1 | /*
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2 | * Copyright 2019-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
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3 | * Copyright (c) 2019, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
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4 | *
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5 | * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
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6 | * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
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7 | * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
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8 | * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
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9 | */
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10 |
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11 | /*
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12 | * Refer to https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-56c/rev-1/final
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13 | * Section 4.1.
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14 | *
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15 | * The Single Step KDF algorithm is given by:
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16 | *
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17 | * Result(0) = empty bit string (i.e., the null string).
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18 | * For i = 1 to reps, do the following:
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19 | * Increment counter by 1.
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20 | * Result(i) = Result(i - 1) || H(counter || Z || FixedInfo).
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21 | * DKM = LeftmostBits(Result(reps), L))
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22 | *
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23 | * NOTES:
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24 | * Z is a shared secret required to produce the derived key material.
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25 | * counter is a 4 byte buffer.
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26 | * FixedInfo is a bit string containing context specific data.
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27 | * DKM is the output derived key material.
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28 | * L is the required size of the DKM.
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29 | * reps = [L / H_outputBits]
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30 | * H(x) is the auxiliary function that can be either a hash, HMAC or KMAC.
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31 | * H_outputBits is the length of the output of the auxiliary function H(x).
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32 | *
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33 | * Currently there is not a comprehensive list of test vectors for this
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34 | * algorithm, especially for H(x) = HMAC and H(x) = KMAC.
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35 | * Test vectors for H(x) = Hash are indirectly used by CAVS KAS tests.
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36 | */
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37 | #include <stdlib.h>
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38 | #include <stdarg.h>
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39 | #include <string.h>
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40 | #include <openssl/hmac.h>
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41 | #include <openssl/evp.h>
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42 | #include <openssl/kdf.h>
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43 | #include <openssl/core_names.h>
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44 | #include <openssl/params.h>
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45 | #include <openssl/proverr.h>
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46 | #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
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47 | #include "internal/numbers.h"
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48 | #include "crypto/evp.h"
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49 | #include "prov/provider_ctx.h"
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50 | #include "prov/providercommon.h"
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51 | #include "prov/implementations.h"
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52 | #include "prov/provider_util.h"
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53 |
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54 | typedef struct {
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55 | void *provctx;
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56 | EVP_MAC_CTX *macctx; /* H(x) = HMAC_hash OR H(x) = KMAC */
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57 | PROV_DIGEST digest; /* H(x) = hash(x) */
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58 | unsigned char *secret;
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59 | size_t secret_len;
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60 | unsigned char *info;
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61 | size_t info_len;
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62 | unsigned char *salt;
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63 | size_t salt_len;
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64 | size_t out_len; /* optional KMAC parameter */
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65 | } KDF_SSKDF;
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66 |
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67 | #define SSKDF_MAX_INLEN (1<<30)
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68 | #define SSKDF_KMAC128_DEFAULT_SALT_SIZE (168 - 4)
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69 | #define SSKDF_KMAC256_DEFAULT_SALT_SIZE (136 - 4)
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70 |
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71 | /* KMAC uses a Customisation string of 'KDF' */
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72 | static const unsigned char kmac_custom_str[] = { 0x4B, 0x44, 0x46 };
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73 |
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74 | static OSSL_FUNC_kdf_newctx_fn sskdf_new;
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75 | static OSSL_FUNC_kdf_freectx_fn sskdf_free;
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76 | static OSSL_FUNC_kdf_reset_fn sskdf_reset;
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77 | static OSSL_FUNC_kdf_derive_fn sskdf_derive;
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78 | static OSSL_FUNC_kdf_derive_fn x963kdf_derive;
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79 | static OSSL_FUNC_kdf_settable_ctx_params_fn sskdf_settable_ctx_params;
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80 | static OSSL_FUNC_kdf_set_ctx_params_fn sskdf_set_ctx_params;
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81 | static OSSL_FUNC_kdf_gettable_ctx_params_fn sskdf_gettable_ctx_params;
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82 | static OSSL_FUNC_kdf_get_ctx_params_fn sskdf_get_ctx_params;
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83 |
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84 | /*
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85 | * Refer to https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-56c/rev-1/final
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86 | * Section 4. One-Step Key Derivation using H(x) = hash(x)
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87 | * Note: X9.63 also uses this code with the only difference being that the
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88 | * counter is appended to the secret 'z'.
