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source: vbox/trunk/src/libs/openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_vfy.c@ 69890

Last change on this file since 69890 was 69890, checked in by vboxsync, 7 years ago

Added OpenSSL 1.1.0g with unneeded files removed, otherwise unmodified.
bugref:8070: src/libs maintenance
  • Property svn:eol-style set to native
File size: 12.8 KB
Line 
1/*
2 * Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3 *
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
8 */
9
10#include <openssl/ocsp.h>
11#include "ocsp_lcl.h"
12#include <openssl/err.h>
13#include <string.h>
14
15static int ocsp_find_signer(X509 **psigner, OCSP_BASICRESP *bs,
16 STACK_OF(X509) *certs, unsigned long flags);
17static X509 *ocsp_find_signer_sk(STACK_OF(X509) *certs, OCSP_RESPID *id);
18static int ocsp_check_issuer(OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, STACK_OF(X509) *chain);
19static int ocsp_check_ids(STACK_OF(OCSP_SINGLERESP) *sresp,
20 OCSP_CERTID **ret);
21static int ocsp_match_issuerid(X509 *cert, OCSP_CERTID *cid,
22 STACK_OF(OCSP_SINGLERESP) *sresp);
23static int ocsp_check_delegated(X509 *x);
24static int ocsp_req_find_signer(X509 **psigner, OCSP_REQUEST *req,
25 X509_NAME *nm, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
26 unsigned long flags);
27
28/* Verify a basic response message */
29
30int OCSP_basic_verify(OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
31 X509_STORE *st, unsigned long flags)
32{
33 X509 *signer, *x;
34 STACK_OF(X509) *chain = NULL;
35 STACK_OF(X509) *untrusted = NULL;
36 X509_STORE_CTX *ctx = NULL;
37 int i, ret = ocsp_find_signer(&signer, bs, certs, flags);
38
39 if (!ret) {
40 OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_BASIC_VERIFY,
41 OCSP_R_SIGNER_CERTIFICATE_NOT_FOUND);
42 goto end;
43 }
44 ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new();
45 if (ctx == NULL) {
46 OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_BASIC_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
47 goto f_err;
48 }
49 if ((ret == 2) && (flags & OCSP_TRUSTOTHER))
50 flags |= OCSP_NOVERIFY;
51 if (!(flags & OCSP_NOSIGS)) {
52 EVP_PKEY *skey;
53 skey = X509_get0_pubkey(signer);
54 if (skey == NULL) {
55 OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_BASIC_VERIFY, OCSP_R_NO_SIGNER_KEY);
56 goto err;
57 }
58 ret = OCSP_BASICRESP_verify(bs, skey, 0);
59 if (ret <= 0) {
60 OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_BASIC_VERIFY, OCSP_R_SIGNATURE_FAILURE);
61 goto end;
62 }
63 }
64 if (!(flags & OCSP_NOVERIFY)) {
65 int init_res;
66 if (flags & OCSP_NOCHAIN) {
67 untrusted = NULL;
68 } else if (bs->certs && certs) {
69 untrusted = sk_X509_dup(bs->certs);
70 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++) {
71 if (!sk_X509_push(untrusted, sk_X509_value(certs, i))) {
72 OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_BASIC_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
73 goto f_err;
74 }
75 }
76 } else if (certs != NULL) {
77 untrusted = certs;
78 } else {
79 untrusted = bs->certs;
80 }
81 init_res = X509_STORE_CTX_init(ctx, st, signer, untrusted);
82 if (!init_res) {
83 OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_BASIC_VERIFY, ERR_R_X509_LIB);
84 goto f_err;
85 }
86
87 X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(ctx, X509_PURPOSE_OCSP_HELPER);
88 ret = X509_verify_cert(ctx);
89 chain = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(ctx);
90 if (ret <= 0) {
91 i = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx);
92 OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_BASIC_VERIFY,
93 OCSP_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_ERROR);
94 ERR_add_error_data(2, "Verify error:",
95 X509_verify_cert_error_string(i));
96 goto end;
97 }
98 if (flags & OCSP_NOCHECKS) {
99 ret = 1;
100 goto end;
101 }
102 /*
103 * At this point we have a valid certificate chain need to verify it
104 * against the OCSP issuer criteria.
