPUMSetChangedFlags(pVCpu, CPUM_CHANGED_ALL);
101
102	/*
103	* Flush the TLB with new CR3. This is required in case the PGM mode change
104	* above doesn't actually change anything.
105	*/
106	if (rc == VINF_SUCCESS)
107	{
108	rc = PGMFlushTLB(pVCpu, pVCpu->cpum.GstCtx.cr3, true);
109	AssertRCReturn(rc, rc);
110	}
111
112	/* Re-initialize IEM cache/state after the drastic mode switch. */
113	iemReInitExec(pVCpu);
114	return rc;
115	}
116
117
118	/**
119	* SVM \#VMEXIT handler.
120	*
121	* @returns Strict VBox status code.
122	* @retval VINF_SVM_VMEXIT when the \#VMEXIT is successful.
123	* @retval VERR_SVM_VMEXIT_FAILED when the \#VMEXIT failed restoring the guest's
124	* "host state" and a shutdown is required.
125	*
126	* @param pVCpu The cross context virtual CPU structure.
127	* @param uExitCode The exit code.
128	* @param uExitInfo1 The exit info. 1 field.
129	* @param uExitInfo2 The exit info. 2 field.
130	*/
131	IEM_STATIC VBOXSTRICTRC iemSvmVmexit(PVMCPUCC pVCpu, uint64_t uExitCode, uint64_t uExitInfo1, uint64_t uExitInfo2)
132	{
133	VBOXSTRICTRC rcStrict;
134	if ( CPUMIsGuestInSvmNestedHwVirtMode(IEM_GET_CTX(pVCpu))
135	\|\| uExitCode == SVM_EXIT_INVALID)
136	{
137	LogFlow(("iemSvmVmexit: CS:RIP=%04x:%08RX64 uExitCode=%#RX64 uExitInfo1=%#RX64 uExitInfo2=%#RX64\n",
138	pVCpu->cpum.GstCtx.cs.Sel, pVCpu->cpum.GstCtx.rip, uExitCode, uExitInfo1, uExitInfo2));
139
140	/*
141	* Disable the global-interrupt flag to prevent interrupts during the 'atomic' world switch.
142	*/
143	CPUMSetGuestGif(&pVCpu->cpum.GstCtx, false);
144
145	/*
146	* Map the nested-guest VMCB from its location in guest memory.
147	* Write exactly what the CPU does on #VMEXIT thereby preserving most other bits in the
148	* guest's VMCB in memory, see @bugref{7243#c113} and related comment on iemSvmVmrun().
149	*/
150	PSVMVMCB pVmcbMem;
151	PGMPAGEMAPLOCK PgLockMem;
152	PSVMVMCBCTRL pVmcbCtrl = &pVCpu->cpum.GstCtx.hwvirt.svm.CTX_SUFF(pVmcb)->ctrl;
153	rcStrict = iemMemPageMap(pVCpu, pVCpu->cpum.GstCtx.hwvirt.svm.GCPhysVmcb, IEM_ACCESS_DATA_RW, (void **)&pVmcbMem,
154	&PgLockMem);
155	if (rcStrict == VINF_SUCCESS)
156	{
157	/*
158	* Notify HM in case the nested-guest was executed using hardware-assisted SVM (which
159	* would have modified some VMCB state) that might need to be restored on #VMEXIT before
160	* writing the VMCB back to guest memory.
161	*/
162	HMNotifySvmNstGstVmexit(pVCpu, IEM_GET_CTX(pVCpu));
163
164	Assert(CPUMSELREG_ARE_HIDDEN_PARTS_VALID(pVCpu, &pVCpu->cpum.GstCtx.es));
165	Assert(CPUMSELREG_ARE_HIDDEN_PARTS_VALID(pVCpu, &pVCpu->cpum.GstCtx.cs));
166	Assert(CPUMSELREG_ARE_HIDDEN_PARTS_VALID(pVCpu, &pVCpu->cpum.GstCtx.ss));
167	Assert(CPUMSELREG_ARE_HIDDEN_PARTS_VALID(pVCpu, &pVCpu->cpum.GstCtx.ds));
168
169	/*
170	* Save the nested-guest state into the VMCB state-save area.
171	*/
172	PSVMVMCBSTATESAVE pVmcbMemState = &pVmcbMem->guest;
173	HMSVM_SEG_REG_COPY_TO_VMCB(IEM_GET_CTX(pVCpu), pVmcbMemState, ES, es);
174	HMSVM_SEG_REG_COPY_TO_VMCB(IEM_GET_CTX(pVCpu), pVmcbMemState, CS, cs);
175	HMSVM_SEG_REG_COPY_TO_VMCB(IEM_GET_CTX(pVCpu), pVmcbMemState, SS, ss);
176	HMSVM_SEG_REG_COPY_TO_VMCB(IEM_GET_CTX(pVCpu), pVmcbMemState, DS, ds);
177	pVmcbMemState->GDTR.u32Limit = pVCpu->cpum.GstCtx.gdtr.cbGdt;
178	pVmcbMemState->GDTR.u64Base = pVCpu->cpum.GstCtx.gdtr.pGdt;
179	pVmcbMemState->IDTR.u32Limit = pVCpu->cpum.GstCtx.idtr.cbIdt;
180	pVmcbMemState->IDTR.u64Base = pVCpu->cpum.GstCtx.idtr.pIdt;
181	pVmcbMemState->u64EFER = pVCpu->cpum.GstCtx.msrEFER;
182	pVmcbMemState->u64CR4 = pVCpu->cpum.GstCtx.cr4;
183	pVmcbMemState->u64CR3 = pVCpu->cpum.GstCtx.cr3;
184	pVmcbMemState->u64CR2 = pVCpu->cpum.GstCtx.cr2;
185	pVmcbMemState->u64CR0 = pVCpu->cpum.GstCtx.cr0;
186	/** @todo Nested paging. */
187	pVmcbMemState->u64RFlags = pVCpu->cpum.GstCtx.rflags.u64;
188	pVmcbMemState->u64RIP = pVCpu->cpum.GstCtx.rip;
189	pVmcbMemState->u64RSP = pVCpu->cpum.GstCtx.rsp;
190	pVmcbMemState->u64RAX = pVCpu->cpum.GstCtx.rax;
191	pVmcbMemState->u64DR7 = pVCpu->cpum.GstCtx.dr[7];
192	pVmcbMemState->u64DR6 = pVCpu->cpum.GstCtx.dr[6];
193	pVmcbMemState->u8CPL = pVCpu->cpum.GstCtx.ss.Attr.n.u2Dpl; /* See comment in CPUMGetGuestCPL(). */
194	Assert(CPUMGetGuestCPL(pVCpu) == pVCpu->cpum.GstCtx.ss.Attr.n.u2Dpl);
195	if (CPUMIsGuestSvmNestedPagingEnabled(pVCpu, IEM_GET_CTX(pVCpu)))
196	pVmcbMemState->u64PAT = pVCpu->cpum.GstCtx.msrPAT;
197
198	/*
199	* Save additional state and intercept information.
200	*
201	* - V_IRQ: Tracked using VMCPU_FF_INTERRUPT_NESTED_GUEST force-flag and updated below.
202	* - V_TPR: Updated by iemCImpl_load_CrX or by the physical CPU for hardware-assisted
203	* SVM execution.
204	* - Interrupt shadow: Tracked using VMCPU_FF_INHIBIT_INTERRUPTS and RIP.
205	*/
206	PSVMVMCBCTRL pVmcbMemCtrl = &pVmcbMem->ctrl;
207	if (!VMCPU_FF_IS_SET(pVCpu, VMCPU_FF_INTERRUPT_NESTED_GUEST)) /* V_IRQ. */
208	pVmcbMemCtrl->IntCtrl.n.u1VIrqPending = 0;
209	else
210	{
211	Assert(pVmcbCtrl->IntCtrl.n.u1VIrqPending);
212	VMCPU_FF_CLEAR(pVCpu, VMCPU_FF_INTERRUPT_NESTED_GUEST);
213	}
214
215	pVmcbMemCtrl->IntCtrl.n.u8VTPR = pVmcbCtrl->IntCtrl.n.u8VTPR; /* V_TPR. */
216
217	if ( VMCPU_FF_IS_SET(pVCpu, VMCPU_FF_INHIBIT_INTERRUPTS) /* Interrupt shadow. */
218	&& EMGetInhibitInterruptsPC(pVCpu) == pVCpu->cpum.GstCtx.rip)
219	{
220	pVmcbMemCtrl->IntShadow.n.u1IntShadow = 1;
221	VMCPU_FF_CLEAR(pVCpu, VMCPU_FF_INHIBIT_INTERRUPTS);
222	LogFlow(("iemSvmVmexit: Interrupt shadow till %#RX64\n", pVCpu->cpum.GstCtx.rip));
223	}
224	else
225	pVmcbMemCtrl->IntShadow.n.u1IntShadow = 0;
226
227	/*
228	* Save nRIP, instruction length and byte fields.
229	*/
230	pVmcbMemCtrl->u64NextRIP = pVmcbCtrl->u64NextRIP;
231	pVmcbMemCtrl->cbInstrFetched = pVmcbCtrl->cbInstrFetched;
232	memcpy(&pVmcbMemCtrl->abInstr[0], &pVmcbCtrl->abInstr[0], sizeof(pVmcbMemCtrl->abInstr));
233
234	/*
235	* Save exit information.
236	*/
237	pVmcbMemCtrl->u64ExitCode = uExitCode;
238	pVmcbMemCtrl->u64ExitInfo1 = uExitInfo1;
239	pVmcbMemCtrl->u64ExitInfo2 = uExitInfo2;
240
241	/*
242	* Update the exit interrupt-information field if this #VMEXIT happened as a result
243	* of delivering an event through IEM.
244	*
245	* Don't update the exit interrupt-information field if the event wasn't being injected
246	* through IEM, as it would have been updated by real hardware if the nested-guest was
247	* executed using hardware-assisted SVM.
248	*/
249	{
250	uint8_t uExitIntVector;
251	uint32_t uExitIntErr;
252	uint32_t fExitIntFlags;
253	bool const fRaisingEvent = IEMGetCurrentXcpt(pVCpu, &uExitIntVector, &fExitIntFlags, &uExitIntErr,
254	NULL /* uExitIntCr2 */);
255	if (fRaisingEvent)
256	{
257	pVmcbCtrl->ExitIntInfo.n.u1Valid = 1;
258	pVmcbCtrl->ExitIntInfo.n.u8Vector = uExitIntVector;
259	pVmcbCtrl->ExitIntInfo.n.u3Type = iemGetSvmEventType(uExitIntVector, fExitIntFlags);
260	if (fExitIntFlags & IEM_XCPT_FLAGS_ERR)
261	{
262	pVmcbCtrl->ExitIntInfo.n.u1ErrorCodeValid = true;
263	pVmcbCtrl->ExitIntInfo.n.u32ErrorCode = uExitIntErr;
264	}
265	}
266	}
267
268	/*
269	* Save the exit interrupt-information field.