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89 | * i.e.
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90 | * result[i] = Hash(counter || z || info) for One Step OR
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91 | * result[i] = Hash(z || counter || info) for X9.63.
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92 | */
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93 | static int SSKDF_hash_kdm(const EVP_MD *kdf_md,
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94 | const unsigned char *z, size_t z_len,
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95 | const unsigned char *info, size_t info_len,
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96 | unsigned int append_ctr,
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97 | unsigned char *derived_key, size_t derived_key_len)
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98 | {
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99 | int ret = 0, hlen;
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100 | size_t counter, out_len, len = derived_key_len;
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101 | unsigned char c[4];
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102 | unsigned char mac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
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103 | unsigned char *out = derived_key;
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104 | EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = NULL, *ctx_init = NULL;
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105 |
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106 | if (z_len > SSKDF_MAX_INLEN || info_len > SSKDF_MAX_INLEN
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107 | || derived_key_len > SSKDF_MAX_INLEN
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108 | || derived_key_len == 0)
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109 | return 0;
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110 |
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111 | hlen = EVP_MD_get_size(kdf_md);
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112 | if (hlen <= 0)
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113 | return 0;
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114 | out_len = (size_t)hlen;
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115 |
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116 | ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
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117 | ctx_init = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
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118 | if (ctx == NULL || ctx_init == NULL)
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119 | goto end;
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120 |
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121 | if (!EVP_DigestInit(ctx_init, kdf_md))
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122 | goto end;
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123 |
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124 | for (counter = 1;; counter++) {
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125 | c[0] = (unsigned char)((counter >> 24) & 0xff);
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126 | c[1] = (unsigned char)((counter >> 16) & 0xff);
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127 | c[2] = (unsigned char)((counter >> 8) & 0xff);
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128 | c[3] = (unsigned char)(counter & 0xff);
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129 |
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130 | if (!(EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(ctx, ctx_init)
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131 | && (append_ctr || EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, c, sizeof(c)))
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132 | && EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, z, z_len)
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133 | && (!append_ctr || EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, c, sizeof(c)))
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134 | && EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, info, info_len)))
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135 | goto end;
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136 | if (len >= out_len) {
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137 | if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, out, NULL))
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138 | goto end;
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139 | out += out_len;
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140 | len -= out_len;
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141 | if (len == 0)
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142 | break;
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143 | } else {
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144 | if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, mac, NULL))
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145 | goto end;
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146 | memcpy(out, mac, len);
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147 | break;
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148 | }
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149 | }
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150 | ret = 1;
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151 | end:
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152 | EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(ctx);
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153 | EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(ctx_init);
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154 | OPENSSL_cleanse(mac, sizeof(mac));
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155 | return ret;
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156 | }
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157 |
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158 | static int kmac_init(EVP_MAC_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *custom,
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159 | size_t custom_len, size_t kmac_out_len,
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160 | size_t derived_key_len, unsigned char **out)
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161 | {
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162 | OSSL_PARAM params[2];
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163 |
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164 | /* Only KMAC has custom data - so return if not KMAC */
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165 | if (custom == NULL)
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166 | return 1;
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167 |
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168 | params[0] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_CUSTOM,
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169 | (void *)custom, custom_len);
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170 | params[1] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
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171 |
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172 | if (!EVP_MAC_CTX_set_params(ctx, params))
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173 | return 0;
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174 |
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175 | /* By default only do one iteration if kmac_out_len is not specified */
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176 | if (kmac_out_len == 0)
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177 | kmac_out_len = derived_key_len;
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178 | /* otherwise check the size is valid */
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179 | else if (!(kmac_out_len == derived_key_len
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180 | || kmac_out_len == 20
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181 | || kmac_out_len == 28
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182 | || kmac_out_len == 32
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183 | || kmac_out_len == 48
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184 | || kmac_out_len == 64))
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185 | return 0;
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186 |
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187 | params[0] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_size_t(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_SIZE,
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188 | &kmac_out_len);
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189 |
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190 | if (EVP_MAC_CTX_set_params(ctx, params) <= 0)
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191 | return 0;
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192 |
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193 | /*
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194 | * For kmac the output buffer can be larger than EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE: so
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195 | * alloc a buffer for this case.
