1 | /*
|
---|
2 | * Copyright 1999-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
|
---|
3 | *
|
---|
4 | * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
|
---|
5 | * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
|
---|
6 | * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
|
---|
7 | * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
|
---|
8 | */
|
---|
9 |
|
---|
10 | #include <stdio.h>
|
---|
11 | #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
|
---|
12 | #include "internal/numbers.h"
|
---|
13 | #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
|
---|
14 | #include <openssl/x509_vfy.h>
|
---|
15 | #include "crypto/x509.h"
|
---|
16 | #include "../x509/x509_local.h" /* for x509_signing_allowed() */
|
---|
17 | #include "internal/tsan_assist.h"
|
---|
18 |
|
---|
19 | static void x509v3_cache_extensions(X509 *x);
|
---|
20 |
|
---|
21 | static int check_ssl_ca(const X509 *x);
|
---|
22 | static int check_purpose_ssl_client(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
|
---|
23 | int ca);
|
---|
24 | static int check_purpose_ssl_server(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
|
---|
25 | int ca);
|
---|
26 | static int check_purpose_ns_ssl_server(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
|
---|
27 | int ca);
|
---|
28 | static int purpose_smime(const X509 *x, int ca);
|
---|
29 | static int check_purpose_smime_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
|
---|
30 | int ca);
|
---|
31 | static int check_purpose_smime_encrypt(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
|
---|
32 | int ca);
|
---|
33 | static int check_purpose_crl_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
|
---|
34 | int ca);
|
---|
35 | static int check_purpose_timestamp_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
|
---|
36 | int ca);
|
---|
37 | static int no_check(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca);
|
---|
38 | static int ocsp_helper(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca);
|
---|
39 |
|
---|
40 | static int xp_cmp(const X509_PURPOSE *const *a, const X509_PURPOSE *const *b);
|
---|
41 | static void xptable_free(X509_PURPOSE *p);
|
---|
42 |
|
---|
43 | static X509_PURPOSE xstandard[] = {
|
---|
44 | {X509_PURPOSE_SSL_CLIENT, X509_TRUST_SSL_CLIENT, 0,
|
---|
45 | check_purpose_ssl_client, "SSL client", "sslclient", NULL},
|
---|
46 | {X509_PURPOSE_SSL_SERVER, X509_TRUST_SSL_SERVER, 0,
|
---|
47 | check_purpose_ssl_server, "SSL server", "sslserver", NULL},
|
---|
48 | {X509_PURPOSE_NS_SSL_SERVER, X509_TRUST_SSL_SERVER, 0,
|
---|
49 | check_purpose_ns_ssl_server, "Netscape SSL server", "nssslserver", NULL},
|
---|
50 | {X509_PURPOSE_SMIME_SIGN, X509_TRUST_EMAIL, 0, check_purpose_smime_sign,
|
---|
51 | "S/MIME signing", "smimesign", NULL},
|
---|
52 | {X509_PURPOSE_SMIME_ENCRYPT, X509_TRUST_EMAIL, 0,
|
---|
53 | check_purpose_smime_encrypt, "S/MIME encryption", "smimeencrypt", NULL},
|
---|
54 | {X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN, X509_TRUST_COMPAT, 0, check_purpose_crl_sign,
|
---|
55 | "CRL signing", "crlsign", NULL},
|
---|
56 | {X509_PURPOSE_ANY, X509_TRUST_DEFAULT, 0, no_check, "Any Purpose", "any",
|
---|
57 | NULL},
|
---|
58 | {X509_PURPOSE_OCSP_HELPER, X509_TRUST_COMPAT, 0, ocsp_helper,
|
---|
59 | "OCSP helper", "ocsphelper", NULL},
|
---|
60 | {X509_PURPOSE_TIMESTAMP_SIGN, X509_TRUST_TSA, 0,
|
---|
61 | check_purpose_timestamp_sign, "Time Stamp signing", "timestampsign",
|
---|
62 | NULL},
|
---|
63 | };
|
---|
64 |
|
---|
65 | #define X509_PURPOSE_COUNT OSSL_NELEM(xstandard)
|
---|
66 |
|
---|
67 | static STACK_OF(X509_PURPOSE) *xptable = NULL;
|
---|
68 |
|
---|
69 | static int xp_cmp(const X509_PURPOSE *const *a, const X509_PURPOSE *const *b)
|
---|
70 | {
|
---|
71 | return (*a)->purpose - (*b)->purpose;
|
---|
72 | }
|
---|
73 |
|
---|
74 | /*
|
---|
75 | * As much as I'd like to make X509_check_purpose use a "const" X509* I
|
---|
76 | * really can't because it does recalculate hashes and do other non-const
|
---|
77 | * things.
