1 | /*
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2 | * Copyright 2011-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
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3 | *
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4 | * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
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5 | * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
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6 | * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
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7 | * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
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8 | */
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9 |
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10 | #include <string.h>
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11 | #include <openssl/crypto.h>
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12 | #include <openssl/err.h>
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13 | #include <openssl/rand.h>
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14 | #include "rand_local.h"
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15 | #include "internal/thread_once.h"
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16 | #include "crypto/rand.h"
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17 | #include "crypto/cryptlib.h"
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18 |
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19 | /*
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20 | * Support framework for NIST SP 800-90A DRBG
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21 | *
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22 | * See manual page RAND_DRBG(7) for a general overview.
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23 | *
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24 | * The OpenSSL model is to have new and free functions, and that new
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25 | * does all initialization. That is not the NIST model, which has
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26 | * instantiation and un-instantiate, and re-use within a new/free
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27 | * lifecycle. (No doubt this comes from the desire to support hardware
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28 | * DRBG, where allocation of resources on something like an HSM is
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29 | * a much bigger deal than just re-setting an allocated resource.)
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30 | */
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31 |
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32 | /*
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33 | * The three shared DRBG instances
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34 | *
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35 | * There are three shared DRBG instances: <master>, <public>, and <private>.
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36 | */
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37 |
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38 | /*
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39 | * The <master> DRBG
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40 | *
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41 | * Not used directly by the application, only for reseeding the two other
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42 | * DRBGs. It reseeds itself by pulling either randomness from os entropy
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43 | * sources or by consuming randomness which was added by RAND_add().
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44 | *
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45 | * The <master> DRBG is a global instance which is accessed concurrently by
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46 | * all threads. The necessary locking is managed automatically by its child
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47 | * DRBG instances during reseeding.
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48 | */
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49 | static RAND_DRBG *master_drbg;
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50 | /*
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51 | * The <public> DRBG
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52 | *
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53 | * Used by default for generating random bytes using RAND_bytes().
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54 | *
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55 | * The <public> DRBG is thread-local, i.e., there is one instance per thread.
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56 | */
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57 | static CRYPTO_THREAD_LOCAL public_drbg;
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58 | /*
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59 | * The <private> DRBG
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60 | *
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61 | * Used by default for generating private keys using RAND_priv_bytes()
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62 | *
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63 | * The <private> DRBG is thread-local, i.e., there is one instance per thread.
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64 | */
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65 | static CRYPTO_THREAD_LOCAL private_drbg;
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66 |
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67 |
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68 |
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69 | /* NIST SP 800-90A DRBG recommends the use of a personalization string. */
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70 | static const char ossl_pers_string[] = "OpenSSL NIST SP 800-90A DRBG";
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71 |
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72 | static CRYPTO_ONCE rand_drbg_init = CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT;
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73 |
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74 |
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75 |
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76 | static int rand_drbg_type = RAND_DRBG_TYPE;
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77 | static unsigned int rand_drbg_flags = RAND_DRBG_FLAGS;
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78 |
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79 | static unsigned int master_reseed_interval = MASTER_RESEED_INTERVAL;
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80 | static unsigned int slave_reseed_interval = SLAVE_RESEED_INTERVAL;
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81 |
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82 | static time_t master_reseed_time_interval = MASTER_RESEED_TIME_INTERVAL;
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83 | static time_t slave_reseed_time_interval = SLAVE_RESEED_TIME_INTERVAL;
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84 |
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85 | /* A logical OR of all used DRBG flag bits (currently there is only one) */
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86 | static const unsigned int rand_drbg_used_flags =
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87 | RAND_DRBG_FLAG_CTR_NO_DF;
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88 |
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89 | static RAND_DRBG *drbg_setup(RAND_DRBG *parent);
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90 |
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91 | static RAND_DRBG *rand_drbg_new(int secure,
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92 | int type,
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93 | unsigned int flags,
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94 | RAND_DRBG *parent);
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95 |
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96 | /*
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97 | * Set/initialize |drbg| to be of type |type|, with optional |flags|.
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98 | *
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99 | * If |type| and |flags| are zero, use the defaults
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100 | *
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101 | * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure.
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102 | */
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103 | int RAND_DRBG_set(RAND_DRBG *drbg, int type, unsigned int flags)
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104 | {
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105 | int ret = 1;
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106 |
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107 | if (type == 0 && flags == 0) {
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108 | type = rand_drbg_type;
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109 | flags = rand_drbg_flags;
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110 | }
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111 |
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112 | /* If set is called multiple times - clear the old one */
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113 | if (drbg->type != 0 && (type != drbg->type || flags != drbg->flags)) {
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114 | drbg->meth->uninstantiate(drbg);
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115 | rand_pool_free(drbg->adin_pool);
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116 | drbg->adin_pool = NULL;
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117 | }
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118 |
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119 | drbg->state = DRBG_UNINITIALISED;
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120 | drbg->flags = flags;
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121 | drbg->type = type;
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122 |
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123 | switch (type) {
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124 | default:
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125 | drbg->type = 0;
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126 | drbg->flags = 0;
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127 | drbg->meth = NULL;
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128 | RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_SET, RAND_R_UNSUPPORTED_DRBG_TYPE);
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129 | return 0;
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130 | case 0:
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131 | /* Uninitialized; that's okay. */
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132 | drbg->meth = NULL;
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133 | return 1;
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134 | case NID_aes_128_ctr:
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135 | case NID_aes_192_ctr:
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136 | case NID_aes_256_ctr:
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137 | ret = drbg_ctr_init(drbg);
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138 | break;
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139 | }
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140 |
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141 | if (ret == 0) {
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142 | drbg->state = DRBG_ERROR;
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143 | RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_SET, RAND_R_ERROR_INITIALISING_DRBG);
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144 | }
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145 | return ret;
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146 | }
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147 |
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148 | /*
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149 | * Set/initialize default |type| and |flag| for new drbg instances.
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150 | *
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151 | * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure.
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152 | */
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153 | int RAND_DRBG_set_defaults(int type, unsigned int flags)
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154 | {
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155 | int ret = 1;
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156 |
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157 | switch (type) {
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158 | default:
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159 | RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_SET_DEFAULTS, RAND_R_UNSUPPORTED_DRBG_TYPE);
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160 | return 0;
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161 | case NID_aes_128_ctr:
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162 | case NID_aes_192_ctr:
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163 | case NID_aes_256_ctr:
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164 | break;
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165 | }
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166 |
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167 | if ((flags & ~rand_drbg_used_flags) != 0) {
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168 | RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_SET_DEFAULTS, RAND_R_UNSUPPORTED_DRBG_FLAGS);
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169 | return 0;
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170 | }
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171 |
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172 | rand_drbg_type = type;
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173 | rand_drbg_flags = flags;
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174 |
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175 | return ret;
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176 | }
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177 |
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178 |
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179 | /*
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180 | * Allocate memory and initialize a new DRBG. The DRBG is allocated on
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181 | * the secure heap if |secure| is nonzero and the secure heap is enabled.