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196 | */
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197 | if (kmac_out_len > EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE) {
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198 | *out = OPENSSL_zalloc(kmac_out_len);
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199 | if (*out == NULL)
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200 | return 0;
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201 | }
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202 | return 1;
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203 | }
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204 |
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205 | /*
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206 | * Refer to https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-56c/rev-1/final
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207 | * Section 4. One-Step Key Derivation using MAC: i.e either
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208 | * H(x) = HMAC-hash(salt, x) OR
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209 | * H(x) = KMAC#(salt, x, outbits, CustomString='KDF')
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210 | */
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211 | static int SSKDF_mac_kdm(EVP_MAC_CTX *ctx_init,
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212 | const unsigned char *kmac_custom,
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213 | size_t kmac_custom_len, size_t kmac_out_len,
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214 | const unsigned char *salt, size_t salt_len,
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215 | const unsigned char *z, size_t z_len,
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216 | const unsigned char *info, size_t info_len,
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217 | unsigned char *derived_key, size_t derived_key_len)
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218 | {
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219 | int ret = 0;
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220 | size_t counter, out_len, len;
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221 | unsigned char c[4];
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222 | unsigned char mac_buf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
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223 | unsigned char *out = derived_key;
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224 | EVP_MAC_CTX *ctx = NULL;
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225 | unsigned char *mac = mac_buf, *kmac_buffer = NULL;
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226 |
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227 | if (z_len > SSKDF_MAX_INLEN || info_len > SSKDF_MAX_INLEN
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228 | || derived_key_len > SSKDF_MAX_INLEN
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229 | || derived_key_len == 0)
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230 | return 0;
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231 |
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232 | if (!kmac_init(ctx_init, kmac_custom, kmac_custom_len, kmac_out_len,
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233 | derived_key_len, &kmac_buffer))
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234 | goto end;
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235 | if (kmac_buffer != NULL)
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236 | mac = kmac_buffer;
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237 |
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238 | if (!EVP_MAC_init(ctx_init, salt, salt_len, NULL))
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239 | goto end;
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240 |
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241 | out_len = EVP_MAC_CTX_get_mac_size(ctx_init); /* output size */
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242 | if (out_len <= 0 || (mac == mac_buf && out_len > sizeof(mac_buf)))
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243 | goto end;
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244 | len = derived_key_len;
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245 |
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246 | for (counter = 1;; counter++) {
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247 | c[0] = (unsigned char)((counter >> 24) & 0xff);
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248 | c[1] = (unsigned char)((counter >> 16) & 0xff);
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249 | c[2] = (unsigned char)((counter >> 8) & 0xff);
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250 | c[3] = (unsigned char)(counter & 0xff);
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251 |
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252 | ctx = EVP_MAC_CTX_dup(ctx_init);
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253 | if (!(ctx != NULL
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254 | && EVP_MAC_update(ctx, c, sizeof(c))
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255 | && EVP_MAC_update(ctx, z, z_len)
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256 | && EVP_MAC_update(ctx, info, info_len)))
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257 | goto end;
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258 | if (len >= out_len) {
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259 | if (!EVP_MAC_final(ctx, out, NULL, len))
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260 | goto end;
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261 | out += out_len;
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262 | len -= out_len;
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263 | if (len == 0)
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264 | break;
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265 | } else {
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266 | if (!EVP_MAC_final(ctx, mac, NULL, out_len))
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267 | goto end;
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268 | memcpy(out, mac, len);