270	*
271	* We write the whole field including overwriting reserved bits as it was observed on an
272	* AMD Ryzen 5 Pro 1500 that the CPU does not preserve reserved bits in EXITINTINFO.
273	*/
274	pVmcbMemCtrl->ExitIntInfo = pVmcbCtrl->ExitIntInfo;
275
276	/*
277	* Clear event injection.
278	*/
279	pVmcbMemCtrl->EventInject.n.u1Valid = 0;
280
281	iemMemPageUnmap(pVCpu, pVCpu->cpum.GstCtx.hwvirt.svm.GCPhysVmcb, IEM_ACCESS_DATA_RW, pVmcbMem, &PgLockMem);
282	}
283
284	/*
285	* Prepare for guest's "host mode" by clearing internal processor state bits.
286	*
287	* We don't need to zero out the state-save area, just the controls should be
288	* sufficient because it has the critical bit of indicating whether we're inside
289	* the nested-guest or not.
290	*/
291	memset(pVmcbCtrl, 0, sizeof(*pVmcbCtrl));
292	Assert(!CPUMIsGuestInSvmNestedHwVirtMode(IEM_GET_CTX(pVCpu)));
293
294	/*
295	* Restore the subset of force-flags that were preserved.
296	*/
297	if (pVCpu->cpum.GstCtx.hwvirt.fLocalForcedActions)
298	{
299	VMCPU_FF_SET_MASK(pVCpu, pVCpu->cpum.GstCtx.hwvirt.fLocalForcedActions);
300	pVCpu->cpum.GstCtx.hwvirt.fLocalForcedActions = 0;
301	}
302
303	if (rcStrict == VINF_SUCCESS)
304	{
305	/** @todo Nested paging. */
306	/** @todo ASID. */
307
308	/*
309	* Reload the guest's "host state".
310	*/
311	CPUMSvmVmExitRestoreHostState(pVCpu, IEM_GET_CTX(pVCpu));
312
313	/*
314	* Update PGM, IEM and others of a world-switch.
315	*/
316	rcStrict = iemSvmWorldSwitch(pVCpu);
317	if (rcStrict == VINF_SUCCESS)
318	rcStrict = VINF_SVM_VMEXIT;
319	else if (RT_SUCCESS(rcStrict))
320	{
321	LogFlow(("iemSvmVmexit: Setting passup status from iemSvmWorldSwitch %Rrc\n", VBOXSTRICTRC_VAL(rcStrict)));
322	iemSetPassUpStatus(pVCpu, rcStrict);
323	rcStrict = VINF_SVM_VMEXIT;
324	}
325	else
326	LogFlow(("iemSvmVmexit: iemSvmWorldSwitch unexpected failure. rc=%Rrc\n", VBOXSTRICTRC_VAL(rcStrict)));
327	}
328	else
329	{
330	AssertMsgFailed(("iemSvmVmexit: Mapping VMCB at %#RGp failed. rc=%Rrc\n", pVCpu->cpum.GstCtx.hwvirt.svm.GCPhysVmcb, VBOXSTRICTRC_VAL(rcStrict)));
331	rcStrict = VERR_SVM_VMEXIT_FAILED;
332	}
333	}
334	else
335	{
336	AssertMsgFailed(("iemSvmVmexit: Not in SVM guest mode! uExitCode=%#RX64 uExitInfo1=%#RX64 uExitInfo2=%#RX64\n", uExitCode, uExitInfo1, uExitInfo2));
337	rcStrict = VERR_SVM_IPE_3;
338	}
339
340	# if defined(VBOX_WITH_NESTED_HWVIRT_ONLY_IN_IEM) && defined(IN_RING3)
341	/* CLGI/STGI may not have been intercepted and thus not executed in IEM. */
342	if ( HMIsEnabled(pVCpu->CTX_SUFF(pVM))
343	&& HMIsSvmVGifActive(pVCpu->CTX_SUFF(pVM)))
344	return EMR3SetExecutionPolicy(pVCpu->CTX_SUFF(pVM)->pUVM, EMEXECPOLICY_IEM_ALL, false);
345	# endif
346	return rcStrict;
347	}
348
349
350	/**
351	* Performs the operations necessary that are part of the vmrun instruction
352	* execution in the guest.
353	*
354	* @returns Strict VBox status code (i.e. informational status codes too).
355	* @retval VINF_SUCCESS successfully executed VMRUN and entered nested-guest
356	* code execution.
357	* @retval VINF_SVM_VMEXIT when executing VMRUN causes a \#VMEXIT
358	* (SVM_EXIT_INVALID most likely).
359	*
360	* @param pVCpu The cross context virtual CPU structure.
361	* @param cbInstr The length of the VMRUN instruction.
362	* @param GCPhysVmcb Guest physical address of the VMCB to run.
363	*/
364	IEM_STATIC VBOXSTRICTRC iemSvmVmrun(PVMCPUCC pVCpu, uint8_t cbInstr, RTGCPHYS GCPhysVmcb)
365	{
366	LogFlow(("iemSvmVmrun\n"));
367
368	/*
369	* Cache the physical address of the VMCB for #VMEXIT exceptions.
370	*/
371	pVCpu->cpum.GstCtx.hwvirt.svm.GCPhysVmcb = GCPhysVmcb;
372
373	/*
374	* Save the host state.
375	*/
376	CPUMSvmVmRunSaveHostState(IEM_GET_CTX(pVCpu), cbInstr);
377
378	/*
379	* Read the guest VMCB.
380	*/
381	PVMCC pVM = pVCpu->CTX_SUFF(pVM);
382	int rc = PGMPhysSimpleReadGCPhys(pVM, pVCpu->cpum.GstCtx.hwvirt.svm.CTX_SUFF(pVmcb), GCPhysVmcb, sizeof(SVMVMCB));
383	if (RT_SUCCESS(rc))
384	{
385	/*
386	* AMD-V seems to preserve reserved fields and only writes back selected, recognized
387	* fields on #VMEXIT. However, not all reserved bits are preserved (e.g, EXITINTINFO)
388	* but in our implementation we try to preserve as much as we possibly can.
389	*
390	* We could read the entire page here and only write back the relevant fields on
391	* #VMEXIT but since our internal VMCB is also being used by HM during hardware-assisted
392	* SVM execution, it creates a potential for a nested-hypervisor to set bits that are
393	* currently reserved but may be recognized as features bits in future CPUs causing
394	* unexpected & undesired results. Hence, we zero out unrecognized fields here as we
395	* typically enter hardware-assisted SVM soon anyway, see @bugref{7243#c113}.
396	*/
397	PSVMVMCBCTRL pVmcbCtrl = &pVCpu->cpum.GstCtx.hwvirt.svm.CTX_SUFF(pVmcb)->ctrl;
398	PSVMVMCBSTATESAVE pVmcbNstGst = &pVCpu->cpum.GstCtx.hwvirt.svm.CTX_SUFF(pVmcb)->guest;
399
400	RT_ZERO(pVmcbCtrl->u8Reserved0);
401	RT_ZERO(pVmcbCtrl->u8Reserved1);
402	RT_ZERO(pVmcbCtrl->u8Reserved2);
403	RT_ZERO(pVmcbNstGst->u8Reserved0);
404	RT_ZERO(pVmcbNstGst->u8Reserved1);
405	RT_ZERO(pVmcbNstGst->u8Reserved2);
406	RT_ZERO(pVmcbNstGst->u8Reserved3);
407	RT_ZERO(pVmcbNstGst->u8Reserved4);
408	RT_ZERO(pVmcbNstGst->u8Reserved5);
409	pVmcbCtrl->u32Reserved0 = 0;
410	pVmcbCtrl->TLBCtrl.n.u24Reserved = 0;
411	pVmcbCtrl->IntCtrl.n.u6Reserved = 0;
412	pVmcbCtrl->IntCtrl.n.u3Reserved = 0;
413	pVmcbCtrl->IntCtrl.n.u5Reserved = 0;
414	pVmcbCtrl->IntCtrl.n.u24Reserved = 0;
415	pVmcbCtrl->IntShadow.n.u30Reserved = 0;
416	pVmcbCtrl->ExitIntInfo.n.u19Reserved = 0;
417	pVmcbCtrl->NestedPagingCtrl.n.u29Reserved = 0;
418	pVmcbCtrl->EventInject.n.u19Reserved = 0;
419	pVmcbCtrl->LbrVirt.n.u30Reserved = 0;
420
421	/*
422	* Validate guest-state and controls.
