1 | /*
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2 | * Copyright 1995-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
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3 | *
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4 | * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
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5 | * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
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6 | * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
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7 | * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
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8 | */
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9 |
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10 | /*
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11 | * DSA low level APIs are deprecated for public use, but still ok for
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12 | * internal use.
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13 | */
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14 | #include "internal/deprecated.h"
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15 |
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16 | #include <stdio.h>
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17 | #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
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18 | #include "crypto/bn.h"
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19 | #include <openssl/bn.h>
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20 | #include <openssl/sha.h>
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21 | #include "dsa_local.h"
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22 | #include <openssl/asn1.h>
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23 |
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24 | static DSA_SIG *dsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, DSA *dsa);
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25 | static int dsa_sign_setup_no_digest(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp,
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26 | BIGNUM **rp);
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27 | static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp,
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28 | BIGNUM **rp, const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen);
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29 | static int dsa_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len,
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30 | DSA_SIG *sig, DSA *dsa);
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31 | static int dsa_init(DSA *dsa);
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32 | static int dsa_finish(DSA *dsa);
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33 | static BIGNUM *dsa_mod_inverse_fermat(const BIGNUM *k, const BIGNUM *q,
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34 | BN_CTX *ctx);
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35 |
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36 | static DSA_METHOD openssl_dsa_meth = {
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37 | "OpenSSL DSA method",
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38 | dsa_do_sign,
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39 | dsa_sign_setup_no_digest,
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40 | dsa_do_verify,
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41 | NULL, /* dsa_mod_exp, */
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42 | NULL, /* dsa_bn_mod_exp, */
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43 | dsa_init,
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44 | dsa_finish,
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45 | DSA_FLAG_FIPS_METHOD,
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46 | NULL,
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47 | NULL,
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48 | NULL
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49 | };
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50 |
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51 | static const DSA_METHOD *default_DSA_method = &openssl_dsa_meth;
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52 |
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53 | #ifndef FIPS_MODULE
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54 | void DSA_set_default_method(const DSA_METHOD *meth)
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55 | {
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56 | default_DSA_method = meth;
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57 | }
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58 | #endif /* FIPS_MODULE */
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59 |
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60 | const DSA_METHOD *DSA_get_default_method(void)
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61 | {
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62 | return default_DSA_method;
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63 | }
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64 |
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65 | const DSA_METHOD *DSA_OpenSSL(void)
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66 | {
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67 | return &openssl_dsa_meth;
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68 | }
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69 |
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70 | DSA_SIG *ossl_dsa_do_sign_int(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, DSA *dsa)
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71 | {
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72 | BIGNUM *kinv = NULL;
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73 | BIGNUM *m, *blind, *blindm, *tmp;
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74 | BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
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75 | int reason = ERR_R_BN_LIB;
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76 | DSA_SIG *ret = NULL;
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77 | int rv = 0;
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78 |
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79 | if (dsa->params.p == NULL
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80 | || dsa->params.q == NULL
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81 | || dsa->params.g == NULL) {
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82 | reason = DSA_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS;
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83 | goto err;
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84 | }
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85 | if (dsa->priv_key == NULL) {
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86 | reason = DSA_R_MISSING_PRIVATE_KEY;
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87 | goto err;
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88 | }
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89 |
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90 | ret = DSA_SIG_new();
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91 | if (ret == NULL)
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92 | goto err;
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93 | ret->r = BN_new();
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94 | ret->s = BN_new();
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95 | if (ret->r == NULL || ret->s == NULL)
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96 | goto err;
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97 |
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98 | ctx = BN_CTX_new_ex(dsa->libctx);
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99 | if (ctx == NULL)
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100 | goto err;
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101 | m = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
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102 | blind = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
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103 | blindm = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
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104 | tmp = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
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105 | if (tmp == NULL)
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106 | goto err;
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107 |
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108 | redo:
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109 | if (!dsa_sign_setup(dsa, ctx, &kinv, &ret->r, dgst, dlen))
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110 | goto err;
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111 |
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112 | if (dlen > BN_num_bytes(dsa->params.q))
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113 | /*
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114 | * if the digest length is greater than the size of q use the
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115 | * BN_num_bits(dsa->q) leftmost bits of the digest, see fips 186-3,
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116 | * 4.2
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117 | */
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118 | dlen = BN_num_bytes(dsa->params.q);
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119 | if (BN_bin2bn(dgst, dlen, m) == NULL)
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120 | goto err;
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121 |
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122 | /*
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123 | * The normal signature calculation is:
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124 | *
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125 | * s := k^-1 * (m + r * priv_key) mod q
