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source: vbox/trunk/src/libs/openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c@ 69890

Last change on this file since 69890 was 69890, checked in by vboxsync, 7 years ago

Added OpenSSL 1.1.0g with unneeded files removed, otherwise unmodified.
bugref:8070: src/libs maintenance
  • Property svn:eol-style set to native
File size: 101.3 KB
Line 
1/*
2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3 *
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
8 */
9
10#include <stdio.h>
11#include <time.h>
12#include <errno.h>
13#include <limits.h>
14
15#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
16#include <openssl/crypto.h>
17#include <openssl/lhash.h>
18#include <openssl/buffer.h>
19#include <openssl/evp.h>
20#include <openssl/asn1.h>
21#include <openssl/x509.h>
22#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
23#include <openssl/objects.h>
24#include <internal/dane.h>
25#include <internal/x509_int.h>
26#include "x509_lcl.h"
27
28/* CRL score values */
29
30/* No unhandled critical extensions */
31
32#define CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL 0x100
33
34/* certificate is within CRL scope */
35
36#define CRL_SCORE_SCOPE 0x080
37
38/* CRL times valid */
39
40#define CRL_SCORE_TIME 0x040
41
42/* Issuer name matches certificate */
43
44#define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME 0x020
45
46/* If this score or above CRL is probably valid */
47
48#define CRL_SCORE_VALID (CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL|CRL_SCORE_TIME|CRL_SCORE_SCOPE)
49
50/* CRL issuer is certificate issuer */
51
52#define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT 0x018
53
54/* CRL issuer is on certificate path */
55
56#define CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH 0x008
57
58/* CRL issuer matches CRL AKID */
59
60#define CRL_SCORE_AKID 0x004
61
62/* Have a delta CRL with valid times */
63
64#define CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA 0x002
65
66static int build_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
67static int verify_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
68static int dane_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
69static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e);
70static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer);
71static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x);
72static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
73static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
74static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
75static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int num_untrusted);
76static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
77static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
78static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
79static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x);
80static int check_dane_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth);
81static int check_key_level(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert);
82static int check_sig_level(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert);
83
84static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer,
85 unsigned int *preasons, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x);
86static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
87 X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x);
88static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl,
89 int *pcrl_score, X509_CRL *base,
90 STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls);
91static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 **pissuer,
92 int *pcrl_score);
93static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score,
94 unsigned int *preasons);
95static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x);
96static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
97 STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path,
98 STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path);
99
100static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
101
102static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e)
103{
104 return ok;
105}
106
107/* Return 1 is a certificate is self signed */
108static int cert_self_signed(X509 *x)
109{
110 /*
111 * FIXME: x509v3_cache_extensions() needs to detect more failures and not
112 * set EXFLAG_SET when that happens. Especially, if the failures are
113 * parse errors, rather than memory pressure!
114 */
115 X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0);
116 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SS)
117 return 1;
118 else
119 return 0;
120}
121
122/* Given a certificate try and find an exact match in the store */
123
124static X509 *lookup_cert_match(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
125{
126 STACK_OF(X509) *certs;
127 X509 *xtmp = NULL;
128 int i;
129 /* Lookup all certs with matching subject name */
130 certs = ctx->lookup_certs(ctx, X509_get_subject_name(x));
131 if (certs == NULL)
132 return NULL;
133 /* Look for exact match */
134 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++) {
135 xtmp = sk_X509_value(certs, i);
136 if (!X509_cmp(xtmp, x))
137 break;
138 }
139 if (i < sk_X509_num(certs))
140 X509_up_ref(xtmp);
141 else
142 xtmp = NULL;
143 sk_X509_pop_free(certs, X509_free);
144 return xtmp;
145}
146
147/*-
148 * Inform the verify callback of an error.
149 * If B<x> is not NULL it is the error cert, otherwise use the chain cert at
150 * B<depth>.
151 * If B<err> is not X509_V_OK, that's the error value, otherwise leave
152 * unchanged (presumably set by the caller).
153 *
154 * Returns 0 to abort verification with an error, non-zero to continue.
155 */
156static int verify_cb_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int depth, int err)
157{
158 ctx->error_depth = depth;
159 ctx->current_cert = (x != NULL) ? x : sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, depth);
160 if (err != X509_V_OK)
161 ctx->error = err;
162 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
163}
164
165/*-
166 * Inform the verify callback of an error, CRL-specific variant. Here, the
167 * error depth and certificate are already set, we just specify the error
168 * number.
169 *
170 * Returns 0 to abort verification with an error, non-zero to continue.
171 */
172static int verify_cb_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int err)
173{
174 ctx->error = err;
175 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
176}
177
178static int check_auth_level(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
179{
180 int i;
181 int num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
182
183 if (ctx->param->auth_level <= 0)
184 return 1;
185
186 for (i = 0; i < num; ++i) {
187 X509 *cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
188
189 /*
190 * We've already checked the security of the leaf key, so here we only
191 * check the security of issuer keys.
192 */
193 if (i > 0 && !check_key_level(ctx, cert) &&
194 verify_cb_cert(ctx, cert, i, X509_V_ERR_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL) == 0)
195 return 0;
196 /*
197 * We also check the signature algorithm security of all certificates
198 * except those of the trust anchor at index num-1.
199 */
200 if (i < num - 1 && !check_sig_level(ctx, cert) &&
201 verify_cb_cert(ctx, cert, i, X509_V_ERR_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK) == 0)
202 return 0;
203 }
204 return 1;
205}
206
207static int verify_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
208{
209 int err;
210 int ok;
211
212 /*
213 * Before either returning with an error, or continuing with CRL checks,
214 * instantiate chain public key parameters.
215 */
216 if ((ok = build_chain(ctx)) == 0 ||
217 (ok = check_chain_extensions(ctx)) == 0 ||
218 (ok = check_auth_level(ctx)) == 0 ||
219 (ok = check_id(ctx)) == 0 || 1)
220 X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL, ctx->chain);
221 if (ok == 0 || (ok = ctx->check_revocation(ctx)) == 0)
222 return ok;
223
224 err = X509_chain_check_suiteb(&ctx->error_depth, NULL, ctx->chain,
225 ctx->param->flags);
226 if (err != X509_V_OK) {
227 if ((ok = verify_cb_cert(ctx, NULL, ctx->error_depth, err)) == 0)
228 return ok;
229 }
230
231 /* Verify chain signatures and expiration times */
232 ok = (ctx->verify != NULL) ? ctx->verify(ctx) : internal_verify(ctx);
233 if (!ok)
234 return ok;
235
236 if ((ok = check_name_constraints(ctx)) == 0)
237 return ok;
238
239#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779
240 /* RFC 3779 path validation, now that CRL check has been done */
241 if ((ok = X509v3_asid_validate_path(ctx)) == 0)
242 return ok;
243 if ((ok = X509v3_addr_validate_path(ctx)) == 0)
244 return ok;
245#endif
246
247 /* If we get this far evaluate policies */
248 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK)
249 ok = ctx->check_policy(ctx);
250 return ok;
251}
252
253int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
254{
255 SSL_DANE *dane = ctx->dane;
256 int ret;
257
258 if (ctx->cert == NULL) {
259 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY);
260 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL;
261 return -1;
262 }
263
264 if (ctx->chain != NULL) {
265 /*
266 * This X509_STORE_CTX has already been used to verify a cert. We
267 * cannot do another one.
268 */
269 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
270 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL;
271 return -1;
272 }
273
274 /*
275 * first we make sure the chain we are going to build is present and that
276 * the first entry is in place
277 */
278 if (((ctx->chain = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) ||
279 (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, ctx->cert))) {
280 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
281 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
282 return -1;
283 }
284 X509_up_ref(ctx->cert);
285 ctx->num_untrusted = 1;
286
287 /* If the peer's public key is too weak, we can stop early. */
288 if (!check_key_level(ctx, ctx->cert) &&
289 !verify_cb_cert(ctx, ctx->cert, 0, X509_V_ERR_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL))
290 return 0;
291
292 if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane))
293 ret = dane_verify(ctx);
294 else
295 ret = verify_chain(ctx);
296
297 /*
298 * Safety-net. If we are returning an error, we must also set ctx->error,
299 * so that the chain is not considered verified should the error be ignored
300 * (e.g. TLS with SSL_VERIFY_NONE).
301 */
302 if (ret <= 0 && ctx->error == X509_V_OK)
303 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED;
304 return ret;
305}
306
307/*
308 * Given a STACK_OF(X509) find the issuer of cert (if any)
309 */
310static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x)
311{
312 int i;
313 X509 *issuer, *rv = NULL;
314
315 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
316 issuer = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
317 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, issuer)) {
318 rv = issuer;
319 if (x509_check_cert_time(ctx, rv, -1))
320 break;
321 }
322 }
323 return rv;
324}
325
326/* Given a possible certificate and issuer check them */
327
328static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer)
329{
330 int ret;
331 if (x == issuer)
332 return cert_self_signed(x);
333 ret = X509_check_issued(issuer, x);
334 if (ret == X509_V_OK) {
335 int i;
336 X509 *ch;
337 /* Special case: single self signed certificate */
338 if (cert_self_signed(x) && sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1)
339 return 1;
340 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) {
341 ch = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
342 if (ch == issuer || !X509_cmp(ch, issuer)) {
343 ret = X509_V_ERR_PATH_LOOP;
344 break;
345 }
346 }
347 }
348
349 return (ret == X509_V_OK);
350}
351
352/* Alternative lookup method: look from a STACK stored in other_ctx */
353
354static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
355{
356 *issuer = find_issuer(ctx, ctx->other_ctx, x);
357 if (*issuer) {
358 X509_up_ref(*issuer);
359 return 1;
360 } else
361 return 0;
362}
363
364static STACK_OF(X509) *lookup_certs_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_NAME *nm)
365{
366 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
367 X509 *x;
368 int i;
369 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->other_ctx); i++) {
370 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->other_ctx, i);
371 if (X509_NAME_cmp(nm, X509_get_subject_name(x)) == 0) {
372 if (sk == NULL)
373 sk = sk_X509_new_null();
374 if (sk == NULL || sk_X509_push(sk, x) == 0) {
375 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
376 return NULL;
377 }
378 X509_up_ref(x);
379 }
380 }
381 return sk;
382}
383
384/*
385 * Check EE or CA certificate purpose. For trusted certificates explicit local
386 * auxiliary trust can be used to override EKU-restrictions.
387 */
388static int check_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int purpose, int depth,
389 int must_be_ca)
390{
391 int tr_ok = X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
392
393 /*
394 * For trusted certificates we want to see whether any auxiliary trust
395 * settings trump the purpose constraints.
396 *
397 * This is complicated by the fact that the trust ordinals in
398 * ctx->param->trust are entirely independent of the purpose ordinals in
399 * ctx->param->purpose!
400 *
401 * What connects them is their mutual initialization via calls from
402 * X509_STORE_CTX_set_default() into X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup() which sets
403 * related values of both param->trust and param->purpose. It is however
404 * typically possible to infer associated trust values from a purpose value
405 * via the X509_PURPOSE API.
406 *
407 * Therefore, we can only check for trust overrides when the purpose we're
408 * checking is the same as ctx->param->purpose and ctx->param->trust is
409 * also set.
410 */
411 if (depth >= ctx->num_untrusted && purpose == ctx->param->purpose)
412 tr_ok = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->param->trust, X509_TRUST_NO_SS_COMPAT);
413
414 switch (tr_ok) {
415 case X509_TRUST_TRUSTED:
416 return 1;
417 case X509_TRUST_REJECTED:
418 break;
419 default:
420 switch (X509_check_purpose(x, purpose, must_be_ca > 0)) {
421 case 1:
422 return 1;
423 case 0:
424 break;
425 default:
426 if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT) == 0)
427 return 1;
428 }
429 break;
430 }
431
432 return verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, depth, X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE);
433}
434
435/*
436 * Check a certificate chains extensions for consistency with the supplied
437 * purpose
438 */
439
440static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
441{
442 int i, must_be_ca, plen = 0;
443 X509 *x;
444 int proxy_path_length = 0;
445 int purpose;
446 int allow_proxy_certs;
447 int num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
448
449 /*-
450 * must_be_ca can have 1 of 3 values:
451 * -1: we accept both CA and non-CA certificates, to allow direct
452 * use of self-signed certificates (which are marked as CA).
453 * 0: we only accept non-CA certificates. This is currently not
454 * used, but the possibility is present for future extensions.