423	*/
424	/* VMRUN must always be intercepted. */
425	if (!CPUMIsGuestSvmCtrlInterceptSet(pVCpu, IEM_GET_CTX(pVCpu), SVM_CTRL_INTERCEPT_VMRUN))
426	{
427	Log(("iemSvmVmrun: VMRUN instruction not intercepted -> #VMEXIT\n"));
428	return iemSvmVmexit(pVCpu, SVM_EXIT_INVALID, 0 /* uExitInfo1 /, 0 / uExitInfo2 */);
429	}
430
431	/* Nested paging. */
432	if ( pVmcbCtrl->NestedPagingCtrl.n.u1NestedPaging
433	&& !pVM->cpum.ro.GuestFeatures.fSvmNestedPaging)
434	{
435	Log(("iemSvmVmrun: Nested paging not supported -> Disabling\n"));
436	pVmcbCtrl->NestedPagingCtrl.n.u1NestedPaging = 0;
437	}
438
439	/* AVIC. */
440	if ( pVmcbCtrl->IntCtrl.n.u1AvicEnable
441	&& !pVM->cpum.ro.GuestFeatures.fSvmAvic)
442	{
443	Log(("iemSvmVmrun: AVIC not supported -> Disabling\n"));
444	pVmcbCtrl->IntCtrl.n.u1AvicEnable = 0;
445	}
446
447	/* Last branch record (LBR) virtualization. */
448	if ( pVmcbCtrl->LbrVirt.n.u1LbrVirt
449	&& !pVM->cpum.ro.GuestFeatures.fSvmLbrVirt)
450	{
451	Log(("iemSvmVmrun: LBR virtualization not supported -> Disabling\n"));
452	pVmcbCtrl->LbrVirt.n.u1LbrVirt = 0;
453	}
454
455	/* Virtualized VMSAVE/VMLOAD. */
456	if ( pVmcbCtrl->LbrVirt.n.u1VirtVmsaveVmload
457	&& !pVM->cpum.ro.GuestFeatures.fSvmVirtVmsaveVmload)
458	{
459	Log(("iemSvmVmrun: Virtualized VMSAVE/VMLOAD not supported -> Disabling\n"));
460	pVmcbCtrl->LbrVirt.n.u1VirtVmsaveVmload = 0;
461	}
462
463	/* Virtual GIF. */
464	if ( pVmcbCtrl->IntCtrl.n.u1VGifEnable
465	&& !pVM->cpum.ro.GuestFeatures.fSvmVGif)
466	{
467	Log(("iemSvmVmrun: Virtual GIF not supported -> Disabling\n"));
468	pVmcbCtrl->IntCtrl.n.u1VGifEnable = 0;
469	}
470
471	/* Guest ASID. */
472	if (!pVmcbCtrl->TLBCtrl.n.u32ASID)
473	{
474	Log(("iemSvmVmrun: Guest ASID is invalid -> #VMEXIT\n"));
475	return iemSvmVmexit(pVCpu, SVM_EXIT_INVALID, 0 /* uExitInfo1 /, 0 / uExitInfo2 */);
476	}
477
478	/* Guest AVIC. */
479	if ( pVmcbCtrl->IntCtrl.n.u1AvicEnable
480	&& !pVM->cpum.ro.GuestFeatures.fSvmAvic)
481	{
482	Log(("iemSvmVmrun: AVIC not supported -> Disabling\n"));
483	pVmcbCtrl->IntCtrl.n.u1AvicEnable = 0;
484	}
485
486	/* Guest Secure Encrypted Virtualization. */
487	if ( ( pVmcbCtrl->NestedPagingCtrl.n.u1Sev
488	\|\| pVmcbCtrl->NestedPagingCtrl.n.u1SevEs)
489	&& !pVM->cpum.ro.GuestFeatures.fSvmAvic)
490	{
491	Log(("iemSvmVmrun: SEV not supported -> Disabling\n"));
492	pVmcbCtrl->NestedPagingCtrl.n.u1Sev = 0;
493	pVmcbCtrl->NestedPagingCtrl.n.u1SevEs = 0;
494	}
495
496	/* Flush by ASID. */
497	if ( !pVM->cpum.ro.GuestFeatures.fSvmFlusbByAsid
498	&& pVmcbCtrl->TLBCtrl.n.u8TLBFlush != SVM_TLB_FLUSH_NOTHING
499	&& pVmcbCtrl->TLBCtrl.n.u8TLBFlush != SVM_TLB_FLUSH_ENTIRE)
500	{
501	Log(("iemSvmVmrun: Flush-by-ASID not supported -> #VMEXIT\n"));
502	return iemSvmVmexit(pVCpu, SVM_EXIT_INVALID, 0 /* uExitInfo1 /, 0 / uExitInfo2 */);
503	}
504
505	/* IO permission bitmap. */
506	RTGCPHYS const GCPhysIOBitmap = pVmcbCtrl->u64IOPMPhysAddr;
507	if ( (GCPhysIOBitmap & X86_PAGE_4K_OFFSET_MASK)
508	\|\| !PGMPhysIsGCPhysNormal(pVM, GCPhysIOBitmap)
509	\|\| !PGMPhysIsGCPhysNormal(pVM, GCPhysIOBitmap + X86_PAGE_4K_SIZE)
510	\|\| !PGMPhysIsGCPhysNormal(pVM, GCPhysIOBitmap + (X86_PAGE_4K_SIZE << 1)))
511	{
512	Log(("iemSvmVmrun: IO bitmap physaddr invalid. GCPhysIOBitmap=%#RX64 -> #VMEXIT\n", GCPhysIOBitmap));
513	return iemSvmVmexit(pVCpu, SVM_EXIT_INVALID, 0 /* uExitInfo1 /, 0 / uExitInfo2 */);
514	}
515
516	/* MSR permission bitmap. */
517	RTGCPHYS const GCPhysMsrBitmap = pVmcbCtrl->u64MSRPMPhysAddr;
518	if ( (GCPhysMsrBitmap & X86_PAGE_4K_OFFSET_MASK)
519	\|\| !PGMPhysIsGCPhysNormal(pVM, GCPhysMsrBitmap)
520	\|\| !PGMPhysIsGCPhysNormal(pVM, GCPhysMsrBitmap + X86_PAGE_4K_SIZE))
521	{
522	Log(("iemSvmVmrun: MSR bitmap physaddr invalid. GCPhysMsrBitmap=%#RX64 -> #VMEXIT\n", GCPhysMsrBitmap));
523	return iemSvmVmexit(pVCpu, SVM_EXIT_INVALID, 0 /* uExitInfo1 /, 0 / uExitInfo2 */);
524	}
525
526	/* CR0. */
527	if ( !(pVmcbNstGst->u64CR0 & X86_CR0_CD)
528	&& (pVmcbNstGst->u64CR0 & X86_CR0_NW))
529	{
530	Log(("iemSvmVmrun: CR0 no-write through with cache disabled. CR0=%#RX64 -> #VMEXIT\n", pVmcbNstGst->u64CR0));
531	return iemSvmVmexit(pVCpu, SVM_EXIT_INVALID, 0 /* uExitInfo1 /, 0 / uExitInfo2 */);
532	}
533	if (pVmcbNstGst->u64CR0 >> 32)
534	{
535	Log(("iemSvmVmrun: CR0 reserved bits set. CR0=%#RX64 -> #VMEXIT\n", pVmcbNstGst->u64CR0));
536	return iemSvmVmexit(pVCpu, SVM_EXIT_INVALID, 0 /* uExitInfo1 /, 0 / uExitInfo2 */);
537	}
538	/** @todo Implement all reserved bits/illegal combinations for CR3, CR4. */
539
540	/* DR6 and DR7. */
541	if ( pVmcbNstGst->u64DR6 >> 32
542	\|\| pVmcbNstGst->u64DR7 >> 32)
543	{
544	Log(("iemSvmVmrun: DR6 and/or DR7 reserved bits set. DR6=%#RX64 DR7=%#RX64 -> #VMEXIT\n", pVmcbNstGst->u64DR6,
545	pVmcbNstGst->u64DR6));
546	return iemSvmVmexit(pVCpu, SVM_EXIT_INVALID, 0 /* uExitInfo1 /, 0 / uExitInfo2 */);
547	}
548
549	/*
550	* PAT (Page Attribute Table) MSR.
551	*
552	* The CPU only validates and loads it when nested-paging is enabled.
553	* See AMD spec. "15.25.4 Nested Paging and VMRUN/#VMEXIT".
554	*/
555	if ( pVmcbCtrl->NestedPagingCtrl.n.u1NestedPaging
556	&& !CPUMIsPatMsrValid(pVmcbNstGst->u64PAT))
557	{
558	Log(("iemSvmVmrun: PAT invalid. u64PAT=%#RX64 -> #VMEXIT\n", pVmcbNstGst->u64PAT));
559	return iemSvmVmexit(pVCpu, SVM_EXIT_INVALID, 0 /* uExitInfo1 /, 0 / uExitInfo2 */);
560	}
561
562	/*
563	* Copy the IO permission bitmap into the cache.
564	*/
565	Assert(pVCpu->cpum.GstCtx.hwvirt.svm.CTX_SUFF(pvIoBitmap));
566	rc = PGMPhysSimpleReadGCPhys(pVM, pVCpu->cpum.GstCtx.hwvirt.svm.CTX_SUFF(pvIoBitmap), GCPhysIOBitmap,
567	SVM_IOPM_PAGES * X86_PAGE_4K_SIZE);
568	if (RT_FAILURE(rc))
569	{
570	Log(("iemSvmVmrun: Failed reading the IO permission bitmap at %#RGp. rc=%Rrc\n", GCPhysIOBitmap, rc));
571	return iemSvmVmexit(pVCpu, SVM_EXIT_INVALID, 0 /* uExitInfo1 /, 0 / uExitInfo2 */);
572	}
573
574	/*
575	* Copy the MSR permission bitmap into the cache.
576	*/
577	Assert(pVCpu->cpum.GstCtx.hwvirt.svm.CTX_SUFF(pvMsrBitmap));
578	rc = PGMPhysSimpleReadGCPhys(pVM, pVCpu->cpum.GstCtx.hwvirt.svm.CTX_SUFF(pvMsrBitmap), GCPhysMsrBitmap,
579	SVM_MSRPM_PAGES * X86_PAGE_4K_SIZE);
580	if (RT_FAILURE(rc))
581	{
582	Log(("iemSvmVmrun: Failed reading the MSR permission bitmap at %#RGp. rc=%Rrc\n", GCPhysMsrBitmap, rc));
583	return iemSvmVmexit(pVCpu, SVM_EXIT_INVALID, 0 /* uExitInfo1 /, 0 / uExitInfo2 */);
584	}
585
586	/*
587	* Copy segments from nested-guest VMCB state to the guest-CPU state.
588	*
589	* We do this here as we need to use the CS attributes and it's easier this way
590	* then using the VMCB format selectors. It doesn't really matter where we copy
591	* the state, we restore the guest-CPU context state on the \#VMEXIT anyway.
592	*/
593	HMSVM_SEG_REG_COPY_FROM_VMCB(IEM_GET_CTX(pVCpu), pVmcbNstGst, ES, es);
594	HMSVM_SEG_REG_COPY_FROM_VMCB(IEM_GET_CTX(pVCpu), pVmcbNstGst, CS, cs);
595	HMSVM_SEG_REG_COPY_FROM_VMCB(IEM_GET_CTX(pVCpu), pVmcbNstGst, SS, ss);
596	HMSVM_SEG_REG_COPY_FROM_VMCB(IEM_GET_CTX(pVCpu), pVmcbNstGst, DS, ds);
597
598	/** @todo Segment attribute overrides by VMRUN. */
599
600	/*
601	* CPL adjustments and overrides.
602	*
603	* SS.DPL is apparently the CPU's CPL, see comment in CPUMGetGuestCPL().
604	* We shall thus adjust both CS.DPL and SS.DPL here.
605	*/
606	pVCpu->cpum.GstCtx.cs.Attr.n.u2Dpl = pVCpu->cpum.GstCtx.ss.Attr.n.u2Dpl = pVmcbNstGst->u8CPL;
607	if (CPUMIsGuestInV86ModeEx(IEM_GET_CTX(pVCpu)))
608	pVCpu->cpum.GstCtx.cs.Attr.n.u2Dpl = pVCpu->cpum.GstCtx.ss.Attr.n.u2Dpl = 3;
609	if (CPUMIsGuestInRealModeEx(IEM_GET_CTX(pVCpu)))
610	pVCpu->cpum.GstCtx.cs.Attr.n.u2Dpl = pVCpu->cpum.GstCtx.ss.Attr.n.u2Dpl = 0;
611	Assert(CPUMSELREG_ARE_HIDDEN_PARTS_VALID(pVCpu, &pVCpu->cpum.GstCtx.ss));
612
613	/*
614	* Continue validating guest-state and controls.
