1 | /*
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2 | * Copyright 2013-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
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3 | *
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4 | * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
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5 | * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
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6 | * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
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7 | * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
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8 | */
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9 |
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10 | #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
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11 | #include <openssl/asn1t.h>
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12 | #include <openssl/pem.h>
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13 | #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
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14 | #include <openssl/err.h>
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15 | #include <openssl/cms.h>
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16 | #include <openssl/aes.h>
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17 | #include "cms_local.h"
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18 | #include "crypto/asn1.h"
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19 |
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20 | /* Key Agreement Recipient Info (KARI) routines */
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21 |
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22 | int CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_get0_alg(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri,
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23 | X509_ALGOR **palg,
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24 | ASN1_OCTET_STRING **pukm)
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25 | {
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26 | if (ri->type != CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE) {
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27 | CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KARI_GET0_ALG,
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28 | CMS_R_NOT_KEY_AGREEMENT);
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29 | return 0;
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30 | }
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31 | if (palg)
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32 | *palg = ri->d.kari->keyEncryptionAlgorithm;
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33 | if (pukm)
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34 | *pukm = ri->d.kari->ukm;
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35 | return 1;
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36 | }
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37 |
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38 | /* Retrieve recipient encrypted keys from a kari */
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39 |
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40 | STACK_OF(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey)
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41 | *CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_get0_reks(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri)
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42 | {
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43 | if (ri->type != CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE) {
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44 | CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KARI_GET0_REKS,
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45 | CMS_R_NOT_KEY_AGREEMENT);
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46 | return NULL;
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47 | }
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48 | return ri->d.kari->recipientEncryptedKeys;
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49 | }
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50 |
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51 | int CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_get0_orig_id(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri,
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52 | X509_ALGOR **pubalg,
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53 | ASN1_BIT_STRING **pubkey,
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54 | ASN1_OCTET_STRING **keyid,
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55 | X509_NAME **issuer,
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56 | ASN1_INTEGER **sno)
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57 | {
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58 | CMS_OriginatorIdentifierOrKey *oik;
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59 | if (ri->type != CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE) {
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60 | CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KARI_GET0_ORIG_ID,
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61 | CMS_R_NOT_KEY_AGREEMENT);
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62 | return 0;
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63 | }
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64 | oik = ri->d.kari->originator;
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65 | if (issuer)
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66 | *issuer = NULL;
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67 | if (sno)
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68 | *sno = NULL;
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69 | if (keyid)
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70 | *keyid = NULL;
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71 | if (pubalg)
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72 | *pubalg = NULL;
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73 | if (pubkey)
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74 | *pubkey = NULL;
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75 | if (oik->type == CMS_OIK_ISSUER_SERIAL) {
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76 | if (issuer)
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77 | *issuer = oik->d.issuerAndSerialNumber->issuer;
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78 | if (sno)
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79 | *sno = oik->d.issuerAndSerialNumber->serialNumber;
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80 | } else if (oik->type == CMS_OIK_KEYIDENTIFIER) {
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81 | if (keyid)
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82 | *keyid = oik->d.subjectKeyIdentifier;
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83 | } else if (oik->type == CMS_OIK_PUBKEY) {
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84 | if (pubalg)
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85 | *pubalg = oik->d.originatorKey->algorithm;
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86 | if (pubkey)
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87 | *pubkey = oik->d.originatorKey->publicKey;
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88 | } else
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89 | return 0;
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90 | return 1;
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91 | }
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92 |
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93 | int CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_orig_id_cmp(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, X509 *cert)