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126 | *
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127 | * We will blind this to protect against side channel attacks
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128 | *
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129 | * s := blind^-1 * k^-1 * (blind * m + blind * r * priv_key) mod q
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130 | */
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131 |
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132 | /* Generate a blinding value */
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133 | do {
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134 | if (!BN_priv_rand_ex(blind, BN_num_bits(dsa->params.q) - 1,
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135 | BN_RAND_TOP_ANY, BN_RAND_BOTTOM_ANY, 0, ctx))
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136 | goto err;
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137 | } while (BN_is_zero(blind));
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138 | BN_set_flags(blind, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
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139 | BN_set_flags(blindm, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
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140 | BN_set_flags(tmp, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
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141 |
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142 | /* tmp := blind * priv_key * r mod q */
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143 | if (!BN_mod_mul(tmp, blind, dsa->priv_key, dsa->params.q, ctx))
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144 | goto err;
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145 | if (!BN_mod_mul(tmp, tmp, ret->r, dsa->params.q, ctx))
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146 | goto err;
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147 |
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148 | /* blindm := blind * m mod q */
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149 | if (!BN_mod_mul(blindm, blind, m, dsa->params.q, ctx))
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150 | goto err;
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151 |
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152 | /* s : = (blind * priv_key * r) + (blind * m) mod q */
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153 | if (!BN_mod_add_quick(ret->s, tmp, blindm, dsa->params.q))
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154 | goto err;
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155 |
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156 | /* s := s * k^-1 mod q */
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157 | if (!BN_mod_mul(ret->s, ret->s, kinv, dsa->params.q, ctx))
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158 | goto err;
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159 |
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160 | /* s:= s * blind^-1 mod q */
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161 | if (BN_mod_inverse(blind, blind, dsa->params.q, ctx) == NULL)
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162 | goto err;
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163 | if (!BN_mod_mul(ret->s, ret->s, blind, dsa->params.q, ctx))
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164 | goto err;
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165 |
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166 | /*
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167 | * Redo if r or s is zero as required by FIPS 186-3: this is very
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168 | * unlikely.
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169 | */
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170 | if (BN_is_zero(ret->r) || BN_is_zero(ret->s))
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171 | goto redo;
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172 |
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173 | rv = 1;
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174 |
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175 | err:
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176 | if (rv == 0) {
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177 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DSA, reason);
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178 | DSA_SIG_free(ret);
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179 | ret = NULL;
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180 | }
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181 | BN_CTX_free(ctx);
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182 | BN_clear_free(kinv);
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183 | return ret;
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184 | }
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185 |
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186 | static DSA_SIG *dsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, DSA *dsa)
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187 | {
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188 | return ossl_dsa_do_sign_int(dgst, dlen, dsa);
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189 | }
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190 |
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191 | static int dsa_sign_setup_no_digest(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in,
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192 | BIGNUM **kinvp, BIGNUM **rp)
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193 | {
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194 | return dsa_sign_setup(dsa, ctx_in, kinvp, rp, NULL, 0);
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195 | }
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196 |
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197 | static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in,
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198 | BIGNUM **kinvp, BIGNUM **rp,
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199 | const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen)
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200 | {
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201 | BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
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202 | BIGNUM *k, *kinv = NULL, *r = *rp;
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203 | BIGNUM *l;
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204 | int ret = 0;
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205 | int q_bits, q_words;
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206 |
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207 | if (!dsa->params.p || !dsa->params.q || !dsa->params.g) {
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208 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DSA, DSA_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS);
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209 | return 0;
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210 | }
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211 |
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212 | /* Reject obviously invalid parameters */
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213 | if (BN_is_zero(dsa->params.p)
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214 | || BN_is_zero(dsa->params.q)
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215 | || BN_is_zero(dsa->params.g)) {
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216 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DSA, DSA_R_INVALID_PARAMETERS);
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217 | return 0;
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218 | }
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219 | if (dsa->priv_key == NULL) {
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220 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DSA, DSA_R_MISSING_PRIVATE_KEY);
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221 | return 0;
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222 | }
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223 |
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224 | k = BN_new();
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225 | l = BN_new();
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226 | if (k == NULL || l == NULL)
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227 | goto err;
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228 |
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229 | if (ctx_in == NULL) {
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230 | /* if you don't pass in ctx_in you get a default libctx */
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231 | if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new_ex(NULL)) == NULL)
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232 | goto err;
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233 | } else
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234 | ctx = ctx_in;
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235 |
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236 | /* Preallocate space */
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237 | q_bits = BN_num_bits(dsa->params.q);
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238 | q_words = bn_get_top(dsa->params.q);
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239 | if (!bn_wexpand(k, q_words + 2)
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240 | || !bn_wexpand(l, q_words + 2))
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241 | goto err;
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242 |
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243 | /* Get random k */
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244 | do {
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245 | if (dgst != NULL) {
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246 | /*
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247 | * We calculate k from SHA512(private_key + H(message) + random).