|
---|
78 | */
|
---|
79 | int X509_check_purpose(X509 *x, int id, int ca)
|
---|
80 | {
|
---|
81 | int idx;
|
---|
82 | const X509_PURPOSE *pt;
|
---|
83 |
|
---|
84 | x509v3_cache_extensions(x);
|
---|
85 | if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID)
|
---|
86 | return -1;
|
---|
87 |
|
---|
88 | /* Return if side-effect only call */
|
---|
89 | if (id == -1)
|
---|
90 | return 1;
|
---|
91 | idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(id);
|
---|
92 | if (idx == -1)
|
---|
93 | return -1;
|
---|
94 | pt = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
|
---|
95 | return pt->check_purpose(pt, x, ca);
|
---|
96 | }
|
---|
97 |
|
---|
98 | int X509_PURPOSE_set(int *p, int purpose)
|
---|
99 | {
|
---|
100 | if (X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose) == -1) {
|
---|
101 | X509V3err(X509V3_F_X509_PURPOSE_SET, X509V3_R_INVALID_PURPOSE);
|
---|
102 | return 0;
|
---|
103 | }
|
---|
104 | *p = purpose;
|
---|
105 | return 1;
|
---|
106 | }
|
---|
107 |
|
---|
108 | int X509_PURPOSE_get_count(void)
|
---|
109 | {
|
---|
110 | if (!xptable)
|
---|
111 | return X509_PURPOSE_COUNT;
|
---|
112 | return sk_X509_PURPOSE_num(xptable) + X509_PURPOSE_COUNT;
|
---|
113 | }
|
---|
114 |
|
---|
115 | X509_PURPOSE *X509_PURPOSE_get0(int idx)
|
---|
116 | {
|
---|
117 | if (idx < 0)
|
---|
118 | return NULL;
|
---|
119 | if (idx < (int)X509_PURPOSE_COUNT)
|
---|
120 | return xstandard + idx;
|
---|
121 | return sk_X509_PURPOSE_value(xptable, idx - X509_PURPOSE_COUNT);
|
---|
122 | }
|
---|
123 |
|
---|
124 | int X509_PURPOSE_get_by_sname(const char *sname)
|
---|
125 | {
|
---|
126 | int i;
|
---|
127 | X509_PURPOSE *xptmp;
|
---|
128 | for (i = 0; i < X509_PURPOSE_get_count(); i++) {
|
---|
129 | xptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(i);
|
---|
130 | if (strcmp(xptmp->sname, sname) == 0)
|
---|
131 | return i;
|
---|
132 | }
|
---|
133 | return -1;
|
---|
134 | }
|
---|
135 |
|
---|
136 | int X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(int purpose)
|
---|
137 | {
|
---|
138 | X509_PURPOSE tmp;
|
---|
139 | int idx;
|
---|
140 |
|
---|
141 | if ((purpose >= X509_PURPOSE_MIN) && (purpose <= X509_PURPOSE_MAX))
|
---|
142 | return purpose - X509_PURPOSE_MIN;
|
---|
143 | if (xptable == NULL)
|
---|
144 | return -1;
|
---|
145 | tmp.purpose = purpose;
|
---|
146 | idx = sk_X509_PURPOSE_find(xptable, &tmp);
|
---|
147 | if (idx < 0)
|
---|
148 | return -1;
|
---|
149 | return idx + X509_PURPOSE_COUNT;
|
---|
150 | }
|
---|
151 |
|
---|
152 | int X509_PURPOSE_add(int id, int trust, int flags,
|
---|
153 | int (*ck) (const X509_PURPOSE *, const X509 *, int),
|
---|
154 | const char *name, const char *sname, void *arg)
|
---|
155 | {
|
---|
156 | int idx;
|
---|
157 | X509_PURPOSE *ptmp;
|
---|
158 | /*
|
---|
159 | * This is set according to what we change: application can't set it
|
---|
160 | */
|
---|
161 | flags &= ~X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC;
|
---|
162 | /* This will always be set for application modified trust entries */
|
---|
163 | flags |= X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC_NAME;
|
---|
164 | /* Get existing entry if any */
|
---|
165 | idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(id);
|
---|
166 | /* Need a new entry */
|
---|
167 | if (idx == -1) {
|
---|
168 | if ((ptmp = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*ptmp))) == NULL) {
|
---|
169 | X509V3err(X509V3_F_X509_PURPOSE_ADD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
---|
170 | return 0;
|
---|
171 | }
|
---|
172 | ptmp->flags = X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC;
|
---|
173 | } else
|
---|
174 | ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
|
---|
175 |
|
---|
176 | /* OPENSSL_free existing name if dynamic */
|
---|
177 | if (ptmp->flags & X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC_NAME) {
|
---|
178 | OPENSSL_free(ptmp->name);
|
---|
179 | OPENSSL_free(ptmp->sname);
|
---|
180 | }
|
---|
181 | /* dup supplied name */
|
---|
182 | ptmp->name = OPENSSL_strdup(name);
|
---|
183 | ptmp->sname = OPENSSL_strdup(sname);
|
---|
184 | if (!ptmp->name || !ptmp->sname) {
|
---|
185 | X509V3err(X509V3_F_X509_PURPOSE_ADD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
---|
186 | goto err;
|
---|
187 | }
|
---|
188 | /* Keep the dynamic flag of existing entry */
|
---|
189 | ptmp->flags &= X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC;
|
---|
190 | /* Set all other flags */
|
---|
191 | ptmp->flags |= flags;
|
---|
192 |
|
---|
193 | ptmp->purpose = id;
|
---|
194 | ptmp->trust = trust;
|
---|
195 | ptmp->check_purpose = ck;
|
---|
196 | ptmp->usr_data = arg;
|
---|
197 |
|
---|
198 | /* If its a new entry manage the dynamic table */
|
---|
199 | if (idx == -1) {
|
---|
200 | if (xptable == NULL
|
---|
201 | && (xptable = sk_X509_PURPOSE_new(xp_cmp)) == NULL) {
|
---|
202 | X509V3err(X509V3_F_X509_PURPOSE_ADD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
---|
203 | goto err;
|
---|
204 | }
|
---|
205 | if (!sk_X509_PURPOSE_push(xptable, ptmp)) {
|
---|
206 | X509V3err(X509V3_F_X509_PURPOSE_ADD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
---|
207 | goto err;
|
---|
208 | }
|
---|
209 | }
|
---|
210 | return 1;
|
---|
211 | err:
|
---|
212 | if (idx == -1) {
|
---|
213 | OPENSSL_free(ptmp->name);
|
---|
214 | OPENSSL_free(ptmp->sname);
|
---|
215 | OPENSSL_free(ptmp);
|
---|
216 | }
|
---|
217 | return 0;
|
---|
218 | }
|
---|
219 |
|
---|
220 | static void xptable_free(X509_PURPOSE *p)
|
---|
221 | {
|
---|
222 | if (!p)
|
---|
223 | return;
|
---|
224 | if (p->flags & X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC) {
|
---|
225 | if (p->flags & X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC_NAME) {
|
---|
226 | OPENSSL_free(p->name);
|
---|
227 | OPENSSL_free(p->sname);
|
---|
228 | }
|
---|
229 | OPENSSL_free(p);
|
---|
230 | }
|
---|
231 | }
|
---|
232 |
|
---|
233 | void X509_PURPOSE_cleanup(void)
|
---|
234 | {
|
---|
235 | sk_X509_PURPOSE_pop_free(xptable, xptable_free);
|
---|
236 | xptable = NULL;
|
---|
237 | }
|
---|
238 |
|
---|
239 | int X509_PURPOSE_get_id(const X509_PURPOSE *xp)
|
---|
240 | {
|
---|
241 | return xp->purpose;
|
---|
242 | }
|
---|
243 |
|
---|
244 | char *X509_PURPOSE_get0_name(const X509_PURPOSE *xp)
|
---|
245 | {
|
---|
246 | return xp->name;
|
---|
247 | }
|
---|
248 |
|
---|
249 | char *X509_PURPOSE_get0_sname(const X509_PURPOSE *xp)
|
---|
250 | {
|
---|
251 | return xp->sname;
|
---|
252 | }
|
---|
253 |
|
---|
254 | int X509_PURPOSE_get_trust(const X509_PURPOSE *xp)
|
---|
255 | {
|
---|
256 | return xp->trust;
|
---|
257 | }
|
---|
258 |
|
---|
259 | static int nid_cmp(const int *a, const int *b)
|
---|
260 | {
|
---|
261 | return *a - *b;
|
---|
262 | }
|
---|
263 |
|
---|
264 | DECLARE_OBJ_BSEARCH_CMP_FN(int, int, nid);
|
---|
265 | IMPLEMENT_OBJ_BSEARCH_CMP_FN(int, int, nid);
|
---|
266 |
|
---|
267 | int X509_supported_extension(X509_EXTENSION *ex)
|
---|
268 | {
|
---|
269 | /*
|
---|
270 | * This table is a list of the NIDs of supported extensions: that is
|
---|
271 | * those which are used by the verify process. If an extension is
|
---|
272 | * critical and doesn't appear in this list then the verify process will
|
---|
273 | * normally reject the certificate. The list must be kept in numerical
|
---|
274 | * order because it will be searched using bsearch.