105 */
106 ret = ocsp_check_issuer(bs, chain);
107
108 /* If fatal error or valid match then finish */
109 if (ret != 0)
110 goto end;
111
112 /*
113 * Easy case: explicitly trusted. Get root CA and check for explicit
114 * trust
115 */
116 if (flags & OCSP_NOEXPLICIT)
117 goto end;
118
119 x = sk_X509_value(chain, sk_X509_num(chain) - 1);
120 if (X509_check_trust(x, NID_OCSP_sign, 0) != X509_TRUST_TRUSTED) {
121 OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_BASIC_VERIFY, OCSP_R_ROOT_CA_NOT_TRUSTED);
122 goto err;
123 }
124 ret = 1;
125 }
126 end:
127 X509_STORE_CTX_free(ctx);
128 sk_X509_pop_free(chain, X509_free);
129 if (bs->certs && certs)
130 sk_X509_free(untrusted);
131 return ret;
132
133 err:
134 ret = 0;
135 goto end;
136 f_err:
137 ret = -1;
138 goto end;
139}
140
141static int ocsp_find_signer(X509 **psigner, OCSP_BASICRESP *bs,
142 STACK_OF(X509) *certs, unsigned long flags)
143{
144 X509 *signer;
145 OCSP_RESPID *rid = &bs->tbsResponseData.responderId;
146 if ((signer = ocsp_find_signer_sk(certs, rid))) {
147 *psigner = signer;
148 return 2;
149 }
150 if (!(flags & OCSP_NOINTERN) &&
151 (signer = ocsp_find_signer_sk(bs->certs, rid))) {
152 *psigner = signer;
153 return 1;
154 }
155 /* Maybe lookup from store if by subject name */
156
157 *psigner = NULL;
158 return 0;
159}
160
161static X509 *ocsp_find_signer_sk(STACK_OF(X509) *certs, OCSP_RESPID *id)
162{
163 int i;
164 unsigned char tmphash[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH], *keyhash;
165 X509 *x;
166
167 /* Easy if lookup by name */
168 if (id->type == V_OCSP_RESPID_NAME)
169 return X509_find_by_subject(certs, id->value.byName);
170
171 /* Lookup by key hash */
172
173 /* If key hash isn't SHA1 length then forget it */
174 if (id->value.byKey->length != SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH)
175 return NULL;
176 keyhash = id->value.byKey->data;
177 /* Calculate hash of each key and compare */
178 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++) {
179 x = sk_X509_value(certs, i);
180 X509_pubkey_digest(x, EVP_sha1(), tmphash, NULL);
181 if (!memcmp(keyhash, tmphash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH))
182 return x;
183 }
184 return NULL;
185}
186
187static int ocsp_check_issuer(OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
188{
189 STACK_OF(OCSP_SINGLERESP) *sresp;
190 X509 *signer, *sca;
191 OCSP_CERTID *caid = NULL;
192 int i;
193 sresp = bs->tbsResponseData.responses;
194
195 if (sk_X509_num(chain) <= 0) {
196 OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_CHECK_ISSUER, OCSP_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_IN_CHAIN);
197 return -1;
198 }
199
200 /* See if the issuer IDs match. */
201 i = ocsp_check_ids(sresp, &caid);
202
203 /* If ID mismatch or other error then return */
204 if (i <= 0)
205 return i;
206
207 signer = sk_X509_value(chain, 0);
208 /* Check to see if OCSP responder CA matches request CA */
209 if (sk_X509_num(chain) > 1) {
210 sca = sk_X509_value(chain, 1);
211 i = ocsp_match_issuerid(sca, caid, sresp);
212 if (i < 0)
213 return i;
214 if (i) {
215 /* We have a match, if extensions OK then success */
216 if (ocsp_check_delegated(signer))
217 return 1;
218 return 0;
219 }
220 }
221
222 /* Otherwise check if OCSP request signed directly by request CA */
223 return ocsp_match_issuerid(signer, caid, sresp);
224}
225
226/*
227 * Check the issuer certificate IDs for equality. If there is a mismatch with
228 * the same algorithm then there's no point trying to match any certificates
229 * against the issuer. If the issuer IDs all match then we just need to check
230 * equality against one of them.
231 */
232
233static int ocsp_check_ids(STACK_OF(OCSP_SINGLERESP) *sresp, OCSP_CERTID **ret)
234{
235 OCSP_CERTID *tmpid, *cid;
236 int i, idcount;
237
238 idcount = sk_OCSP_SINGLERESP_num(sresp);
239 if (idcount <= 0) {
240 OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_CHECK_IDS,
241 OCSP_R_RESPONSE_CONTAINS_NO_REVOCATION_DATA);
242 return -1;
243 }
244
245 cid = sk_OCSP_SINGLERESP_value(sresp, 0)->certId;
246
247 *ret = NULL;
248
249 for (i = 1; i < idcount; i++) {
250 tmpid = sk_OCSP_SINGLERESP_value(sresp, i)->certId;
251 /* Check to see if IDs match */
252 if (OCSP_id_issuer_cmp(cid, tmpid)) {
253 /* If algorithm mismatch let caller deal with it */
254 if (OBJ_cmp(tmpid->hashAlgorithm.algorithm,
255 cid->hashAlgorithm.algorithm))
256 return 2;
257 /* Else mismatch */
258 return 0;
259 }
260 }
261
262 /* All IDs match: only need to check one ID */
263 *ret = cid;
264 return 1;
265}
266
267static int ocsp_match_issuerid(X509 *cert, OCSP_CERTID *cid,
268 STACK_OF(OCSP_SINGLERESP) *sresp)
269{
270 /* If only one ID to match then do it */
271 if (cid) {