455 * 1: we only accept CA certificates. This is currently used for
456 * all certificates in the chain except the leaf certificate.
457 */
458 must_be_ca = -1;
459
460 /* CRL path validation */
461 if (ctx->parent) {
462 allow_proxy_certs = 0;
463 purpose = X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN;
464 } else {
465 allow_proxy_certs =
466 ! !(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS);
467 purpose = ctx->param->purpose;
468 }
469
470 for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
471 int ret;
472 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
473 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
474 && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) {
475 if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i,
476 X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION))
477 return 0;
478 }
479 if (!allow_proxy_certs && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY)) {
480 if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i,
481 X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED))
482 return 0;
483 }
484 ret = X509_check_ca(x);
485 switch (must_be_ca) {
486 case -1:
487 if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
488 && (ret != 1) && (ret != 0)) {
489 ret = 0;
490 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
491 } else
492 ret = 1;
493 break;
494 case 0:
495 if (ret != 0) {
496 ret = 0;
497 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA;
498 } else
499 ret = 1;
500 break;
501 default:
502 /* X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT is implicit for intermediate CAs */
503 if ((ret == 0)
504 || ((i + 1 < num || ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
505 && (ret != 1))) {
506 ret = 0;
507 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
508 } else
509 ret = 1;
510 break;
511 }
512 if (ret == 0 && !verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i, X509_V_OK))
513 return 0;
514 /* check_purpose() makes the callback as needed */
515 if (purpose > 0 && !check_purpose(ctx, x, purpose, i, must_be_ca))
516 return 0;
517 /* Check pathlen if not self issued */
518 if ((i > 1) && !(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)
519 && (x->ex_pathlen != -1)
520 && (plen > (x->ex_pathlen + proxy_path_length + 1))) {
521 if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED))
522 return 0;
523 }
524 /* Increment path length if not self issued */
525 if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
526 plen++;
527 /*
528 * If this certificate is a proxy certificate, the next certificate
529 * must be another proxy certificate or a EE certificate. If not,
530 * the next certificate must be a CA certificate.
531 */
532 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) {
533 /*
534 * RFC3820, 4.1.3 (b)(1) stipulates that if pCPathLengthConstraint
535 * is less than max_path_length, the former should be copied to
536 * the latter, and 4.1.4 (a) stipulates that max_path_length
537 * should be verified to be larger than zero and decrement it.
538 *
539 * Because we're checking the certs in the reverse order, we start
540 * with verifying that proxy_path_length isn't larger than pcPLC,
541 * and copy the latter to the former if it is, and finally,
542 * increment proxy_path_length.
543 */
544 if (x->ex_pcpathlen != -1) {
545 if (proxy_path_length > x->ex_pcpathlen) {
546 if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i,
547 X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED))
548 return 0;
549 }
550 proxy_path_length = x->ex_pcpathlen;
551 }
552 proxy_path_length++;
553 must_be_ca = 0;
554 } else
555 must_be_ca = 1;
556 }
557 return 1;
558}
559
560static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
561{
562 int i;
563
564 /* Check name constraints for all certificates */
565 for (i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
566 X509 *x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
567 int j;
568
569 /* Ignore self issued certs unless last in chain */
570 if (i && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
571 continue;
572
573 /*
574 * Proxy certificates policy has an extra constraint, where the
575 * certificate subject MUST be the issuer with a single CN entry
576 * added.
577 * (RFC 3820: 3.4, 4.1.3 (a)(4))
578 */
579 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) {
580 X509_NAME *tmpsubject = X509_get_subject_name(x);
581 X509_NAME *tmpissuer = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
582 X509_NAME_ENTRY *tmpentry = NULL;
583 int last_object_nid = 0;
584 int err = X509_V_OK;
585 int last_object_loc = X509_NAME_entry_count(tmpsubject) - 1;
586
587 /* Check that there are at least two RDNs */
588 if (last_object_loc < 1) {
589 err = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION;
590 goto proxy_name_done;
591 }
592
593 /*
594 * Check that there is exactly one more RDN in subject as
595 * there is in issuer.
596 */
597 if (X509_NAME_entry_count(tmpsubject)
598 != X509_NAME_entry_count(tmpissuer) + 1) {
599 err = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION;
600 goto proxy_name_done;
601 }
602
603 /*
604 * Check that the last subject component isn't part of a
605 * multivalued RDN
606 */
607 if (X509_NAME_ENTRY_set(X509_NAME_get_entry(tmpsubject,
608 last_object_loc))
609 == X509_NAME_ENTRY_set(X509_NAME_get_entry(tmpsubject,
610 last_object_loc - 1))) {
611 err = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION;
612 goto proxy_name_done;
613 }
614
615 /*
616 * Check that the last subject RDN is a commonName, and that
617 * all the previous RDNs match the issuer exactly
618 */
619 tmpsubject = X509_NAME_dup(tmpsubject);
620 if (tmpsubject == NULL) {
621 X509err(X509_F_CHECK_NAME_CONSTRAINTS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
622 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
623 return 0;
624 }
625
626 tmpentry =
627 X509_NAME_delete_entry(tmpsubject, last_object_loc);
628 last_object_nid =
629 OBJ_obj2nid(X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_object(tmpentry));
630
631 if (last_object_nid != NID_commonName
632 || X509_NAME_cmp(tmpsubject, tmpissuer) != 0) {
633 err = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION;
634 }
635
636 X509_NAME_ENTRY_free(tmpentry);
637 X509_NAME_free(tmpsubject);
638
639 proxy_name_done:
640 if (err != X509_V_OK
641 && !verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i, err))
642 return 0;
643 }
644
645 /*
646 * Check against constraints for all certificates higher in chain
647 * including trust anchor. Trust anchor not strictly speaking needed
648 * but if it includes constraints it is to be assumed it expects them
649 * to be obeyed.
650 */
651 for (j = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; j > i; j--) {
652 NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j)->nc;
653
654 if (nc) {
655 int rv = NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check(x, nc);
656
657 /* If EE certificate check commonName too */
658 if (rv == X509_V_OK && i == 0)
659 rv = NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check_CN(x, nc);
660
661 switch (rv) {
662 case X509_V_OK:
663 break;
664 case X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM:
665 return 0;
666 default:
667 if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i, rv))
668 return 0;
669 break;
670 }
671 }
672 }
673 }
674 return 1;
675}
676
677static int check_id_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int errcode)
678{
679 return verify_cb_cert(ctx, ctx->cert, 0, errcode);
680}
681
682static int check_hosts(X509 *x, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm)
683{
684 int i;
685 int n = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(vpm->hosts);
686 char *name;
687
688 if (vpm->peername != NULL) {
689 OPENSSL_free(vpm->peername);
690 vpm->peername = NULL;
691 }
692 for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
693 name = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(vpm->hosts, i);
694 if (X509_check_host(x, name, 0, vpm->hostflags, &vpm->peername) > 0)
695 return 1;
696 }
697 return n == 0;
698}
699
700static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
701{
702 X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm = ctx->param;
703 X509 *x = ctx->cert;
704 if (vpm->hosts && check_hosts(x, vpm) <= 0) {
705 if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH))
706 return 0;
707 }
708 if (vpm->email && X509_check_email(x, vpm->email, vpm->emaillen, 0) <= 0) {
709 if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH))
710 return 0;
711 }
712 if (vpm->ip && X509_check_ip(x, vpm->ip, vpm->iplen, 0) <= 0) {
713 if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH))
714 return 0;
715 }
716 return 1;
717}
718
719static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int num_untrusted)
720{
721 int i;
722 X509 *x = NULL;
723 X509 *mx;
724 SSL_DANE *dane = ctx->dane;
725 int num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
726 int trust;
727
728 /*
729 * Check for a DANE issuer at depth 1 or greater, if it is a DANE-TA(2)
730 * match, we're done, otherwise we'll merely record the match depth.
731 */
732 if (DANETLS_HAS_TA(dane) && num_untrusted > 0 && num_untrusted < num) {
733 switch (trust = check_dane_issuer(ctx, num_untrusted)) {
734 case X509_TRUST_TRUSTED:
735 case X509_TRUST_REJECTED:
736 return trust;
737 }
738 }
739
740 /*
741 * Check trusted certificates in chain at depth num_untrusted and up.
742 * Note, that depths 0..num_untrusted-1 may also contain trusted
743 * certificates, but the caller is expected to have already checked those,
744 * and wants to incrementally check just any added since.
745 */
746 for (i = num_untrusted; i < num; i++) {
747 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
748 trust = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->param->trust, 0);
749 /* If explicitly trusted return trusted */
750 if (trust == X509_TRUST_TRUSTED)
751 goto trusted;
752 if (trust == X509_TRUST_REJECTED)
753 goto rejected;
754 }
755
756 /*
757 * If we are looking at a trusted certificate, and accept partial chains,
758 * the chain is PKIX trusted.
759 */
760 if (num_untrusted < num) {
761 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN)
762 goto trusted;
763 return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
764 }
765
766 if (num_untrusted == num && ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN) {
767 /*
768 * Last-resort call with no new trusted certificates, check the leaf
769 * for a direct trust store match.
770 */
771 i = 0;
772 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
773 mx = lookup_cert_match(ctx, x);
774 if (!mx)
775 return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
776
777 /*
778 * Check explicit auxiliary trust/reject settings. If none are set,
779 * we'll accept X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED when not self-signed.
780 */
781 trust = X509_check_trust(mx, ctx->param->trust, 0);
782 if (trust == X509_TRUST_REJECTED) {
783 X509_free(mx);
784 goto rejected;
785 }
786
787 /* Replace leaf with trusted match */
788 (void) sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, 0, mx);
789 X509_free(x);
790 ctx->num_untrusted = 0;
791 goto trusted;
792 }
793
794 /*
795 * If no trusted certs in chain at all return untrusted and allow
796 * standard (no issuer cert) etc errors to be indicated.
797 */
798 return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
799
800 rejected:
801 if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED))
802 return X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
803 return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
804
805 trusted:
806 if (!DANETLS_ENABLED(dane))
807 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
808 if (dane->pdpth < 0)
809 dane->pdpth = num_untrusted;
810 /* With DANE, PKIX alone is not trusted until we have both */
811 if (dane->mdpth >= 0)
812 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
813 return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
814}
815
816static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
817{
818 int i = 0, last = 0, ok = 0;
819 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK))
820 return 1;
821 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL)
822 last = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
823 else {
824 /* If checking CRL paths this isn't the EE certificate */
825 if (ctx->parent)
826 return 1;
827 last = 0;
828 }
829 for (i = 0; i <= last; i++) {
830 ctx->error_depth = i;
831 ok = check_cert(ctx);
832 if (!ok)
833 return ok;
834 }
835 return 1;
836}
837
838static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
839{
840 X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL;
841 int ok = 0;
842 int cnum = ctx->error_depth;
843 X509 *x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum);
844
845 ctx->current_cert = x;
846 ctx->current_issuer = NULL;
847 ctx->current_crl_score = 0;
848 ctx->current_reasons = 0;
849
850 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY)
851 return 1;
852
853 while (ctx->current_reasons != CRLDP_ALL_REASONS) {
854 unsigned int last_reasons = ctx->current_reasons;
855
856 /* Try to retrieve relevant CRL */
857 if (ctx->get_crl)
858 ok = ctx->get_crl(ctx, &crl, x);
859 else
860 ok = get_crl_delta(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, x);
861 /*
862 * If error looking up CRL, nothing we can do except notify callback
863 */
864 if (!ok) {
865 ok = verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL);
866 goto done;
867 }
868 ctx->current_crl = crl;
869 ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, crl);
870 if (!ok)
871 goto done;
872
873 if (dcrl) {
874 ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, dcrl);
875 if (!ok)
876 goto done;
877 ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, dcrl, x);
878 if (!ok)
879 goto done;
880 } else
881 ok = 1;
882
883 /* Don't look in full CRL if delta reason is removefromCRL */
884 if (ok != 2) {
885 ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, crl, x);
886 if (!ok)
887 goto done;
888 }
889
890 X509_CRL_free(crl);
891 X509_CRL_free(dcrl);
892 crl = NULL;
893 dcrl = NULL;
894 /*
895 * If reasons not updated we won't get anywhere by another iteration,
896 * so exit loop.