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248 | * This protects the private key from a weak PRNG.
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249 | */
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250 | if (!BN_generate_dsa_nonce(k, dsa->params.q, dsa->priv_key, dgst,
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251 | dlen, ctx))
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252 | goto err;
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253 | } else if (!BN_priv_rand_range_ex(k, dsa->params.q, 0, ctx))
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254 | goto err;
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255 | } while (BN_is_zero(k));
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256 |
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257 | BN_set_flags(k, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
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258 | BN_set_flags(l, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
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259 |
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260 | if (dsa->flags & DSA_FLAG_CACHE_MONT_P) {
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261 | if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&dsa->method_mont_p,
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262 | dsa->lock, dsa->params.p, ctx))
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263 | goto err;
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264 | }
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265 |
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266 | /* Compute r = (g^k mod p) mod q */
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267 |
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268 | /*
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269 | * We do not want timing information to leak the length of k, so we
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270 | * compute G^k using an equivalent scalar of fixed bit-length.
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271 | *
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272 | * We unconditionally perform both of these additions to prevent a
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273 | * small timing information leakage. We then choose the sum that is
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274 | * one bit longer than the modulus.
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275 | *
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276 | * There are some concerns about the efficacy of doing this. More
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277 | * specifically refer to the discussion starting with:
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278 | * https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7486#discussion_r228323705
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279 | * The fix is to rework BN so these gymnastics aren't required.
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280 | */
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281 | if (!BN_add(l, k, dsa->params.q)
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282 | || !BN_add(k, l, dsa->params.q))
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283 | goto err;
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284 |
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285 | BN_consttime_swap(BN_is_bit_set(l, q_bits), k, l, q_words + 2);
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286 |
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287 | if ((dsa)->meth->bn_mod_exp != NULL) {
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288 | if (!dsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(dsa, r, dsa->params.g, k, dsa->params.p,
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289 | ctx, dsa->method_mont_p))
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290 | goto err;
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291 | } else {
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292 | if (!BN_mod_exp_mont(r, dsa->params.g, k, dsa->params.p, ctx,
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293 | dsa->method_mont_p))
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294 | goto err;
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295 | }
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296 |
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297 | if (!BN_mod(r, r, dsa->params.q, ctx))
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298 | goto err;
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299 |
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300 | /* Compute part of 's = inv(k) (m + xr) mod q' */
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301 | if ((kinv = dsa_mod_inverse_fermat(k, dsa->params.q, ctx)) == NULL)
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302 | goto err;
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303 |
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304 | BN_clear_free(*kinvp);
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305 | *kinvp = kinv;
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306 | kinv = NULL;
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307 | ret = 1;
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308 | err:
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309 | if (!ret)
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310 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DSA, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
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311 | if (ctx != ctx_in)
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312 | BN_CTX_free(ctx);
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313 | BN_clear_free(k);
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314 | BN_clear_free(l);
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315 | return ret;
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316 | }
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317 |
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318 | static int dsa_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len,
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319 | DSA_SIG *sig, DSA *dsa)
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320 | {
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321 | BN_CTX *ctx;
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322 | BIGNUM *u1, *u2, *t1;
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323 | BN_MONT_CTX *mont = NULL;
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324 | const BIGNUM *r, *s;
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325 | int ret = -1, i;
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326 |
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327 | if (dsa->params.p == NULL
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328 | || dsa->params.q == NULL
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329 | || dsa->params.g == NULL) {
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330 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DSA, DSA_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS);
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331 | return -1;
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332 | }
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333 |
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334 | i = BN_num_bits(dsa->params.q);
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335 | /* fips 186-3 allows only different sizes for q */
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336 | if (i != 160 && i != 224 && i != 256) {
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337 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DSA, DSA_R_BAD_Q_VALUE);
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338 | return -1;
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339 | }
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340 |
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341 | if (BN_num_bits(dsa->params.p) > OPENSSL_DSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
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342 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DSA, DSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
