1 | =pod
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2 |
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3 | =head1 NAME
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4 |
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5 | des_modes - the variants of DES and other crypto algorithms of OpenSSL
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6 |
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7 | =head1 DESCRIPTION
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8 |
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9 | Several crypto algorithms for OpenSSL can be used in a number of modes. Those
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10 | are used for using block ciphers in a way similar to stream ciphers, among
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11 | other things.
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12 |
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13 | =head1 OVERVIEW
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14 |
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15 | =head2 Electronic Codebook Mode (ECB)
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16 |
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17 | Normally, this is found as the function I<algorithm>_ecb_encrypt().
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18 |
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19 | =over 2
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20 |
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21 | =item *
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22 |
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23 | 64 bits are enciphered at a time.
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24 |
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25 | =item *
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26 |
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27 | The order of the blocks can be rearranged without detection.
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28 |
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29 | =item *
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30 |
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31 | The same plaintext block always produces the same ciphertext block
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32 | (for the same key) making it vulnerable to a 'dictionary attack'.
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33 |
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34 | =item *
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35 |
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36 | An error will only affect one ciphertext block.
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37 |
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38 | =back
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39 |
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40 | =head2 Cipher Block Chaining Mode (CBC)
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41 |
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42 | Normally, this is found as the function I<algorithm>_cbc_encrypt().
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43 | Be aware that des_cbc_encrypt() is not really DES CBC (it does
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44 | not update the IV); use des_ncbc_encrypt() instead.
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45 |
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46 | =over 2
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47 |
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48 | =item *
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49 |
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50 | a multiple of 64 bits are enciphered at a time.
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51 |
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52 | =item *
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53 |
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54 | The CBC mode produces the same ciphertext whenever the same
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55 | plaintext is encrypted using the same key and starting variable.
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56 |
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57 | =item *
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58 |
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59 | The chaining operation makes the ciphertext blocks dependent on the
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60 | current and all preceding plaintext blocks and therefore blocks can not
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61 | be rearranged.
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62 |
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63 | =item *
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64 |
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65 | The use of different starting variables prevents the same plaintext
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66 | enciphering to the same ciphertext.
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67 |
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68 | =item *
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69 |
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70 | An error will affect the current and the following ciphertext blocks.
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71 |
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72 | =back
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73 |
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74 | =head2 Cipher Feedback Mode (CFB)
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75 |
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76 | Normally, this is found as the function I<algorithm>_cfb_encrypt().
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77 |
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78 | =over 2
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79 |
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80 | =item *
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81 |
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82 | a number of bits (j) <= 64 are enciphered at a time.
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83 |
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84 | =item *
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85 |
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86 | The CFB mode produces the same ciphertext whenever the same
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87 | plaintext is encrypted using the same key and starting variable.
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88 |
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89 | =item *
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90 |
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91 | The chaining operation makes the ciphertext variables dependent on the
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92 | current and all preceding variables and therefore j-bit variables are
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93 | chained together and can not be rearranged.
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94 |
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95 | =item *
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96 |
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97 | The use of different starting variables prevents the same plaintext
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98 | enciphering to the same ciphertext.
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99 |
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100 | =item *
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101 |
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102 | The strength of the CFB mode depends on the size of k (maximal if
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103 | j == k). In my implementation this is always the case.
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104 |
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105 | =item *
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106 |
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107 | Selection of a small value for j will require more cycles through
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108 | the encipherment algorithm per unit of plaintext and thus cause
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109 | greater processing overheads.
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110 |
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111 | =item *
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112 |
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113 | Only multiples of j bits can be enciphered.
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114 |
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115 | =item *
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116 |
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117 | An error will affect the current and the following ciphertext variables.
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118 |
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119 | =back
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120 |
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121 | =head2 Output Feedback Mode (OFB)
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122 |
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123 | Normally, this is found as the function I<algorithm>_ofb_encrypt().
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124 |
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125 | =over 2
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126 |
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127 | =item *
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128 |
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129 | a number of bits (j) <= 64 are enciphered at a time.