615	*
616	* We pass CR0 as 0 to CPUMIsGuestEferMsrWriteValid() below to skip the illegal
617	* EFER.LME bit transition check. We pass the nested-guest's EFER as both the
618	* old and new EFER value to not have any guest EFER bits influence the new
619	* nested-guest EFER.
620	*/
621	uint64_t uValidEfer;
622	rc = CPUMIsGuestEferMsrWriteValid(pVM, 0 /* CR0 */, pVmcbNstGst->u64EFER, pVmcbNstGst->u64EFER, &uValidEfer);
623	if (RT_FAILURE(rc))
624	{
625	Log(("iemSvmVmrun: EFER invalid uOldEfer=%#RX64 -> #VMEXIT\n", pVmcbNstGst->u64EFER));
626	return iemSvmVmexit(pVCpu, SVM_EXIT_INVALID, 0 /* uExitInfo1 /, 0 / uExitInfo2 */);
627	}
628
629	/* Validate paging and CPU mode bits. */
630	bool const fSvm = RT_BOOL(uValidEfer & MSR_K6_EFER_SVME);
631	bool const fLongModeSupported = RT_BOOL(pVM->cpum.ro.GuestFeatures.fLongMode);
632	bool const fLongModeEnabled = RT_BOOL(uValidEfer & MSR_K6_EFER_LME);
633	bool const fPaging = RT_BOOL(pVmcbNstGst->u64CR0 & X86_CR0_PG);
634	bool const fPae = RT_BOOL(pVmcbNstGst->u64CR4 & X86_CR4_PAE);
635	bool const fProtMode = RT_BOOL(pVmcbNstGst->u64CR0 & X86_CR0_PE);
636	bool const fLongModeWithPaging = fLongModeEnabled && fPaging;
637	bool const fLongModeConformCS = pVCpu->cpum.GstCtx.cs.Attr.n.u1Long && pVCpu->cpum.GstCtx.cs.Attr.n.u1DefBig;
638	/* Adjust EFER.LMA (this is normally done by the CPU when system software writes CR0). */
639	if (fLongModeWithPaging)
640	uValidEfer \|= MSR_K6_EFER_LMA;
641	bool const fLongModeActiveOrEnabled = RT_BOOL(uValidEfer & (MSR_K6_EFER_LME \| MSR_K6_EFER_LMA));
642	if ( !fSvm
643	\|\| (!fLongModeSupported && fLongModeActiveOrEnabled)
644	\|\| (fLongModeWithPaging && !fPae)
645	\|\| (fLongModeWithPaging && !fProtMode)
646	\|\| ( fLongModeEnabled
647	&& fPaging
648	&& fPae
649	&& fLongModeConformCS))
650	{
651	Log(("iemSvmVmrun: EFER invalid. uValidEfer=%#RX64 -> #VMEXIT\n", uValidEfer));
652	return iemSvmVmexit(pVCpu, SVM_EXIT_INVALID, 0 /* uExitInfo1 /, 0 / uExitInfo2 */);
653	}
654
655	/*
656	* Preserve the required force-flags.
657	*
658	* We only preserve the force-flags that would affect the execution of the
659	* nested-guest (or the guest).
660	*
661	* - VMCPU_FF_BLOCK_NMIS needs to be preserved as it blocks NMI until the
662	* execution of a subsequent IRET instruction in the guest.
663	*
664	* The remaining FFs (e.g. timers) can stay in place so that we will be able to
665	* generate interrupts that should cause #VMEXITs for the nested-guest.
666	*
667	* VMRUN has implicit GIF (Global Interrupt Flag) handling, we don't need to
668	* preserve VMCPU_FF_INHIBIT_INTERRUPTS.
669	*/
670	pVCpu->cpum.GstCtx.hwvirt.fLocalForcedActions = pVCpu->fLocalForcedActions & VMCPU_FF_BLOCK_NMIS;
671	VMCPU_FF_CLEAR(pVCpu, VMCPU_FF_BLOCK_NMIS);
672
673	/*
674	* Pause filter.
675	*/
676	if (pVM->cpum.ro.GuestFeatures.fSvmPauseFilter)
677	{
678	pVCpu->cpum.GstCtx.hwvirt.svm.cPauseFilter = pVmcbCtrl->u16PauseFilterCount;
679	if (pVM->cpum.ro.GuestFeatures.fSvmPauseFilterThreshold)
680	pVCpu->cpum.GstCtx.hwvirt.svm.cPauseFilterThreshold = pVmcbCtrl->u16PauseFilterCount;
681	}
682
683	/*
684	* Interrupt shadow.
685	*/
686	if (pVmcbCtrl->IntShadow.n.u1IntShadow)
687	{
688	LogFlow(("iemSvmVmrun: setting interrupt shadow. inhibit PC=%#RX64\n", pVmcbNstGst->u64RIP));
689	/** @todo will this cause trouble if the nested-guest is 64-bit but the guest is 32-bit? */
690	EMSetInhibitInterruptsPC(pVCpu, pVmcbNstGst->u64RIP);
691	}
692
693	/*
694	* TLB flush control.
695	* Currently disabled since it's redundant as we unconditionally flush the TLB
696	* in iemSvmWorldSwitch() below.
697	*/
698	# if 0
699	/** @todo @bugref{7243}: ASID based PGM TLB flushes. */
700	if ( pVmcbCtrl->TLBCtrl.n.u8TLBFlush == SVM_TLB_FLUSH_ENTIRE
701	\|\| pVmcbCtrl->TLBCtrl.n.u8TLBFlush == SVM_TLB_FLUSH_SINGLE_CONTEXT
702	\|\| pVmcbCtrl->TLBCtrl.n.u8TLBFlush == SVM_TLB_FLUSH_SINGLE_CONTEXT_RETAIN_GLOBALS)
703	PGMFlushTLB(pVCpu, pVmcbNstGst->u64CR3, true /* fGlobal */);
704	# endif
705
706	/*
707	* Copy the remaining guest state from the VMCB to the guest-CPU context.
708	*/
709	pVCpu->cpum.GstCtx.gdtr.cbGdt = pVmcbNstGst->GDTR.u32Limit;
710	pVCpu->cpum.GstCtx.gdtr.pGdt = pVmcbNstGst->GDTR.u64Base;
711	pVCpu->cpum.GstCtx.idtr.cbIdt = pVmcbNstGst->IDTR.u32Limit;
712	pVCpu->cpum.GstCtx.idtr.pIdt = pVmcbNstGst->IDTR.u64Base;
713	CPUMSetGuestCR0(pVCpu, pVmcbNstGst->u64CR0);
714	CPUMSetGuestCR4(pVCpu, pVmcbNstGst->u64CR4);
715	pVCpu->cpum.GstCtx.cr3 = pVmcbNstGst->u64CR3;
716	pVCpu->cpum.GstCtx.cr2 = pVmcbNstGst->u64CR2;
717	pVCpu->cpum.GstCtx.dr[6] = pVmcbNstGst->u64DR6;
718	pVCpu->cpum.GstCtx.dr[7] = pVmcbNstGst->u64DR7;
719	pVCpu->cpum.GstCtx.rflags.u64 = pVmcbNstGst->u64RFlags;
720	pVCpu->cpum.GstCtx.rax = pVmcbNstGst->u64RAX;
721	pVCpu->cpum.GstCtx.rsp = pVmcbNstGst->u64RSP;
722	pVCpu->cpum.GstCtx.rip = pVmcbNstGst->u64RIP;
723	CPUMSetGuestEferMsrNoChecks(pVCpu, pVCpu->cpum.GstCtx.msrEFER, uValidEfer);
724	if (pVmcbCtrl->NestedPagingCtrl.n.u1NestedPaging)
725	pVCpu->cpum.GstCtx.msrPAT = pVmcbNstGst->u64PAT;
726
727	/* Mask DR6, DR7 bits mandatory set/clear bits. */
728	pVCpu->cpum.GstCtx.dr[6] &= ~(X86_DR6_RAZ_MASK \| X86_DR6_MBZ_MASK);
729	pVCpu->cpum.GstCtx.dr[6] \|= X86_DR6_RA1_MASK;
730	pVCpu->cpum.GstCtx.dr[7] &= ~(X86_DR7_RAZ_MASK \| X86_DR7_MBZ_MASK);
731	pVCpu->cpum.GstCtx.dr[7] \|= X86_DR7_RA1_MASK;
732
733	/*
734	* Check for pending virtual interrupts.
735	*/
736	if (pVmcbCtrl->IntCtrl.n.u1VIrqPending)
737	VMCPU_FF_SET(pVCpu, VMCPU_FF_INTERRUPT_NESTED_GUEST);
738	else
739	Assert(!VMCPU_FF_IS_SET(pVCpu, VMCPU_FF_INTERRUPT_NESTED_GUEST));
740
741	/*
742	* Update PGM, IEM and others of a world-switch.
743	*/
744	VBOXSTRICTRC rcStrict = iemSvmWorldSwitch(pVCpu);
745	if (rcStrict == VINF_SUCCESS)
746	{ /* likely */ }
747	else if (RT_SUCCESS(rcStrict))
748	{
749	LogFlow(("iemSvmVmrun: iemSvmWorldSwitch returned %Rrc, setting passup status\n", VBOXSTRICTRC_VAL(rcStrict)));
750	rcStrict = iemSetPassUpStatus(pVCpu, rcStrict);
751	}
752	else
753	{
754	LogFlow(("iemSvmVmrun: iemSvmWorldSwitch unexpected failure. rc=%Rrc\n", VBOXSTRICTRC_VAL(rcStrict)));
755	return rcStrict;
756	}
757
758	/*
759	* Set the global-interrupt flag to allow interrupts in the guest.
760	*/
761	CPUMSetGuestGif(&pVCpu->cpum.GstCtx, true);
762
763	/*
764	* Event injection.