897 */
898 if (last_reasons == ctx->current_reasons) {
899 ok = verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL);
900 goto done;
901 }
902 }
903 done:
904 X509_CRL_free(crl);
905 X509_CRL_free(dcrl);
906
907 ctx->current_crl = NULL;
908 return ok;
909}
910
911/* Check CRL times against values in X509_STORE_CTX */
912
913static int check_crl_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, int notify)
914{
915 time_t *ptime;
916 int i;
917
918 if (notify)
919 ctx->current_crl = crl;
920 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
921 ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
922 else if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NO_CHECK_TIME)
923 return 1;
924 else
925 ptime = NULL;
926
927 i = X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get0_lastUpdate(crl), ptime);
928 if (i == 0) {
929 if (!notify)
930 return 0;
931 if (!verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD))
932 return 0;
933 }
934
935 if (i > 0) {
936 if (!notify)
937 return 0;
938 if (!verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID))
939 return 0;
940 }
941
942 if (X509_CRL_get0_nextUpdate(crl)) {
943 i = X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get0_nextUpdate(crl), ptime);
944
945 if (i == 0) {
946 if (!notify)
947 return 0;
948 if (!verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD))
949 return 0;
950 }
951 /* Ignore expiry of base CRL is delta is valid */
952 if ((i < 0) && !(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA)) {
953 if (!notify)
954 return 0;
955 if (!verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED))
956 return 0;
957 }
958 }
959
960 if (notify)
961 ctx->current_crl = NULL;
962
963 return 1;
964}
965
966static int get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl,
967 X509 **pissuer, int *pscore, unsigned int *preasons,
968 STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
969{
970 int i, crl_score, best_score = *pscore;
971 unsigned int reasons, best_reasons = 0;
972 X509 *x = ctx->current_cert;
973 X509_CRL *crl, *best_crl = NULL;
974 X509 *crl_issuer = NULL, *best_crl_issuer = NULL;
975
976 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) {
977 crl = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
978 reasons = *preasons;
979 crl_score = get_crl_score(ctx, &crl_issuer, &reasons, crl, x);
980 if (crl_score < best_score || crl_score == 0)
981 continue;
982 /* If current CRL is equivalent use it if it is newer */
983 if (crl_score == best_score && best_crl != NULL) {
984 int day, sec;
985 if (ASN1_TIME_diff(&day, &sec, X509_CRL_get0_lastUpdate(best_crl),
986 X509_CRL_get0_lastUpdate(crl)) == 0)
987 continue;
988 /*
989 * ASN1_TIME_diff never returns inconsistent signs for |day|
990 * and |sec|.
991 */
992 if (day <= 0 && sec <= 0)
993 continue;
994 }
995 best_crl = crl;
996 best_crl_issuer = crl_issuer;
997 best_score = crl_score;
998 best_reasons = reasons;
999 }
1000
1001 if (best_crl) {
1002 X509_CRL_free(*pcrl);
1003 *pcrl = best_crl;
1004 *pissuer = best_crl_issuer;
1005 *pscore = best_score;
1006 *preasons = best_reasons;
1007 X509_CRL_up_ref(best_crl);
1008 X509_CRL_free(*pdcrl);
1009 *pdcrl = NULL;
1010 get_delta_sk(ctx, pdcrl, pscore, best_crl, crls);
1011 }
1012
1013 if (best_score >= CRL_SCORE_VALID)
1014 return 1;
1015
1016 return 0;
1017}
1018
1019/*
1020 * Compare two CRL extensions for delta checking purposes. They should be
1021 * both present or both absent. If both present all fields must be identical.
1022 */
1023
1024static int crl_extension_match(X509_CRL *a, X509_CRL *b, int nid)
1025{
1026 ASN1_OCTET_STRING *exta, *extb;
1027 int i;
1028 i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, -1);
1029 if (i >= 0) {
1030 /* Can't have multiple occurrences */
1031 if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, i) != -1)
1032 return 0;
1033 exta = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(a, i));
1034 } else
1035 exta = NULL;
1036
1037 i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, -1);
1038
1039 if (i >= 0) {
1040
1041 if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, i) != -1)
1042 return 0;
1043 extb = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(b, i));
1044 } else
1045 extb = NULL;
1046
1047 if (!exta && !extb)
1048 return 1;
1049
1050 if (!exta || !extb)
1051 return 0;
1052
1053 if (ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(exta, extb))
1054 return 0;
1055
1056 return 1;
1057}
1058
1059/* See if a base and delta are compatible */
1060
1061static int check_delta_base(X509_CRL *delta, X509_CRL *base)
1062{
1063 /* Delta CRL must be a delta */
1064 if (!delta->base_crl_number)
1065 return 0;
1066 /* Base must have a CRL number */
1067 if (!base->crl_number)
1068 return 0;
1069 /* Issuer names must match */
1070 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base), X509_CRL_get_issuer(delta)))
1071 return 0;
1072 /* AKID and IDP must match */
1073 if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_authority_key_identifier))
1074 return 0;
1075 if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_issuing_distribution_point))
1076 return 0;
1077 /* Delta CRL base number must not exceed Full CRL number. */
1078 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->base_crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0)
1079 return 0;
1080 /* Delta CRL number must exceed full CRL number */
1081 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0)
1082 return 1;
1083 return 0;
1084}
1085
1086/*
1087 * For a given base CRL find a delta... maybe extend to delta scoring or
1088 * retrieve a chain of deltas...
1089 */
1090
1091static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, int *pscore,
1092 X509_CRL *base, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
1093{
1094 X509_CRL *delta;
1095 int i;
1096 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_DELTAS))
1097 return;
1098 if (!((ctx->current_cert->ex_flags | base->flags) & EXFLAG_FRESHEST))
1099 return;
1100 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) {
1101 delta = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
1102 if (check_delta_base(delta, base)) {
1103 if (check_crl_time(ctx, delta, 0))
1104 *pscore |= CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA;
1105 X509_CRL_up_ref(delta);
1106 *dcrl = delta;
1107 return;
1108 }
1109 }
1110 *dcrl = NULL;
1111}
1112
1113/*
1114 * For a given CRL return how suitable it is for the supplied certificate
1115 * 'x'. The return value is a mask of several criteria. If the issuer is not
1116 * the certificate issuer this is returned in *pissuer. The reasons mask is
1117 * also used to determine if the CRL is suitable: if no new reasons the CRL
1118 * is rejected, otherwise reasons is updated.
1119 */
1120
1121static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer,
1122 unsigned int *preasons, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
1123{
1124
1125 int crl_score = 0;
1126 unsigned int tmp_reasons = *preasons, crl_reasons;
1127
1128 /* First see if we can reject CRL straight away */
1129
1130 /* Invalid IDP cannot be processed */
1131 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID)
1132 return 0;
1133 /* Reason codes or indirect CRLs need extended CRL support */
1134 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT)) {
1135 if (crl->idp_flags & (IDP_INDIRECT | IDP_REASONS))
1136 return 0;
1137 } else if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_REASONS) {
1138 /* If no new reasons reject */
1139 if (!(crl->idp_reasons & ~tmp_reasons))
1140 return 0;
1141 }
1142 /* Don't process deltas at this stage */
1143 else if (crl->base_crl_number)
1144 return 0;
1145 /* If issuer name doesn't match certificate need indirect CRL */
1146 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(x), X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl))) {
1147 if (!(crl->idp_flags & IDP_INDIRECT))
1148 return 0;
1149 } else
1150 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME;
1151
1152 if (!(crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL))
1153 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL;
1154
1155 /* Check expiry */
1156 if (check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 0))
1157 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_TIME;
1158
1159 /* Check authority key ID and locate certificate issuer */
1160 crl_akid_check(ctx, crl, pissuer, &crl_score);
1161
1162 /* If we can't locate certificate issuer at this point forget it */
1163
1164 if (!(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_AKID))
1165 return 0;
1166
1167 /* Check cert for matching CRL distribution points */
1168
1169 if (crl_crldp_check(x, crl, crl_score, &crl_reasons)) {
1170 /* If no new reasons reject */
1171 if (!(crl_reasons & ~tmp_reasons))
1172 return 0;
1173 tmp_reasons |= crl_reasons;
1174 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_SCOPE;
1175 }
1176
1177 *preasons = tmp_reasons;
1178
1179 return crl_score;
1180
1181}
1182
1183static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl,
1184 X509 **pissuer, int *pcrl_score)
1185{
1186 X509 *crl_issuer = NULL;
1187 X509_NAME *cnm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl);
1188 int cidx = ctx->error_depth;
1189 int i;
1190
1191 if (cidx != sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1)
1192 cidx++;
1193
1194 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx);
1195
1196 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) {
1197 if (*pcrl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME) {
1198 *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID | CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT;
1199 *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1200 return;
1201 }
1202 }
1203
1204 for (cidx++; cidx < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); cidx++) {
1205 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx);
1206 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm))
1207 continue;
1208 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) {
1209 *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID | CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH;
1210 *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1211 return;
1212 }
1213 }
1214
1215 /* Anything else needs extended CRL support */
1216
1217 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT))
1218 return;
1219
1220 /*
1221 * Otherwise the CRL issuer is not on the path. Look for it in the set of
1222 * untrusted certificates.
1223 */
1224 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->untrusted); i++) {
1225 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->untrusted, i);
1226 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm))
1227 continue;
1228 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) {
1229 *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1230 *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID;
1231 return;
1232 }
1233 }
1234}
1235
1236/*
1237 * Check the path of a CRL issuer certificate. This creates a new
1238 * X509_STORE_CTX and populates it with most of the parameters from the
1239 * parent. This could be optimised somewhat since a lot of path checking will
1240 * be duplicated by the parent, but this will rarely be used in practice.
1241 */
1242
1243static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
1244{
1245 X509_STORE_CTX crl_ctx;
1246 int ret;
1247
1248 /* Don't allow recursive CRL path validation */
1249 if (ctx->parent)
1250 return 0;
1251 if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&crl_ctx, ctx->ctx, x, ctx->untrusted))
1252 return -1;
1253
1254 crl_ctx.crls = ctx->crls;
1255 /* Copy verify params across */
1256 X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(&crl_ctx, ctx->param);
1257
1258 crl_ctx.parent = ctx;
1259 crl_ctx.verify_cb = ctx->verify_cb;
1260
1261 /* Verify CRL issuer */
1262 ret = X509_verify_cert(&crl_ctx);
1263 if (ret <= 0)
1264 goto err;
1265
1266 /* Check chain is acceptable */
1267 ret = check_crl_chain(ctx, ctx->chain, crl_ctx.chain);
1268 err:
1269 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&crl_ctx);
1270 return ret;
1271}
1272
1273/*
1274 * RFC3280 says nothing about the relationship between CRL path and
1275 * certificate path, which could lead to situations where a certificate could
1276 * be revoked or validated by a CA not authorised to do so. RFC5280 is more
1277 * strict and states that the two paths must end in the same trust anchor,
1278 * though some discussions remain... until this is resolved we use the
1279 * RFC5280 version
1280 */
1281
1282static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
1283 STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path,
1284 STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path)
1285{
1286 X509 *cert_ta, *crl_ta;
1287 cert_ta = sk_X509_value(cert_path, sk_X509_num(cert_path) - 1);
1288 crl_ta = sk_X509_value(crl_path, sk_X509_num(crl_path) - 1);
1289 if (!X509_cmp(cert_ta, crl_ta))
1290 return 1;
1291 return 0;
1292}
1293
1294/*-
1295 * Check for match between two dist point names: three separate cases.
1296 * 1. Both are relative names and compare X509_NAME types.
1297 * 2. One full, one relative. Compare X509_NAME to GENERAL_NAMES.
1298 * 3. Both are full names and compare two GENERAL_NAMES.
1299 * 4. One is NULL: automatic match.