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269 | break;
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270 | }
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271 | EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ctx);
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272 | ctx = NULL;
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273 | }
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274 | ret = 1;
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275 | end:
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276 | if (kmac_buffer != NULL)
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277 | OPENSSL_clear_free(kmac_buffer, kmac_out_len);
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278 | else
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279 | OPENSSL_cleanse(mac_buf, sizeof(mac_buf));
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280 |
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281 | EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ctx);
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282 | return ret;
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283 | }
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284 |
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285 | static void *sskdf_new(void *provctx)
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286 | {
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287 | KDF_SSKDF *ctx;
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288 |
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289 | if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
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290 | return NULL;
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291 |
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292 | if ((ctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ctx))) == NULL)
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293 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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294 | ctx->provctx = provctx;
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295 | return ctx;
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296 | }
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297 |
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298 | static void sskdf_reset(void *vctx)
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299 | {
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300 | KDF_SSKDF *ctx = (KDF_SSKDF *)vctx;
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301 | void *provctx = ctx->provctx;
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302 |
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303 | EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ctx->macctx);
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304 | ossl_prov_digest_reset(&ctx->digest);
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305 | OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->secret, ctx->secret_len);
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306 | OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->info, ctx->info_len);
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307 | OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->salt, ctx->salt_len);
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308 | memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
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309 | ctx->provctx = provctx;
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310 | }
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311 |
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312 | static void sskdf_free(void *vctx)
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313 | {
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314 | KDF_SSKDF *ctx = (KDF_SSKDF *)vctx;
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315 |
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316 | if (ctx != NULL) {
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317 | sskdf_reset(ctx);
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318 | OPENSSL_free(ctx);
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319 | }
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320 | }
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321 |
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322 | static int sskdf_set_buffer(unsigned char **out, size_t *out_len,
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323 | const OSSL_PARAM *p)
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324 | {
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325 | if (p->data == NULL || p->data_size == 0)
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326 | return 1;
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327 | OPENSSL_free(*out);
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328 | *out = NULL;
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329 | return OSSL_PARAM_get_octet_string(p, (void **)out, 0, out_len);
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330 | }
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331 |
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332 | static size_t sskdf_size(KDF_SSKDF *ctx)
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333 | {
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334 | int len;
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335 | const EVP_MD *md = ossl_prov_digest_md(&ctx->digest);
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336 |
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337 | if (md == NULL) {
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338 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_MESSAGE_DIGEST);
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339 | return 0;
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340 | }
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341 | len = EVP_MD_get_size(md);
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342 | return (len <= 0) ? 0 : (size_t)len;
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343 | }
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344 |
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345 | static int sskdf_derive(void *vctx, unsigned char *key, size_t keylen,