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182 | * The |parent|, if not NULL, will be used as random source for reseeding.
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183 | *
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184 | * Returns a pointer to the new DRBG instance on success, NULL on failure.
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185 | */
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186 | static RAND_DRBG *rand_drbg_new(int secure,
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187 | int type,
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188 | unsigned int flags,
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189 | RAND_DRBG *parent)
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190 | {
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191 | RAND_DRBG *drbg = secure ? OPENSSL_secure_zalloc(sizeof(*drbg))
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192 | : OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*drbg));
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193 |
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194 | if (drbg == NULL) {
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195 | RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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196 | return NULL;
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197 | }
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198 |
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199 | drbg->secure = secure && CRYPTO_secure_allocated(drbg);
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200 | drbg->fork_id = openssl_get_fork_id();
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201 | drbg->parent = parent;
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202 |
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203 | if (parent == NULL) {
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204 | drbg->get_entropy = rand_drbg_get_entropy;
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205 | drbg->cleanup_entropy = rand_drbg_cleanup_entropy;
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206 | #ifndef RAND_DRBG_GET_RANDOM_NONCE
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207 | drbg->get_nonce = rand_drbg_get_nonce;
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208 | drbg->cleanup_nonce = rand_drbg_cleanup_nonce;
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209 | #endif
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210 |
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211 | drbg->reseed_interval = master_reseed_interval;
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212 | drbg->reseed_time_interval = master_reseed_time_interval;
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213 | } else {
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214 | drbg->get_entropy = rand_drbg_get_entropy;
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215 | drbg->cleanup_entropy = rand_drbg_cleanup_entropy;
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216 | /*
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217 | * Do not provide nonce callbacks, the child DRBGs will
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218 | * obtain their nonce using random bits from the parent.
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219 | */
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220 |
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221 | drbg->reseed_interval = slave_reseed_interval;
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222 | drbg->reseed_time_interval = slave_reseed_time_interval;
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223 | }
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224 |
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225 | if (RAND_DRBG_set(drbg, type, flags) == 0)
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226 | goto err;
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227 |
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228 | if (parent != NULL) {
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229 | rand_drbg_lock(parent);
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230 | if (drbg->strength > parent->strength) {
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231 | /*
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232 | * We currently don't support the algorithm from NIST SP 800-90C
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233 | * 10.1.2 to use a weaker DRBG as source
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234 | */
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235 | rand_drbg_unlock(parent);
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236 | RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_NEW, RAND_R_PARENT_STRENGTH_TOO_WEAK);
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237 | goto err;
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238 | }
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239 | rand_drbg_unlock(parent);
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240 | }
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241 |
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242 | return drbg;
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243 |
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244 | err:
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245 | RAND_DRBG_free(drbg);
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246 |
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247 | return NULL;
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248 | }
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249 |
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250 | RAND_DRBG *RAND_DRBG_new(int type, unsigned int flags, RAND_DRBG *parent)
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251 | {
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252 | return rand_drbg_new(0, type, flags, parent);
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253 | }
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254 |
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255 | RAND_DRBG *RAND_DRBG_secure_new(int type, unsigned int flags, RAND_DRBG *parent)
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256 | {
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257 | return rand_drbg_new(1, type, flags, parent);
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258 | }
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259 |
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260 | /*
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261 | * Uninstantiate |drbg| and free all memory.
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262 | */
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263 | void RAND_DRBG_free(RAND_DRBG *drbg)
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264 | {
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265 | if (drbg == NULL)
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266 | return;
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267 |
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268 | if (drbg->meth != NULL)
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269 | drbg->meth->uninstantiate(drbg);
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270 | rand_pool_free(drbg->adin_pool);
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271 | CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(drbg->lock);
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272 | CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_DRBG, drbg, &drbg->ex_data);
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273 |
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274 | if (drbg->secure)
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275 | OPENSSL_secure_clear_free(drbg, sizeof(*drbg));
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276 | else
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277 | OPENSSL_clear_free(drbg, sizeof(*drbg));
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278 | }
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279 |
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280 | /*
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281 | * Instantiate |drbg|, after it has been initialized. Use |pers| and
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282 | * |perslen| as prediction-resistance input.
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283 | *
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284 | * Requires that drbg->lock is already locked for write, if non-null.
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285 | *
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286 | * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure.
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287 | */
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288 | int RAND_DRBG_instantiate(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
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289 | const unsigned char *pers, size_t perslen)
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290 | {
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291 | unsigned char *nonce = NULL, *entropy = NULL;
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292 | size_t noncelen = 0, entropylen = 0;
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293 | size_t min_entropy = drbg->strength;
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294 | size_t min_entropylen = drbg->min_entropylen;
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295 | size_t max_entropylen = drbg->max_entropylen;
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296 |
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297 | if (perslen > drbg->max_perslen) {
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298 | RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_INSTANTIATE,
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299 | RAND_R_PERSONALISATION_STRING_TOO_LONG);
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300 | goto end;
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301 | }
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302 |
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303 | if (drbg->meth == NULL) {
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304 | RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_INSTANTIATE,
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305 | RAND_R_NO_DRBG_IMPLEMENTATION_SELECTED);
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306 | goto end;
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307 | }
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308 |
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309 | if (drbg->state != DRBG_UNINITIALISED) {
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310 | RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_INSTANTIATE,
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311 | drbg->state == DRBG_ERROR ? RAND_R_IN_ERROR_STATE
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312 | : RAND_R_ALREADY_INSTANTIATED);
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313 | goto end;
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314 | }
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315 |
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316 | drbg->state = DRBG_ERROR;
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317 |
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318 | /*
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319 | * NIST SP800-90Ar1 section 9.1 says you can combine getting the entropy
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320 | * and nonce in 1 call by increasing the entropy with 50% and increasing
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321 | * the minimum length to accommodate the length of the nonce.
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322 | * We do this in case a nonce is require and get_nonce is NULL.