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130 |
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131 | =item *
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132 |
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133 | The OFB mode produces the same ciphertext whenever the same
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134 | plaintext enciphered using the same key and starting variable. More
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135 | over, in the OFB mode the same key stream is produced when the same
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136 | key and start variable are used. Consequently, for security reasons
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137 | a specific start variable should be used only once for a given key.
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138 |
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139 | =item *
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140 |
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141 | The absence of chaining makes the OFB more vulnerable to specific attacks.
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142 |
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143 | =item *
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144 |
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145 | The use of different start variables values prevents the same
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146 | plaintext enciphering to the same ciphertext, by producing different
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147 | key streams.
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148 |
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149 | =item *
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150 |
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151 | Selection of a small value for j will require more cycles through
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152 | the encipherment algorithm per unit of plaintext and thus cause
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153 | greater processing overheads.
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154 |
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155 | =item *
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156 |
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157 | Only multiples of j bits can be enciphered.
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158 |
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159 | =item *
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160 |
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161 | OFB mode of operation does not extend ciphertext errors in the
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162 | resultant plaintext output. Every bit error in the ciphertext causes
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163 | only one bit to be in error in the deciphered plaintext.
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164 |
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165 | =item *
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166 |
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167 | OFB mode is not self-synchronizing. If the two operation of
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168 | encipherment and decipherment get out of synchronism, the system needs
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169 | to be re-initialized.
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170 |
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171 | =item *
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172 |
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173 | Each re-initialization should use a value of the start variable
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174 | different from the start variable values used before with the same
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175 | key. The reason for this is that an identical bit stream would be
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176 | produced each time from the same parameters. This would be
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177 | susceptible to a 'known plaintext' attack.
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178 |
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179 | =back
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180 |
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181 | =head2 Triple ECB Mode
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182 |
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183 | Normally, this is found as the function I<algorithm>_ecb3_encrypt().
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184 |
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185 | =over 2
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186 |
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187 | =item *
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188 |
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189 | Encrypt with key1, decrypt with key2 and encrypt with key3 again.
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190 |
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191 | =item *
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192 |
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193 | As for ECB encryption but increases the key length to 168 bits.
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194 | There are theoretic attacks that can be used that make the effective
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195 | key length 112 bits, but this attack also requires 2^56 blocks of
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196 | memory, not very likely, even for the NSA.
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197 |
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198 | =item *
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199 |
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200 | If both keys are the same it is equivalent to encrypting once with
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201 | just one key.
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202 |
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203 | =item *
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204 |
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205 | If the first and last key are the same, the key length is 112 bits.
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206 | There are attacks that could reduce the effective key strength
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207 | to only slightly more than 56 bits, but these require a lot of memory.
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208 |
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209 | =item *
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210 |
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211 | If all 3 keys are the same, this is effectively the same as normal
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212 | ecb mode.
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213 |
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214 | =back
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215 |
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216 | =head2 Triple CBC Mode
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217 |
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218 | Normally, this is found as the function I<algorithm>_ede3_cbc_encrypt().
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219 |
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220 | =over 2
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221 |
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222 | =item *
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223 |
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224 | Encrypt with key1, decrypt with key2 and then encrypt with key3.
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225 |
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226 | =item *
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227 |
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228 | As for CBC encryption but increases the key length to 168 bits with
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229 | the same restrictions as for triple ecb mode.
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230 |
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231 | =back
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232 |
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233 | =head1 NOTES
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234 |
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235 | This text was been written in large parts by Eric Young in his original
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236 | documentation for SSLeay, the predecessor of OpenSSL. In turn, he attributed
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237 | it to:
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238 |
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239 | AS 2805.5.2
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240 | Australian Standard
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241 | Electronic funds transfer - Requirements for interfaces,
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242 | Part 5.2: Modes of operation for an n-bit block cipher algorithm
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243 | Appendix A
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244 |
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245 | =head1 SEE ALSO
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246 |
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247 | L<BF_encrypt(3)>, L<DES_crypt(3)>
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248 |
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249 | =head1 COPYRIGHT
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250 |
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251 | Copyright 2000-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
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252 |
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253 | Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
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254 | this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
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255 | in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
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256 | L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
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257 |
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258 | =cut
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