765	*/
766	PCSVMEVENT pEventInject = &pVmcbCtrl->EventInject;
767	pVCpu->cpum.GstCtx.hwvirt.svm.fInterceptEvents = !pEventInject->n.u1Valid;
768	if (pEventInject->n.u1Valid)
769	{
770	uint8_t const uVector = pEventInject->n.u8Vector;
771	TRPMEVENT const enmType = HMSvmEventToTrpmEventType(pEventInject, uVector);
772	uint16_t const uErrorCode = pEventInject->n.u1ErrorCodeValid ? pEventInject->n.u32ErrorCode : 0;
773
774	/* Validate vectors for hardware exceptions, see AMD spec. 15.20 "Event Injection". */
775	if (RT_UNLIKELY(enmType == TRPM_32BIT_HACK))
776	{
777	Log(("iemSvmVmrun: Invalid event type =%#x -> #VMEXIT\n", (uint8_t)pEventInject->n.u3Type));
778	return iemSvmVmexit(pVCpu, SVM_EXIT_INVALID, 0 /* uExitInfo1 /, 0 / uExitInfo2 */);
779	}
780	if (pEventInject->n.u3Type == SVM_EVENT_EXCEPTION)
781	{
782	if ( uVector == X86_XCPT_NMI
783	\|\| uVector > X86_XCPT_LAST)
784	{
785	Log(("iemSvmVmrun: Invalid vector for hardware exception. uVector=%#x -> #VMEXIT\n", uVector));
786	return iemSvmVmexit(pVCpu, SVM_EXIT_INVALID, 0 /* uExitInfo1 /, 0 / uExitInfo2 */);
787	}
788	if ( uVector == X86_XCPT_BR
789	&& CPUMIsGuestInLongModeEx(IEM_GET_CTX(pVCpu)))
790	{
791	Log(("iemSvmVmrun: Cannot inject #BR when not in long mode -> #VMEXIT\n"));
792	return iemSvmVmexit(pVCpu, SVM_EXIT_INVALID, 0 /* uExitInfo1 /, 0 / uExitInfo2 */);
793	}
794	/** @todo any others? */
795	}
796
797	/*
798	* Invalidate the exit interrupt-information field here. This field is fully updated
799	* on #VMEXIT as events other than the one below can also cause intercepts during
800	* their injection (e.g. exceptions).
801	*/
802	pVmcbCtrl->ExitIntInfo.n.u1Valid = 0;
803
804	/*
805	* Clear the event injection valid bit here. While the AMD spec. mentions that the CPU
806	* clears this bit from the VMCB unconditionally on #VMEXIT, internally the CPU could be
807	* clearing it at any time, most likely before/after injecting the event. Since VirtualBox
808	* doesn't have any virtual-CPU internal representation of this bit, we clear/update the
809	* VMCB here. This also has the added benefit that we avoid the risk of injecting the event
810	* twice if we fallback to executing the nested-guest using hardware-assisted SVM after
811	* injecting the event through IEM here.
812	*/
813	pVmcbCtrl->EventInject.n.u1Valid = 0;
814
815	/** @todo NRIP: Software interrupts can only be pushed properly if we support
816	* NRIP for the nested-guest to calculate the instruction length
817	* below. */
818	LogFlow(("iemSvmVmrun: Injecting event: %04x:%08RX64 vec=%#x type=%d uErr=%u cr2=%#RX64 cr3=%#RX64 efer=%#RX64\n",
819	pVCpu->cpum.GstCtx.cs.Sel, pVCpu->cpum.GstCtx.rip, uVector, enmType, uErrorCode, pVCpu->cpum.GstCtx.cr2,
820	pVCpu->cpum.GstCtx.cr3, pVCpu->cpum.GstCtx.msrEFER));
821
822	/*
823	* We shall not inject the event here right away. There may be paging mode related updates
824	* as a result of the world-switch above that are yet to be honored. Instead flag the event
825	* as pending for injection.
826	*/
827	TRPMAssertTrap(pVCpu, uVector, enmType);
828	if (pEventInject->n.u1ErrorCodeValid)
829	TRPMSetErrorCode(pVCpu, uErrorCode);
830	if ( enmType == TRPM_TRAP
831	&& uVector == X86_XCPT_PF)
832	TRPMSetFaultAddress(pVCpu, pVCpu->cpum.GstCtx.cr2);
833	}
834	else
835	LogFlow(("iemSvmVmrun: Entering nested-guest: %04x:%08RX64 cr0=%#RX64 cr3=%#RX64 cr4=%#RX64 efer=%#RX64 efl=%#x\n",
836	pVCpu->cpum.GstCtx.cs.Sel, pVCpu->cpum.GstCtx.rip, pVCpu->cpum.GstCtx.cr0, pVCpu->cpum.GstCtx.cr3,
837	pVCpu->cpum.GstCtx.cr4, pVCpu->cpum.GstCtx.msrEFER, pVCpu->cpum.GstCtx.rflags.u64));
838
839	LogFlow(("iemSvmVmrun: returns %d\n", VBOXSTRICTRC_VAL(rcStrict)));
840
841	# if defined(VBOX_WITH_NESTED_HWVIRT_ONLY_IN_IEM) && defined(IN_RING3)
842	/* If CLGI/STGI isn't intercepted we force IEM-only nested-guest execution here. */
843	if ( HMIsEnabled(pVM)
844	&& HMIsSvmVGifActive(pVM))
845	return EMR3SetExecutionPolicy(pVCpu->CTX_SUFF(pVM)->pUVM, EMEXECPOLICY_IEM_ALL, true);
846	# endif
847
848	return rcStrict;
849	}
850
851	/* Shouldn't really happen as the caller should've validated the physical address already. */
852	Log(("iemSvmVmrun: Failed to read nested-guest VMCB at %#RGp (rc=%Rrc) -> #VMEXIT\n", GCPhysVmcb, rc));
853	return rc;
854	}
855
856
857	/**
858	* Checks if the event intercepts and performs the \#VMEXIT if the corresponding
859	* intercept is active.
860	*
861	* @returns Strict VBox status code.
862	* @retval VINF_HM_INTERCEPT_NOT_ACTIVE if the intercept is not active or
863	* we're not executing a nested-guest.
864	* @retval VINF_SVM_VMEXIT if the intercept is active and the \#VMEXIT occurred
865	* successfully.
866	* @retval VERR_SVM_VMEXIT_FAILED if the intercept is active and the \#VMEXIT
867	* failed and a shutdown needs to be initiated for the guest.
868	*
869	* @returns VBox strict status code.
870	* @param pVCpu The cross context virtual CPU structure of the calling thread.
871	* @param u8Vector The interrupt or exception vector.
872	* @param fFlags The exception flags (see IEM_XCPT_FLAGS_XXX).
873	* @param uErr The error-code associated with the exception.
874	* @param uCr2 The CR2 value in case of a \#PF exception.
875	*/
876	IEM_STATIC VBOXSTRICTRC iemHandleSvmEventIntercept(PVMCPUCC pVCpu, uint8_t u8Vector, uint32_t fFlags, uint32_t uErr, uint64_t uCr2)
877	{
878	Assert(CPUMIsGuestInSvmNestedHwVirtMode(IEM_GET_CTX(pVCpu)));
879
880	/*
881	* Handle SVM exception and software interrupt intercepts, see AMD spec. 15.12 "Exception Intercepts".
882	*
883	* - NMI intercepts have their own exit code and do not cause SVM_EXIT_XCPT_2 #VMEXITs.
884	* - External interrupts and software interrupts (INTn instruction) do not check the exception intercepts
885	* even when they use a vector in the range 0 to 31.
886	* - ICEBP should not trigger #DB intercept, but its own intercept.
887	* - For #PF exceptions, its intercept is checked before CR2 is written by the exception.
888	*/
889	/* Check NMI intercept */
890	if ( u8Vector == X86_XCPT_NMI
891	&& (fFlags & IEM_XCPT_FLAGS_T_CPU_XCPT)
892	&& IEM_SVM_IS_CTRL_INTERCEPT_SET(pVCpu, SVM_CTRL_INTERCEPT_NMI))
893	{
894	Log2(("iemHandleSvmNstGstEventIntercept: NMI intercept -> #VMEXIT\n"));
895	IEM_SVM_VMEXIT_RET(pVCpu, SVM_EXIT_NMI, 0 /* uExitInfo1 /, 0 / uExitInfo2 */);
896	}
897
898	/* Check ICEBP intercept. */
899	if ( (fFlags & IEM_XCPT_FLAGS_ICEBP_INSTR)
900	&& IEM_SVM_IS_CTRL_INTERCEPT_SET(pVCpu, SVM_CTRL_INTERCEPT_ICEBP))
901	{
902	Log2(("iemHandleSvmNstGstEventIntercept: ICEBP intercept -> #VMEXIT\n"));
903	IEM_SVM_UPDATE_NRIP(pVCpu);
904	IEM_SVM_VMEXIT_RET(pVCpu, SVM_EXIT_ICEBP, 0 /* uExitInfo1 /, 0 / uExitInfo2 */);
905	}
906
907	/* Check CPU exception intercepts. */
908	if ( (fFlags & IEM_XCPT_FLAGS_T_CPU_XCPT)
909	&& IEM_SVM_IS_XCPT_INTERCEPT_SET(pVCpu, u8Vector))
910	{
911	Assert(u8Vector <= X86_XCPT_LAST);
912	uint64_t const uExitInfo1 = fFlags & IEM_XCPT_FLAGS_ERR ? uErr : 0;
913	uint64_t const uExitInfo2 = fFlags & IEM_XCPT_FLAGS_CR2 ? uCr2 : 0;
914	if ( IEM_GET_GUEST_CPU_FEATURES(pVCpu)->fSvmDecodeAssists
915	&& u8Vector == X86_XCPT_PF
916	&& !(uErr & X86_TRAP_PF_ID))
917	{
918	PSVMVMCBCTRL pVmcbCtrl = &pVCpu->cpum.GstCtx.hwvirt.svm.CTX_SUFF(pVmcb)->ctrl;
919	# ifdef IEM_WITH_CODE_TLB
920	uint8_t const *pbInstrBuf = pVCpu->iem.s.pbInstrBuf;
921	uint8_t const cbInstrBuf = pVCpu->iem.s.cbInstrBuf;
922	pVmcbCtrl->cbInstrFetched = RT_MIN(cbInstrBuf, SVM_CTRL_GUEST_INSTR_BYTES_MAX);
923	if ( pbInstrBuf
924	&& cbInstrBuf > 0)
925	memcpy(&pVmcbCtrl->abInstr[0], pbInstrBuf, pVmcbCtrl->cbInstrFetched);
926	# else
927	uint8_t const cbOpcode = pVCpu->iem.s.cbOpcode;
928	pVmcbCtrl->cbInstrFetched = RT_MIN(cbOpcode, SVM_CTRL_GUEST_INSTR_BYTES_MAX);
929	if (cbOpcode > 0)
930	memcpy(&pVmcbCtrl->abInstr[0], &pVCpu->iem.s.abOpcode[0], pVmcbCtrl->cbInstrFetched);
931	# endif
932	}
933	if (u8Vector == X86_XCPT_BR)
934	IEM_SVM_UPDATE_NRIP(pVCpu);
935	Log2(("iemHandleSvmNstGstEventIntercept: Xcpt intercept u32InterceptXcpt=%#RX32 u8Vector=%#x "
936	"uExitInfo1=%#RX64 uExitInfo2=%#RX64 -> #VMEXIT\n", pVCpu->cpum.GstCtx.hwvirt.svm.CTX_SUFF(pVmcb)->ctrl.u32InterceptXcpt,
937	u8Vector, uExitInfo1, uExitInfo2));
938	IEM_SVM_VMEXIT_RET(pVCpu, SVM_EXIT_XCPT_0 + u8Vector, uExitInfo1, uExitInfo2);
939	}
940
941	/* Check software interrupt (INTn) intercepts. */
942	if ( (fFlags & ( IEM_XCPT_FLAGS_T_SOFT_INT
943	\| IEM_XCPT_FLAGS_BP_INSTR
944	\| IEM_XCPT_FLAGS_ICEBP_INSTR
945	\| IEM_XCPT_FLAGS_OF_INSTR)) == IEM_XCPT_FLAGS_T_SOFT_INT
946	&& IEM_SVM_IS_CTRL_INTERCEPT_SET(pVCpu, SVM_CTRL_INTERCEPT_INTN))
947	{
948	uint64_t const uExitInfo1 = IEM_GET_GUEST_CPU_FEATURES(pVCpu)->fSvmDecodeAssists ? u8Vector : 0;
949	Log2(("iemHandleSvmNstGstEventIntercept: Software INT intercept (u8Vector=%#x) -> #VMEXIT\n", u8Vector));
950	IEM_SVM_UPDATE_NRIP(pVCpu);
951	IEM_SVM_VMEXIT_RET(pVCpu, SVM_EXIT_SWINT, uExitInfo1, 0 /* uExitInfo2 */);
952	}
953
954	return VINF_SVM_INTERCEPT_NOT_ACTIVE;
955	}
956
957
958	/**
959	* Checks the SVM IO permission bitmap and performs the \#VMEXIT if the
960	* corresponding intercept is active.