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323 | */
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324 | if (drbg->min_noncelen > 0 && drbg->get_nonce == NULL) {
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325 | min_entropy += drbg->strength / 2;
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326 | min_entropylen += drbg->min_noncelen;
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327 | max_entropylen += drbg->max_noncelen;
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328 | }
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329 |
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330 | drbg->reseed_next_counter = tsan_load(&drbg->reseed_prop_counter);
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331 | if (drbg->reseed_next_counter) {
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332 | drbg->reseed_next_counter++;
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333 | if(!drbg->reseed_next_counter)
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334 | drbg->reseed_next_counter = 1;
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335 | }
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336 |
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337 | if (drbg->get_entropy != NULL)
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338 | entropylen = drbg->get_entropy(drbg, &entropy, min_entropy,
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339 | min_entropylen, max_entropylen, 0);
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340 | if (entropylen < min_entropylen
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341 | || entropylen > max_entropylen) {
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342 | RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_INSTANTIATE, RAND_R_ERROR_RETRIEVING_ENTROPY);
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343 | goto end;
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344 | }
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345 |
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346 | if (drbg->min_noncelen > 0 && drbg->get_nonce != NULL) {
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347 | noncelen = drbg->get_nonce(drbg, &nonce, drbg->strength / 2,
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348 | drbg->min_noncelen, drbg->max_noncelen);
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349 | if (noncelen < drbg->min_noncelen || noncelen > drbg->max_noncelen) {
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350 | RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_INSTANTIATE, RAND_R_ERROR_RETRIEVING_NONCE);
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351 | goto end;
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352 | }
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353 | }
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354 |
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355 | if (!drbg->meth->instantiate(drbg, entropy, entropylen,
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356 | nonce, noncelen, pers, perslen)) {
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357 | RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_INSTANTIATE, RAND_R_ERROR_INSTANTIATING_DRBG);
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358 | goto end;
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359 | }
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360 |
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361 | drbg->state = DRBG_READY;
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362 | drbg->reseed_gen_counter = 1;
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363 | drbg->reseed_time = time(NULL);
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364 | tsan_store(&drbg->reseed_prop_counter, drbg->reseed_next_counter);
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365 |
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366 | end:
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367 | if (entropy != NULL && drbg->cleanup_entropy != NULL)
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368 | drbg->cleanup_entropy(drbg, entropy, entropylen);
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369 | if (nonce != NULL && drbg->cleanup_nonce != NULL)
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370 | drbg->cleanup_nonce(drbg, nonce, noncelen);
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371 | if (drbg->state == DRBG_READY)
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372 | return 1;
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373 | return 0;
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374 | }
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375 |
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376 | /*
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377 | * Uninstantiate |drbg|. Must be instantiated before it can be used.
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378 | *
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379 | * Requires that drbg->lock is already locked for write, if non-null.
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380 | *
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381 | * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure.
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382 | */
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383 | int RAND_DRBG_uninstantiate(RAND_DRBG *drbg)
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384 | {
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385 | if (drbg->meth == NULL) {
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386 | drbg->state = DRBG_ERROR;
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387 | RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_UNINSTANTIATE,
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388 | RAND_R_NO_DRBG_IMPLEMENTATION_SELECTED);
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389 | return 0;
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390 | }
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391 |
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392 | /* Clear the entire drbg->ctr struct, then reset some important
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393 | * members of the drbg->ctr struct (e.g. keysize, df_ks) to their
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394 | * initial values.
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395 | */
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396 | drbg->meth->uninstantiate(drbg);
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397 | return RAND_DRBG_set(drbg, drbg->type, drbg->flags);
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398 | }
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399 |
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400 | /*
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401 | * Reseed |drbg|, mixing in the specified data
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402 | *
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403 | * Requires that drbg->lock is already locked for write, if non-null.
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404 | *
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405 | * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure.
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406 | */
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407 | int RAND_DRBG_reseed(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
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408 | const unsigned char *adin, size_t adinlen,
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409 | int prediction_resistance)
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410 | {
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411 | unsigned char *entropy = NULL;
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412 | size_t entropylen = 0;
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413 |
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414 | if (drbg->state == DRBG_ERROR) {
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415 | RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_RESEED, RAND_R_IN_ERROR_STATE);
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416 | return 0;
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417 | }
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418 | if (drbg->state == DRBG_UNINITIALISED) {
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419 | RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_RESEED, RAND_R_NOT_INSTANTIATED);
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420 | return 0;
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421 | }
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422 |
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423 | if (adin == NULL) {
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424 | adinlen = 0;
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425 | } else if (adinlen > drbg->max_adinlen) {
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426 | RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_RESEED, RAND_R_ADDITIONAL_INPUT_TOO_LONG);
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427 | return 0;
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428 | }
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429 |
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430 | drbg->state = DRBG_ERROR;
|
---|
431 |
|
---|
432 | drbg->reseed_next_counter = tsan_load(&drbg->reseed_prop_counter);
|
---|
433 | if (drbg->reseed_next_counter) {
|
---|
434 | drbg->reseed_next_counter++;
|
---|
435 | if(!drbg->reseed_next_counter)
|
---|
436 | drbg->reseed_next_counter = 1;
|
---|
437 | }
|
---|
438 |
|
---|
439 | if (drbg->get_entropy != NULL)
|
---|
440 | entropylen = drbg->get_entropy(drbg, &entropy, drbg->strength,
|
---|
441 | drbg->min_entropylen,
|
---|
442 | drbg->max_entropylen,
|
---|
443 | prediction_resistance);
|
---|
444 | if (entropylen < drbg->min_entropylen
|
---|
445 | || entropylen > drbg->max_entropylen) {
|
---|
446 | RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_RESEED, RAND_R_ERROR_RETRIEVING_ENTROPY);
|
---|
447 | goto end;
|
---|
448 | }
|
---|
449 |
|
---|
450 | if (!drbg->meth->reseed(drbg, entropy, entropylen, adin, adinlen))
|
---|
451 | goto end;
|
---|
452 |
|
---|
453 | drbg->state = DRBG_READY;
|
---|
454 | drbg->reseed_gen_counter = 1;
|
---|
455 | drbg->reseed_time = time(NULL);
|
---|
456 | tsan_store(&drbg->reseed_prop_counter, drbg->reseed_next_counter);
|
---|
457 |
|
---|
458 | end:
|
---|
459 | if (entropy != NULL && drbg->cleanup_entropy != NULL)
|
---|
460 | drbg->cleanup_entropy(drbg, entropy, entropylen);
|
---|
461 | if (drbg->state == DRBG_READY)
|
---|
462 | return 1;
|
---|
463 | return 0;
|
---|
464 | }
|
---|
465 |
|
---|
466 | /*
|
---|
467 | * Restart |drbg|, using the specified entropy or additional input
|
---|
468 | *
|
---|
469 | * Tries its best to get the drbg instantiated by all means,
|
---|
470 | * regardless of its current state.
|
---|
471 | *
|
---|
472 | * Optionally, a |buffer| of |len| random bytes can be passed,
|
---|
473 | * which is assumed to contain at least |entropy| bits of entropy.
|
---|
474 | *
|
---|
475 | * If |entropy| > 0, the buffer content is used as entropy input.