|
---|
275 | */
|
---|
276 |
|
---|
277 | static const int supported_nids[] = {
|
---|
278 | NID_netscape_cert_type, /* 71 */
|
---|
279 | NID_key_usage, /* 83 */
|
---|
280 | NID_subject_alt_name, /* 85 */
|
---|
281 | NID_basic_constraints, /* 87 */
|
---|
282 | NID_certificate_policies, /* 89 */
|
---|
283 | NID_crl_distribution_points, /* 103 */
|
---|
284 | NID_ext_key_usage, /* 126 */
|
---|
285 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779
|
---|
286 | NID_sbgp_ipAddrBlock, /* 290 */
|
---|
287 | NID_sbgp_autonomousSysNum, /* 291 */
|
---|
288 | #endif
|
---|
289 | NID_policy_constraints, /* 401 */
|
---|
290 | NID_proxyCertInfo, /* 663 */
|
---|
291 | NID_name_constraints, /* 666 */
|
---|
292 | NID_policy_mappings, /* 747 */
|
---|
293 | NID_inhibit_any_policy /* 748 */
|
---|
294 | };
|
---|
295 |
|
---|
296 | int ex_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(X509_EXTENSION_get_object(ex));
|
---|
297 |
|
---|
298 | if (ex_nid == NID_undef)
|
---|
299 | return 0;
|
---|
300 |
|
---|
301 | if (OBJ_bsearch_nid(&ex_nid, supported_nids, OSSL_NELEM(supported_nids)))
|
---|
302 | return 1;
|
---|
303 | return 0;
|
---|
304 | }
|
---|
305 |
|
---|
306 | static int setup_dp(X509 *x, DIST_POINT *dp)
|
---|
307 | {
|
---|
308 | X509_NAME *iname = NULL;
|
---|
309 | int i;
|
---|
310 |
|
---|
311 | if (dp->reasons) {
|
---|
312 | if (dp->reasons->length > 0)
|
---|
313 | dp->dp_reasons = dp->reasons->data[0];
|
---|
314 | if (dp->reasons->length > 1)
|
---|
315 | dp->dp_reasons |= (dp->reasons->data[1] << 8);
|
---|
316 | dp->dp_reasons &= CRLDP_ALL_REASONS;
|
---|
317 | } else
|
---|
318 | dp->dp_reasons = CRLDP_ALL_REASONS;
|
---|
319 | if (!dp->distpoint || (dp->distpoint->type != 1))
|
---|
320 | return 1;
|
---|
321 | for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp->CRLissuer); i++) {
|
---|
322 | GENERAL_NAME *gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp->CRLissuer, i);
|
---|
323 | if (gen->type == GEN_DIRNAME) {
|
---|
324 | iname = gen->d.directoryName;
|
---|
325 | break;
|
---|
326 | }
|
---|
327 | }
|
---|
328 | if (!iname)
|
---|
329 | iname = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
|
---|
330 |
|
---|
331 | return DIST_POINT_set_dpname(dp->distpoint, iname);
|
---|
332 | }
|
---|
333 |
|
---|
334 | static int setup_crldp(X509 *x)
|
---|
335 | {
|
---|
336 | int i;
|
---|
337 |
|
---|
338 | x->crldp = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_crl_distribution_points, &i, NULL);
|
---|
339 | if (x->crldp == NULL && i != -1)
|
---|
340 | return 0;
|
---|
341 | for (i = 0; i < sk_DIST_POINT_num(x->crldp); i++) {
|
---|
342 | if (!setup_dp(x, sk_DIST_POINT_value(x->crldp, i)))
|
---|
343 | return 0;
|
---|
344 | }
|
---|
345 | return 1;
|
---|
346 | }
|
---|
347 |
|
---|
348 | /* Check that issuer public key algorithm matches subject signature algorithm */
|
---|
349 | static int check_sig_alg_match(const EVP_PKEY *pkey, const X509 *subject)
|
---|
350 | {
|
---|
351 | int pkey_sig_nid, subj_sig_nid;
|
---|
352 |
|
---|
353 | if (pkey == NULL)
|
---|
354 | return X509_V_ERR_NO_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
|
---|
355 | if (OBJ_find_sigid_algs(EVP_PKEY_base_id(pkey),
|
---|
356 | NULL, &pkey_sig_nid) == 0)
|
---|
357 | pkey_sig_nid = EVP_PKEY_base_id(pkey);
|
---|
358 | if (OBJ_find_sigid_algs(OBJ_obj2nid(subject->cert_info.signature.algorithm),
|
---|
359 | NULL, &subj_sig_nid) == 0)
|
---|
360 | return X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM;
|
---|
361 | if (pkey_sig_nid != EVP_PKEY_type(subj_sig_nid))
|
---|
362 | return X509_V_ERR_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM_MISMATCH;
|
---|
363 | return X509_V_OK;
|
---|
364 | }
|
---|
365 |
|
---|
366 | #define V1_ROOT (EXFLAG_V1|EXFLAG_SS)
|
---|
367 | #define ku_reject(x, usage) \
|
---|
368 | (((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) && !((x)->ex_kusage & (usage)))
|
---|
369 | #define xku_reject(x, usage) \
|
---|
370 | (((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_XKUSAGE) && !((x)->ex_xkusage & (usage)))
|
---|
371 | #define ns_reject(x, usage) \
|
---|
372 | (((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_NSCERT) && !((x)->ex_nscert & (usage)))
|
---|
373 |
|
---|
374 | static void x509v3_cache_extensions(X509 *x)
|
---|
375 | {
|
---|
376 | BASIC_CONSTRAINTS *bs;
|
---|
377 | PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION *pci;
|
---|
378 | ASN1_BIT_STRING *usage;
|
---|
379 | ASN1_BIT_STRING *ns;
|
---|
380 | EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE *extusage;
|
---|
381 | X509_EXTENSION *ex;
|
---|
382 | int i;
|
---|
383 |
|
---|
384 | #ifdef tsan_ld_acq
|
---|