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94 | {
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95 | CMS_OriginatorIdentifierOrKey *oik;
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96 | if (ri->type != CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE) {
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97 | CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KARI_ORIG_ID_CMP,
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98 | CMS_R_NOT_KEY_AGREEMENT);
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99 | return -2;
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100 | }
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101 | oik = ri->d.kari->originator;
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102 | if (oik->type == CMS_OIK_ISSUER_SERIAL)
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103 | return cms_ias_cert_cmp(oik->d.issuerAndSerialNumber, cert);
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104 | else if (oik->type == CMS_OIK_KEYIDENTIFIER)
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105 | return cms_keyid_cert_cmp(oik->d.subjectKeyIdentifier, cert);
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106 | return -1;
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107 | }
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108 |
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109 | int CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey_get0_id(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey *rek,
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110 | ASN1_OCTET_STRING **keyid,
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111 | ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME **tm,
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112 | CMS_OtherKeyAttribute **other,
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113 | X509_NAME **issuer, ASN1_INTEGER **sno)
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114 | {
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115 | CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientIdentifier *rid = rek->rid;
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116 | if (rid->type == CMS_REK_ISSUER_SERIAL) {
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117 | if (issuer)
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118 | *issuer = rid->d.issuerAndSerialNumber->issuer;
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119 | if (sno)
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120 | *sno = rid->d.issuerAndSerialNumber->serialNumber;
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121 | if (keyid)
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122 | *keyid = NULL;
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123 | if (tm)
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124 | *tm = NULL;
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125 | if (other)
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126 | *other = NULL;
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127 | } else if (rid->type == CMS_REK_KEYIDENTIFIER) {
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128 | if (keyid)
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129 | *keyid = rid->d.rKeyId->subjectKeyIdentifier;
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130 | if (tm)
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131 | *tm = rid->d.rKeyId->date;
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132 | if (other)
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133 | *other = rid->d.rKeyId->other;
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134 | if (issuer)
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135 | *issuer = NULL;
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136 | if (sno)
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137 | *sno = NULL;
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138 | } else
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139 | return 0;
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140 | return 1;
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141 | }
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142 |
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143 | int CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey_cert_cmp(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey *rek,
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144 | X509 *cert)
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145 | {
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146 | CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientIdentifier *rid = rek->rid;
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147 | if (rid->type == CMS_REK_ISSUER_SERIAL)
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148 | return cms_ias_cert_cmp(rid->d.issuerAndSerialNumber, cert);
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149 | else if (rid->type == CMS_REK_KEYIDENTIFIER)
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150 | return cms_keyid_cert_cmp(rid->d.rKeyId->subjectKeyIdentifier, cert);
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151 | else
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152 | return -1;
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153 | }
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154 |
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155 | int CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_set0_pkey(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, EVP_PKEY *pk)
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156 | {
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157 | EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx;
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158 | CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo *kari = ri->d.kari;
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159 |
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160 | EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(kari->pctx);
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161 | kari->pctx = NULL;
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162 | if (!pk)
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163 | return 1;
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164 | pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL);
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165 | if (!pctx || EVP_PKEY_derive_init(pctx) <= 0)
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166 | goto err;
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167 | kari->pctx = pctx;
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168 | return 1;
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169 | err:
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170 | EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
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171 | return 0;
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172 | }
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173 |
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174 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX *CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_get0_ctx(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri)
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175 | {
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176 | if (ri->type == CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE)
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177 | return ri->d.kari->ctx;
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178 | return NULL;
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179 | }
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180 |
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181 | /*
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182 | * Derive KEK and decrypt/encrypt with it to produce either the original CEK
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183 | * or the encrypted CEK.