|
---|
476 | *
|
---|
477 | * If |entropy| == 0, the buffer content is used as additional input
|
---|
478 | *
|
---|
479 | * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure.
|
---|
480 | *
|
---|
481 | * This function is used internally only.
|
---|
482 | */
|
---|
483 | int rand_drbg_restart(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
|
---|
484 | const unsigned char *buffer, size_t len, size_t entropy)
|
---|
485 | {
|
---|
486 | int reseeded = 0;
|
---|
487 | const unsigned char *adin = NULL;
|
---|
488 | size_t adinlen = 0;
|
---|
489 |
|
---|
490 | if (drbg->seed_pool != NULL) {
|
---|
491 | RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_RESTART, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
---|
492 | drbg->state = DRBG_ERROR;
|
---|
493 | rand_pool_free(drbg->seed_pool);
|
---|
494 | drbg->seed_pool = NULL;
|
---|
495 | return 0;
|
---|
496 | }
|
---|
497 |
|
---|
498 | if (buffer != NULL) {
|
---|
499 | if (entropy > 0) {
|
---|
500 | if (drbg->max_entropylen < len) {
|
---|
501 | RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_RESTART,
|
---|
502 | RAND_R_ENTROPY_INPUT_TOO_LONG);
|
---|
503 | drbg->state = DRBG_ERROR;
|
---|
504 | return 0;
|
---|
505 | }
|
---|
506 |
|
---|
507 | if (entropy > 8 * len) {
|
---|
508 | RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_RESTART, RAND_R_ENTROPY_OUT_OF_RANGE);
|
---|
509 | drbg->state = DRBG_ERROR;
|
---|
510 | return 0;
|
---|
511 | }
|
---|
512 |
|
---|
513 | /* will be picked up by the rand_drbg_get_entropy() callback */
|
---|
514 | drbg->seed_pool = rand_pool_attach(buffer, len, entropy);
|
---|
515 | if (drbg->seed_pool == NULL)
|
---|
516 | return 0;
|
---|
517 | } else {
|
---|
518 | if (drbg->max_adinlen < len) {
|
---|
519 | RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_RESTART,
|
---|
520 | RAND_R_ADDITIONAL_INPUT_TOO_LONG);
|
---|
521 | drbg->state = DRBG_ERROR;
|
---|
522 | return 0;
|
---|
523 | }
|
---|
524 | adin = buffer;
|
---|
525 | adinlen = len;
|
---|
526 | }
|
---|
527 | }
|
---|
528 |
|
---|
529 | /* repair error state */
|
---|
530 | if (drbg->state == DRBG_ERROR)
|
---|
531 | RAND_DRBG_uninstantiate(drbg);
|
---|
532 |
|
---|
533 | /* repair uninitialized state */
|
---|
534 | if (drbg->state == DRBG_UNINITIALISED) {
|
---|
535 | /* reinstantiate drbg */
|
---|
536 | RAND_DRBG_instantiate(drbg,
|
---|
537 | (const unsigned char *) ossl_pers_string,
|
---|
538 | sizeof(ossl_pers_string) - 1);
|
---|
539 | /* already reseeded. prevent second reseeding below */
|
---|
540 | reseeded = (drbg->state == DRBG_READY);
|
---|
541 | }
|
---|
542 |
|
---|
543 | /* refresh current state if entropy or additional input has been provided */
|
---|
544 | if (drbg->state == DRBG_READY) {
|
---|
545 | if (adin != NULL) {
|
---|
546 | /*
|
---|
547 | * mix in additional input without reseeding
|
---|
548 | *
|
---|
549 | * Similar to RAND_DRBG_reseed(), but the provided additional
|
---|
550 | * data |adin| is mixed into the current state without pulling
|
---|
551 | * entropy from the trusted entropy source using get_entropy().
|
---|
552 | * This is not a reseeding in the strict sense of NIST SP 800-90A.
|
---|
553 | */
|
---|
554 | drbg->meth->reseed(drbg, adin, adinlen, NULL, 0);
|
---|
555 | } else if (reseeded == 0) {
|
---|
556 | /* do a full reseeding if it has not been done yet above */
|
---|
557 | RAND_DRBG_reseed(drbg, NULL, 0, 0);
|
---|
558 | }
|
---|
559 | }
|
---|
560 |
|
---|
561 | rand_pool_free(drbg->seed_pool);
|
---|
562 | drbg->seed_pool = NULL;
|
---|
563 |
|
---|
564 | return drbg->state == DRBG_READY;
|
---|
565 | }
|
---|
566 |
|
---|
567 | /*
|
---|
568 | * Generate |outlen| bytes into the buffer at |out|. Reseed if we need
|
---|
569 | * to or if |prediction_resistance| is set. Additional input can be
|
---|
570 | * sent in |adin| and |adinlen|.
|
---|
571 | *
|
---|
572 | * Requires that drbg->lock is already locked for write, if non-null.
|
---|
573 | *
|
---|
574 | * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure.