961	*
962	* @returns Strict VBox status code.
963	* @retval VINF_HM_INTERCEPT_NOT_ACTIVE if the intercept is not active or
964	* we're not executing a nested-guest.
965	* @retval VINF_SVM_VMEXIT if the intercept is active and the \#VMEXIT occurred
966	* successfully.
967	* @retval VERR_SVM_VMEXIT_FAILED if the intercept is active and the \#VMEXIT
968	* failed and a shutdown needs to be initiated for the guest.
969	*
970	* @returns VBox strict status code.
971	* @param pVCpu The cross context virtual CPU structure of the calling thread.
972	* @param u16Port The IO port being accessed.
973	* @param enmIoType The type of IO access.
974	* @param cbReg The IO operand size in bytes.
975	* @param cAddrSizeBits The address size bits (for 16, 32 or 64).
976	* @param iEffSeg The effective segment number.
977	* @param fRep Whether this is a repeating IO instruction (REP prefix).
978	* @param fStrIo Whether this is a string IO instruction.
979	* @param cbInstr The length of the IO instruction in bytes.
980	*/
981	IEM_STATIC VBOXSTRICTRC iemSvmHandleIOIntercept(PVMCPUCC pVCpu, uint16_t u16Port, SVMIOIOTYPE enmIoType, uint8_t cbReg,
982	uint8_t cAddrSizeBits, uint8_t iEffSeg, bool fRep, bool fStrIo, uint8_t cbInstr)
983	{
984	Assert(IEM_SVM_IS_CTRL_INTERCEPT_SET(pVCpu, SVM_CTRL_INTERCEPT_IOIO_PROT));
985	Assert(cAddrSizeBits == 16 \|\| cAddrSizeBits == 32 \|\| cAddrSizeBits == 64);
986	Assert(cbReg == 1 \|\| cbReg == 2 \|\| cbReg == 4 \|\| cbReg == 8);
987
988	Log3(("iemSvmHandleIOIntercept: u16Port=%#x (%u)\n", u16Port, u16Port));
989
990	SVMIOIOEXITINFO IoExitInfo;
991	void *pvIoBitmap = pVCpu->cpum.GstCtx.hwvirt.svm.CTX_SUFF(pvIoBitmap);
992	bool const fIntercept = CPUMIsSvmIoInterceptSet(pvIoBitmap, u16Port, enmIoType, cbReg, cAddrSizeBits, iEffSeg, fRep,
993	fStrIo, &IoExitInfo);
994	if (fIntercept)
995	{
996	Log3(("iemSvmHandleIOIntercept: u16Port=%#x (%u) -> #VMEXIT\n", u16Port, u16Port));
997	IEM_SVM_UPDATE_NRIP(pVCpu);
998	return iemSvmVmexit(pVCpu, SVM_EXIT_IOIO, IoExitInfo.u, pVCpu->cpum.GstCtx.rip + cbInstr);
999	}
1000
1001	/** @todo remove later (for debugging as VirtualBox always traps all IO
1002	* intercepts). */
1003	AssertMsgFailed(("iemSvmHandleIOIntercept: We expect an IO intercept here!\n"));
1004	return VINF_SVM_INTERCEPT_NOT_ACTIVE;
1005	}
1006
1007
1008	/**
1009	* Checks the SVM MSR permission bitmap and performs the \#VMEXIT if the
1010	* corresponding intercept is active.
1011	*
1012	* @returns Strict VBox status code.
1013	* @retval VINF_HM_INTERCEPT_NOT_ACTIVE if the MSR permission bitmap does not
1014	* specify interception of the accessed MSR @a idMsr.
1015	* @retval VINF_SVM_VMEXIT if the intercept is active and the \#VMEXIT occurred
1016	* successfully.
1017	* @retval VERR_SVM_VMEXIT_FAILED if the intercept is active and the \#VMEXIT
1018	* failed and a shutdown needs to be initiated for the guest.
1019	*
1020	* @param pVCpu The cross context virtual CPU structure.
1021	* @param idMsr The MSR being accessed in the nested-guest.
1022	* @param fWrite Whether this is an MSR write access, @c false implies an
1023	* MSR read.
1024	* @param cbInstr The length of the MSR read/write instruction in bytes.
1025	*/
1026	IEM_STATIC VBOXSTRICTRC iemSvmHandleMsrIntercept(PVMCPUCC pVCpu, uint32_t idMsr, bool fWrite)
1027	{
1028	/*
1029	* Check if any MSRs are being intercepted.
1030	*/
1031	Assert(CPUMIsGuestSvmCtrlInterceptSet(pVCpu, IEM_GET_CTX(pVCpu), SVM_CTRL_INTERCEPT_MSR_PROT));
1032	Assert(CPUMIsGuestInSvmNestedHwVirtMode(IEM_GET_CTX(pVCpu)));
1033
1034	uint64_t const uExitInfo1 = fWrite ? SVM_EXIT1_MSR_WRITE : SVM_EXIT1_MSR_READ;
1035
1036	/*
1037	* Get the byte and bit offset of the permission bits corresponding to the MSR.
1038	*/
1039	uint16_t offMsrpm;
1040	uint8_t uMsrpmBit;
1041	int rc = CPUMGetSvmMsrpmOffsetAndBit(idMsr, &offMsrpm, &uMsrpmBit);
1042	if (RT_SUCCESS(rc))
1043	{
1044	Assert(uMsrpmBit == 0 \|\| uMsrpmBit == 2 \|\| uMsrpmBit == 4 \|\| uMsrpmBit == 6);
1045	Assert(offMsrpm < SVM_MSRPM_PAGES << X86_PAGE_4K_SHIFT);
1046	if (fWrite)
1047	++uMsrpmBit;
1048
1049	/*
1050	* Check if the bit is set, if so, trigger a #VMEXIT.
1051	*/
1052	uint8_t pbMsrpm = (uint8_t )pVCpu->cpum.GstCtx.hwvirt.svm.CTX_SUFF(pvMsrBitmap);
1053	pbMsrpm += offMsrpm;
1054	if (*pbMsrpm & RT_BIT(uMsrpmBit))
1055	{
1056	IEM_SVM_UPDATE_NRIP(pVCpu);
1057	return iemSvmVmexit(pVCpu, SVM_EXIT_MSR, uExitInfo1, 0 /* uExitInfo2 */);
1058	}
1059	}
1060	else
1061	{
1062	/*
1063	* This shouldn't happen, but if it does, cause a #VMEXIT and let the "host" (nested hypervisor) deal with it.
1064	*/
1065	Log(("iemSvmHandleMsrIntercept: Invalid/out-of-range MSR %#RX32 fWrite=%RTbool -> #VMEXIT\n", idMsr, fWrite));
1066	return iemSvmVmexit(pVCpu, SVM_EXIT_MSR, uExitInfo1, 0 /* uExitInfo2 */);
1067	}
1068	return VINF_SVM_INTERCEPT_NOT_ACTIVE;
1069	}
1070
1071
1072
1073	/**
1074	* Implements 'VMRUN'.
1075	*/
1076	IEM_CIMPL_DEF_0(iemCImpl_vmrun)
1077	{
1078	# if defined(VBOX_WITH_NESTED_HWVIRT_ONLY_IN_IEM) && !defined(IN_RING3)
1079	RT_NOREF2(pVCpu, cbInstr);
1080	return VINF_EM_RAW_EMULATE_INSTR;
1081	# else
1082	LogFlow(("iemCImpl_vmrun\n"));
1083	IEM_SVM_INSTR_COMMON_CHECKS(pVCpu, vmrun);
1084
1085	/** @todo Check effective address size using address size prefix. */
1086	RTGCPHYS const GCPhysVmcb = pVCpu->iem.s.enmCpuMode == IEMMODE_64BIT ? pVCpu->cpum.GstCtx.rax : pVCpu->cpum.GstCtx.eax;
1087	if ( (GCPhysVmcb & X86_PAGE_4K_OFFSET_MASK)
1088	\|\| !PGMPhysIsGCPhysNormal(pVCpu->CTX_SUFF(pVM), GCPhysVmcb))
1089	{
1090	Log(("vmrun: VMCB physaddr (%#RGp) not valid -> #GP(0)\n", GCPhysVmcb));
1091	return iemRaiseGeneralProtectionFault0(pVCpu);
1092	}
1093
1094	if (IEM_SVM_IS_CTRL_INTERCEPT_SET(pVCpu, SVM_CTRL_INTERCEPT_VMRUN))
1095	{
1096	Log(("vmrun: Guest intercept -> #VMEXIT\n"));
1097	IEM_SVM_VMEXIT_RET(pVCpu, SVM_EXIT_VMRUN, 0 /* uExitInfo1 /, 0 / uExitInfo2 */);
1098	}
1099
1100	VBOXSTRICTRC rcStrict = iemSvmVmrun(pVCpu, cbInstr, GCPhysVmcb);
1101	if (rcStrict == VERR_SVM_VMEXIT_FAILED)
1102	{
1103	Assert(!CPUMIsGuestInSvmNestedHwVirtMode(IEM_GET_CTX(pVCpu)));
1104	rcStrict = VINF_EM_TRIPLE_FAULT;
1105	}
1106	return rcStrict;
1107	# endif
1108	}
1109
1110
1111	/**
1112	* Implements 'VMLOAD'.