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184 | */
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185 |
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186 | static int cms_kek_cipher(unsigned char **pout, size_t *poutlen,
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187 | const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen,
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188 | CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo *kari, int enc)
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189 | {
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190 | /* Key encryption key */
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191 | unsigned char kek[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
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192 | size_t keklen;
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193 | int rv = 0;
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194 | unsigned char *out = NULL;
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195 | int outlen;
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196 | keklen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(kari->ctx);
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197 | if (keklen > EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH)
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198 | return 0;
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199 | /* Derive KEK */
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200 | if (EVP_PKEY_derive(kari->pctx, kek, &keklen) <= 0)
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201 | goto err;
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202 | /* Set KEK in context */
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203 | if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(kari->ctx, NULL, NULL, kek, NULL, enc))
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204 | goto err;
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205 | /* obtain output length of ciphered key */
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206 | if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(kari->ctx, NULL, &outlen, in, inlen))
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207 | goto err;
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208 | out = OPENSSL_malloc(outlen);
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209 | if (out == NULL)
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210 | goto err;
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211 | if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(kari->ctx, out, &outlen, in, inlen))
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212 | goto err;
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213 | *pout = out;
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214 | *poutlen = (size_t)outlen;
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215 | rv = 1;
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216 |
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217 | err:
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218 | OPENSSL_cleanse(kek, keklen);
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219 | if (!rv)
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220 | OPENSSL_free(out);
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221 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset(kari->ctx);
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222 | /* FIXME: WHY IS kari->pctx freed here? /RL */
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223 | EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(kari->pctx);
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224 | kari->pctx = NULL;
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225 | return rv;
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226 | }
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227 |
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228 | int CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_decrypt(CMS_ContentInfo *cms,
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229 | CMS_RecipientInfo *ri,
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230 | CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey *rek)
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231 | {
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232 | int rv = 0;
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233 | unsigned char *enckey = NULL, *cek = NULL;
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234 | size_t enckeylen;
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235 | size_t ceklen;
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236 | CMS_EncryptedContentInfo *ec;
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237 | enckeylen = rek->encryptedKey->length;
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238 | enckey = rek->encryptedKey->data;
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239 | /* Setup all parameters to derive KEK */
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240 | if (!cms_env_asn1_ctrl(ri, 1))
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241 | goto err;
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242 | /* Attempt to decrypt CEK */
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243 | if (!cms_kek_cipher(&cek, &ceklen, enckey, enckeylen, ri->d.kari, 0))
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244 | goto err;
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245 | ec = cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo;
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246 | OPENSSL_clear_free(ec->key, ec->keylen);
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247 | ec->key = cek;
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248 | ec->keylen = ceklen;
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249 | cek = NULL;
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250 | rv = 1;
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251 | err:
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252 | OPENSSL_free(cek);
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253 | return rv;
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254 | }
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255 |
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256 | /* Create ephemeral key and initialise context based on it */
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257 | static int cms_kari_create_ephemeral_key(CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo *kari,
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258 | EVP_PKEY *pk)
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259 | {
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260 | EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
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261 | EVP_PKEY *ekey = NULL;
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262 | int rv = 0;
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263 | pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL);
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264 | if (!pctx)
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265 | goto err;
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266 | if (EVP_PKEY_keygen_init(pctx) <= 0)
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267 | goto err;
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268 | if (EVP_PKEY_keygen(pctx, &ekey) <= 0)
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269 | goto err;
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270 | EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
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271 | pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(ekey, NULL);
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272 | if (!pctx)
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273 | goto err;
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274 | if (EVP_PKEY_derive_init(pctx) <= 0)
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275 | goto err;
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276 | kari->pctx = pctx;
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277 | rv = 1;
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278 | err:
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279 | if (!rv)
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280 | EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
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281 | EVP_PKEY_free(ekey);
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282 | return rv;
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283 | }
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284 |
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285 | /* Initialise a kari based on passed certificate and key */
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286 |
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287 | int cms_RecipientInfo_kari_init(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, X509 *recip,
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288 | EVP_PKEY *pk, unsigned int flags)
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289 | {
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290 | CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo *kari;
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291 | CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey *rek = NULL;
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292 |
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293 | ri->d.kari = M_ASN1_new_of(CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo);
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294 | if (!ri->d.kari)
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295 | return 0;
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296 | ri->type = CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE;
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297 |
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298 | kari = ri->d.kari;
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299 | kari->version = 3;
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300 |