|
---|
575 | *
|
---|
576 | */
|
---|
577 | int RAND_DRBG_generate(RAND_DRBG *drbg, unsigned char *out, size_t outlen,
|
---|
578 | int prediction_resistance,
|
---|
579 | const unsigned char *adin, size_t adinlen)
|
---|
580 | {
|
---|
581 | int fork_id;
|
---|
582 | int reseed_required = 0;
|
---|
583 |
|
---|
584 | if (drbg->state != DRBG_READY) {
|
---|
585 | /* try to recover from previous errors */
|
---|
586 | rand_drbg_restart(drbg, NULL, 0, 0);
|
---|
587 |
|
---|
588 | if (drbg->state == DRBG_ERROR) {
|
---|
589 | RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_GENERATE, RAND_R_IN_ERROR_STATE);
|
---|
590 | return 0;
|
---|
591 | }
|
---|
592 | if (drbg->state == DRBG_UNINITIALISED) {
|
---|
593 | RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_GENERATE, RAND_R_NOT_INSTANTIATED);
|
---|
594 | return 0;
|
---|
595 | }
|
---|
596 | }
|
---|
597 |
|
---|
598 | if (outlen > drbg->max_request) {
|
---|
599 | RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_GENERATE, RAND_R_REQUEST_TOO_LARGE_FOR_DRBG);
|
---|
600 | return 0;
|
---|
601 | }
|
---|
602 | if (adinlen > drbg->max_adinlen) {
|
---|
603 | RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_GENERATE, RAND_R_ADDITIONAL_INPUT_TOO_LONG);
|
---|
604 | return 0;
|
---|
605 | }
|
---|
606 |
|
---|
607 | fork_id = openssl_get_fork_id();
|
---|
608 |
|
---|
609 | if (drbg->fork_id != fork_id) {
|
---|
610 | drbg->fork_id = fork_id;
|
---|
611 | reseed_required = 1;
|
---|
612 | }
|
---|
613 |
|
---|
614 | if (drbg->reseed_interval > 0) {
|
---|
615 | if (drbg->reseed_gen_counter >= drbg->reseed_interval)
|
---|
616 | reseed_required = 1;
|
---|
617 | }
|
---|
618 | if (drbg->reseed_time_interval > 0) {
|
---|
619 | time_t now = time(NULL);
|
---|
620 | if (now < drbg->reseed_time
|
---|
621 | || now - drbg->reseed_time >= drbg->reseed_time_interval)
|
---|
622 | reseed_required = 1;
|
---|
623 | }
|
---|
624 | if (drbg->parent != NULL) {
|
---|
625 | unsigned int reseed_counter = tsan_load(&drbg->reseed_prop_counter);
|
---|
626 | if (reseed_counter > 0
|
---|
627 | && tsan_load(&drbg->parent->reseed_prop_counter)
|
---|
628 | != reseed_counter)
|
---|
629 | reseed_required = 1;
|
---|
630 | }
|
---|
631 |
|
---|
632 | if (reseed_required || prediction_resistance) {
|
---|
633 | if (!RAND_DRBG_reseed(drbg, adin, adinlen, prediction_resistance)) {
|
---|
634 | RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_GENERATE, RAND_R_RESEED_ERROR);
|
---|
635 | return 0;
|
---|
636 | }
|
---|
637 | adin = NULL;
|
---|
638 | adinlen = 0;
|
---|
639 | }
|
---|
640 |
|
---|
641 | if (!drbg->meth->generate(drbg, out, outlen, adin, adinlen)) {
|
---|
642 | drbg->state = DRBG_ERROR;
|
---|
643 | RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_GENERATE, RAND_R_GENERATE_ERROR);
|
---|
644 | return 0;
|
---|
645 | }
|
---|
646 |
|
---|
647 | drbg->reseed_gen_counter++;
|
---|
648 |
|
---|
649 | return 1;
|
---|
650 | }
|
---|
651 |
|
---|
652 | /*
|
---|
653 | * Generates |outlen| random bytes and stores them in |out|. It will
|
---|
654 | * using the given |drbg| to generate the bytes.
|
---|
655 | *
|
---|
656 | * Requires that drbg->lock is already locked for write, if non-null.
|
---|
657 | *
|
---|
658 | * Returns 1 on success 0 on failure.
|
---|
659 | */
|
---|
660 | int RAND_DRBG_bytes(RAND_DRBG *drbg, unsigned char *out, size_t outlen)
|
---|
661 | {
|
---|
662 | unsigned char *additional = NULL;
|
---|
663 | size_t additional_len;
|
---|
664 | size_t chunk;
|
---|
665 | size_t ret = 0;
|
---|
666 |
|
---|
667 | if (drbg->adin_pool == NULL) {
|
---|
668 | if (drbg->type == 0)
|
---|
669 | goto err;
|
---|
670 | drbg->adin_pool = rand_pool_new(0, 0, 0, drbg->max_adinlen);
|
---|
671 | if (drbg->adin_pool == NULL)
|
---|
672 | goto err;
|
---|
673 | }
|
---|
674 |
|
---|
675 | additional_len = rand_drbg_get_additional_data(drbg->adin_pool,
|
---|
676 | &additional);
|
---|
677 |
|
---|
678 | for ( ; outlen > 0; outlen -= chunk, out += chunk) {
|
---|
679 | chunk = outlen;
|
---|
680 | if (chunk > drbg->max_request)
|
---|
681 | chunk = drbg->max_request;
|
---|
682 | ret = RAND_DRBG_generate(drbg, out, chunk, 0, additional, additional_len);
|
---|
683 | if (!ret)
|
---|
684 | goto err;
|
---|
685 | }
|
---|
686 | ret = 1;
|
---|
687 |
|
---|
688 | err:
|
---|
689 | if (additional != NULL)
|
---|
690 | rand_drbg_cleanup_additional_data(drbg->adin_pool, additional);
|
---|
691 |
|
---|
692 | return ret;
|
---|
693 | }
|
---|
694 |
|
---|
695 | /*
|
---|
696 | * Set the RAND_DRBG callbacks for obtaining entropy and nonce.
|
---|
697 | *
|
---|
698 | * Setting the callbacks is allowed only if the drbg has not been
|
---|
699 | * initialized yet. Otherwise, the operation will fail.
|
---|
700 | *
|
---|
701 | * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure.
|
---|
702 | */
|
---|
703 | int RAND_DRBG_set_callbacks(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
|
---|
704 | RAND_DRBG_get_entropy_fn get_entropy,
|
---|
705 | RAND_DRBG_cleanup_entropy_fn cleanup_entropy,
|
---|
706 | RAND_DRBG_get_nonce_fn get_nonce,
|
---|
707 | RAND_DRBG_cleanup_nonce_fn cleanup_nonce)
|
---|
708 | {
|
---|
709 | if (drbg->state != DRBG_UNINITIALISED
|
---|
710 | || drbg->parent != NULL)
|
---|
711 | return 0;
|
---|
712 | drbg->get_entropy = get_entropy;
|
---|
713 | drbg->cleanup_entropy = cleanup_entropy;
|
---|
714 | drbg->get_nonce = get_nonce;
|
---|
715 | drbg->cleanup_nonce = cleanup_nonce;
|
---|
716 | return 1;
|
---|
717 | }
|
---|
718 |
|
---|
719 | /*
|
---|
720 | * Set the reseed interval.
|
---|
721 | *
|
---|
722 | * The drbg will reseed automatically whenever the number of generate
|
---|
723 | * requests exceeds the given reseed interval. If the reseed interval
|
---|
724 | * is 0, then this feature is disabled.
|
---|
725 | *
|
---|
726 | * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure.
|
---|
727 | */
|
---|
728 | int RAND_DRBG_set_reseed_interval(RAND_DRBG *drbg, unsigned int interval)
|
---|
729 | {
|
---|
730 | if (interval > MAX_RESEED_INTERVAL)
|
---|
731 | return 0;
|
---|
732 | drbg->reseed_interval = interval;
|
---|
733 | return 1;
|
---|
734 | }
|
---|
735 |
|
---|
736 | /*
|
---|
737 | * Set the reseed time interval.
|
---|
738 | *
|
---|
739 | * The drbg will reseed automatically whenever the time elapsed since
|
---|
740 | * the last reseeding exceeds the given reseed time interval. For safety,
|
---|
741 | * a reseeding will also occur if the clock has been reset to a smaller
|
---|
742 | * value.