1300 */
1301
1302static int idp_check_dp(DIST_POINT_NAME *a, DIST_POINT_NAME *b)
1303{
1304 X509_NAME *nm = NULL;
1305 GENERAL_NAMES *gens = NULL;
1306 GENERAL_NAME *gena, *genb;
1307 int i, j;
1308 if (!a || !b)
1309 return 1;
1310 if (a->type == 1) {
1311 if (!a->dpname)
1312 return 0;
1313 /* Case 1: two X509_NAME */
1314 if (b->type == 1) {
1315 if (!b->dpname)
1316 return 0;
1317 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(a->dpname, b->dpname))
1318 return 1;
1319 else
1320 return 0;
1321 }
1322 /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
1323 nm = a->dpname;
1324 gens = b->name.fullname;
1325 } else if (b->type == 1) {
1326 if (!b->dpname)
1327 return 0;
1328 /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
1329 gens = a->name.fullname;
1330 nm = b->dpname;
1331 }
1332
1333 /* Handle case 2 with one GENERAL_NAMES and one X509_NAME */
1334 if (nm) {
1335 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++) {
1336 gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i);
1337 if (gena->type != GEN_DIRNAME)
1338 continue;
1339 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, gena->d.directoryName))
1340 return 1;
1341 }
1342 return 0;
1343 }
1344
1345 /* Else case 3: two GENERAL_NAMES */
1346
1347 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(a->name.fullname); i++) {
1348 gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(a->name.fullname, i);
1349 for (j = 0; j < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(b->name.fullname); j++) {
1350 genb = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(b->name.fullname, j);
1351 if (!GENERAL_NAME_cmp(gena, genb))
1352 return 1;
1353 }
1354 }
1355
1356 return 0;
1357
1358}
1359
1360static int crldp_check_crlissuer(DIST_POINT *dp, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score)
1361{
1362 int i;
1363 X509_NAME *nm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl);
1364 /* If no CRLissuer return is successful iff don't need a match */
1365 if (!dp->CRLissuer)
1366 return ! !(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME);
1367 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp->CRLissuer); i++) {
1368 GENERAL_NAME *gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp->CRLissuer, i);
1369 if (gen->type != GEN_DIRNAME)
1370 continue;
1371 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(gen->d.directoryName, nm))
1372 return 1;
1373 }
1374 return 0;
1375}
1376
1377/* Check CRLDP and IDP */
1378
1379static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score,
1380 unsigned int *preasons)
1381{
1382 int i;
1383 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYATTR)
1384 return 0;
1385 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) {
1386 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYUSER)
1387 return 0;
1388 } else {
1389 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYCA)
1390 return 0;
1391 }
1392 *preasons = crl->idp_reasons;
1393 for (i = 0; i < sk_DIST_POINT_num(x->crldp); i++) {
1394 DIST_POINT *dp = sk_DIST_POINT_value(x->crldp, i);
1395 if (crldp_check_crlissuer(dp, crl, crl_score)) {
1396 if (!crl->idp || idp_check_dp(dp->distpoint, crl->idp->distpoint)) {
1397 *preasons &= dp->dp_reasons;
1398 return 1;
1399 }
1400 }
1401 }
1402 if ((!crl->idp || !crl->idp->distpoint)
1403 && (crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME))
1404 return 1;
1405 return 0;
1406}
1407
1408/*
1409 * Retrieve CRL corresponding to current certificate. If deltas enabled try
1410 * to find a delta CRL too
1411 */
1412
1413static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
1414 X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x)
1415{
1416 int ok;
1417 X509 *issuer = NULL;
1418 int crl_score = 0;
1419 unsigned int reasons;
1420 X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL;
1421 STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *skcrl;
1422 X509_NAME *nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
1423
1424 reasons = ctx->current_reasons;
1425 ok = get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl,
1426 &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, ctx->crls);
1427 if (ok)
1428 goto done;
1429
1430 /* Lookup CRLs from store */
1431
1432 skcrl = ctx->lookup_crls(ctx, nm);
1433
1434 /* If no CRLs found and a near match from get_crl_sk use that */
1435 if (!skcrl && crl)
1436 goto done;
1437
1438 get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, skcrl);
1439
1440 sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(skcrl, X509_CRL_free);
1441
1442 done:
1443 /* If we got any kind of CRL use it and return success */
1444 if (crl) {
1445 ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
1446 ctx->current_crl_score = crl_score;
1447 ctx->current_reasons = reasons;
1448 *pcrl = crl;
1449 *pdcrl = dcrl;
1450 return 1;
1451 }
1452 return 0;
1453}
1454
1455/* Check CRL validity */
1456static int check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl)
1457{
1458 X509 *issuer = NULL;
1459 EVP_PKEY *ikey = NULL;
1460 int cnum = ctx->error_depth;
1461 int chnum = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
1462
1463 /* if we have an alternative CRL issuer cert use that */
1464 if (ctx->current_issuer)
1465 issuer = ctx->current_issuer;
1466 /*
1467 * Else find CRL issuer: if not last certificate then issuer is next
1468 * certificate in chain.
1469 */
1470 else if (cnum < chnum)
1471 issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum + 1);
1472 else {
1473 issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, chnum);
1474 /* If not self signed, can't check signature */
1475 if (!ctx->check_issued(ctx, issuer, issuer) &&
1476 !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER))
1477 return 0;
1478 }
1479
1480 if (issuer == NULL)
1481 return 1;
1482
1483 /*
1484 * Skip most tests for deltas because they have already been done
1485 */
1486 if (!crl->base_crl_number) {
1487 /* Check for cRLSign bit if keyUsage present */
1488 if ((issuer->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) &&
1489 !(issuer->ex_kusage & KU_CRL_SIGN) &&
1490 !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN))
1491 return 0;
1492
1493 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SCOPE) &&
1494 !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_DIFFERENT_CRL_SCOPE))
1495 return 0;
1496
1497 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH) &&
1498 check_crl_path(ctx, ctx->current_issuer) <= 0 &&
1499 !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_CRL_PATH_VALIDATION_ERROR))
1500 return 0;
1501
1502 if ((crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID) &&
1503 !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION))
1504 return 0;
1505 }
1506
1507 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME) &&
1508 !check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 1))
1509 return 0;
1510
1511 /* Attempt to get issuer certificate public key */
1512 ikey = X509_get0_pubkey(issuer);
1513
1514 if (!ikey &&
1515 !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY))
1516 return 0;
1517
1518 if (ikey) {
1519 int rv = X509_CRL_check_suiteb(crl, ikey, ctx->param->flags);
1520
1521 if (rv != X509_V_OK && !verify_cb_crl(ctx, rv))
1522 return 0;
1523 /* Verify CRL signature */
1524 if (X509_CRL_verify(crl, ikey) <= 0 &&
1525 !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE))
1526 return 0;
1527 }
1528 return 1;
1529}
1530
1531/* Check certificate against CRL */
1532static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
1533{
1534 X509_REVOKED *rev;
1535
1536 /*
1537 * The rules changed for this... previously if a CRL contained unhandled
1538 * critical extensions it could still be used to indicate a certificate
1539 * was revoked. This has since been changed since critical extensions can
1540 * change the meaning of CRL entries.
1541 */
1542 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
1543 && (crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL) &&
1544 !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION))
1545 return 0;
1546 /*
1547 * Look for serial number of certificate in CRL. If found, make sure
1548 * reason is not removeFromCRL.
1549 */
1550 if (X509_CRL_get0_by_cert(crl, &rev, x)) {
1551 if (rev->reason == CRL_REASON_REMOVE_FROM_CRL)
1552 return 2;
1553 if (!verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED))
1554 return 0;
1555 }
1556
1557 return 1;
1558}
1559
1560static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1561{
1562 int ret;
1563
1564 if (ctx->parent)
1565 return 1;
1566 /*
1567 * With DANE, the trust anchor might be a bare public key, not a
1568 * certificate! In that case our chain does not have the trust anchor
1569 * certificate as a top-most element. This comports well with RFC5280
1570 * chain verification, since there too, the trust anchor is not part of the
1571 * chain to be verified. In particular, X509_policy_check() does not look
1572 * at the TA cert, but assumes that it is present as the top-most chain
1573 * element. We therefore temporarily push a NULL cert onto the chain if it
1574 * was verified via a bare public key, and pop it off right after the
1575 * X509_policy_check() call.
1576 */
1577 if (ctx->bare_ta_signed && !sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, NULL)) {
1578 X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1579 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
1580 return 0;
1581 }
1582 ret = X509_policy_check(&ctx->tree, &ctx->explicit_policy, ctx->chain,
1583 ctx->param->policies, ctx->param->flags);
1584 if (ctx->bare_ta_signed)
1585 sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain);
1586
1587 if (ret == X509_PCY_TREE_INTERNAL) {
1588 X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1589 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
1590 return 0;
1591 }
1592 /* Invalid or inconsistent extensions */
1593 if (ret == X509_PCY_TREE_INVALID) {
1594 int i;
1595
1596 /* Locate certificates with bad extensions and notify callback. */
1597 for (i = 1; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) {
1598 X509 *x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
1599
1600 if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY))
1601 continue;
1602 if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i,
1603 X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION))
1604 return 0;
1605 }
1606 return 1;
1607 }
1608 if (ret == X509_PCY_TREE_FAILURE) {
1609 ctx->current_cert = NULL;
1610 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY;
1611 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1612 }
1613 if (ret != X509_PCY_TREE_VALID) {
1614 X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1615 return 0;
1616 }
1617
1618 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY) {
1619 ctx->current_cert = NULL;
1620 /*
1621 * Verification errors need to be "sticky", a callback may have allowed
1622 * an SSL handshake to continue despite an error, and we must then
1623 * remain in an error state. Therefore, we MUST NOT clear earlier
1624 * verification errors by setting the error to X509_V_OK.
1625 */
1626 if (!ctx->verify_cb(2, ctx))
1627 return 0;
1628 }
1629
1630 return 1;
1631}
1632
1633/*-
1634 * Check certificate validity times.
1635 * If depth >= 0, invoke verification callbacks on error, otherwise just return
1636 * the validation status.
1637 *
1638 * Return 1 on success, 0 otherwise.
1639 */
1640int x509_check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int depth)
1641{
1642 time_t *ptime;
1643 int i;
1644
1645 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
1646 ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
1647 else if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NO_CHECK_TIME)
1648 return 1;
1649 else
1650 ptime = NULL;
1651
1652 i = X509_cmp_time(X509_get0_notBefore(x), ptime);
1653 if (i >= 0 && depth < 0)
1654 return 0;
1655 if (i == 0 && !verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, depth,
1656 X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD))
1657 return 0;
1658 if (i > 0 && !verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, depth, X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID))
1659 return 0;
1660
1661 i = X509_cmp_time(X509_get0_notAfter(x), ptime);
1662 if (i <= 0 && depth < 0)
1663 return 0;
1664 if (i == 0 && !verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, depth,
1665 X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD))
1666 return 0;
1667 if (i < 0 && !verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, depth, X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED))
1668 return 0;
1669 return 1;
1670}
1671
1672static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1673{
1674 int n = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
1675 X509 *xi = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n);
1676 X509 *xs;
1677
1678 /*
1679 * With DANE-verified bare public key TA signatures, it remains only to
1680 * check the timestamps of the top certificate. We report the issuer as
1681 * NULL, since all we have is a bare key.
1682 */
1683 if (ctx->bare_ta_signed) {
1684 xs = xi;
1685 xi = NULL;
1686 goto check_cert;
1687 }
1688
1689 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, xi, xi))
1690 xs = xi;
1691 else {
1692 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN) {
1693 xs = xi;
1694 goto check_cert;
1695 }
1696 if (n <= 0)
1697 return verify_cb_cert(ctx, xi, 0,
1698 X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE);
1699 n--;
1700 ctx->error_depth = n;
1701 xs = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n);
1702 }
1703
1704 /*
1705 * Do not clear ctx->error=0, it must be "sticky", only the user's callback
1706 * is allowed to reset errors (at its own peril).
1707 */
1708 while (n >= 0) {
1709 EVP_PKEY *pkey;
1710
1711 /*
1712 * Skip signature check for self signed certificates unless explicitly
1713 * asked for. It doesn't add any security and just wastes time. If
1714 * the issuer's public key is unusable, report the issuer certificate
1715 * and its depth (rather than the depth of the subject).
1716 */
1717 if (xs != xi || (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE)) {
1718 if ((pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(xi)) == NULL) {
1719 if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, xi, xi != xs ? n+1 : n,
1720 X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY))
1721 return 0;
1722 } else if (X509_verify(xs, pkey) <= 0) {
1723 if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, xs, n,
1724 X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE))
1725 return 0;
1726 }
1727 }
1728
1729 check_cert:
1730 /* Calls verify callback as needed */
1731 if (!x509_check_cert_time(ctx, xs, n))
1732 return 0;
1733
1734 /*
1735 * Signal success at this depth. However, the previous error (if any)
1736 * is retained.