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346 | const OSSL_PARAM params[])
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347 | {
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348 | KDF_SSKDF *ctx = (KDF_SSKDF *)vctx;
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349 | const EVP_MD *md;
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350 |
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351 | if (!ossl_prov_is_running() || !sskdf_set_ctx_params(ctx, params))
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352 | return 0;
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353 | if (ctx->secret == NULL) {
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354 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_SECRET);
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355 | return 0;
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356 | }
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357 | md = ossl_prov_digest_md(&ctx->digest);
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358 |
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359 | if (ctx->macctx != NULL) {
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360 | /* H(x) = KMAC or H(x) = HMAC */
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361 | int ret;
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362 | const unsigned char *custom = NULL;
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363 | size_t custom_len = 0;
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364 | int default_salt_len;
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365 | EVP_MAC *mac = EVP_MAC_CTX_get0_mac(ctx->macctx);
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366 |
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367 | if (EVP_MAC_is_a(mac, OSSL_MAC_NAME_HMAC)) {
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368 | /* H(x) = HMAC(x, salt, hash) */
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369 | if (md == NULL) {
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370 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_MESSAGE_DIGEST);
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371 | return 0;
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372 | }
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373 | default_salt_len = EVP_MD_get_size(md);
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374 | if (default_salt_len <= 0)
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375 | return 0;
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376 | } else if (EVP_MAC_is_a(mac, OSSL_MAC_NAME_KMAC128)
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377 | || EVP_MAC_is_a(mac, OSSL_MAC_NAME_KMAC256)) {
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378 | /* H(x) = KMACzzz(x, salt, custom) */
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379 | custom = kmac_custom_str;
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380 | custom_len = sizeof(kmac_custom_str);
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381 | if (EVP_MAC_is_a(mac, OSSL_MAC_NAME_KMAC128))
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382 | default_salt_len = SSKDF_KMAC128_DEFAULT_SALT_SIZE;
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383 | else
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384 | default_salt_len = SSKDF_KMAC256_DEFAULT_SALT_SIZE;
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385 | } else {
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386 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_UNSUPPORTED_MAC_TYPE);
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387 | return 0;
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388 | }
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389 | /* If no salt is set then use a default_salt of zeros */
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390 | if (ctx->salt == NULL || ctx->salt_len <= 0) {
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391 | ctx->salt = OPENSSL_zalloc(default_salt_len);
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392 | if (ctx->salt == NULL) {
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393 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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394 | return 0;
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395 | }
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396 | ctx->salt_len = default_salt_len;
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397 | }
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398 | ret = SSKDF_mac_kdm(ctx->macctx,
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399 | custom, custom_len, ctx->out_len,
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400 | ctx->salt, ctx->salt_len,
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401 | ctx->secret, ctx->secret_len,
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402 | ctx->info, ctx->info_len, key, keylen);
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403 | return ret;
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404 | } else {
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405 | /* H(x) = hash */
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406 | if (md == NULL) {
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407 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_MESSAGE_DIGEST);
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408 | return 0;
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409 | }
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410 | return SSKDF_hash_kdm(md, ctx->secret, ctx->secret_len,
|
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411 | ctx->info, ctx->info_len, 0, key, keylen);
|
---|
412 | }
|
---|
413 | }
|
---|
414 |
|
---|
415 | static int x963kdf_derive(void *vctx, unsigned char *key, size_t keylen,
|
---|
416 | const OSSL_PARAM params[])
|
---|
417 | {
|
---|
418 | KDF_SSKDF *ctx = (KDF_SSKDF *)vctx;
|
---|
419 | const EVP_MD *md;
|
---|
420 |
|
---|
421 | if (!ossl_prov_is_running() || !sskdf_set_ctx_params(ctx, params))
|
---|
422 | return 0;
|
---|
423 |
|
---|
424 | if (ctx->secret == NULL) {
|
---|
425 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_SECRET);
|
---|
426 | return 0;
|
---|
427 | }
|
---|