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343 | return -1;
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344 | }
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345 | u1 = BN_new();
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346 | u2 = BN_new();
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347 | t1 = BN_new();
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348 | ctx = BN_CTX_new_ex(NULL); /* verify does not need a libctx */
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349 | if (u1 == NULL || u2 == NULL || t1 == NULL || ctx == NULL)
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350 | goto err;
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351 |
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352 | DSA_SIG_get0(sig, &r, &s);
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353 |
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354 | if (BN_is_zero(r) || BN_is_negative(r) ||
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355 | BN_ucmp(r, dsa->params.q) >= 0) {
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356 | ret = 0;
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357 | goto err;
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358 | }
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359 | if (BN_is_zero(s) || BN_is_negative(s) ||
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360 | BN_ucmp(s, dsa->params.q) >= 0) {
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361 | ret = 0;
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362 | goto err;
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363 | }
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364 |
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365 | /*
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366 | * Calculate W = inv(S) mod Q save W in u2
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367 | */
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368 | if ((BN_mod_inverse(u2, s, dsa->params.q, ctx)) == NULL)
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369 | goto err;
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370 |
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371 | /* save M in u1 */
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372 | if (dgst_len > (i >> 3))
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373 | /*
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374 | * if the digest length is greater than the size of q use the
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375 | * BN_num_bits(dsa->q) leftmost bits of the digest, see fips 186-3,
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376 | * 4.2
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377 | */
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378 | dgst_len = (i >> 3);
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379 | if (BN_bin2bn(dgst, dgst_len, u1) == NULL)
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380 | goto err;
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381 |
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382 | /* u1 = M * w mod q */
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383 | if (!BN_mod_mul(u1, u1, u2, dsa->params.q, ctx))
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384 | goto err;
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385 |
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386 | /* u2 = r * w mod q */
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387 | if (!BN_mod_mul(u2, r, u2, dsa->params.q, ctx))
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388 | goto err;
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389 |
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390 | if (dsa->flags & DSA_FLAG_CACHE_MONT_P) {
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391 | mont = BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&dsa->method_mont_p,
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392 | dsa->lock, dsa->params.p, ctx);
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393 | if (!mont)
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394 | goto err;
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395 | }
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396 |
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397 | if (dsa->meth->dsa_mod_exp != NULL) {
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398 | if (!dsa->meth->dsa_mod_exp(dsa, t1, dsa->params.g, u1, dsa->pub_key, u2,
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399 | dsa->params.p, ctx, mont))
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400 | goto err;
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401 | } else {
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402 | if (!BN_mod_exp2_mont(t1, dsa->params.g, u1, dsa->pub_key, u2,
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403 | dsa->params.p, ctx, mont))
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404 | goto err;
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405 | }
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406 |
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407 | /* let u1 = u1 mod q */
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408 | if (!BN_mod(u1, t1, dsa->params.q, ctx))
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409 | goto err;
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410 |
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411 | /*
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412 | * V is now in u1. If the signature is correct, it will be equal to R.
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413 | */
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414 | ret = (BN_ucmp(u1, r) == 0);
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415 |
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416 | err:
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417 | if (ret < 0)
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418 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DSA, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
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419 | BN_CTX_free(ctx);
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420 | BN_free(u1);
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421 | BN_free(u2);
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422 | BN_free(t1);
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423 | return ret;
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424 | }
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425 |
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426 | static int dsa_init(DSA *dsa)
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427 | {
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428 | dsa->flags |= DSA_FLAG_CACHE_MONT_P;
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429 | ossl_ffc_params_init(&dsa->params);
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430 | dsa->dirty_cnt++;
|
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431 | return 1;
|
---|
432 | }
|
---|
433 |
|
---|
434 | static int dsa_finish(DSA *dsa)
|
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435 | {
|
---|
436 | BN_MONT_CTX_free(dsa->method_mont_p);
|
---|
437 | return 1;
|
---|
438 | }
|
---|
439 |
|
---|
440 | /*
|
---|
441 | * Compute the inverse of k modulo q.
|
---|
442 | * Since q is prime, Fermat's Little Theorem applies, which reduces this to
|
---|
443 | * mod-exp operation. Both the exponent and modulus are public information
|
---|
444 | * so a mod-exp that doesn't leak the base is sufficient. A newly allocated
|
---|
445 | * BIGNUM is returned which the caller must free.
|
---|
446 | */
|
---|
447 | static BIGNUM *dsa_mod_inverse_fermat(const BIGNUM *k, const BIGNUM *q,
|
---|
448 | BN_CTX *ctx)
|
---|
449 | {
|
---|
450 | BIGNUM *res = NULL;
|
---|
451 | BIGNUM *r, *e;
|
---|
452 |
|
---|
453 | if ((r = BN_new()) == NULL)
|
---|
454 | return NULL;
|
---|
455 |
|
---|
456 | BN_CTX_start(ctx);
|
---|
457 | if ((e = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) != NULL
|
---|
458 | && BN_set_word(r, 2)
|
---|
459 | && BN_sub(e, q, r)
|
---|
460 | && BN_mod_exp_mont(r, k, e, q, ctx, NULL))
|
---|
461 | res = r;
|
---|
462 | else
|
---|
463 | BN_free(r);
|
---|
464 | BN_CTX_end(ctx);
|
---|
465 | return res;
|
---|
466 | }
|
---|