|
---|
743 | *
|
---|
744 | * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure.
|
---|
745 | */
|
---|
746 | int RAND_DRBG_set_reseed_time_interval(RAND_DRBG *drbg, time_t interval)
|
---|
747 | {
|
---|
748 | if (interval > MAX_RESEED_TIME_INTERVAL)
|
---|
749 | return 0;
|
---|
750 | drbg->reseed_time_interval = interval;
|
---|
751 | return 1;
|
---|
752 | }
|
---|
753 |
|
---|
754 | /*
|
---|
755 | * Set the default values for reseed (time) intervals of new DRBG instances
|
---|
756 | *
|
---|
757 | * The default values can be set independently for master DRBG instances
|
---|
758 | * (without a parent) and slave DRBG instances (with parent).
|
---|
759 | *
|
---|
760 | * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure.
|
---|
761 | */
|
---|
762 |
|
---|
763 | int RAND_DRBG_set_reseed_defaults(
|
---|
764 | unsigned int _master_reseed_interval,
|
---|
765 | unsigned int _slave_reseed_interval,
|
---|
766 | time_t _master_reseed_time_interval,
|
---|
767 | time_t _slave_reseed_time_interval
|
---|
768 | )
|
---|
769 | {
|
---|
770 | if (_master_reseed_interval > MAX_RESEED_INTERVAL
|
---|
771 | || _slave_reseed_interval > MAX_RESEED_INTERVAL)
|
---|
772 | return 0;
|
---|
773 |
|
---|
774 | if (_master_reseed_time_interval > MAX_RESEED_TIME_INTERVAL
|
---|
775 | || _slave_reseed_time_interval > MAX_RESEED_TIME_INTERVAL)
|
---|
776 | return 0;
|
---|
777 |
|
---|
778 | master_reseed_interval = _master_reseed_interval;
|
---|
779 | slave_reseed_interval = _slave_reseed_interval;
|
---|
780 |
|
---|
781 | master_reseed_time_interval = _master_reseed_time_interval;
|
---|
782 | slave_reseed_time_interval = _slave_reseed_time_interval;
|
---|
783 |
|
---|
784 | return 1;
|
---|
785 | }
|
---|
786 |
|
---|
787 | /*
|
---|
788 | * Locks the given drbg. Locking a drbg which does not have locking
|
---|
789 | * enabled is considered a successful no-op.
|
---|
790 | *
|
---|
791 | * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure.
|
---|
792 | */
|
---|
793 | int rand_drbg_lock(RAND_DRBG *drbg)
|
---|
794 | {
|
---|
795 | if (drbg->lock != NULL)
|
---|
796 | return CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(drbg->lock);
|
---|
797 |
|
---|
798 | return 1;
|
---|
799 | }
|
---|
800 |
|
---|
801 | /*
|
---|
802 | * Unlocks the given drbg. Unlocking a drbg which does not have locking
|
---|
803 | * enabled is considered a successful no-op.
|
---|
804 | *
|
---|
805 | * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure.
|
---|
806 | */
|
---|
807 | int rand_drbg_unlock(RAND_DRBG *drbg)
|
---|
808 | {
|
---|
809 | if (drbg->lock != NULL)
|
---|
810 | return CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(drbg->lock);
|
---|
811 |
|
---|
812 | return 1;
|
---|
813 | }
|
---|
814 |
|
---|
815 | /*
|
---|
816 | * Enables locking for the given drbg
|
---|
817 | *
|
---|
818 | * Locking can only be enabled if the random generator
|
---|
819 | * is in the uninitialized state.
|
---|
820 | *
|
---|
821 | * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure.
|
---|
822 | */
|
---|
823 | int rand_drbg_enable_locking(RAND_DRBG *drbg)
|
---|
824 | {
|
---|
825 | if (drbg->state != DRBG_UNINITIALISED) {
|
---|
826 | RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_ENABLE_LOCKING,
|
---|
827 | RAND_R_DRBG_ALREADY_INITIALIZED);
|
---|
828 | return 0;
|
---|
829 | }
|
---|
830 |
|
---|
831 | if (drbg->lock == NULL) {
|
---|
832 | if (drbg->parent != NULL && drbg->parent->lock == NULL) {
|
---|
833 | RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_ENABLE_LOCKING,
|
---|
834 | RAND_R_PARENT_LOCKING_NOT_ENABLED);
|
---|
835 | return 0;
|
---|
836 | }
|
---|
837 |
|
---|
838 | drbg->lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new();
|
---|
839 | if (drbg->lock == NULL) {
|
---|
840 | RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_ENABLE_LOCKING,
|
---|
841 | RAND_R_FAILED_TO_CREATE_LOCK);
|
---|
842 | return 0;
|
---|
843 | }
|
---|
844 | }
|
---|
845 |
|
---|
846 | return 1;
|
---|
847 | }
|
---|
848 |
|
---|
849 | /*
|
---|
850 | * Get and set the EXDATA
|
---|
851 | */
|
---|
852 | int RAND_DRBG_set_ex_data(RAND_DRBG *drbg, int idx, void *arg)
|
---|
853 | {
|
---|
854 | return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&drbg->ex_data, idx, arg);
|
---|
855 | }
|
---|
856 |
|
---|
857 | void *RAND_DRBG_get_ex_data(const RAND_DRBG *drbg, int idx)
|
---|
858 | {
|
---|
859 | return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&drbg->ex_data, idx);
|
---|
860 | }
|
---|
861 |
|
---|
862 |
|
---|
863 | /*
|
---|
864 | * The following functions provide a RAND_METHOD that works on the
|
---|
865 | * global DRBG. They lock.
|
---|
866 | */
|
---|
867 |
|
---|
868 | /*
|
---|
869 | * Allocates a new global DRBG on the secure heap (if enabled) and
|
---|
870 | * initializes it with default settings.
|
---|
871 | *
|
---|
872 | * Returns a pointer to the new DRBG instance on success, NULL on failure.
|
---|
873 | */
|
---|
874 | static RAND_DRBG *drbg_setup(RAND_DRBG *parent)
|
---|
875 | {
|
---|
876 | RAND_DRBG *drbg;
|
---|
877 |
|
---|
878 | drbg = RAND_DRBG_secure_new(rand_drbg_type, rand_drbg_flags, parent);
|
---|
879 | if (drbg == NULL)
|
---|
880 | return NULL;
|
---|
881 |
|
---|
882 | /* Only the master DRBG needs to have a lock */
|
---|
883 | if (parent == NULL && rand_drbg_enable_locking(drbg) == 0)
|
---|
884 | goto err;
|
---|
885 |
|
---|
886 | /* enable seed propagation */
|
---|
887 | tsan_store(&drbg->reseed_prop_counter, 1);
|
---|
888 |
|
---|
889 | /*
|
---|
890 | * Ignore instantiation error to support just-in-time instantiation.