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301 | rek = M_ASN1_new_of(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey);
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302 | if (rek == NULL)
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303 | return 0;
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304 |
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305 | if (!sk_CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey_push(kari->recipientEncryptedKeys, rek)) {
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306 | M_ASN1_free_of(rek, CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey);
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307 | return 0;
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308 | }
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309 |
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310 | if (flags & CMS_USE_KEYID) {
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311 | rek->rid->type = CMS_REK_KEYIDENTIFIER;
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312 | rek->rid->d.rKeyId = M_ASN1_new_of(CMS_RecipientKeyIdentifier);
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313 | if (rek->rid->d.rKeyId == NULL)
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314 | return 0;
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315 | if (!cms_set1_keyid(&rek->rid->d.rKeyId->subjectKeyIdentifier, recip))
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316 | return 0;
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317 | } else {
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318 | rek->rid->type = CMS_REK_ISSUER_SERIAL;
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319 | if (!cms_set1_ias(&rek->rid->d.issuerAndSerialNumber, recip))
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320 | return 0;
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321 | }
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322 |
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323 | /* Create ephemeral key */
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324 | if (!cms_kari_create_ephemeral_key(kari, pk))
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325 | return 0;
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326 |
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327 | EVP_PKEY_up_ref(pk);
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328 | rek->pkey = pk;
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329 | return 1;
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330 | }
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331 |
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332 | static int cms_wrap_init(CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo *kari,
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333 | const EVP_CIPHER *cipher)
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334 | {
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335 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = kari->ctx;
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336 | const EVP_CIPHER *kekcipher;
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337 | int keylen = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(cipher);
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338 | /* If a suitable wrap algorithm is already set nothing to do */
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339 | kekcipher = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(ctx);
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340 |
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341 | if (kekcipher) {
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342 | if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ctx) != EVP_CIPH_WRAP_MODE)
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343 | return 0;
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344 | return 1;
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345 | }
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346 | /*
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347 | * Pick a cipher based on content encryption cipher. If it is DES3 use
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348 | * DES3 wrap otherwise use AES wrap similar to key size.
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349 | */
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350 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DES
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351 | if (EVP_CIPHER_type(cipher) == NID_des_ede3_cbc)
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352 | kekcipher = EVP_des_ede3_wrap();
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353 | else
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354 | #endif
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355 | if (keylen <= 16)
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356 | kekcipher = EVP_aes_128_wrap();
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357 | else if (keylen <= 24)
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358 | kekcipher = EVP_aes_192_wrap();
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359 | else
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360 | kekcipher = EVP_aes_256_wrap();
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361 | return EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, kekcipher, NULL, NULL, NULL);
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362 | }
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363 |
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364 | /* Encrypt content key in key agreement recipient info */
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365 |
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366 | int cms_RecipientInfo_kari_encrypt(CMS_ContentInfo *cms,
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367 | CMS_RecipientInfo *ri)
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368 | {
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369 | CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo *kari;
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370 | CMS_EncryptedContentInfo *ec;
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371 | CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey *rek;
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372 | STACK_OF(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey) *reks;
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373 | int i;
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374 |
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375 | if (ri->type != CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE) {
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376 | CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KARI_ENCRYPT, CMS_R_NOT_KEY_AGREEMENT);
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377 | return 0;
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378 | }
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379 | kari = ri->d.kari;
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380 | reks = kari->recipientEncryptedKeys;
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381 | ec = cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo;
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382 | /* Initialise wrap algorithm parameters */
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383 | if (!cms_wrap_init(kari, ec->cipher))
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384 | return 0;
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385 | /*
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386 | * If no originator key set up initialise for ephemeral key the public key
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387 | * ASN1 structure will set the actual public key value.
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388 | */
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389 | if (kari->originator->type == -1) {
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390 | CMS_OriginatorIdentifierOrKey *oik = kari->originator;
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391 | oik->type = CMS_OIK_PUBKEY;
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392 | oik->d.originatorKey = M_ASN1_new_of(CMS_OriginatorPublicKey);
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393 | if (!oik->d.originatorKey)
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394 | return 0;
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395 | }
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396 | /* Initialise KDF algorithm */
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397 | if (!cms_env_asn1_ctrl(ri, 0))
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398 | return 0;
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399 | /* For each rek, derive KEK, encrypt CEK */
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400 | for (i = 0; i < sk_CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey_num(reks); i++) {
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401 | unsigned char *enckey;
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402 | size_t enckeylen;
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403 | rek = sk_CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey_value(reks, i);
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404 | if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(kari->pctx, rek->pkey) <= 0)
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405 | return 0;
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406 | if (!cms_kek_cipher(&enckey, &enckeylen, ec->key, ec->keylen,
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407 | kari, 1))
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408 | return 0;
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409 | ASN1_STRING_set0(rek->encryptedKey, enckey, enckeylen);
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410 | }
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411 |
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412 | return 1;
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413 |
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414 | }
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