428 |
|
---|
429 | if (ctx->macctx != NULL) {
|
---|
430 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_NOT_SUPPORTED);
|
---|
431 | return 0;
|
---|
432 | }
|
---|
433 |
|
---|
434 | /* H(x) = hash */
|
---|
435 | md = ossl_prov_digest_md(&ctx->digest);
|
---|
436 | if (md == NULL) {
|
---|
437 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_MESSAGE_DIGEST);
|
---|
438 | return 0;
|
---|
439 | }
|
---|
440 |
|
---|
441 | return SSKDF_hash_kdm(md, ctx->secret, ctx->secret_len,
|
---|
442 | ctx->info, ctx->info_len, 1, key, keylen);
|
---|
443 | }
|
---|
444 |
|
---|
445 | static int sskdf_set_ctx_params(void *vctx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
|
---|
446 | {
|
---|
447 | const OSSL_PARAM *p;
|
---|
448 | KDF_SSKDF *ctx = vctx;
|
---|
449 | OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx = PROV_LIBCTX_OF(ctx->provctx);
|
---|
450 | size_t sz;
|
---|
451 |
|
---|
452 | if (params == NULL)
|
---|
453 | return 1;
|
---|
454 |
|
---|
455 | if (!ossl_prov_digest_load_from_params(&ctx->digest, params, libctx))
|
---|
456 | return 0;
|
---|
457 |
|
---|
458 | if (!ossl_prov_macctx_load_from_params(&ctx->macctx, params,
|
---|
459 | NULL, NULL, NULL, libctx))
|
---|
460 | return 0;
|
---|
461 |
|
---|
462 | if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SECRET)) != NULL
|
---|
463 | || (p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_KEY)) != NULL)
|
---|
464 | if (!sskdf_set_buffer(&ctx->secret, &ctx->secret_len, p))
|
---|
465 | return 0;
|
---|
466 |
|
---|
467 | if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_INFO)) != NULL)
|
---|
468 | if (!sskdf_set_buffer(&ctx->info, &ctx->info_len, p))
|
---|
469 | return 0;
|
---|
470 |
|
---|
471 | if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SALT)) != NULL)
|
---|
472 | if (!sskdf_set_buffer(&ctx->salt, &ctx->salt_len, p))
|
---|
473 | return 0;
|
---|
474 |
|
---|
475 | if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_MAC_SIZE))
|
---|
476 | != NULL) {
|
---|
477 | if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_size_t(p, &sz) || sz == 0)
|
---|
478 | return 0;
|
---|
479 | ctx->out_len = sz;
|
---|
480 | }
|
---|
481 | return 1;
|
---|
482 | }
|
---|
483 |
|
---|
484 | static const OSSL_PARAM *sskdf_settable_ctx_params(ossl_unused void *ctx,
|
---|
485 | ossl_unused void *provctx)
|
---|
486 | {
|
---|
487 | static const OSSL_PARAM known_settable_ctx_params[] = {
|
---|
488 | OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SECRET, NULL, 0),
|
---|
489 | OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_KEY, NULL, 0),
|
---|
490 | OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_INFO, NULL, 0),
|
---|
491 | OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_PROPERTIES, NULL, 0),
|
---|
492 | OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_DIGEST, NULL, 0),
|
---|
493 | OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_MAC, NULL, 0),
|
---|
494 | OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SALT, NULL, 0),
|
---|
495 | OSSL_PARAM_size_t(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_MAC_SIZE, NULL),
|
---|
496 | OSSL_PARAM_END
|
---|
497 | };
|
---|
498 | return known_settable_ctx_params;
|
---|
499 | }
|
---|
500 |
|
---|
501 | static int sskdf_get_ctx_params(void *vctx, OSSL_PARAM params[])
|
---|
502 | {
|
---|
503 | KDF_SSKDF *ctx = (KDF_SSKDF *)vctx;
|
---|
504 | OSSL_PARAM *p;
|
---|
505 |
|
---|
506 | if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE)) != NULL)
|
---|
507 | return OSSL_PARAM_set_size_t(p, sskdf_size(ctx));
|
---|
508 | return -2;
|
---|
509 | }
|
---|
510 |
|
---|
511 | static const OSSL_PARAM *sskdf_gettable_ctx_params(ossl_unused void *ctx,
|
---|
512 | ossl_unused void *provctx)
|
---|
513 | {
|
---|
514 | static const OSSL_PARAM known_gettable_ctx_params[] = {
|
---|
515 | OSSL_PARAM_size_t(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE, NULL),
|
---|
516 | OSSL_PARAM_END
|
---|
517 | };
|
---|
518 | return known_gettable_ctx_params;
|
---|
519 | }
|
---|
520 |
|
---|
521 | const OSSL_DISPATCH ossl_kdf_sskdf_functions[] = {
|
---|
522 | { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_NEWCTX, (void(*)(void))sskdf_new },
|
---|
523 | { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_FREECTX, (void(*)(void))sskdf_free },
|
---|
524 | { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_RESET, (void(*)(void))sskdf_reset },
|
---|
525 | { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_DERIVE, (void(*)(void))sskdf_derive },
|
---|
526 | { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_SETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS,
|
---|
527 | (void(*)(void))sskdf_settable_ctx_params },
|
---|
528 | { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_SET_CTX_PARAMS, (void(*)(void))sskdf_set_ctx_params },
|
---|
529 | { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_GETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS,
|
---|
530 | (void(*)(void))sskdf_gettable_ctx_params },
|
---|
531 | { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_GET_CTX_PARAMS, (void(*)(void))sskdf_get_ctx_params },
|
---|
532 | { 0, NULL }
|
---|
533 | };
|
---|
534 |
|
---|
535 | const OSSL_DISPATCH ossl_kdf_x963_kdf_functions[] = {
|
---|
536 | { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_NEWCTX, (void(*)(void))sskdf_new },
|
---|
537 | { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_FREECTX, (void(*)(void))sskdf_free },
|
---|
538 | { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_RESET, (void(*)(void))sskdf_reset },
|
---|
539 | { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_DERIVE, (void(*)(void))x963kdf_derive },
|
---|
540 | { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_SETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS,
|
---|
541 | (void(*)(void))sskdf_settable_ctx_params },
|
---|
542 | { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_SET_CTX_PARAMS, (void(*)(void))sskdf_set_ctx_params },
|
---|
543 | { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_GETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS,
|
---|
544 | (void(*)(void))sskdf_gettable_ctx_params },
|
---|
545 | { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_GET_CTX_PARAMS, (void(*)(void))sskdf_get_ctx_params },
|
---|
546 | { 0, NULL }
|
---|
547 | };
|
---|