1737 */
1738 ctx->current_issuer = xi;
1739 ctx->current_cert = xs;
1740 ctx->error_depth = n;
1741 if (!ctx->verify_cb(1, ctx))
1742 return 0;
1743
1744 if (--n >= 0) {
1745 xi = xs;
1746 xs = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n);
1747 }
1748 }
1749 return 1;
1750}
1751
1752int X509_cmp_current_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm)
1753{
1754 return X509_cmp_time(ctm, NULL);
1755}
1756
1757int X509_cmp_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm, time_t *cmp_time)
1758{
1759 char *str;
1760 ASN1_TIME atm;
1761 long offset;
1762 char buff1[24], buff2[24], *p;
1763 int i, j, remaining;
1764
1765 p = buff1;
1766 remaining = ctm->length;
1767 str = (char *)ctm->data;
1768 /*
1769 * Note that the following (historical) code allows much more slack in the
1770 * time format than RFC5280. In RFC5280, the representation is fixed:
1771 * UTCTime: YYMMDDHHMMSSZ
1772 * GeneralizedTime: YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ
1773 */
1774 if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) {
1775 /* YYMMDDHHMM[SS]Z or YYMMDDHHMM[SS](+-)hhmm */
1776 int min_length = sizeof("YYMMDDHHMMZ") - 1;
1777 int max_length = sizeof("YYMMDDHHMMSS+hhmm") - 1;
1778 if (remaining < min_length || remaining > max_length)
1779 return 0;
1780 memcpy(p, str, 10);
1781 p += 10;
1782 str += 10;
1783 remaining -= 10;
1784 } else {
1785 /* YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS[.fff]]Z or YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS[.f[f[f]]]](+-)hhmm */
1786 int min_length = sizeof("YYYYMMDDHHMMZ") - 1;
1787 int max_length = sizeof("YYYYMMDDHHMMSS.fff+hhmm") - 1;
1788 if (remaining < min_length || remaining > max_length)
1789 return 0;
1790 memcpy(p, str, 12);
1791 p += 12;
1792 str += 12;
1793 remaining -= 12;
1794 }
1795
1796 if ((*str == 'Z') || (*str == '-') || (*str == '+')) {
1797 *(p++) = '0';
1798 *(p++) = '0';
1799 } else {
1800 /* SS (seconds) */
1801 if (remaining < 2)
1802 return 0;
1803 *(p++) = *(str++);
1804 *(p++) = *(str++);
1805 remaining -= 2;
1806 /*
1807 * Skip any (up to three) fractional seconds...
1808 * TODO(emilia): in RFC5280, fractional seconds are forbidden.
1809 * Can we just kill them altogether?
1810 */
1811 if (remaining && *str == '.') {
1812 str++;
1813 remaining--;
1814 for (i = 0; i < 3 && remaining; i++, str++, remaining--) {
1815 if (*str < '0' || *str > '9')
1816 break;
1817 }
1818 }
1819
1820 }
1821 *(p++) = 'Z';
1822 *(p++) = '\0';
1823
1824 /* We now need either a terminating 'Z' or an offset. */
1825 if (!remaining)
1826 return 0;
1827 if (*str == 'Z') {
1828 if (remaining != 1)
1829 return 0;
1830 offset = 0;
1831 } else {
1832 /* (+-)HHMM */
1833 if ((*str != '+') && (*str != '-'))
1834 return 0;
1835 /* Historical behaviour: the (+-)hhmm offset is forbidden in RFC5280. */
1836 if (remaining != 5)
1837 return 0;
1838 if (str[1] < '0' || str[1] > '9' || str[2] < '0' || str[2] > '9' ||
1839 str[3] < '0' || str[3] > '9' || str[4] < '0' || str[4] > '9')
1840 return 0;
1841 offset = ((str[1] - '0') * 10 + (str[2] - '0')) * 60;
1842 offset += (str[3] - '0') * 10 + (str[4] - '0');
1843 if (*str == '-')
1844 offset = -offset;
1845 }
1846 atm.type = ctm->type;
1847 atm.flags = 0;
1848 atm.length = sizeof(buff2);
1849 atm.data = (unsigned char *)buff2;
1850
1851 if (X509_time_adj(&atm, offset * 60, cmp_time) == NULL)
1852 return 0;
1853
1854 if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) {
1855 i = (buff1[0] - '0') * 10 + (buff1[1] - '0');
1856 if (i < 50)
1857 i += 100; /* cf. RFC 2459 */
1858 j = (buff2[0] - '0') * 10 + (buff2[1] - '0');
1859 if (j < 50)
1860 j += 100;
1861
1862 if (i < j)
1863 return -1;
1864 if (i > j)
1865 return 1;
1866 }
1867 i = strcmp(buff1, buff2);
1868 if (i == 0) /* wait a second then return younger :-) */
1869 return -1;
1870 else
1871 return i;
1872}
1873
1874ASN1_TIME *X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj)
1875{
1876 return X509_time_adj(s, adj, NULL);
1877}
1878
1879ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm)
1880{
1881 return X509_time_adj_ex(s, 0, offset_sec, in_tm);
1882}
1883
1884ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj_ex(ASN1_TIME *s,
1885 int offset_day, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm)
1886{
1887 time_t t;
1888
1889 if (in_tm)
1890 t = *in_tm;
1891 else
1892 time(&t);
1893
1894 if (s && !(s->flags & ASN1_STRING_FLAG_MSTRING)) {
1895 if (s->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
1896 return ASN1_UTCTIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec);
1897 if (s->type == V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME)
1898 return ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec);
1899 }
1900 return ASN1_TIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec);
1901}
1902
1903int X509_get_pubkey_parameters(EVP_PKEY *pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
1904{
1905 EVP_PKEY *ktmp = NULL, *ktmp2;
1906 int i, j;
1907
1908 if ((pkey != NULL) && !EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey))
1909 return 1;
1910
1911 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
1912 ktmp = X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain, i));
1913 if (ktmp == NULL) {
1914 X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,
1915 X509_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_CERTS_PUBLIC_KEY);
1916 return 0;
1917 }
1918 if (!EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(ktmp))
1919 break;
1920 }
1921 if (ktmp == NULL) {
1922 X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,
1923 X509_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PARAMETERS_IN_CHAIN);
1924 return 0;
1925 }
1926
1927 /* first, populate the other certs */
1928 for (j = i - 1; j >= 0; j--) {
1929 ktmp2 = X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain, j));
1930 EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ktmp2, ktmp);
1931 }
1932
1933 if (pkey != NULL)
1934 EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey, ktmp);
1935 return 1;
1936}
1937
1938/* Make a delta CRL as the diff between two full CRLs */
1939
1940X509_CRL *X509_CRL_diff(X509_CRL *base, X509_CRL *newer,
1941 EVP_PKEY *skey, const EVP_MD *md, unsigned int flags)
1942{
1943 X509_CRL *crl = NULL;
1944 int i;
1945 STACK_OF(X509_REVOKED) *revs = NULL;
1946 /* CRLs can't be delta already */
1947 if (base->base_crl_number || newer->base_crl_number) {
1948 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_CRL_ALREADY_DELTA);
1949 return NULL;
1950 }
1951 /* Base and new CRL must have a CRL number */
1952 if (!base->crl_number || !newer->crl_number) {
1953 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_NO_CRL_NUMBER);
1954 return NULL;
1955 }
1956 /* Issuer names must match */
1957 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base), X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer))) {
1958 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_ISSUER_MISMATCH);
1959 return NULL;
1960 }
1961 /* AKID and IDP must match */
1962 if (!crl_extension_match(base, newer, NID_authority_key_identifier)) {
1963 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_AKID_MISMATCH);
1964 return NULL;
1965 }
1966 if (!crl_extension_match(base, newer, NID_issuing_distribution_point)) {
1967 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_IDP_MISMATCH);
1968 return NULL;
1969 }
1970 /* Newer CRL number must exceed full CRL number */
1971 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(newer->crl_number, base->crl_number) <= 0) {
1972 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_NEWER_CRL_NOT_NEWER);
1973 return NULL;
1974 }
1975 /* CRLs must verify */
1976 if (skey && (X509_CRL_verify(base, skey) <= 0 ||
1977 X509_CRL_verify(newer, skey) <= 0)) {
1978 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_CRL_VERIFY_FAILURE);
1979 return NULL;
1980 }
1981 /* Create new CRL */
1982 crl = X509_CRL_new();
1983 if (crl == NULL || !X509_CRL_set_version(crl, 1))
1984 goto memerr;
1985 /* Set issuer name */
1986 if (!X509_CRL_set_issuer_name(crl, X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer)))
1987 goto memerr;
1988
1989 if (!X509_CRL_set1_lastUpdate(crl, X509_CRL_get0_lastUpdate(newer)))
1990 goto memerr;
1991 if (!X509_CRL_set1_nextUpdate(crl, X509_CRL_get0_nextUpdate(newer)))
1992 goto memerr;
1993
1994 /* Set base CRL number: must be critical */
1995
1996 if (!X509_CRL_add1_ext_i2d(crl, NID_delta_crl, base->crl_number, 1, 0))
1997 goto memerr;
1998
1999 /*
2000 * Copy extensions across from newest CRL to delta: this will set CRL
2001 * number to correct value too.
2002 */
2003
2004 for (i = 0; i < X509_CRL_get_ext_count(newer); i++) {
2005 X509_EXTENSION *ext;
2006 ext = X509_CRL_get_ext(newer, i);
2007 if (!X509_CRL_add_ext(crl, ext, -1))
2008 goto memerr;
2009 }
2010
2011 /* Go through revoked entries, copying as needed */
2012
2013 revs = X509_CRL_get_REVOKED(newer);
2014
2015 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_REVOKED_num(revs); i++) {
2016 X509_REVOKED *rvn, *rvtmp;
2017 rvn = sk_X509_REVOKED_value(revs, i);
2018 /*
2019 * Add only if not also in base. TODO: need something cleverer here
2020 * for some more complex CRLs covering multiple CAs.
2021 */
2022 if (!X509_CRL_get0_by_serial(base, &rvtmp, &rvn->serialNumber)) {
2023 rvtmp = X509_REVOKED_dup(rvn);
2024 if (!rvtmp)
2025 goto memerr;
2026 if (!X509_CRL_add0_revoked(crl, rvtmp)) {
2027 X509_REVOKED_free(rvtmp);
2028 goto memerr;
2029 }
2030 }
2031 }
2032 /* TODO: optionally prune deleted entries */
2033
2034 if (skey && md && !X509_CRL_sign(crl, skey, md))
2035 goto memerr;
2036
2037 return crl;
2038
2039 memerr:
2040 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2041 X509_CRL_free(crl);
2042 return NULL;
2043}
2044
2045int X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx, void *data)
2046{
2047 return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data, idx, data);
2048}
2049
2050void *X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx)
2051{
2052 return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data, idx);
2053}
2054
2055int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2056{
2057 return ctx->error;
2058}
2059
2060void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int err)
2061{
2062 ctx->error = err;
2063}
2064
2065int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2066{
2067 return ctx->error_depth;
2068}
2069
2070void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth)
2071{
2072 ctx->error_depth = depth;
2073}
2074
2075X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2076{
2077 return ctx->current_cert;
2078}
2079
2080void X509_STORE_CTX_set_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
2081{
2082 ctx->current_cert = x;
2083}
2084
2085STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2086{
2087 return ctx->chain;
2088}
2089
2090STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2091{
2092 if (!ctx->chain)
2093 return NULL;
2094 return X509_chain_up_ref(ctx->chain);
2095}
2096
2097X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2098{
2099 return ctx->current_issuer;
2100}
2101
2102X509_CRL *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2103{
2104 return ctx->current_crl;
2105}
2106
2107X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_parent_ctx(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2108{
2109 return ctx->parent;
2110}
2111
2112void X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
2113{
2114 ctx->cert = x;
2115}
2116
2117void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *sk)
2118{
2119 ctx->crls = sk;
2120}
2121
2122int X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int purpose)
2123{
2124 /*
2125 * XXX: Why isn't this function always used to set the associated trust?
2126 * Should there even be a VPM->trust field at all? Or should the trust
2127 * always be inferred from the purpose by X509_STORE_CTX_init().
2128 */
2129 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, purpose, 0);
2130}
2131
2132int X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int trust)
2133{
2134 /*
2135 * XXX: See above, this function would only be needed when the default
2136 * trust for the purpose needs an override in a corner case.
2137 */
2138 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, 0, trust);
2139}
2140
2141/*
2142 * This function is used to set the X509_STORE_CTX purpose and trust values.
2143 * This is intended to be used when another structure has its own trust and
2144 * purpose values which (if set) will be inherited by the ctx. If they aren't
2145 * set then we will usually have a default purpose in mind which should then
2146 * be used to set the trust value. An example of this is SSL use: an SSL
2147 * structure will have its own purpose and trust settings which the
2148 * application can set: if they aren't set then we use the default of SSL
2149 * client/server.