1113	*/
1114	IEM_CIMPL_DEF_0(iemCImpl_vmload)
1115	{
1116	# if defined(VBOX_WITH_NESTED_HWVIRT_ONLY_IN_IEM) && !defined(IN_RING3)
1117	RT_NOREF2(pVCpu, cbInstr);
1118	return VINF_EM_RAW_EMULATE_INSTR;
1119	# else
1120	LogFlow(("iemCImpl_vmload\n"));
1121	IEM_SVM_INSTR_COMMON_CHECKS(pVCpu, vmload);
1122
1123	/** @todo Check effective address size using address size prefix. */
1124	RTGCPHYS const GCPhysVmcb = pVCpu->iem.s.enmCpuMode == IEMMODE_64BIT ? pVCpu->cpum.GstCtx.rax : pVCpu->cpum.GstCtx.eax;
1125	if ( (GCPhysVmcb & X86_PAGE_4K_OFFSET_MASK)
1126	\|\| !PGMPhysIsGCPhysNormal(pVCpu->CTX_SUFF(pVM), GCPhysVmcb))
1127	{
1128	Log(("vmload: VMCB physaddr (%#RGp) not valid -> #GP(0)\n", GCPhysVmcb));
1129	return iemRaiseGeneralProtectionFault0(pVCpu);
1130	}
1131
1132	if (IEM_SVM_IS_CTRL_INTERCEPT_SET(pVCpu, SVM_CTRL_INTERCEPT_VMLOAD))
1133	{
1134	Log(("vmload: Guest intercept -> #VMEXIT\n"));
1135	IEM_SVM_VMEXIT_RET(pVCpu, SVM_EXIT_VMLOAD, 0 /* uExitInfo1 /, 0 / uExitInfo2 */);
1136	}
1137
1138	SVMVMCBSTATESAVE VmcbNstGst;
1139	VBOXSTRICTRC rcStrict = PGMPhysSimpleReadGCPhys(pVCpu->CTX_SUFF(pVM), &VmcbNstGst, GCPhysVmcb + RT_UOFFSETOF(SVMVMCB, guest),
1140	sizeof(SVMVMCBSTATESAVE));
1141	if (rcStrict == VINF_SUCCESS)
1142	{
1143	LogFlow(("vmload: Loading VMCB at %#RGp enmEffAddrMode=%d\n", GCPhysVmcb, pVCpu->iem.s.enmEffAddrMode));
1144	HMSVM_SEG_REG_COPY_FROM_VMCB(IEM_GET_CTX(pVCpu), &VmcbNstGst, FS, fs);
1145	HMSVM_SEG_REG_COPY_FROM_VMCB(IEM_GET_CTX(pVCpu), &VmcbNstGst, GS, gs);
1146	HMSVM_SEG_REG_COPY_FROM_VMCB(IEM_GET_CTX(pVCpu), &VmcbNstGst, TR, tr);
1147	HMSVM_SEG_REG_COPY_FROM_VMCB(IEM_GET_CTX(pVCpu), &VmcbNstGst, LDTR, ldtr);
1148
1149	pVCpu->cpum.GstCtx.msrKERNELGSBASE = VmcbNstGst.u64KernelGSBase;
1150	pVCpu->cpum.GstCtx.msrSTAR = VmcbNstGst.u64STAR;
1151	pVCpu->cpum.GstCtx.msrLSTAR = VmcbNstGst.u64LSTAR;
1152	pVCpu->cpum.GstCtx.msrCSTAR = VmcbNstGst.u64CSTAR;
1153	pVCpu->cpum.GstCtx.msrSFMASK = VmcbNstGst.u64SFMASK;
1154
1155	pVCpu->cpum.GstCtx.SysEnter.cs = VmcbNstGst.u64SysEnterCS;
1156	pVCpu->cpum.GstCtx.SysEnter.esp = VmcbNstGst.u64SysEnterESP;
1157	pVCpu->cpum.GstCtx.SysEnter.eip = VmcbNstGst.u64SysEnterEIP;
1158
1159	iemRegAddToRipAndClearRF(pVCpu, cbInstr);
1160	}
1161	return rcStrict;
1162	# endif
1163	}
1164
1165
1166	/**
1167	* Implements 'VMSAVE'.
1168	*/
1169	IEM_CIMPL_DEF_0(iemCImpl_vmsave)
1170	{
1171	# if defined(VBOX_WITH_NESTED_HWVIRT_ONLY_IN_IEM) && !defined(IN_RING3)
1172	RT_NOREF2(pVCpu, cbInstr);
1173	return VINF_EM_RAW_EMULATE_INSTR;
1174	# else
1175	LogFlow(("iemCImpl_vmsave\n"));
1176	IEM_SVM_INSTR_COMMON_CHECKS(pVCpu, vmsave);
1177
1178	/** @todo Check effective address size using address size prefix. */
1179	RTGCPHYS const GCPhysVmcb = pVCpu->iem.s.enmCpuMode == IEMMODE_64BIT ? pVCpu->cpum.GstCtx.rax : pVCpu->cpum.GstCtx.eax;
1180	if ( (GCPhysVmcb & X86_PAGE_4K_OFFSET_MASK)
1181	\|\| !PGMPhysIsGCPhysNormal(pVCpu->CTX_SUFF(pVM), GCPhysVmcb))
1182	{
1183	Log(("vmsave: VMCB physaddr (%#RGp) not valid -> #GP(0)\n", GCPhysVmcb));
1184	return iemRaiseGeneralProtectionFault0(pVCpu);
1185	}
1186
1187	if (IEM_SVM_IS_CTRL_INTERCEPT_SET(pVCpu, SVM_CTRL_INTERCEPT_VMSAVE))
1188	{
1189	Log(("vmsave: Guest intercept -> #VMEXIT\n"));
1190	IEM_SVM_VMEXIT_RET(pVCpu, SVM_EXIT_VMSAVE, 0 /* uExitInfo1 /, 0 / uExitInfo2 */);
1191	}
1192
1193	SVMVMCBSTATESAVE VmcbNstGst;
1194	VBOXSTRICTRC rcStrict = PGMPhysSimpleReadGCPhys(pVCpu->CTX_SUFF(pVM), &VmcbNstGst, GCPhysVmcb + RT_UOFFSETOF(SVMVMCB, guest),
1195	sizeof(SVMVMCBSTATESAVE));
1196	if (rcStrict == VINF_SUCCESS)
1197	{
1198	LogFlow(("vmsave: Saving VMCB at %#RGp enmEffAddrMode=%d\n", GCPhysVmcb, pVCpu->iem.s.enmEffAddrMode));
1199	IEM_CTX_IMPORT_RET(pVCpu, CPUMCTX_EXTRN_FS \| CPUMCTX_EXTRN_GS \| CPUMCTX_EXTRN_TR \| CPUMCTX_EXTRN_LDTR
1200	\| CPUMCTX_EXTRN_KERNEL_GS_BASE \| CPUMCTX_EXTRN_SYSCALL_MSRS \| CPUMCTX_EXTRN_SYSENTER_MSRS);
1201
1202	HMSVM_SEG_REG_COPY_TO_VMCB(IEM_GET_CTX(pVCpu), &VmcbNstGst, FS, fs);
1203	HMSVM_SEG_REG_COPY_TO_VMCB(IEM_GET_CTX(pVCpu), &VmcbNstGst, GS, gs);
1204	HMSVM_SEG_REG_COPY_TO_VMCB(IEM_GET_CTX(pVCpu), &VmcbNstGst, TR, tr);
1205	HMSVM_SEG_REG_COPY_TO_VMCB(IEM_GET_CTX(pVCpu), &VmcbNstGst, LDTR, ldtr);
1206
1207	VmcbNstGst.u64KernelGSBase = pVCpu->cpum.GstCtx.msrKERNELGSBASE;
1208	VmcbNstGst.u64STAR = pVCpu->cpum.GstCtx.msrSTAR;
1209	VmcbNstGst.u64LSTAR = pVCpu->cpum.GstCtx.msrLSTAR;
1210	VmcbNstGst.u64CSTAR = pVCpu->cpum.GstCtx.msrCSTAR;
1211	VmcbNstGst.u64SFMASK = pVCpu->cpum.GstCtx.msrSFMASK;
1212
1213	VmcbNstGst.u64SysEnterCS = pVCpu->cpum.GstCtx.SysEnter.cs;
1214	VmcbNstGst.u64SysEnterESP = pVCpu->cpum.GstCtx.SysEnter.esp;
1215	VmcbNstGst.u64SysEnterEIP = pVCpu->cpum.GstCtx.SysEnter.eip;
1216
1217	rcStrict = PGMPhysSimpleWriteGCPhys(pVCpu->CTX_SUFF(pVM), GCPhysVmcb + RT_UOFFSETOF(SVMVMCB, guest), &VmcbNstGst,
1218	sizeof(SVMVMCBSTATESAVE));
1219	if (rcStrict == VINF_SUCCESS)
1220	iemRegAddToRipAndClearRF(pVCpu, cbInstr);
1221	}
1222	return rcStrict;
1223	# endif
1224	}
1225
1226
1227	/**
1228	* Implements 'CLGI'.
1229	*/
1230	IEM_CIMPL_DEF_0(iemCImpl_clgi)
1231	{
1232	# if defined(VBOX_WITH_NESTED_HWVIRT_ONLY_IN_IEM) && !defined(IN_RING3)
1233	RT_NOREF2(pVCpu, cbInstr);
1234	return VINF_EM_RAW_EMULATE_INSTR;
1235	# else
1236	LogFlow(("iemCImpl_clgi\n"));
1237	IEM_SVM_INSTR_COMMON_CHECKS(pVCpu, clgi);
1238	if (IEM_SVM_IS_CTRL_INTERCEPT_SET(pVCpu, SVM_CTRL_INTERCEPT_CLGI))
1239	{
1240	Log(("clgi: Guest intercept -> #VMEXIT\n"));
1241	IEM_SVM_VMEXIT_RET(pVCpu, SVM_EXIT_CLGI, 0 /* uExitInfo1 /, 0 / uExitInfo2 */);
1242	}
1243
1244	CPUMSetGuestGif(&pVCpu->cpum.GstCtx, false);
1245	iemRegAddToRipAndClearRF(pVCpu, cbInstr);
1246
1247	# if defined(VBOX_WITH_NESTED_HWVIRT_ONLY_IN_IEM) && defined(IN_RING3)
1248	return EMR3SetExecutionPolicy(pVCpu->CTX_SUFF(pVM)->pUVM, EMEXECPOLICY_IEM_ALL, true);
1249	# else
1250	return VINF_SUCCESS;
1251	# endif
1252	# endif
1253	}
1254
1255
1256	/**
1257	* Implements 'STGI'.