272 const EVP_MD *dgst;
273 X509_NAME *iname;
274 int mdlen;
275 unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
276 if ((dgst = EVP_get_digestbyobj(cid->hashAlgorithm.algorithm))
277 == NULL) {
278 OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_MATCH_ISSUERID,
279 OCSP_R_UNKNOWN_MESSAGE_DIGEST);
280 return -1;
281 }
282
283 mdlen = EVP_MD_size(dgst);
284 if (mdlen < 0)
285 return -1;
286 if ((cid->issuerNameHash.length != mdlen) ||
287 (cid->issuerKeyHash.length != mdlen))
288 return 0;
289 iname = X509_get_subject_name(cert);
290 if (!X509_NAME_digest(iname, dgst, md, NULL))
291 return -1;
292 if (memcmp(md, cid->issuerNameHash.data, mdlen))
293 return 0;
294 X509_pubkey_digest(cert, dgst, md, NULL);
295 if (memcmp(md, cid->issuerKeyHash.data, mdlen))
296 return 0;
297
298 return 1;
299
300 } else {
301 /* We have to match the whole lot */
302 int i, ret;
303 OCSP_CERTID *tmpid;
304 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_SINGLERESP_num(sresp); i++) {
305 tmpid = sk_OCSP_SINGLERESP_value(sresp, i)->certId;
306 ret = ocsp_match_issuerid(cert, tmpid, NULL);
307 if (ret <= 0)
308 return ret;
309 }
310 return 1;
311 }
312
313}
314
315static int ocsp_check_delegated(X509 *x)
316{
317 if ((X509_get_extension_flags(x) & EXFLAG_XKUSAGE)
318 && (X509_get_extended_key_usage(x) & XKU_OCSP_SIGN))
319 return 1;
320 OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_CHECK_DELEGATED, OCSP_R_MISSING_OCSPSIGNING_USAGE);
321 return 0;
322}
323
324/*
325 * Verify an OCSP request. This is fortunately much easier than OCSP response
326 * verify. Just find the signers certificate and verify it against a given
327 * trust value.
328 */
329
330int OCSP_request_verify(OCSP_REQUEST *req, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
331 X509_STORE *store, unsigned long flags)
332{
333 X509 *signer;
334 X509_NAME *nm;
335 GENERAL_NAME *gen;
336 int ret = 0;
337 X509_STORE_CTX *ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new();
338
339 if (ctx == NULL) {
340 OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_REQUEST_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
341 goto err;
342 }
343
344 if (!req->optionalSignature) {
345 OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_REQUEST_VERIFY, OCSP_R_REQUEST_NOT_SIGNED);
346 goto err;
347 }
348 gen = req->tbsRequest.requestorName;
349 if (!gen || gen->type != GEN_DIRNAME) {
350 OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_REQUEST_VERIFY,
351 OCSP_R_UNSUPPORTED_REQUESTORNAME_TYPE);
352 goto err;
353 }
354 nm = gen->d.directoryName;
355 ret = ocsp_req_find_signer(&signer, req, nm, certs, flags);
356 if (ret <= 0) {
357 OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_REQUEST_VERIFY,
358 OCSP_R_SIGNER_CERTIFICATE_NOT_FOUND);
359 goto err;
360 }
361 if ((ret == 2) && (flags & OCSP_TRUSTOTHER))
362 flags |= OCSP_NOVERIFY;
363 if (!(flags & OCSP_NOSIGS)) {
364 EVP_PKEY *skey;
365 skey = X509_get0_pubkey(signer);
366 ret = OCSP_REQUEST_verify(req, skey);
367 if (ret <= 0) {
368 OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_REQUEST_VERIFY, OCSP_R_SIGNATURE_FAILURE);
369 goto err;
370 }
371 }
372 if (!(flags & OCSP_NOVERIFY)) {
373 int init_res;
374 if (flags & OCSP_NOCHAIN)
375 init_res = X509_STORE_CTX_init(ctx, store, signer, NULL);
376 else
377 init_res = X509_STORE_CTX_init(ctx, store, signer,
378 req->optionalSignature->certs);
379 if (!init_res) {
380 OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_REQUEST_VERIFY, ERR_R_X509_LIB);
381 goto err;
382 }
383
384 X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(ctx, X509_PURPOSE_OCSP_HELPER);
385 X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(ctx, X509_TRUST_OCSP_REQUEST);
386 ret = X509_verify_cert(ctx);
387 if (ret <= 0) {
388 ret = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx);
389 OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_REQUEST_VERIFY,
390 OCSP_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_ERROR);
391 ERR_add_error_data(2, "Verify error:",
392 X509_verify_cert_error_string(ret));
393 goto err;
394 }
395 }
396 ret = 1;
397 goto end;
398
399err:
400 ret = 0;
401end:
402 X509_STORE_CTX_free(ctx);
403 return ret;
404
405}
406
407static int ocsp_req_find_signer(X509 **psigner, OCSP_REQUEST *req,
408 X509_NAME *nm, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
409 unsigned long flags)
410{
411 X509 *signer;
412 if (!(flags & OCSP_NOINTERN)) {
413 signer = X509_find_by_subject(req->optionalSignature->certs, nm);
414 if (signer) {
415 *psigner = signer;
416 return 1;
417 }
418 }
419
420 signer = X509_find_by_subject(certs, nm);
421 if (signer) {
422 *psigner = signer;
423 return 2;
424 }
425 return 0;
426}
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