385 | /* fast lock-free check, see end of the function for details. */
|
---|
386 | if (tsan_ld_acq((TSAN_QUALIFIER int *)&x->ex_cached))
|
---|
387 | return;
|
---|
388 | #endif
|
---|
389 |
|
---|
390 | CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(x->lock);
|
---|
391 | if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SET) {
|
---|
392 | CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(x->lock);
|
---|
393 | return;
|
---|
394 | }
|
---|
395 |
|
---|
396 | if (!X509_digest(x, EVP_sha1(), x->sha1_hash, NULL))
|
---|
397 | x->ex_flags |= (EXFLAG_NO_FINGERPRINT | EXFLAG_INVALID);
|
---|
398 |
|
---|
399 | /* V1 should mean no extensions ... */
|
---|
400 | if (!X509_get_version(x))
|
---|
401 | x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_V1;
|
---|
402 | /* Handle basic constraints */
|
---|
403 | if ((bs = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_basic_constraints, &i, NULL))) {
|
---|
404 | if (bs->ca)
|
---|
405 | x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_CA;
|
---|
406 | if (bs->pathlen) {
|
---|
407 | if (bs->pathlen->type == V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER) {
|
---|
408 | x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
|
---|
409 | x->ex_pathlen = 0;
|
---|
410 | } else {
|
---|
411 | x->ex_pathlen = ASN1_INTEGER_get(bs->pathlen);
|
---|
412 | if (!bs->ca && x->ex_pathlen != 0) {
|
---|
413 | x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
|
---|
414 | x->ex_pathlen = 0;
|
---|
415 | }
|
---|
416 | }
|
---|
417 | } else
|
---|
418 | x->ex_pathlen = -1;
|
---|
419 | BASIC_CONSTRAINTS_free(bs);
|
---|
420 | x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_BCONS;
|
---|
421 | } else if (i != -1) {
|
---|
422 | x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
|
---|
423 | }
|
---|
424 | /* Handle proxy certificates */
|
---|
425 | if ((pci = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_proxyCertInfo, &i, NULL))) {
|
---|
426 | if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA
|
---|
427 | || X509_get_ext_by_NID(x, NID_subject_alt_name, -1) >= 0
|
---|
428 | || X509_get_ext_by_NID(x, NID_issuer_alt_name, -1) >= 0) {
|
---|
429 | x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
|
---|
430 | }
|
---|
431 | if (pci->pcPathLengthConstraint) {
|
---|
432 | x->ex_pcpathlen = ASN1_INTEGER_get(pci->pcPathLengthConstraint);
|
---|
433 | } else
|
---|
434 | x->ex_pcpathlen = -1;
|
---|
435 | PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION_free(pci);
|
---|
436 | x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_PROXY;
|
---|
437 | } else if (i != -1) {
|
---|
438 | x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
|
---|
439 | }
|
---|
440 | /* Handle key usage */
|
---|
441 | if ((usage = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_key_usage, &i, NULL))) {
|
---|
442 | if (usage->length > 0) {
|
---|
443 | x->ex_kusage = usage->data[0];
|
---|
444 | if (usage->length > 1)
|
---|
445 | x->ex_kusage |= usage->data[1] << 8;
|
---|
446 | } else
|
---|
447 | x->ex_kusage = 0;
|
---|
448 | x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_KUSAGE;
|
---|
449 | ASN1_BIT_STRING_free(usage);
|
---|
450 | } else if (i != -1) {
|
---|
451 | x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
|
---|
452 | }
|
---|
453 | x->ex_xkusage = 0;
|
---|
454 | if ((extusage = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_ext_key_usage, &i, NULL))) {
|
---|
455 | x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_XKUSAGE;
|
---|
456 | for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(extusage); i++) {
|
---|
457 | switch (OBJ_obj2nid(sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(extusage, i))) {
|
---|
458 | case NID_server_auth:
|
---|
459 | x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_SSL_SERVER;
|
---|
460 | break;
|
---|
461 |
|
---|
462 | case NID_client_auth:
|
---|
463 | x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_SSL_CLIENT;
|
---|
464 | break;
|
---|
465 |
|
---|
466 | case NID_email_protect:
|
---|
467 | x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_SMIME;
|
---|
468 | break;
|
---|
469 |
|
---|
470 | case NID_code_sign:
|
---|
471 | x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_CODE_SIGN;
|
---|
472 | break;
|
---|
473 |
|
---|
474 | case NID_ms_sgc:
|
---|
475 | case NID_ns_sgc:
|
---|
476 | x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_SGC;
|
---|
477 | break;
|
---|
478 |
|
---|
479 | case NID_OCSP_sign:
|
---|
480 | x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_OCSP_SIGN;
|
---|
481 | break;
|
---|
482 |
|
---|
483 | case NID_time_stamp:
|
---|
484 | x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_TIMESTAMP;
|
---|
485 | break;