|
---|
891 | *
|
---|
892 | * The state of the drbg will be checked in RAND_DRBG_generate() and
|
---|
893 | * an automatic recovery is attempted.
|
---|
894 | */
|
---|
895 | (void)RAND_DRBG_instantiate(drbg,
|
---|
896 | (const unsigned char *) ossl_pers_string,
|
---|
897 | sizeof(ossl_pers_string) - 1);
|
---|
898 | return drbg;
|
---|
899 |
|
---|
900 | err:
|
---|
901 | RAND_DRBG_free(drbg);
|
---|
902 | return NULL;
|
---|
903 | }
|
---|
904 |
|
---|
905 | /*
|
---|
906 | * Initialize the global DRBGs on first use.
|
---|
907 | * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure.
|
---|
908 | */
|
---|
909 | DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(do_rand_drbg_init)
|
---|
910 | {
|
---|
911 | /*
|
---|
912 | * ensure that libcrypto is initialized, otherwise the
|
---|
913 | * DRBG locks are not cleaned up properly
|
---|
914 | */
|
---|
915 | if (!OPENSSL_init_crypto(0, NULL))
|
---|
916 | return 0;
|
---|
917 |
|
---|
918 | if (!CRYPTO_THREAD_init_local(&private_drbg, NULL))
|
---|
919 | return 0;
|
---|
920 |
|
---|
921 | if (!CRYPTO_THREAD_init_local(&public_drbg, NULL))
|
---|
922 | goto err1;
|
---|
923 |
|
---|
924 | master_drbg = drbg_setup(NULL);
|
---|
925 | if (master_drbg == NULL)
|
---|
926 | goto err2;
|
---|
927 |
|
---|
928 | return 1;
|
---|
929 |
|
---|
930 | err2:
|
---|
931 | CRYPTO_THREAD_cleanup_local(&public_drbg);
|
---|
932 | err1:
|
---|
933 | CRYPTO_THREAD_cleanup_local(&private_drbg);
|
---|
934 | return 0;
|
---|
935 | }
|
---|
936 |
|
---|
937 | /* Clean up the global DRBGs before exit */
|
---|
938 | void rand_drbg_cleanup_int(void)
|
---|
939 | {
|
---|
940 | if (master_drbg != NULL) {
|
---|
941 | RAND_DRBG_free(master_drbg);
|
---|
942 | master_drbg = NULL;
|
---|
943 |
|
---|
944 | CRYPTO_THREAD_cleanup_local(&private_drbg);
|
---|
945 | CRYPTO_THREAD_cleanup_local(&public_drbg);
|
---|
946 | }
|
---|
947 | }
|
---|
948 |
|
---|
949 | void drbg_delete_thread_state(void)
|
---|
950 | {
|
---|
951 | RAND_DRBG *drbg;
|
---|
952 |
|
---|
953 | drbg = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_local(&public_drbg);
|
---|
954 | CRYPTO_THREAD_set_local(&public_drbg, NULL);
|
---|
955 | RAND_DRBG_free(drbg);
|
---|
956 |
|
---|
957 | drbg = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_local(&private_drbg);
|
---|
958 | CRYPTO_THREAD_set_local(&private_drbg, NULL);
|
---|
959 | RAND_DRBG_free(drbg);
|
---|
960 | }
|
---|
961 |
|
---|
962 | /* Implements the default OpenSSL RAND_bytes() method */
|
---|
963 | static int drbg_bytes(unsigned char *out, int count)
|
---|
964 | {
|
---|
965 | int ret;
|
---|
966 | RAND_DRBG *drbg = RAND_DRBG_get0_public();
|
---|
967 |
|
---|
968 | if (drbg == NULL)
|
---|
969 | return 0;
|
---|
970 |
|
---|
971 | ret = RAND_DRBG_bytes(drbg, out, count);
|
---|
972 |
|
---|
973 | return ret;
|
---|
974 | }
|
---|
975 |
|
---|
976 | /*
|
---|
977 | * Calculates the minimum length of a full entropy buffer
|
---|
978 | * which is necessary to seed (i.e. instantiate) the DRBG
|
---|
979 | * successfully.
|
---|
980 | */
|
---|
981 | size_t rand_drbg_seedlen(RAND_DRBG *drbg)
|
---|
982 | {
|
---|
983 | /*
|
---|
984 | * If no os entropy source is available then RAND_seed(buffer, bufsize)
|
---|
985 | * is expected to succeed if and only if the buffer length satisfies
|
---|
986 | * the following requirements, which follow from the calculations
|
---|
987 | * in RAND_DRBG_instantiate().
|
---|
988 | */
|
---|
989 | size_t min_entropy = drbg->strength;
|
---|
990 | size_t min_entropylen = drbg->min_entropylen;
|
---|
991 |
|
---|
992 | /*
|
---|
993 | * Extra entropy for the random nonce in the absence of a
|
---|
994 | * get_nonce callback, see comment in RAND_DRBG_instantiate().
|
---|
995 | */
|
---|
996 | if (drbg->min_noncelen > 0 && drbg->get_nonce == NULL) {
|
---|
997 | min_entropy += drbg->strength / 2;
|
---|
998 | min_entropylen += drbg->min_noncelen;
|
---|
999 | }
|
---|
1000 |
|
---|
1001 | /*
|
---|
1002 | * Convert entropy requirement from bits to bytes
|
---|
1003 | * (dividing by 8 without rounding upwards, because
|
---|
1004 | * all entropy requirements are divisible by 8).
|
---|
1005 | */
|
---|
1006 | min_entropy >>= 3;
|
---|
1007 |
|
---|
1008 | /* Return a value that satisfies both requirements */
|
---|
1009 | return min_entropy > min_entropylen ? min_entropy : min_entropylen;
|
---|
1010 | }
|
---|
1011 |
|
---|
1012 | /* Implements the default OpenSSL RAND_add() method */
|
---|
1013 | static int drbg_add(const void *buf, int num, double randomness)
|
---|
1014 | {
|
---|
1015 | int ret = 0;
|
---|
1016 | RAND_DRBG *drbg = RAND_DRBG_get0_master();
|
---|
1017 | size_t buflen;
|
---|
1018 | size_t seedlen;
|
---|
1019 |
|
---|
1020 | if (drbg == NULL)
|
---|
1021 | return 0;
|
---|
1022 |
|
---|
1023 | if (num < 0 || randomness < 0.0)
|
---|
1024 | return 0;
|
---|
1025 |
|
---|
1026 | rand_drbg_lock(drbg);
|
---|
1027 | seedlen = rand_drbg_seedlen(drbg);
|
---|
1028 |
|
---|
1029 | buflen = (size_t)num;
|
---|
1030 |
|
---|
1031 | if (buflen < seedlen || randomness < (double) seedlen) {
|
---|
1032 | #if defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_NONE)
|
---|
1033 | /*
|
---|
1034 | * If no os entropy source is available, a reseeding will fail
|
---|
1035 | * inevitably. So we use a trick to mix the buffer contents into
|
---|
1036 | * the DRBG state without forcing a reseeding: we generate a
|
---|
1037 | * dummy random byte, using the buffer content as additional data.