1258	*/
1259	IEM_CIMPL_DEF_0(iemCImpl_stgi)
1260	{
1261	# if defined(VBOX_WITH_NESTED_HWVIRT_ONLY_IN_IEM) && !defined(IN_RING3)
1262	RT_NOREF2(pVCpu, cbInstr);
1263	return VINF_EM_RAW_EMULATE_INSTR;
1264	# else
1265	LogFlow(("iemCImpl_stgi\n"));
1266	IEM_SVM_INSTR_COMMON_CHECKS(pVCpu, stgi);
1267	if (IEM_SVM_IS_CTRL_INTERCEPT_SET(pVCpu, SVM_CTRL_INTERCEPT_STGI))
1268	{
1269	Log2(("stgi: Guest intercept -> #VMEXIT\n"));
1270	IEM_SVM_VMEXIT_RET(pVCpu, SVM_EXIT_STGI, 0 /* uExitInfo1 /, 0 / uExitInfo2 */);
1271	}
1272
1273	CPUMSetGuestGif(&pVCpu->cpum.GstCtx, true);
1274	iemRegAddToRipAndClearRF(pVCpu, cbInstr);
1275
1276	# if defined(VBOX_WITH_NESTED_HWVIRT_ONLY_IN_IEM) && defined(IN_RING3)
1277	return EMR3SetExecutionPolicy(pVCpu->CTX_SUFF(pVM)->pUVM, EMEXECPOLICY_IEM_ALL, false);
1278	# else
1279	return VINF_SUCCESS;
1280	# endif
1281	# endif
1282	}
1283
1284
1285	/**
1286	* Implements 'INVLPGA'.
1287	*/
1288	IEM_CIMPL_DEF_0(iemCImpl_invlpga)
1289	{
1290	/** @todo Check effective address size using address size prefix. */
1291	RTGCPTR const GCPtrPage = pVCpu->iem.s.enmCpuMode == IEMMODE_64BIT ? pVCpu->cpum.GstCtx.rax : pVCpu->cpum.GstCtx.eax;
1292	/** @todo PGM needs virtual ASID support. */
1293	# if 0
1294	uint32_t const uAsid = pVCpu->cpum.GstCtx.ecx;
1295	# endif
1296
1297	IEM_SVM_INSTR_COMMON_CHECKS(pVCpu, invlpga);
1298	if (IEM_SVM_IS_CTRL_INTERCEPT_SET(pVCpu, SVM_CTRL_INTERCEPT_INVLPGA))
1299	{
1300	Log2(("invlpga: Guest intercept (%RGp) -> #VMEXIT\n", GCPtrPage));
1301	IEM_SVM_VMEXIT_RET(pVCpu, SVM_EXIT_INVLPGA, 0 /* uExitInfo1 /, 0 / uExitInfo2 */);
1302	}
1303
1304	PGMInvalidatePage(pVCpu, GCPtrPage);
1305	iemRegAddToRipAndClearRF(pVCpu, cbInstr);
1306	return VINF_SUCCESS;
1307	}
1308
1309
1310	/**
1311	* Implements 'SKINIT'.
1312	*/
1313	IEM_CIMPL_DEF_0(iemCImpl_skinit)
1314	{
1315	IEM_SVM_INSTR_COMMON_CHECKS(pVCpu, invlpga);
1316
1317	uint32_t uIgnore;
1318	uint32_t fFeaturesECX;
1319	CPUMGetGuestCpuId(pVCpu, 0x80000001, 0 /* iSubLeaf */, &uIgnore, &uIgnore, &fFeaturesECX, &uIgnore);
1320	if (!(fFeaturesECX & X86_CPUID_AMD_FEATURE_ECX_SKINIT))
1321	return iemRaiseUndefinedOpcode(pVCpu);
1322
1323	if (IEM_SVM_IS_CTRL_INTERCEPT_SET(pVCpu, SVM_CTRL_INTERCEPT_SKINIT))
1324	{
1325	Log2(("skinit: Guest intercept -> #VMEXIT\n"));
1326	IEM_SVM_VMEXIT_RET(pVCpu, SVM_EXIT_SKINIT, 0 /* uExitInfo1 /, 0 / uExitInfo2 */);
1327	}
1328
1329	RT_NOREF(cbInstr);
1330	return VERR_IEM_INSTR_NOT_IMPLEMENTED;
1331	}
1332
1333
1334	/**
1335	* Implements SVM's implementation of PAUSE.
1336	*/
1337	IEM_CIMPL_DEF_0(iemCImpl_svm_pause)
1338	{
1339	bool fCheckIntercept = true;
1340	if (IEM_GET_GUEST_CPU_FEATURES(pVCpu)->fSvmPauseFilter)
1341	{
1342	IEM_CTX_IMPORT_RET(pVCpu, CPUMCTX_EXTRN_HWVIRT);
1343
1344	/* TSC based pause-filter thresholding. */
1345	if ( IEM_GET_GUEST_CPU_FEATURES(pVCpu)->fSvmPauseFilterThreshold
1346	&& pVCpu->cpum.GstCtx.hwvirt.svm.cPauseFilterThreshold > 0)
1347	{
1348	uint64_t const uTick = TMCpuTickGet(pVCpu);
1349	if (uTick - pVCpu->cpum.GstCtx.hwvirt.svm.uPrevPauseTick > pVCpu->cpum.GstCtx.hwvirt.svm.cPauseFilterThreshold)
1350	pVCpu->cpum.GstCtx.hwvirt.svm.cPauseFilter = CPUMGetGuestSvmPauseFilterCount(pVCpu, IEM_GET_CTX(pVCpu));
1351	pVCpu->cpum.GstCtx.hwvirt.svm.uPrevPauseTick = uTick;
1352	}
1353
1354	/* Simple pause-filter counter. */
1355	if (pVCpu->cpum.GstCtx.hwvirt.svm.cPauseFilter > 0)
1356	{
1357	--pVCpu->cpum.GstCtx.hwvirt.svm.cPauseFilter;
1358	fCheckIntercept = false;
1359	}
1360	}
1361
1362	if (fCheckIntercept)
1363	IEM_SVM_CHECK_INSTR_INTERCEPT(pVCpu, SVM_CTRL_INTERCEPT_PAUSE, SVM_EXIT_PAUSE, 0, 0);
1364
1365	iemRegAddToRipAndClearRF(pVCpu, cbInstr);
1366	return VINF_SUCCESS;
1367	}
1368
1369	#endif /* VBOX_WITH_NESTED_HWVIRT_SVM */
1370
1371	/**
1372	* Common code for iemCImpl_vmmcall and iemCImpl_vmcall (latter in IEMAllCImplVmxInstr.cpp.h).
1373	*/
1374	IEM_CIMPL_DEF_1(iemCImpl_Hypercall, uint16_t, uDisOpcode)
1375	{
1376	if (EMAreHypercallInstructionsEnabled(pVCpu))
1377	{
1378	NOREF(uDisOpcode);
1379	VBOXSTRICTRC rcStrict = GIMHypercallEx(pVCpu, IEM_GET_CTX(pVCpu), uDisOpcode, cbInstr);
1380	if (RT_SUCCESS(rcStrict))
1381	{
1382	if (rcStrict == VINF_SUCCESS)
1383	iemRegAddToRipAndClearRF(pVCpu, cbInstr);
1384	if ( rcStrict == VINF_SUCCESS
1385	\|\| rcStrict == VINF_GIM_HYPERCALL_CONTINUING)
1386	return VINF_SUCCESS;
1387	AssertMsgReturn(rcStrict == VINF_GIM_R3_HYPERCALL, ("%Rrc\n", VBOXSTRICTRC_VAL(rcStrict)), VERR_IEM_IPE_4);
1388	return rcStrict;
1389	}
1390	AssertMsgReturn( rcStrict == VERR_GIM_HYPERCALL_ACCESS_DENIED
1391	\|\| rcStrict == VERR_GIM_HYPERCALLS_NOT_AVAILABLE
1392	\|\| rcStrict == VERR_GIM_NOT_ENABLED
1393	\|\| rcStrict == VERR_GIM_HYPERCALL_MEMORY_READ_FAILED
1394	\|\| rcStrict == VERR_GIM_HYPERCALL_MEMORY_WRITE_FAILED,
1395	("%Rrc\n", VBOXSTRICTRC_VAL(rcStrict)), VERR_IEM_IPE_4);
1396
1397	/* Raise #UD on all failures. */
1398	}
1399	return iemRaiseUndefinedOpcode(pVCpu);
1400	}
1401
1402
1403	/**
1404	* Implements 'VMMCALL'.
1405	*/
1406	IEM_CIMPL_DEF_0(iemCImpl_vmmcall)
1407	{
1408	if (IEM_SVM_IS_CTRL_INTERCEPT_SET(pVCpu, SVM_CTRL_INTERCEPT_VMMCALL))
1409	{
1410	Log(("vmmcall: Guest intercept -> #VMEXIT\n"));
1411	IEM_SVM_VMEXIT_RET(pVCpu, SVM_EXIT_VMMCALL, 0 /* uExitInfo1 /, 0 / uExitInfo2 */);
1412	}
1413
1414	/* This is a little bit more complicated than the VT-x version because HM/SVM may
1415	patch MOV CR8 instructions to speed up APIC.TPR access for 32-bit windows guests. */
1416	PVMCC pVM = pVCpu->CTX_SUFF(pVM);
1417	if (VM_IS_HM_ENABLED(pVM))
1418	{
1419	int rc = HMHCMaybeMovTprSvmHypercall(pVM, pVCpu);
1420	if (RT_SUCCESS(rc))
1421	{
1422	Log(("vmmcall: MovTpr\n"));
1423	return VINF_SUCCESS;
1424	}
1425	}
1426
1427	/* Join forces with vmcall. */
1428	return IEM_CIMPL_CALL_1(iemCImpl_Hypercall, OP_VMMCALL);
1429	}
1430

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source: vbox/trunk/src/VBox/VMM/VMMAll/IEMAllCImplSvmInstr.cpp.h@ 85546

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