|
---|
486 |
|
---|
487 | case NID_dvcs:
|
---|
488 | x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_DVCS;
|
---|
489 | break;
|
---|
490 |
|
---|
491 | case NID_anyExtendedKeyUsage:
|
---|
492 | x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_ANYEKU;
|
---|
493 | break;
|
---|
494 | }
|
---|
495 | }
|
---|
496 | sk_ASN1_OBJECT_pop_free(extusage, ASN1_OBJECT_free);
|
---|
497 | } else if (i != -1) {
|
---|
498 | x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
|
---|
499 | }
|
---|
500 |
|
---|
501 | if ((ns = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_netscape_cert_type, &i, NULL))) {
|
---|
502 | if (ns->length > 0)
|
---|
503 | x->ex_nscert = ns->data[0];
|
---|
504 | else
|
---|
505 | x->ex_nscert = 0;
|
---|
506 | x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_NSCERT;
|
---|
507 | ASN1_BIT_STRING_free(ns);
|
---|
508 | } else if (i != -1) {
|
---|
509 | x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
|
---|
510 | }
|
---|
511 | x->skid = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_subject_key_identifier, &i, NULL);
|
---|
512 | if (x->skid == NULL && i != -1)
|
---|
513 | x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
|
---|
514 | x->akid = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_authority_key_identifier, &i, NULL);
|
---|
515 | if (x->akid == NULL && i != -1)
|
---|
516 | x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
|
---|
517 | /* Does subject name match issuer ? */
|
---|
518 | if (!X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(x), X509_get_issuer_name(x))) {
|
---|
519 | x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_SI; /* cert is self-issued */
|
---|
520 | if (X509_check_akid(x, x->akid) == X509_V_OK /* SKID matches AKID */
|
---|
521 | /* .. and the signature alg matches the PUBKEY alg: */
|
---|
522 | && check_sig_alg_match(X509_get0_pubkey(x), x) == X509_V_OK)
|
---|
523 | x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_SS; /* indicate self-signed */
|
---|
524 | }
|
---|
525 | x->altname = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_subject_alt_name, &i, NULL);
|
---|
526 | if (x->altname == NULL && i != -1)
|
---|
527 | x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
|
---|
528 | x->nc = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_name_constraints, &i, NULL);
|
---|
529 | if (x->nc == NULL && i != -1)
|
---|
530 | x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
|
---|
531 | if (!setup_crldp(x))
|
---|
532 | x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
|
---|
533 |
|
---|
534 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779
|
---|
535 | x->rfc3779_addr = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_sbgp_ipAddrBlock, &i, NULL);
|
---|
536 | if (x->rfc3779_addr == NULL && i != -1)
|
---|
537 | x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
|
---|
538 | x->rfc3779_asid = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_sbgp_autonomousSysNum, &i, NULL);
|
---|
539 | if (x->rfc3779_asid == NULL && i != -1)
|
---|
540 | x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
|
---|
541 | #endif
|
---|
542 | for (i = 0; i < X509_get_ext_count(x); i++) {
|
---|
543 | ex = X509_get_ext(x, i);
|
---|
544 | if (OBJ_obj2nid(X509_EXTENSION_get_object(ex))
|
---|
545 | == NID_freshest_crl)
|
---|
546 | x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_FRESHEST;
|
---|
547 | if (!X509_EXTENSION_get_critical(ex))
|
---|
548 | continue;
|
---|
549 | if (!X509_supported_extension(ex)) {
|
---|
550 | x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_CRITICAL;
|
---|
551 | break;
|
---|
552 | }
|
---|
553 | }
|
---|
554 | x509_init_sig_info(x);
|
---|
555 | x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_SET;
|
---|
556 | #ifdef tsan_st_rel
|
---|
557 | tsan_st_rel((TSAN_QUALIFIER int *)&x->ex_cached, 1);
|
---|
558 | /*
|
---|
559 | * Above store triggers fast lock-free check in the beginning of the
|
---|
560 | * function. But one has to ensure that the structure is "stable", i.e.
|
---|
561 | * all stores are visible on all processors. Hence the release fence.
|
---|
562 | */
|
---|
563 | #endif
|
---|
564 | CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(x->lock);
|
---|
565 | }
|
---|
566 |
|
---|
567 | /*-
|
---|
568 | * CA checks common to all purposes
|
---|
569 | * return codes:
|
---|
570 | * 0 not a CA
|
---|
571 | * 1 is a CA
|
---|
572 | * 2 Only possible in older versions of openSSL when basicConstraints are absent
|
---|
573 | * new versions will not return this value. May be a CA
|
---|
574 | * 3 basicConstraints absent but self signed V1.
|
---|
575 | * 4 basicConstraints absent but keyUsage present and keyCertSign asserted.