2150 */
2151
2152int X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int def_purpose,
2153 int purpose, int trust)
2154{
2155 int idx;
2156 /* If purpose not set use default */
2157 if (!purpose)
2158 purpose = def_purpose;
2159 /* If we have a purpose then check it is valid */
2160 if (purpose) {
2161 X509_PURPOSE *ptmp;
2162 idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose);
2163 if (idx == -1) {
2164 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
2165 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
2166 return 0;
2167 }
2168 ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
2169 if (ptmp->trust == X509_TRUST_DEFAULT) {
2170 idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(def_purpose);
2171 /*
2172 * XXX: In the two callers above def_purpose is always 0, which is
2173 * not a known value, so idx will always be -1. How is the
2174 * X509_TRUST_DEFAULT case actually supposed to be handled?
2175 */
2176 if (idx == -1) {
2177 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
2178 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
2179 return 0;
2180 }
2181 ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
2182 }
2183 /* If trust not set then get from purpose default */
2184 if (!trust)
2185 trust = ptmp->trust;
2186 }
2187 if (trust) {
2188 idx = X509_TRUST_get_by_id(trust);
2189 if (idx == -1) {
2190 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
2191 X509_R_UNKNOWN_TRUST_ID);
2192 return 0;
2193 }
2194 }
2195
2196 if (purpose && !ctx->param->purpose)
2197 ctx->param->purpose = purpose;
2198 if (trust && !ctx->param->trust)
2199 ctx->param->trust = trust;
2200 return 1;
2201}
2202
2203X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_new(void)
2204{
2205 X509_STORE_CTX *ctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ctx));
2206
2207 if (ctx == NULL) {
2208 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2209 return NULL;
2210 }
2211 return ctx;
2212}
2213
2214void X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2215{
2216 if (ctx == NULL)
2217 return;
2218
2219 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
2220 OPENSSL_free(ctx);
2221}
2222
2223int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, X509 *x509,
2224 STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
2225{
2226 int ret = 1;
2227
2228 ctx->ctx = store;
2229 ctx->cert = x509;
2230 ctx->untrusted = chain;
2231 ctx->crls = NULL;
2232 ctx->num_untrusted = 0;
2233 ctx->other_ctx = NULL;
2234 ctx->valid = 0;
2235 ctx->chain = NULL;
2236 ctx->error = 0;
2237 ctx->explicit_policy = 0;
2238 ctx->error_depth = 0;
2239 ctx->current_cert = NULL;
2240 ctx->current_issuer = NULL;
2241 ctx->current_crl = NULL;
2242 ctx->current_crl_score = 0;
2243 ctx->current_reasons = 0;
2244 ctx->tree = NULL;
2245 ctx->parent = NULL;
2246 ctx->dane = NULL;
2247 ctx->bare_ta_signed = 0;
2248 /* Zero ex_data to make sure we're cleanup-safe */
2249 memset(&ctx->ex_data, 0, sizeof(ctx->ex_data));
2250
2251 /* store->cleanup is always 0 in OpenSSL, if set must be idempotent */
2252 if (store)
2253 ctx->cleanup = store->cleanup;
2254 else
2255 ctx->cleanup = 0;
2256
2257 if (store && store->check_issued)
2258 ctx->check_issued = store->check_issued;
2259 else
2260 ctx->check_issued = check_issued;
2261
2262 if (store && store->get_issuer)
2263 ctx->get_issuer = store->get_issuer;
2264 else
2265 ctx->get_issuer = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer;
2266
2267 if (store && store->verify_cb)
2268 ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
2269 else
2270 ctx->verify_cb = null_callback;
2271
2272 if (store && store->verify)
2273 ctx->verify = store->verify;
2274 else
2275 ctx->verify = internal_verify;
2276
2277 if (store && store->check_revocation)
2278 ctx->check_revocation = store->check_revocation;
2279 else
2280 ctx->check_revocation = check_revocation;
2281
2282 if (store && store->get_crl)
2283 ctx->get_crl = store->get_crl;
2284 else
2285 ctx->get_crl = NULL;
2286
2287 if (store && store->check_crl)
2288 ctx->check_crl = store->check_crl;
2289 else
2290 ctx->check_crl = check_crl;
2291
2292 if (store && store->cert_crl)
2293 ctx->cert_crl = store->cert_crl;
2294 else
2295 ctx->cert_crl = cert_crl;
2296
2297 if (store && store->check_policy)
2298 ctx->check_policy = store->check_policy;
2299 else
2300 ctx->check_policy = check_policy;
2301
2302 if (store && store->lookup_certs)
2303 ctx->lookup_certs = store->lookup_certs;
2304 else
2305 ctx->lookup_certs = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_certs;
2306
2307 if (store && store->lookup_crls)
2308 ctx->lookup_crls = store->lookup_crls;
2309 else
2310 ctx->lookup_crls = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_crls;
2311
2312 ctx->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
2313 if (ctx->param == NULL) {
2314 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2315 goto err;
2316 }
2317
2318 /*
2319 * Inherit callbacks and flags from X509_STORE if not set use defaults.
2320 */
2321 if (store)
2322 ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, store->param);
2323 else
2324 ctx->param->inh_flags |= X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT | X509_VP_FLAG_ONCE;
2325
2326 if (ret)
2327 ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param,
2328 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup("default"));
2329
2330 if (ret == 0) {
2331 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2332 goto err;
2333 }
2334
2335 /*
2336 * XXX: For now, continue to inherit trust from VPM, but infer from the
2337 * purpose if this still yields the default value.
2338 */
2339 if (ctx->param->trust == X509_TRUST_DEFAULT) {
2340 int idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(ctx->param->purpose);
2341 X509_PURPOSE *xp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
2342
2343 if (xp != NULL)
2344 ctx->param->trust = X509_PURPOSE_get_trust(xp);
2345 }
2346
2347 if (CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx,
2348 &ctx->ex_data))
2349 return 1;
2350 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2351
2352 err:
2353 /*
2354 * On error clean up allocated storage, if the store context was not
2355 * allocated with X509_STORE_CTX_new() this is our last chance to do so.
2356 */
2357 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
2358 return 0;
2359}
2360
2361/*
2362 * Set alternative lookup method: just a STACK of trusted certificates. This
2363 * avoids X509_STORE nastiness where it isn't needed.
2364 */
2365void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
2366{
2367 ctx->other_ctx = sk;
2368 ctx->get_issuer = get_issuer_sk;
2369 ctx->lookup_certs = lookup_certs_sk;
2370}
2371
2372void X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2373{
2374 /*
2375 * We need to be idempotent because, unfortunately, free() also calls
2376 * cleanup(), so the natural call sequence new(), init(), cleanup(), free()
2377 * calls cleanup() for the same object twice! Thus we must zero the
2378 * pointers below after they're freed!
2379 */
2380 /* Seems to always be 0 in OpenSSL, do this at most once. */
2381 if (ctx->cleanup != NULL) {
2382 ctx->cleanup(ctx);
2383 ctx->cleanup = NULL;
2384 }
2385 if (ctx->param != NULL) {
2386 if (ctx->parent == NULL)
2387 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
2388 ctx->param = NULL;
2389 }
2390 X509_policy_tree_free(ctx->tree);
2391 ctx->tree = NULL;
2392 sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->chain, X509_free);
2393 ctx->chain = NULL;
2394 CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx, &(ctx->ex_data));
2395 memset(&ctx->ex_data, 0, sizeof(ctx->ex_data));
2396}
2397
2398void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth)
2399{
2400 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth);
2401}
2402
2403void X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags)
2404{
2405 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(ctx->param, flags);
2406}
2407
2408void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags,
2409 time_t t)
2410{
2411 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(ctx->param, t);
2412}
2413
2414X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2415{
2416 return ctx->cert;
2417}
2418
2419STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_untrusted(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2420{
2421 return ctx->untrusted;
2422}
2423
2424void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_untrusted(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
2425{
2426 ctx->untrusted = sk;
2427}
2428
2429void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_verified_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
2430{
2431 sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->chain, X509_free);
2432 ctx->chain = sk;
2433}
2434
2435void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
2436 X509_STORE_CTX_verify_cb verify_cb)
2437{
2438 ctx->verify_cb = verify_cb;
2439}
2440
2441X509_STORE_CTX_verify_cb X509_STORE_CTX_get_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2442{
2443 return ctx->verify_cb;
2444}
2445
2446void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
2447 X509_STORE_CTX_verify_fn verify)
2448{
2449 ctx->verify = verify;
2450}
2451
2452X509_STORE_CTX_verify_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2453{
2454 return ctx->verify;
2455}
2456
2457X509_STORE_CTX_get_issuer_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_get_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2458{
2459 return ctx->get_issuer;
2460}
2461
2462X509_STORE_CTX_check_issued_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2463{
2464 return ctx->check_issued;
2465}
2466
2467X509_STORE_CTX_check_revocation_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2468{
2469 return ctx->check_revocation;
2470}
2471
2472X509_STORE_CTX_get_crl_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_get_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2473{
2474 return ctx->get_crl;
2475}
2476
2477X509_STORE_CTX_check_crl_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2478{
2479 return ctx->check_crl;
2480}
2481
2482X509_STORE_CTX_cert_crl_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2483{
2484 return ctx->cert_crl;
2485}
2486
2487X509_STORE_CTX_check_policy_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2488{
2489 return ctx->check_policy;
2490}
2491
2492X509_STORE_CTX_lookup_certs_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_lookup_certs(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2493{
2494 return ctx->lookup_certs;
2495}
2496
2497X509_STORE_CTX_lookup_crls_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_lookup_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2498{
2499 return ctx->lookup_crls;
2500}
2501
2502X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2503{
2504 return ctx->cleanup;
2505}
2506
2507X509_POLICY_TREE *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_policy_tree(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2508{
2509 return ctx->tree;
2510}
2511
2512int X509_STORE_CTX_get_explicit_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2513{
2514 return ctx->explicit_policy;
2515}
2516
2517int X509_STORE_CTX_get_num_untrusted(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2518{
2519 return ctx->num_untrusted;
2520}
2521
2522int X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, const char *name)
2523{
2524 const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param;
2525 param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup(name);
2526 if (!param)
2527 return 0;
2528 return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, param);
2529}
2530
2531X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2532{
2533 return ctx->param;
2534}
2535
2536void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param)
2537{
2538 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
2539 ctx->param = param;
2540}
2541
2542void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_dane(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, SSL_DANE *dane)
2543{
2544 ctx->dane = dane;
2545}
2546
2547static unsigned char *dane_i2d(
2548 X509 *cert,
2549 uint8_t selector,
2550 unsigned int *i2dlen)
2551{
2552 unsigned char *buf = NULL;
2553 int len;
2554
2555 /*
2556 * Extract ASN.1 DER form of certificate or public key.
2557 */
2558 switch (selector) {
2559 case DANETLS_SELECTOR_CERT:
2560 len = i2d_X509(cert, &buf);
2561 break;
2562 case DANETLS_SELECTOR_SPKI:
2563 len = i2d_X509_PUBKEY(X509_get_X509_PUBKEY(cert), &buf);
2564 break;
2565 default:
2566 X509err(X509_F_DANE_I2D, X509_R_BAD_SELECTOR);
2567 return NULL;
2568 }
2569
2570 if (len < 0 || buf == NULL) {
2571 X509err(X509_F_DANE_I2D, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2572 return NULL;
2573 }
2574
2575 *i2dlen = (unsigned int)len;
2576 return buf;
2577}
2578
2579#define DANETLS_NONE 256 /* impossible uint8_t */
2580
2581static int dane_match(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert, int depth)
2582{
2583 SSL_DANE *dane = ctx->dane;
2584 unsigned usage = DANETLS_NONE;
2585 unsigned selector = DANETLS_NONE;
2586 unsigned ordinal = DANETLS_NONE;
2587 unsigned mtype = DANETLS_NONE;
2588 unsigned char *i2dbuf = NULL;
2589 unsigned int i2dlen = 0;
2590 unsigned char mdbuf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
2591 unsigned char *cmpbuf = NULL;
2592 unsigned int cmplen = 0;
2593 int i;
2594 int recnum;
2595 int matched = 0;
2596 danetls_record *t = NULL;
2597 uint32_t mask;
2598
2599 mask = (depth == 0) ? DANETLS_EE_MASK : DANETLS_TA_MASK;
2600
2601 /*
2602 * The trust store is not applicable with DANE-TA(2)
2603 */
2604 if (depth >= ctx->num_untrusted)
2605 mask &= DANETLS_PKIX_MASK;
2606
2607 /*
2608 * If we've previously matched a PKIX-?? record, no need to test any
2609 * further PKIX-?? records, it remains to just build the PKIX chain.