|
---|
1038 | * Note: This won't work with RAND_DRBG_FLAG_CTR_NO_DF.
|
---|
1039 | */
|
---|
1040 | unsigned char dummy[1];
|
---|
1041 |
|
---|
1042 | ret = RAND_DRBG_generate(drbg, dummy, sizeof(dummy), 0, buf, buflen);
|
---|
1043 | rand_drbg_unlock(drbg);
|
---|
1044 | return ret;
|
---|
1045 | #else
|
---|
1046 | /*
|
---|
1047 | * If an os entropy source is available then we declare the buffer content
|
---|
1048 | * as additional data by setting randomness to zero and trigger a regular
|
---|
1049 | * reseeding.
|
---|
1050 | */
|
---|
1051 | randomness = 0.0;
|
---|
1052 | #endif
|
---|
1053 | }
|
---|
1054 |
|
---|
1055 |
|
---|
1056 | if (randomness > (double)seedlen) {
|
---|
1057 | /*
|
---|
1058 | * The purpose of this check is to bound |randomness| by a
|
---|
1059 | * relatively small value in order to prevent an integer
|
---|
1060 | * overflow when multiplying by 8 in the rand_drbg_restart()
|
---|
1061 | * call below. Note that randomness is measured in bytes,
|
---|
1062 | * not bits, so this value corresponds to eight times the
|
---|
1063 | * security strength.
|
---|
1064 | */
|
---|
1065 | randomness = (double)seedlen;
|
---|
1066 | }
|
---|
1067 |
|
---|
1068 | ret = rand_drbg_restart(drbg, buf, buflen, (size_t)(8 * randomness));
|
---|
1069 | rand_drbg_unlock(drbg);
|
---|
1070 |
|
---|
1071 | return ret;
|
---|
1072 | }
|
---|
1073 |
|
---|
1074 | /* Implements the default OpenSSL RAND_seed() method */
|
---|
1075 | static int drbg_seed(const void *buf, int num)
|
---|
1076 | {
|
---|
1077 | return drbg_add(buf, num, num);
|
---|
1078 | }
|
---|
1079 |
|
---|
1080 | /* Implements the default OpenSSL RAND_status() method */
|
---|
1081 | static int drbg_status(void)
|
---|
1082 | {
|
---|
1083 | int ret;
|
---|
1084 | RAND_DRBG *drbg = RAND_DRBG_get0_master();
|
---|
1085 |
|
---|
1086 | if (drbg == NULL)
|
---|
1087 | return 0;
|
---|
1088 |
|
---|
1089 | rand_drbg_lock(drbg);
|
---|
1090 | ret = drbg->state == DRBG_READY ? 1 : 0;
|
---|
1091 | rand_drbg_unlock(drbg);
|
---|
1092 | return ret;
|
---|
1093 | }
|
---|
1094 |
|
---|
1095 | /*
|
---|
1096 | * Get the master DRBG.
|
---|
1097 | * Returns pointer to the DRBG on success, NULL on failure.
|
---|
1098 | *
|
---|
1099 | */
|
---|
1100 | RAND_DRBG *RAND_DRBG_get0_master(void)
|
---|
1101 | {
|
---|
1102 | if (!RUN_ONCE(&rand_drbg_init, do_rand_drbg_init))
|
---|
1103 | return NULL;
|
---|
1104 |
|
---|
1105 | return master_drbg;
|
---|
1106 | }
|
---|
1107 |
|
---|
1108 | /*
|
---|
1109 | * Get the public DRBG.
|
---|
1110 | * Returns pointer to the DRBG on success, NULL on failure.
|
---|
1111 | */
|
---|
1112 | RAND_DRBG *RAND_DRBG_get0_public(void)
|
---|
1113 | {
|
---|
1114 | RAND_DRBG *drbg;
|
---|
1115 |
|
---|
1116 | if (!RUN_ONCE(&rand_drbg_init, do_rand_drbg_init))
|
---|
1117 | return NULL;
|
---|
1118 |
|
---|
1119 | drbg = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_local(&public_drbg);
|
---|
1120 | if (drbg == NULL) {
|
---|
1121 | if (!ossl_init_thread_start(OPENSSL_INIT_THREAD_RAND))
|
---|
1122 | return NULL;
|
---|
1123 | drbg = drbg_setup(master_drbg);
|
---|
1124 | CRYPTO_THREAD_set_local(&public_drbg, drbg);
|
---|
1125 | }
|
---|
1126 | return drbg;
|
---|
1127 | }
|
---|
1128 |
|
---|
1129 | /*
|
---|
1130 | * Get the private DRBG.
|
---|
1131 | * Returns pointer to the DRBG on success, NULL on failure.
|
---|
1132 | */
|
---|
1133 | RAND_DRBG *RAND_DRBG_get0_private(void)
|
---|
1134 | {
|
---|
1135 | RAND_DRBG *drbg;
|
---|
1136 |
|
---|
1137 | if (!RUN_ONCE(&rand_drbg_init, do_rand_drbg_init))
|
---|
1138 | return NULL;
|
---|
1139 |
|
---|
1140 | drbg = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_local(&private_drbg);
|
---|
1141 | if (drbg == NULL) {
|
---|
1142 | if (!ossl_init_thread_start(OPENSSL_INIT_THREAD_RAND))
|
---|
1143 | return NULL;
|
---|
1144 | drbg = drbg_setup(master_drbg);
|
---|
1145 | CRYPTO_THREAD_set_local(&private_drbg, drbg);
|
---|
1146 | }
|
---|
1147 | return drbg;
|
---|
1148 | }
|
---|
1149 |
|
---|
1150 | RAND_METHOD rand_meth = {
|
---|
1151 | drbg_seed,
|
---|
1152 | drbg_bytes,
|
---|
1153 | NULL,
|
---|
1154 | drbg_add,
|
---|
1155 | drbg_bytes,
|
---|
1156 | drbg_status
|
---|
1157 | };
|
---|
1158 |
|
---|
1159 | RAND_METHOD *RAND_OpenSSL(void)
|
---|
1160 | {
|
---|
1161 | return &rand_meth;
|
---|
1162 | }
|
---|