|
---|
576 | * 5 Netscape specific CA Flags present
|
---|
577 | */
|
---|
578 |
|
---|
579 | static int check_ca(const X509 *x)
|
---|
580 | {
|
---|
581 | /* keyUsage if present should allow cert signing */
|
---|
582 | if (ku_reject(x, KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN))
|
---|
583 | return 0;
|
---|
584 | if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_BCONS) {
|
---|
585 | if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA)
|
---|
586 | return 1;
|
---|
587 | /* If basicConstraints says not a CA then say so */
|
---|
588 | else
|
---|
589 | return 0;
|
---|
590 | } else {
|
---|
591 | /* we support V1 roots for... uh, I don't really know why. */
|
---|
592 | if ((x->ex_flags & V1_ROOT) == V1_ROOT)
|
---|
593 | return 3;
|
---|
594 | /*
|
---|
595 | * If key usage present it must have certSign so tolerate it
|
---|
596 | */
|
---|
597 | else if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE)
|
---|
598 | return 4;
|
---|
599 | /* Older certificates could have Netscape-specific CA types */
|
---|
600 | else if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_NSCERT && x->ex_nscert & NS_ANY_CA)
|
---|
601 | return 5;
|
---|
602 | /* can this still be regarded a CA certificate? I doubt it */
|
---|
603 | return 0;
|
---|
604 | }
|
---|
605 | }
|
---|
606 |
|
---|
607 | void X509_set_proxy_flag(X509 *x)
|
---|
608 | {
|
---|
609 | x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_PROXY;
|
---|
610 | }
|
---|
611 |
|
---|
612 | void X509_set_proxy_pathlen(X509 *x, long l)
|
---|
613 | {
|
---|
614 | x->ex_pcpathlen = l;
|
---|
615 | }
|
---|
616 |
|
---|
617 | int X509_check_ca(X509 *x)
|
---|
618 | {
|
---|
619 | x509v3_cache_extensions(x);
|
---|
620 |
|
---|
621 | return check_ca(x);
|
---|
622 | }
|
---|
623 |
|
---|
624 | /* Check SSL CA: common checks for SSL client and server */
|
---|
625 | static int check_ssl_ca(const X509 *x)
|
---|
626 | {
|
---|
627 | int ca_ret;
|
---|
628 | ca_ret = check_ca(x);
|
---|
629 | if (!ca_ret)
|
---|
630 | return 0;
|
---|
631 | /* check nsCertType if present */
|
---|
632 | if (ca_ret != 5 || x->ex_nscert & NS_SSL_CA)
|
---|
633 | return ca_ret;
|
---|
634 | else
|
---|
635 | return 0;
|
---|
636 | }
|
---|
637 |
|
---|
638 | static int check_purpose_ssl_client(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
|
---|
639 | int ca)
|
---|
640 | {
|
---|
641 | if (xku_reject(x, XKU_SSL_CLIENT))
|
---|
642 | return 0;
|
---|
643 | if (ca)
|
---|
644 | return check_ssl_ca(x);
|
---|
645 | /* We need to do digital signatures or key agreement */
|
---|
646 | if (ku_reject(x, KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE | KU_KEY_AGREEMENT))
|
---|
647 | return 0;
|
---|
648 | /* nsCertType if present should allow SSL client use */
|
---|
649 | if (ns_reject(x, NS_SSL_CLIENT))
|
---|
650 | return 0;
|
---|
651 | return 1;
|
---|
652 | }
|
---|
653 |
|
---|
654 | /*
|
---|
655 | * Key usage needed for TLS/SSL server: digital signature, encipherment or
|
---|
656 | * key agreement. The ssl code can check this more thoroughly for individual
|
---|
657 | * key types.
|
---|
658 | */
|
---|
659 | #define KU_TLS \
|
---|
660 | KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE|KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT|KU_KEY_AGREEMENT
|
---|
661 |
|
---|
662 | static int check_purpose_ssl_server(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
|
---|
663 | int ca)
|
---|
664 | {
|
---|
665 | if (xku_reject(x, XKU_SSL_SERVER | XKU_SGC))
|
---|
666 | return 0;
|
---|
667 | if (ca)
|
---|
668 | return check_ssl_ca(x);
|
---|
669 |
|
---|
670 | if (ns_reject(x, NS_SSL_SERVER))
|
---|
671 | return 0;
|
---|
672 | if (ku_reject(x, KU_TLS))
|
---|
673 | return 0;
|
---|
674 |
|
---|
675 | return 1;
|
---|
676 |
|
---|
677 | }
|
---|
678 |
|
---|
679 | static int check_purpose_ns_ssl_server(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
|
---|
680 | int ca)
|
---|
681 | {
|
---|
682 | int ret;
|
---|
683 | ret = check_purpose_ssl_server(xp, x, ca);
|
---|
684 | if (!ret || ca)
|
---|
685 | return ret;
|
---|
686 | /* We need to encipher or Netscape complains */
|
---|
687 | if (ku_reject(x, KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT))
|
---|
688 | return 0;
|
---|
689 | return ret;
|
---|
690 | }
|
---|
691 |
|
---|
692 | /* common S/MIME checks */
|
---|
693 | static int purpose_smime(const X509 *x, int ca)
|
---|
694 | {
|
---|
695 | if (xku_reject(x, XKU_SMIME))
|
---|
696 | return 0;
|
---|
697 | if (ca) {
|
---|
698 | int ca_ret;
|
---|
699 | ca_ret = check_ca(x);
|
---|
700 | if (!ca_ret)
|
---|
701 | return 0;
|
---|
702 | /* check nsCertType if present */
|
---|
703 | if (ca_ret != 5 || x->ex_nscert & NS_SMIME_CA)
|
---|
704 | return ca_ret;
|
---|
705 | else
|
---|
706 | return 0;
|
---|
707 | }
|
---|
708 | if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_NSCERT) {
|
---|
709 | if (x->ex_nscert & NS_SMIME)
|
---|
710 | return 1;
|
---|
711 | /* Workaround for some buggy certificates */
|
---|
712 | if (x->ex_nscert & NS_SSL_CLIENT)
|
---|
713 | return 2;
|
---|
714 | return 0;
|
---|
715 | }
|
---|
716 | return 1;
|
---|
717 | }
|
---|
718 |
|
---|
719 | static int check_purpose_smime_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
|
---|
720 | int ca)
|
---|
721 | {
|
---|
722 | int ret;
|
---|
723 | ret = purpose_smime(x, ca);
|
---|
724 | if (!ret || ca)
|
---|
725 | return ret;
|
---|
726 | if (ku_reject(x, KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE | KU_NON_REPUDIATION))
|
---|
727 | return 0;
|
---|
728 | return ret;
|
---|
729 | }
|
---|
730 |
|
---|
731 | static int check_purpose_smime_encrypt(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
|
---|
732 | int ca)
|
---|
733 | {
|
---|
734 | int ret;
|
---|
735 | ret = purpose_smime(x, ca);
|
---|
736 | if (!ret || ca)
|
---|
737 | return ret;
|
---|
738 | if (ku_reject(x, KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT))
|
---|
739 | return 0;
|
---|
740 | return ret;
|
---|
741 | }
|
---|
742 |
|
---|
743 | static int check_purpose_crl_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
|
---|
744 | int ca)
|
---|
745 | {
|
---|
746 | if (ca) {
|
---|
747 | int ca_ret;
|
---|
748 | if ((ca_ret = check_ca(x)) != 2)
|
---|
749 | return ca_ret;
|
---|
750 | else
|
---|
751 | return 0;
|
---|
752 | }
|
---|
753 | if (ku_reject(x, KU_CRL_SIGN))
|
---|
754 | return 0;
|
---|
755 | return 1;
|
---|
756 | }
|
---|
757 |
|
---|
758 | /*
|
---|
759 | * OCSP helper: this is *not* a full OCSP check. It just checks that each CA
|
---|
760 | * is valid. Additional checks must be made on the chain.