2610 * Had the match been a DANE-?? record, we'd be done already.
2611 */
2612 if (dane->mdpth >= 0)
2613 mask &= ~DANETLS_PKIX_MASK;
2614
2615 /*-
2616 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-5.1
2617 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-5.2
2618 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-5.3
2619 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-5.4
2620 *
2621 * We handle DANE-EE(3) records first as they require no chain building
2622 * and no expiration or hostname checks. We also process digests with
2623 * higher ordinals first and ignore lower priorities except Full(0) which
2624 * is always processed (last). If none match, we then process PKIX-EE(1).
2625 *
2626 * NOTE: This relies on DANE usages sorting before the corresponding PKIX
2627 * usages in SSL_dane_tlsa_add(), and also on descending sorting of digest
2628 * priorities. See twin comment in ssl/ssl_lib.c.
2629 *
2630 * We expect that most TLSA RRsets will have just a single usage, so we
2631 * don't go out of our way to cache multiple selector-specific i2d buffers
2632 * across usages, but if the selector happens to remain the same as switch
2633 * usages, that's OK. Thus, a set of "3 1 1", "3 0 1", "1 1 1", "1 0 1",
2634 * records would result in us generating each of the certificate and public
2635 * key DER forms twice, but more typically we'd just see multiple "3 1 1"
2636 * or multiple "3 0 1" records.
2637 *
2638 * As soon as we find a match at any given depth, we stop, because either
2639 * we've matched a DANE-?? record and the peer is authenticated, or, after
2640 * exhausting all DANE-?? records, we've matched a PKIX-?? record, which is
2641 * sufficient for DANE, and what remains to do is ordinary PKIX validation.
2642 */
2643 recnum = (dane->umask & mask) ? sk_danetls_record_num(dane->trecs) : 0;
2644 for (i = 0; matched == 0 && i < recnum; ++i) {
2645 t = sk_danetls_record_value(dane->trecs, i);
2646 if ((DANETLS_USAGE_BIT(t->usage) & mask) == 0)
2647 continue;
2648 if (t->usage != usage) {
2649 usage = t->usage;
2650
2651 /* Reset digest agility for each usage/selector pair */
2652 mtype = DANETLS_NONE;
2653 ordinal = dane->dctx->mdord[t->mtype];
2654 }
2655 if (t->selector != selector) {
2656 selector = t->selector;
2657
2658 /* Update per-selector state */
2659 OPENSSL_free(i2dbuf);
2660 i2dbuf = dane_i2d(cert, selector, &i2dlen);
2661 if (i2dbuf == NULL)
2662 return -1;
2663
2664 /* Reset digest agility for each usage/selector pair */
2665 mtype = DANETLS_NONE;
2666 ordinal = dane->dctx->mdord[t->mtype];
2667 } else if (t->mtype != DANETLS_MATCHING_FULL) {
2668 /*-
2669 * Digest agility:
2670 *
2671 * <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-9>
2672 *
2673 * For a fixed selector, after processing all records with the
2674 * highest mtype ordinal, ignore all mtypes with lower ordinals
2675 * other than "Full".
2676 */
2677 if (dane->dctx->mdord[t->mtype] < ordinal)
2678 continue;
2679 }
2680
2681 /*
2682 * Each time we hit a (new selector or) mtype, re-compute the relevant
2683 * digest, more complex caching is not worth the code space.
2684 */
2685 if (t->mtype != mtype) {
2686 const EVP_MD *md = dane->dctx->mdevp[mtype = t->mtype];
2687 cmpbuf = i2dbuf;
2688 cmplen = i2dlen;
2689
2690 if (md != NULL) {
2691 cmpbuf = mdbuf;
2692 if (!EVP_Digest(i2dbuf, i2dlen, cmpbuf, &cmplen, md, 0)) {
2693 matched = -1;
2694 break;
2695 }
2696 }
2697 }
2698
2699 /*
2700 * Squirrel away the certificate and depth if we have a match. Any
2701 * DANE match is dispositive, but with PKIX we still need to build a
2702 * full chain.
2703 */
2704 if (cmplen == t->dlen &&
2705 memcmp(cmpbuf, t->data, cmplen) == 0) {
2706 if (DANETLS_USAGE_BIT(usage) & DANETLS_DANE_MASK)
2707 matched = 1;
2708 if (matched || dane->mdpth < 0) {
2709 dane->mdpth = depth;
2710 dane->mtlsa = t;
2711 OPENSSL_free(dane->mcert);
2712 dane->mcert = cert;
2713 X509_up_ref(cert);
2714 }
2715 break;
2716 }
2717 }
2718
2719 /* Clear the one-element DER cache */
2720 OPENSSL_free(i2dbuf);
2721 return matched;
2722}
2723
2724static int check_dane_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth)
2725{
2726 SSL_DANE *dane = ctx->dane;
2727 int matched = 0;
2728 X509 *cert;
2729
2730 if (!DANETLS_HAS_TA(dane) || depth == 0)
2731 return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
2732
2733 /*
2734 * Record any DANE trust-anchor matches, for the first depth to test, if
2735 * there's one at that depth. (This'll be false for length 1 chains looking
2736 * for an exact match for the leaf certificate).
2737 */
2738 cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, depth);
2739 if (cert != NULL && (matched = dane_match(ctx, cert, depth)) < 0)
2740 return X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
2741 if (matched > 0) {
2742 ctx->num_untrusted = depth - 1;
2743 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
2744 }
2745
2746 return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
2747}
2748
2749static int check_dane_pkeys(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2750{
2751 SSL_DANE *dane = ctx->dane;
2752 danetls_record *t;
2753 int num = ctx->num_untrusted;
2754 X509 *cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1);
2755 int recnum = sk_danetls_record_num(dane->trecs);
2756 int i;
2757
2758 for (i = 0; i < recnum; ++i) {
2759 t = sk_danetls_record_value(dane->trecs, i);
2760 if (t->usage != DANETLS_USAGE_DANE_TA ||
2761 t->selector != DANETLS_SELECTOR_SPKI ||
2762 t->mtype != DANETLS_MATCHING_FULL ||
2763 X509_verify(cert, t->spki) <= 0)
2764 continue;
2765
2766 /* Clear any PKIX-?? matches that failed to extend to a full chain */
2767 X509_free(dane->mcert);
2768 dane->mcert = NULL;
2769
2770 /* Record match via a bare TA public key */
2771 ctx->bare_ta_signed = 1;
2772 dane->mdpth = num - 1;
2773 dane->mtlsa = t;
2774
2775 /* Prune any excess chain certificates */
2776 num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
2777 for (; num > ctx->num_untrusted; --num)
2778 X509_free(sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain));
2779
2780 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
2781 }
2782
2783 return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
2784}
2785
2786static void dane_reset(SSL_DANE *dane)
2787{
2788 /*
2789 * Reset state to verify another chain, or clear after failure.
2790 */
2791 X509_free(dane->mcert);
2792 dane->mcert = NULL;
2793 dane->mtlsa = NULL;
2794 dane->mdpth = -1;
2795 dane->pdpth = -1;
2796}
2797
2798static int check_leaf_suiteb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert)
2799{
2800 int err = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, cert, NULL, ctx->param->flags);
2801
2802 if (err == X509_V_OK)
2803 return 1;
2804 return verify_cb_cert(ctx, cert, 0, err);
2805}
2806
2807static int dane_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2808{
2809 X509 *cert = ctx->cert;
2810 SSL_DANE *dane = ctx->dane;
2811 int matched;
2812 int done;
2813
2814 dane_reset(dane);
2815
2816 /*-
2817 * When testing the leaf certificate, if we match a DANE-EE(3) record,
2818 * dane_match() returns 1 and we're done. If however we match a PKIX-EE(1)
2819 * record, the match depth and matching TLSA record are recorded, but the
2820 * return value is 0, because we still need to find a PKIX trust-anchor.
2821 * Therefore, when DANE authentication is enabled (required), we're done
2822 * if:
2823 * + matched < 0, internal error.
2824 * + matched == 1, we matched a DANE-EE(3) record
2825 * + matched == 0, mdepth < 0 (no PKIX-EE match) and there are no
2826 * DANE-TA(2) or PKIX-TA(0) to test.
2827 */
2828 matched = dane_match(ctx, ctx->cert, 0);
2829 done = matched != 0 || (!DANETLS_HAS_TA(dane) && dane->mdpth < 0);
2830
2831 if (done)
2832 X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL, ctx->chain);
2833
2834 if (matched > 0) {
2835 /* Callback invoked as needed */
2836 if (!check_leaf_suiteb(ctx, cert))
2837 return 0;
2838 /* Callback invoked as needed */
2839 if ((dane->flags & DANE_FLAG_NO_DANE_EE_NAMECHECKS) == 0 &&
2840 !check_id(ctx))
2841 return 0;
2842 /* Bypass internal_verify(), issue depth 0 success callback */
2843 ctx->error_depth = 0;
2844 ctx->current_cert = cert;
2845 return ctx->verify_cb(1, ctx);
2846 }
2847
2848 if (matched < 0) {
2849 ctx->error_depth = 0;
2850 ctx->current_cert = cert;
2851 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
2852 return -1;
2853 }
2854
2855 if (done) {
2856 /* Fail early, TA-based success is not possible */
2857 if (!check_leaf_suiteb(ctx, cert))
2858 return 0;
2859 return verify_cb_cert(ctx, cert, 0, X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH);
2860 }
2861
2862 /*
2863 * Chain verification for usages 0/1/2. TLSA record matching of depth > 0
2864 * certificates happens in-line with building the rest of the chain.
2865 */
2866 return verify_chain(ctx);
2867}
2868
2869/* Get issuer, without duplicate suppression */
2870static int get_issuer(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert)
2871{
2872 STACK_OF(X509) *saved_chain = ctx->chain;
2873 int ok;
2874
2875 ctx->chain = NULL;
2876 ok = ctx->get_issuer(issuer, ctx, cert);
2877 ctx->chain = saved_chain;
2878
2879 return ok;
2880}
2881
2882static int build_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2883{
2884 SSL_DANE *dane = ctx->dane;
2885 int num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
2886 X509 *cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1);
2887 int ss = cert_self_signed(cert);
2888 STACK_OF(X509) *sktmp = NULL;
2889 unsigned int search;
2890 int may_trusted = 0;
2891 int may_alternate = 0;
2892 int trust = X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
2893 int alt_untrusted = 0;
2894 int depth;
2895 int ok = 0;
2896 int i;
2897
2898 /* Our chain starts with a single untrusted element. */
2899 OPENSSL_assert(num == 1 && ctx->num_untrusted == num);
2900
2901#define S_DOUNTRUSTED (1 << 0) /* Search untrusted chain */
2902#define S_DOTRUSTED (1 << 1) /* Search trusted store */
2903#define S_DOALTERNATE (1 << 2) /* Retry with pruned alternate chain */
2904 /*
2905 * Set up search policy, untrusted if possible, trusted-first if enabled.
2906 * If we're doing DANE and not doing PKIX-TA/PKIX-EE, we never look in the
2907 * trust_store, otherwise we might look there first. If not trusted-first,
2908 * and alternate chains are not disabled, try building an alternate chain
2909 * if no luck with untrusted first.
2910 */
2911 search = (ctx->untrusted != NULL) ? S_DOUNTRUSTED : 0;
2912 if (DANETLS_HAS_PKIX(dane) || !DANETLS_HAS_DANE(dane)) {
2913 if (search == 0 || ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST)
2914 search |= S_DOTRUSTED;
2915 else if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS))
2916 may_alternate = 1;
2917 may_trusted = 1;
2918 }
2919
2920 /*
2921 * Shallow-copy the stack of untrusted certificates (with TLS, this is
2922 * typically the content of the peer's certificate message) so can make
2923 * multiple passes over it, while free to remove elements as we go.