|
---|
761 | */
|
---|
762 |
|
---|
763 | static int ocsp_helper(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca)
|
---|
764 | {
|
---|
765 | /*
|
---|
766 | * Must be a valid CA. Should we really support the "I don't know" value
|
---|
767 | * (2)?
|
---|
768 | */
|
---|
769 | if (ca)
|
---|
770 | return check_ca(x);
|
---|
771 | /* leaf certificate is checked in OCSP_verify() */
|
---|
772 | return 1;
|
---|
773 | }
|
---|
774 |
|
---|
775 | static int check_purpose_timestamp_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
|
---|
776 | int ca)
|
---|
777 | {
|
---|
778 | int i_ext;
|
---|
779 |
|
---|
780 | /* If ca is true we must return if this is a valid CA certificate. */
|
---|
781 | if (ca)
|
---|
782 | return check_ca(x);
|
---|
783 |
|
---|
784 | /*
|
---|
785 | * Check the optional key usage field:
|
---|
786 | * if Key Usage is present, it must be one of digitalSignature
|
---|
787 | * and/or nonRepudiation (other values are not consistent and shall
|
---|
788 | * be rejected).
|
---|
789 | */
|
---|
790 | if ((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE)
|
---|
791 | && ((x->ex_kusage & ~(KU_NON_REPUDIATION | KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE)) ||
|
---|
792 | !(x->ex_kusage & (KU_NON_REPUDIATION | KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE))))
|
---|
793 | return 0;
|
---|
794 |
|
---|
795 | /* Only time stamp key usage is permitted and it's required. */
|
---|
796 | if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_XKUSAGE) || x->ex_xkusage != XKU_TIMESTAMP)
|
---|
797 | return 0;
|
---|
798 |
|
---|
799 | /* Extended Key Usage MUST be critical */
|
---|
800 | i_ext = X509_get_ext_by_NID(x, NID_ext_key_usage, -1);
|
---|
801 | if (i_ext >= 0) {
|
---|
802 | X509_EXTENSION *ext = X509_get_ext((X509 *)x, i_ext);
|
---|
803 | if (!X509_EXTENSION_get_critical(ext))
|
---|
804 | return 0;
|
---|
805 | }
|
---|
806 |
|
---|
807 | return 1;
|
---|
808 | }
|
---|
809 |
|
---|
810 | static int no_check(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca)
|
---|
811 | {
|
---|
812 | return 1;
|
---|
813 | }
|
---|
814 |
|
---|
815 | /*-
|
---|
816 | * Check if certificate I<issuer> is allowed to issue certificate I<subject>
|
---|
817 | * according to the B<keyUsage> field of I<issuer> if present
|
---|
818 | * depending on any proxyCertInfo extension of I<subject>.
|
---|
819 | * Returns 0 for OK, or positive for reason for rejection
|
---|
820 | * where reason codes match those for X509_verify_cert().
|
---|
821 | */
|
---|
822 | int x509_signing_allowed(const X509 *issuer, const X509 *subject)
|
---|
823 | {
|
---|
824 | if (subject->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) {
|
---|
825 | if (ku_reject(issuer, KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE))
|
---|
826 | return X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE;
|
---|
827 | } else if (ku_reject(issuer, KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN))
|
---|
828 | return X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CERTSIGN;
|
---|
829 | return X509_V_OK;
|
---|
830 | }
|
---|
831 |
|
---|
832 | /*-
|
---|
833 | * Various checks to see if one certificate issued the second.
|
---|
834 | * This can be used to prune a set of possible issuer certificates
|
---|
835 | * which have been looked up using some simple method such as by
|
---|
836 | * subject name.
|
---|
837 | * These are:
|
---|
838 | * 1. Check issuer_name(subject) == subject_name(issuer)
|
---|
839 | * 2. If akid(subject) exists check it matches issuer
|
---|
840 | * 3. Check that issuer public key algorithm matches subject signature algorithm
|
---|
841 | * 4. If key_usage(issuer) exists check it supports certificate signing
|
---|
842 | * returns 0 for OK, positive for reason for mismatch, reasons match
|
---|
843 | * codes for X509_verify_cert()
|
---|
844 | */
|
---|
845 |
|
---|
846 | int X509_check_issued(X509 *issuer, X509 *subject)
|
---|
847 | {
|
---|
848 | int ret;
|
---|
849 |
|
---|
850 | if ((ret = x509_likely_issued(issuer, subject)) != X509_V_OK)
|
---|
851 | return ret;
|
---|
852 | return x509_signing_allowed(issuer, subject);
|
---|
853 | }
|
---|
854 |
|
---|
855 | /* do the checks 1., 2., and 3. as described above for X509_check_issued() */
|
---|
856 | int x509_likely_issued(X509 *issuer, X509 *subject)
|
---|
857 | {
|
---|
858 | if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(issuer),
|
---|
859 | X509_get_issuer_name(subject)))
|
---|
860 | return X509_V_ERR_SUBJECT_ISSUER_MISMATCH;
|
---|
861 |
|
---|
862 | x509v3_cache_extensions(issuer);
|
---|
863 | if (issuer->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID)
|
---|
864 | return X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED;
|
---|
865 | x509v3_cache_extensions(subject);
|
---|
866 | if (subject->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID)
|
---|
867 | return X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED;
|
---|
868 |
|
---|
869 | if (subject->akid) {
|
---|
870 | int ret = X509_check_akid(issuer, subject->akid);
|
---|
871 | if (ret != X509_V_OK)
|
---|
872 | return ret;
|
---|
873 | }
|
---|
874 |
|
---|
875 | /* check if the subject signature alg matches the issuer's PUBKEY alg */
|
---|
876 | return check_sig_alg_match(X509_get0_pubkey(issuer), subject);
|
---|
877 | }
|
---|
878 |
|
---|
879 | int X509_check_akid(X509 *issuer, AUTHORITY_KEYID *akid)
|
---|
880 | {
|
---|
881 |
|
---|
882 | if (!akid)
|
---|
883 | return X509_V_OK;
|
---|
884 |
|
---|
885 | /* Check key ids (if present) */
|
---|
886 | if (akid->keyid && issuer->skid &&
|
---|
887 | ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(akid->keyid, issuer->skid))
|
---|
888 | return X509_V_ERR_AKID_SKID_MISMATCH;
|
---|
889 | /* Check serial number */
|
---|
890 | if (akid->serial &&
|
---|
891 | ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(X509_get_serialNumber(issuer), akid->serial))
|
---|
892 | return X509_V_ERR_AKID_ISSUER_SERIAL_MISMATCH;
|
---|
893 | /* Check issuer name */
|
---|
894 | if (akid->issuer) {
|
---|
895 | /*
|
---|
896 | * Ugh, for some peculiar reason AKID includes SEQUENCE OF
|
---|
897 | * GeneralName. So look for a DirName. There may be more than one but
|
---|
898 | * we only take any notice of the first.
|
---|
899 | */
|
---|
900 | GENERAL_NAMES *gens;
|
---|
901 | GENERAL_NAME *gen;
|
---|
902 | X509_NAME *nm = NULL;
|
---|
903 | int i;
|
---|
904 | gens = akid->issuer;
|
---|
905 | for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++) {
|
---|
906 | gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i);
|
---|
907 | if (gen->type == GEN_DIRNAME) {
|
---|
908 | nm = gen->d.dirn;
|
---|
909 | break;
|
---|
910 | }
|
---|
911 | }
|
---|
912 | if (nm && X509_NAME_cmp(nm, X509_get_issuer_name(issuer)))
|
---|
913 | return X509_V_ERR_AKID_ISSUER_SERIAL_MISMATCH;
|
---|
914 | }
|
---|
915 | return X509_V_OK;
|
---|
916 | }
|
---|
917 |
|
---|
918 | uint32_t X509_get_extension_flags(X509 *x)
|
---|
919 | {
|
---|
920 | /* Call for side-effect of computing hash and caching extensions */
|
---|
921 | X509_check_purpose(x, -1, -1);
|
---|
922 | return x->ex_flags;
|
---|
923 | }
|
---|
924 |
|
---|
925 | uint32_t X509_get_key_usage(X509 *x)
|
---|
926 | {
|
---|
927 | /* Call for side-effect of computing hash and caching extensions */
|
---|
928 | if (X509_check_purpose(x, -1, -1) != 1)
|
---|
929 | return 0;
|
---|
930 | if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE)
|
---|
931 | return x->ex_kusage;
|
---|
932 | return UINT32_MAX;
|
---|
933 | }
|
---|
934 |
|
---|
935 | uint32_t X509_get_extended_key_usage(X509 *x)
|
---|
936 | {
|
---|
937 | /* Call for side-effect of computing hash and caching extensions */
|
---|
938 | if (X509_check_purpose(x, -1, -1) != 1)
|
---|
939 | return 0;
|
---|
940 | if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_XKUSAGE)
|
---|
941 | return x->ex_xkusage;
|
---|
942 | return UINT32_MAX;
|
---|
943 | }
|
---|
944 |
|
---|
945 | const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *X509_get0_subject_key_id(X509 *x)
|
---|
946 | {
|
---|
947 | /* Call for side-effect of computing hash and caching extensions */
|
---|
948 | if (X509_check_purpose(x, -1, -1) != 1)
|
---|
949 | return NULL;
|
---|
950 | return x->skid;
|
---|
951 | }
|
---|
952 |
|
---|
953 | const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *X509_get0_authority_key_id(X509 *x)
|
---|
954 | {
|
---|
955 | /* Call for side-effect of computing hash and caching extensions */
|
---|
956 | if (X509_check_purpose(x, -1, -1) != 1)
|
---|
957 | return NULL;
|
---|
958 | return (x->akid != NULL ? x->akid->keyid : NULL);
|
---|
959 | }
|
---|
960 |
|
---|
961 | const GENERAL_NAMES *X509_get0_authority_issuer(X509 *x)
|
---|
962 | {
|
---|
963 | /* Call for side-effect of computing hash and caching extensions */
|
---|
964 | if (X509_check_purpose(x, -1, -1) != 1)
|
---|
965 | return NULL;
|
---|
966 | return (x->akid != NULL ? x->akid->issuer : NULL);
|
---|
967 | }
|
---|
968 |
|
---|
969 | const ASN1_INTEGER *X509_get0_authority_serial(X509 *x)
|
---|
970 | {
|
---|
971 | /* Call for side-effect of computing hash and caching extensions */
|
---|
972 | if (X509_check_purpose(x, -1, -1) != 1)
|
---|
973 | return NULL;
|
---|
974 | return (x->akid != NULL ? x->akid->serial : NULL);
|
---|
975 | }
|
---|
976 |
|
---|
977 | long X509_get_pathlen(X509 *x)
|
---|
978 | {
|
---|
979 | /* Called for side effect of caching extensions */
|
---|
980 | if (X509_check_purpose(x, -1, -1) != 1
|
---|
981 | || (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_BCONS) == 0)
|
---|
982 | return -1;
|
---|
983 | return x->ex_pathlen;
|
---|
984 | }
|
---|
985 |
|
---|
986 | long X509_get_proxy_pathlen(X509 *x)
|
---|
987 | {
|
---|
988 | /* Called for side effect of caching extensions */
|
---|
989 | if (X509_check_purpose(x, -1, -1) != 1
|
---|
990 | || (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) == 0)
|
---|
991 | return -1;
|
---|
992 | return x->ex_pcpathlen;
|
---|
993 | }
|
---|