2924 */
2925 if (ctx->untrusted && (sktmp = sk_X509_dup(ctx->untrusted)) == NULL) {
2926 X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2927 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
2928 return 0;
2929 }
2930
2931 /*
2932 * If we got any "DANE-TA(2) Cert(0) Full(0)" trust-anchors from DNS, add
2933 * them to our working copy of the untrusted certificate stack. Since the
2934 * caller of X509_STORE_CTX_init() may have provided only a leaf cert with
2935 * no corresponding stack of untrusted certificates, we may need to create
2936 * an empty stack first. [ At present only the ssl library provides DANE
2937 * support, and ssl_verify_cert_chain() always provides a non-null stack
2938 * containing at least the leaf certificate, but we must be prepared for
2939 * this to change. ]
2940 */
2941 if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane) && dane->certs != NULL) {
2942 if (sktmp == NULL && (sktmp = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
2943 X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2944 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
2945 return 0;
2946 }
2947 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(dane->certs); ++i) {
2948 if (!sk_X509_push(sktmp, sk_X509_value(dane->certs, i))) {
2949 sk_X509_free(sktmp);
2950 X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2951 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
2952 return 0;
2953 }
2954 }
2955 }
2956
2957 /*
2958 * Still absurdly large, but arithmetically safe, a lower hard upper bound
2959 * might be reasonable.
2960 */
2961 if (ctx->param->depth > INT_MAX/2)
2962 ctx->param->depth = INT_MAX/2;
2963
2964 /*
2965 * Try to Extend the chain until we reach an ultimately trusted issuer.
2966 * Build chains up to one longer the limit, later fail if we hit the limit,
2967 * with an X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG error code.
2968 */
2969 depth = ctx->param->depth + 1;
2970
2971 while (search != 0) {
2972 X509 *x;
2973 X509 *xtmp = NULL;
2974
2975 /*
2976 * Look in the trust store if enabled for first lookup, or we've run
2977 * out of untrusted issuers and search here is not disabled. When we
2978 * reach the depth limit, we stop extending the chain, if by that point
2979 * we've not found a trust-anchor, any trusted chain would be too long.
2980 *
2981 * The error reported to the application verify callback is at the
2982 * maximal valid depth with the current certificate equal to the last
2983 * not ultimately-trusted issuer. For example, with verify_depth = 0,
2984 * the callback will report errors at depth=1 when the immediate issuer
2985 * of the leaf certificate is not a trust anchor. No attempt will be
2986 * made to locate an issuer for that certificate, since such a chain
2987 * would be a-priori too long.
2988 */
2989 if ((search & S_DOTRUSTED) != 0) {
2990 i = num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
2991 if ((search & S_DOALTERNATE) != 0) {
2992 /*
2993 * As high up the chain as we can, look for an alternative
2994 * trusted issuer of an untrusted certificate that currently
2995 * has an untrusted issuer. We use the alt_untrusted variable
2996 * to track how far up the chain we find the first match. It
2997 * is only if and when we find a match, that we prune the chain
2998 * and reset ctx->num_untrusted to the reduced count of
2999 * untrusted certificates. While we're searching for such a
3000 * match (which may never be found), it is neither safe nor
3001 * wise to preemptively modify either the chain or
3002 * ctx->num_untrusted.
3003 *
3004 * Note, like ctx->num_untrusted, alt_untrusted is a count of
3005 * untrusted certificates, not a "depth".
3006 */
3007 i = alt_untrusted;
3008 }
3009 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i-1);
3010
3011 ok = (depth < num) ? 0 : get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
3012
3013 if (ok < 0) {
3014 trust = X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
3015 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP;
3016 search = 0;
3017 continue;
3018 }
3019
3020 if (ok > 0) {
3021 /*
3022 * Alternative trusted issuer for a mid-chain untrusted cert?
3023 * Pop the untrusted cert's successors and retry. We might now
3024 * be able to complete a valid chain via the trust store. Note
3025 * that despite the current trust-store match we might still
3026 * fail complete the chain to a suitable trust-anchor, in which
3027 * case we may prune some more untrusted certificates and try
3028 * again. Thus the S_DOALTERNATE bit may yet be turned on
3029 * again with an even shorter untrusted chain!
3030 *
3031 * If in the process we threw away our matching PKIX-TA trust
3032 * anchor, reset DANE trust. We might find a suitable trusted
3033 * certificate among the ones from the trust store.
3034 */
3035 if ((search & S_DOALTERNATE) != 0) {
3036 OPENSSL_assert(num > i && i > 0 && ss == 0);
3037 search &= ~S_DOALTERNATE;
3038 for (; num > i; --num)
3039 X509_free(sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain));
3040 ctx->num_untrusted = num;
3041
3042 if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane) &&
3043 dane->mdpth >= ctx->num_untrusted) {
3044 dane->mdpth = -1;
3045 X509_free(dane->mcert);
3046 dane->mcert = NULL;
3047 }
3048 if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane) &&
3049 dane->pdpth >= ctx->num_untrusted)
3050 dane->pdpth = -1;
3051 }
3052
3053 /*
3054 * Self-signed untrusted certificates get replaced by their
3055 * trusted matching issuer. Otherwise, grow the chain.
3056 */
3057 if (ss == 0) {
3058 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, x = xtmp)) {
3059 X509_free(xtmp);
3060 X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3061 trust = X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
3062 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
3063 search = 0;
3064 continue;
3065 }
3066 ss = cert_self_signed(x);
3067 } else if (num == ctx->num_untrusted) {
3068 /*
3069 * We have a self-signed certificate that has the same
3070 * subject name (and perhaps keyid and/or serial number) as
3071 * a trust-anchor. We must have an exact match to avoid
3072 * possible impersonation via key substitution etc.
3073 */
3074 if (X509_cmp(x, xtmp) != 0) {
3075 /* Self-signed untrusted mimic. */
3076 X509_free(xtmp);
3077 ok = 0;
3078 } else {
3079 X509_free(x);
3080 ctx->num_untrusted = --num;
3081 (void) sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, num, x = xtmp);
3082 }
3083 }
3084
3085 /*
3086 * We've added a new trusted certificate to the chain, recheck
3087 * trust. If not done, and not self-signed look deeper.
3088 * Whether or not we're doing "trusted first", we no longer
3089 * look for untrusted certificates from the peer's chain.
3090 *
3091 * At this point ctx->num_trusted and num must reflect the
3092 * correct number of untrusted certificates, since the DANE
3093 * logic in check_trust() depends on distinguishing CAs from
3094 * "the wire" from CAs from the trust store. In particular, the
3095 * certificate at depth "num" should be the new trusted
3096 * certificate with ctx->num_untrusted <= num.
3097 */
3098 if (ok) {
3099 OPENSSL_assert(ctx->num_untrusted <= num);
3100 search &= ~S_DOUNTRUSTED;
3101 switch (trust = check_trust(ctx, num)) {
3102 case X509_TRUST_TRUSTED:
3103 case X509_TRUST_REJECTED:
3104 search = 0;
3105 continue;
3106 }
3107 if (ss == 0)
3108 continue;
3109 }
3110 }
3111
3112 /*
3113 * No dispositive decision, and either self-signed or no match, if
3114 * we were doing untrusted-first, and alt-chains are not disabled,
3115 * do that, by repeatedly losing one untrusted element at a time,
3116 * and trying to extend the shorted chain.
3117 */
3118 if ((search & S_DOUNTRUSTED) == 0) {
3119 /* Continue search for a trusted issuer of a shorter chain? */
3120 if ((search & S_DOALTERNATE) != 0 && --alt_untrusted > 0)
3121 continue;
3122 /* Still no luck and no fallbacks left? */
3123 if (!may_alternate || (search & S_DOALTERNATE) != 0 ||
3124 ctx->num_untrusted < 2)
3125 break;
3126 /* Search for a trusted issuer of a shorter chain */
3127 search |= S_DOALTERNATE;
3128 alt_untrusted = ctx->num_untrusted - 1;
3129 ss = 0;
3130 }
3131 }
3132
3133 /*
3134 * Extend chain with peer-provided certificates
3135 */
3136 if ((search & S_DOUNTRUSTED) != 0) {
3137 num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
3138 OPENSSL_assert(num == ctx->num_untrusted);
3139 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num-1);
3140
3141 /*
3142 * Once we run out of untrusted issuers, we stop looking for more
3143 * and start looking only in the trust store if enabled.
3144 */
3145 xtmp = (ss || depth < num) ? NULL : find_issuer(ctx, sktmp, x);
3146 if (xtmp == NULL) {
3147 search &= ~S_DOUNTRUSTED;
3148 if (may_trusted)
3149 search |= S_DOTRUSTED;
3150 continue;
3151 }
3152
3153 /* Drop this issuer from future consideration */
3154 (void) sk_X509_delete_ptr(sktmp, xtmp);
3155
3156 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, xtmp)) {
3157 X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3158 trust = X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
3159 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
3160 search = 0;
3161 continue;
3162 }
3163
3164 X509_up_ref(x = xtmp);
3165 ++ctx->num_untrusted;
3166 ss = cert_self_signed(xtmp);
3167
3168 /*
3169 * Check for DANE-TA trust of the topmost untrusted certificate.
3170 */
3171 switch (trust = check_dane_issuer(ctx, ctx->num_untrusted - 1)) {
3172 case X509_TRUST_TRUSTED:
3173 case X509_TRUST_REJECTED:
3174 search = 0;
3175 continue;
3176 }
3177 }
3178 }
3179 sk_X509_free(sktmp);
3180
3181 /*
3182 * Last chance to make a trusted chain, either bare DANE-TA public-key
3183 * signers, or else direct leaf PKIX trust.
3184 */
3185 num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
3186 if (num <= depth) {
3187 if (trust == X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED && DANETLS_HAS_DANE_TA(dane))
3188 trust = check_dane_pkeys(ctx);
3189 if (trust == X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED && num == ctx->num_untrusted)
3190 trust = check_trust(ctx, num);
3191 }
3192
3193 switch (trust) {
3194 case X509_TRUST_TRUSTED:
3195 return 1;
3196 case X509_TRUST_REJECTED:
3197 /* Callback already issued */
3198 return 0;
3199 case X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED:
3200 default:
3201 num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
3202 if (num > depth)
3203 return verify_cb_cert(ctx, NULL, num-1,
3204 X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG);
3205 if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane) &&
3206 (!DANETLS_HAS_PKIX(dane) || dane->pdpth >= 0))
3207 return verify_cb_cert(ctx, NULL, num-1, X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH);
3208 if (ss && sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1)
3209 return verify_cb_cert(ctx, NULL, num-1,
3210 X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT);
3211 if (ss)
3212 return verify_cb_cert(ctx, NULL, num-1,
3213 X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN);
3214 if (ctx->num_untrusted < num)
3215 return verify_cb_cert(ctx, NULL, num-1,
3216 X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT);
3217 return verify_cb_cert(ctx, NULL, num-1,
3218 X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY);
3219 }
3220}
3221
3222static const int minbits_table[] = { 80, 112, 128, 192, 256 };
3223static const int NUM_AUTH_LEVELS = OSSL_NELEM(minbits_table);
3224
3225/*
3226 * Check whether the public key of ``cert`` meets the security level of
3227 * ``ctx``.
3228 *
3229 * Returns 1 on success, 0 otherwise.
3230 */
3231static int check_key_level(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert)
3232{
3233 EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(cert);
3234 int level = ctx->param->auth_level;
3235
3236 /* Unsupported or malformed keys are not secure */
3237 if (pkey == NULL)
3238 return 0;
3239
3240 if (level <= 0)
3241 return 1;
3242 if (level > NUM_AUTH_LEVELS)
3243 level = NUM_AUTH_LEVELS;
3244
3245 return EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey) >= minbits_table[level - 1];
3246}
3247
3248/*
3249 * Check whether the signature digest algorithm of ``cert`` meets the security
3250 * level of ``ctx``. Should not be checked for trust anchors (whether
3251 * self-signed or otherwise).
3252 *
3253 * Returns 1 on success, 0 otherwise.
3254 */
3255static int check_sig_level(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert)
3256{
3257 int nid = X509_get_signature_nid(cert);
3258 int mdnid = NID_undef;
3259 int secbits = -1;
3260 int level = ctx->param->auth_level;
3261
3262 if (level <= 0)
3263 return 1;
3264 if (level > NUM_AUTH_LEVELS)
3265 level = NUM_AUTH_LEVELS;
3266
3267 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
3268 if (nid && OBJ_find_sigid_algs(nid, &mdnid, NULL)) {
3269 const EVP_MD *md;
3270
3271 /* Assume 4 bits of collision resistance for each hash octet */
3272 if (mdnid != NID_undef && (md = EVP_get_digestbynid(mdnid)) != NULL)
3273 secbits = EVP_MD_size(md) * 4;
3274 }
3275
3276 return secbits >= minbits_table[level - 1];
3277}
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